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 RELIGIOUS INTERNATIONALISM: 
THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL TILLICH 
Matthew Lon Weaver, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
The purpose of this study is to assemble and assess the ethics of war and peace in the writings of 
Paul Tillich. It proceeds chronologically, sketching the evolution of Tillich’s thought from the 
period of his World War One chaplaincy in the German Imperial Army through the time of the 
Cold War, when he was one of the most prominent Protestant theologians in the United States. 
The material for this study includes two hundred seventy-five primary sources and nearly two 
hundred secondary sources. Tillich’s corpus ranges from lectures and occasional articles to 
theological treatises, from political and social theory to sermons and radio addresses, from 
systematic theology to philosophy of history. Chapter one analyzes Tillich’s theological roots 
and his chaplaincy sermons as the starting point for his thoughts on power, nation, and 
nationalism. Chapter two examines his post war turn to socialist thought and his participation in 
religious socialism, fueling his cultural analyses and culminating in his forced emigration under 
Hitler. Chapter three probes the transitional, American inter war period of Tillich’s work, giving 
special attention to his self-described boundary perspective as well as the one treatise he wrote 
on religion and international affairs. Chapter four is devoted to his Voice of America speeches, 
written and broadcasted into his former homeland during World War Two. Chapter five covers 
the same Second World War period, giving special attention to Tillich’s message to his English-
speaking audience and emphasizing social and world reconstruction. Chapter six turns to the 
Cold War period and Tillich’s apparently lessening interest in political and social theory and 
interpretation of history, but his simultaneous commitment to paths toward personhood in an 
internationally bipolar world.  The concluding seventh chapter assembles Tillich’s ethics of war 
and peace as an ethic of religious internationalism. It assesses the ethic, offering suggestions for 
adjustments intended to give it more universal significance. The study concludes that Tillich’s 
thought has provocative contributions to make to current debates regarding civilizational 
conflict, economics and international justice, trade and globalization, the defense of unprotected 
minorities, and immigration policy. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 TILLICH AS RELIGIOUS INTERNATIONALIST 
Religious internationalism seems to be a contradiction in terms. If Paul Tillich is correct that 
religion has to do with that which concerns us ultimately, it could be argued that politics rooted 
in religion exalts a particular concern for purposes of power. The logical result would be the 
dominance of provincialism and nationalism over universalism and internationalism. This would 
be consistent with the picture painted by Samuel Huntington in his description of civilizational 
identity based in religion as the basis for conflict in the twenty-first century.1 Such a view would 
give deterministic import to the Taliban of Afghanistan and the Christian fundamentalism of the 
United States, for example. 
Yet, in the evolution of Tillich’s thought one sees the opposite trend. For Tillich, the 
outward forms of cultic practice, doctrinal formulation, and ethical discourse were religion in a 
penultimate sense. They are the result of humanity’s capacity for transcendence and depth, two 
terms which Tillich used to understand the religious dimension of human beings. However, to 
limit the understanding of religion to these phenomena results in a truncated transcendence, a 
“rising above” that has neither risen to the height of “being itself” nor plunged to the depths of 
the “ground of being”, Tillich’s phrases for the goals of true religion. His solution is a 
                                                 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49; and Samuel 
P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
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formulation of religion as one’s ultimate concern that perpetually fends off penultimate truth 
claims, ethical norms, and political positions in their struggle to claim ultimacy. Religion in this 
second sense must constantly correct the idolatrous arrogance of religion in the first sense and 
the politics arising from it. Idolatrous, particularistic religion tends to sacralize the local and 
nationalistic. Transcending and depth-penetrating religion enters into existence with unrelenting 
questioning: this became Tillich’s modus operandi. It drives toward the broadest, most 
international, most universal perspective. It sees particularism, provincialism and nationalism as 
ignorant and absurd. Contrary to the instincts of twenty-first century popular religious culture, 
the oxymoron for Tillichian thought is religious nationalism, not religious internationalism. 
Although he knew that the particularistic bent was dominant, he certainly came to see it as 
inaccurate. Therefore, it is sound to pursue his ethics of war and peace as the practice of religious 
internationalism. 
1.2 THE STATE OF THE DISCUSSION 
The theory of religious internationalism constructed in this work is part of the broader fabric of 
Tillich’s political philosophy. This philosophy directed Tillich’s thoughts and interests to topics 
ranging from general political theory to ethics, from theology of culture to Marxism, economic 
justice and religious socialism, from World War I and nationalism to World War II projects in 
collaboration with the Voice of America and the Council for a Democratic Germany, and from 
inter religious dialogue to religion’s relationship to the live issues of every period. A significant 
body of secondary literature gives consideration to these areas of Tillich’s work. 
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Tillich’s general political theory inspired a dissertation by Louis C. Midgely and articles 
by Guy Hammond, Theodore Runyon, and Ronald Stone. Midgely has considered the possibility 
that Tillich’s self-proclaimed existentialist analysis of politics is, in fact, essentialist, making it 
difficult to verify the norms derived from his ontological approach.2 Hammond has discussed 
Tillich’s and Horkheimer’s argument that individuals with developed consciences are required to 
fend off fascism.3 Runyon has argued that Tillich was a conservative revolutionary, accepting 
the inevitability of revolution, but seeking positive consequences of it.4 Stone has described the 
sometimes complicated relationship between Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr at Union Theological 
Seminary as they took their different paths in voicing their convictions on social, governmental 
policies.5 He has also pointed to the prophetic tradition as the unifying theme in what he has 
described as a (Hans) Morgenthau-(Reinhold) Niebuhr-Tillich school of thought on the idea of 
power.6
The Tillichian approach to ethics led to dissertations by Oscar Remick and Nicholas 
Piediscalzi and to shorter pieces by Paul Ramsey, Melvin Watson, Joseph Fletcher, Gert 
Hummel, Jonathan Rothchild, John Carey, Terence O’Keeffe, J. Mark Thomas, David Novak, 
and Konrad Glöckner. Remick has argued for the presence of a theory of value in Tillich’s 
thought rooted in his idealism.7 Piediscalzi has compared and contrasted the thinking of Tillich 
                                                 
2 Louis C. Midgley, “Politics and Ultimate Concern: The Normative Political Philosophy of Paul Tillich” (Ph.D. 
thesis, Brown University, 1965). 
3 Guy B. Hammond, “Why Did Westerners Become Fascists? Fromm, Tillich, and Horkheimer on Character 
Types,” Meeting Papers: North American Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1989): 8-12. 
4 Theodore Runyon, “Tillich’s Understanding of Revolution,” in Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich’s 
Engagement with Modern Culture, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1984), 267-280. 
5 Ronald Stone, “Tillich and Niebuhr as Allied Public Theologians,” Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich 
Society XXXII, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 3-7. 
6 Ronald Stone, “Ontology of Power in Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Tillich,” Newsletter of the North American Paul 
Tillich Society XXVIII, #2 (Spring 2002): 4-14. 
7 Oscar E. Remick, “Value in the Thought of Paul Tillich” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1966). 
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with that of Erik Erikson on “the origin and nature of morality and ethics”.8 Ramsey interpreted 
Tillich’s ethics as one in which love transforms natural justice.9 Watson described the nature of 
Tillich’s social ethics as based on concrete decisions in real-life contexts, rather than a series of 
principles.10 Fletcher saw Tillich’s relativizing of tradition and the call for courageous decision 
in the light of context as a negation of the law.11 Hummel argued that Tillich’s dialectic between 
Christian message and concrete situation remained a valid way to face emerging ethical issues.12  
Rothchild has argued for the presence of a participation-transcendence dynamic within 
Tillich’s thought which embodies his tension between moral imperative and concrete decision.13 
Carey has written of Tillich’s ethics as one of self-realization laden with moral ambiguity.14 
O’Keeffe has structured Tillich’s ethics around the concepts of law and community.15 Thomas 
has rooted Tillich’s theonomous social ethics in classical Greek thought.16 David Novak has 
used analytical philosopher William Frankena to consider the legitimacy of Tillich’s argument 
for theonomy, arguing that Tillich combines Hume’s emphasis on the experiential and Kant’s 
                                                 
8 Nicholas Piediscalzi, “Paul Tillich and Erik H. Erikson on the Origin and Nature of Morality and Ethics” (Ph.D. 
diss., Boston University, 1965). 
9 Paul Ramsey, Nine Modern Moralists (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962). 
10 Melvin Watson, “The Social Thought of Paul Tillich,” The Journal of Religious Thought 10, no. 1 (Autumn-
Winter 1952-53): 5-17. 
11 Joseph Fletcher, “Tillich and Ethics: The Negation of Law,” Pastoral Psychology, vol. 19 (February, 1968): 33-
40. 
12 Gert Hummel, “Morality and Beyond: Anthropology and New Ethics in Tomorrow’s Information Society,” in 
Being and Doing: Paul Tillich as Ethicist, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1987), 125-154. 
13 Jonathan Rothchild, “Global Flows, Head Scarves, and Finite Freedom: Tillich on Globalization,” Bulletin of the 
North American Paul Tillich Society XXXI, no.  3 (Summer 2005): 16-21. 
14 John J. Carey, “Morality and Beyond: Tillich’s Ethics in Life and Death,” in Tillich Studies: 1975, ed. John J. 
Carey (Chicago: The North American Paul Tillich Society, 1975), 104-115. 
15 Terence M. O’Keeffe, “Ethics and the Realm of Praxis,” in Being and Doing: Paul Tillich as Ethicist, ed. John J. 
Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1987), 87-105. 
16 J. Mark Thomas, “Theonomous Social Ethics: Paul Tillich’s Neoclassical Interpretation of Justice,” in Being and 
Doing: Paul Tillich as Ethicist, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1987), 109-123. 
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emphasis on the moral in his ethical theory.17 Glöckner interprets Tillich’s ethics as expressing 
the notion that the end or goal of creation—or the creative act—is the existence of personhood.18
The idea of a theology of culture in Tillich’s work was the stimulus for books by James 
Luther Adams, Eberhard Amelung, and Raymond F. Bulman, and essays by Theodore M. 
Greene, Theodor Siegfried, Langdon Gilkey, Peter Haigis, Paul G. Wiebe, Bulman, A. Arnold 
Wettstein, Jari Ristiniemi, Ronald Stone, Russell Manning, Kelton Cobb, and Victor Nuovo. 
Adams described Tillich’s philosophy of culture, science, and religion to interpret all spheres of 
cultural life through the lens of religion.19 Amelung analyzed Tillich’s thought to interpret 
Tillich’s well-known statement that “religion is the substance of culture, culture is the form of 
religion” to mean that religion brings the dimension of love into culture.20 Bulman has argued 
that Tillich’s theology of culture offers a humanistic theology which presents a viable alternative 
to secular humanism.21 Greene wrote of Tillich’ argument that the appropriate relationship to 
culture was one combining involvement with objectivity.22 Siegfried wrote of the significance of 
Tillich’s interpretation of culture in terms of his criticism of culture as such in distinction from 
criticism of specific elements of cultural life.23 Gilkey used Tillich’s approach to describe the 
role of the theologian as a creative interpreter of culture, fully connected to the context of his or 
                                                 
17 David Novak, “Theonomous Ethics: A Defense and A Critique of Tillich,” Soundings LXIX (1986): 436-63. 
18 Konrad Glöckner, „Personenhaftes Sein als Telos der Schöpfung. Eine Darstellung der Theologie Tillichs aus der 
Perspektive seiner Ethik,“ in Tillich Journal: Interpretieren—Vergleichen—Kritisieren—Weiterentwickeln I (1997): 
74-9. 
19 James Luther Adams, Paul Tillich’s Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 
1965). 
20 Eberhard Amelung, Die Gestalt der Liebe: Paul Tillichs Theologie der Kultur (Gerd Mohn: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1972). 
21 Raymond F. Bulman, A Blueprint for Humanity: Paul Tillich’s Theology of Culture (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell 
University Press, 1981). 
22 Theodore M. Greene, “Paul Tillich and Our Secular Culture,” in The Theology of Paul Tillich, eds. Charles W. 
Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), 50-66. 
23 Theodor Siegfried, “The Significance of Paul Tillich’s Theology for the German Situation,” in The Theology of 
Paul Tillich, eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), 68-83. 
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her time.24 Haigis has interpreted Tillich’s theology of culture as a necessary bridge over a 
glaring gap between philosophy and theology, calling it the Protestant interpretation of cultural 
realities.25 Wiebe has argued for the seminal importance of Tillich’s 1923 book, The System of 
the Sciences, for his later work and for understanding theology’s place in the academy.26 Bulman 
has argued for the centrality of Tillich’s notion of theonomy in Tillich’s interpretation of 
technological society through his theology of culture.27 Wettstein has assessed whether Tillich’s 
theology of culture is helpful in interpreting what he terms the supercultural context of modern 
technological civilization.28 Ristiniemi has argued that Tillich’s message to the technological age 
is to reject objectification and to embrace community with all of life: people, animals, and 
things.29 Stone has argued that Tillich’s method of correlation is the appropriate way to relate 
politics to culture.30 Manning has written of the fruitfulness of Tillich’s theology of culture in the 
postcolonial era because of its simultaneous openness to new cultural formulations and refusal to 
be equated with any formulations.31 Cobb has argued that Tillich’s theology of culture defers to 
                                                 
24 Langdon Gilkey, “The Role of the Theologian in Contemporary Society,” in The Thought of Paul Tillich, eds. 
James Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Roger Lincoln Shinn (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 330-350. 
25 Peter Haigis, “Tillich’s Early Writings in Social Philosophy and Social Ethics within the Context of His Theology 
of Culture,” North American Paul Tillich Society Newsletter XXVI, #1 (Winter 2000): 21-30. 
26 Paul G. Wiebe, “The Significance of The System of the Sciences within Tillich’s Thought,” in Tillich Studies: 
1975, ed. John J. Carey (Chicago: The North American Paul Tillich Society, 1975), 76-87. 
27 Raymond F. Bulman, “Theonomy and Technology: A Study in Tillich’s Theology of Culture,” in Kairos and 
Logos: Studies in the Roots and Implications of Tillich’s Theology, ed. John J. Carey (The North American Paul 
Tillich Society, 1978. New Edition, Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1984), 213-233. 
28 A. Arnold Wettstein, “Re-Viewing Tillich in a Technological Culture,” in Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in 
Paul Tillich’s Engagement with Modern Culture, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1984), 
113-133. 
29 Jari Ristiniemi, “Politics of Soul in a Changing Society: Tillich’s Political Pathos of the 1920's in Light of 
Nietzsche’s Moral Philosophy,” Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society XXXI, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 9-
15. 
30 Ronald H. Stone, “The Correlation of Politics and Culture in Paul Tillich’s Thought” Soundings LXIX (1986): 
499-511. 
31 Russell Manning, “Tillich’s Theology of Culture after Postcolonialism,” Newsletter of the North American Paul 
Tillich Society XXVIII, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 25-32. 
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cultural elitism to the neglect of the substance present in popular culture.32 Nuovo has interpreted 
Tillich’s theology of culture as a contradictory and, therefore, self-defeating project.33
Tillich’s engagement with Marx, his struggle for economic justice, and his perspectives 
on religious socialism prompted books by Brian Donnelly, John R. Stumme, and Ronald Stone, a 
dissertation by Eberhard Amelung, as well as chapters and articles by James V. Fisher, Marion 
Enzmann, Stone, Anna L. Peterson, John Carey, Roger Shinn, Dennis P. McCann, Terence 
O’Keeffe, Walter Weisskopf, Walter F. Bense, George H. Williams, Langdon Gilkey, Eduard 
Heimann, Charles C. West, James W. Champion, and Clark A. Kucheman. Donnelly has argued 
that Marx remained both an explicit and an implicit presence in the thought of the later Tillich.34  
Stumme has written of theological drive behind Tillich’s practice of religious socialism.35 
Stone has written of the broad range of social and political issues to which Tillich applied his 
religious socialism during the course of his life.36 Amelung has argued that the Kairos Circle 
took the distortive, ideological moves of making the economy the Unconditional for modern 
industrial society, separating the understanding of society from its legal system, and masking the 
reality that modern industrial society has created an ambiguous mixture of greater freedom and 
greater dehumanization.37 Fisher has examined the beginnings of Tillich’s political writing, in 
                                                 
32 Kelton Cobb, “Expanding the Stock of Sources in Tillich’s Theology of Culture,” Meeting Papers: North 
American Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1992): 13-23. cf. Kelton Cobb, “Reconsidering the Status of Popular Culture in 
Tillich’s Theology of Culture,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion LXIII, no.1 (Spring 1995): 53-85. 
33 Victor Nuovo, Visionary Science: A Translation of Tillich’s “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture” with an 
Interpretive Essay (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1987). 
34 Brian Donnelly, The Socialist Emigre: Marxism and the Later Tillich (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 
2003). John Carey has also written of the continuing interest of Tillich in Marx and Marxism until the end of his life. 
John J. Carey, “Tillich, Marx, and the Interpretation of History,” Meeting Papers: North American Paul Tillich 
Society (Nov. 1989): 1-7. 
35 John R. Stumme, Socialism in Theological Perspective: A Study of Paul Tillich, 1918-1933 (Missoula, Montana: 
Scholars Press, 1978). 
36 Ronald H. Stone, Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986). 
37 Eberhard A. Amelung, “Religious Socialism as Ideology: A Study of the Kairos Circle in Germany between 1919 
and 1933” (Th.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1962). 
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conjunction with his friend, Carl Richard Wegener.38 He has also argued that Tillich ultimately 
argued for a socialism that accepted no separation of the sacred from the secular.39 Enzmann has 
argued that the Weimar period manifests Tillich’s legitimization of politics as a theological 
theme.40 Stone has interpreted Tillich’s dialectical relation to socialism as an “essential”—rather 
than an ephemeral—part of his thought41 and has examined the nature of the Kairos Circle as 
one not dominated by Tillich (following Stumme and contra Amelung), but one in which theistic 
and atheistic voices contributed to discussions about the direction of the new German (Weimar) 
republic.42 Peterson has interpreted Tillich’s political thought as a general defense of socialism.43  
Carey has written that Tillich’s interest in Marx is related to Tillich’s own interest in the 
interpretation of history.44 Shinn has written of Tillich’s religious socialism as a combination of 
interpreting and changing civilization, following Marx’s counsel that philosophers persistently 
do the former to the neglect of the latter.45 McCann has argued that Tillich’s religious socialism 
was a creative synthesis based in existential understanding of religion, expressed in his unique 
religious language.46 Stone has argued that Tillich’s approaches to such topics as utopianism, 
antisemitism, and economics was influenced by his relationship to the Frankfurt School and its 
                                                 
38 James V. Fisher, “The Politicizing of Paul Tillich: The First Phase,” in Tillich Studies: 1975, ed. John J. Carey 
(Chicago: The North American Paul Tillich Society, 1975), 27-38. 
39 James V. Fisher, “Review Essay: The Socialist Decision,” Newsletter of the North American Paul Tillich Society 
III, #1 (Dec. 1977): 21-27. 
40 Marion Enzmann, „Die politischen Ideen Paul Tillichs in der Weimarer Republik,“ Tillich Journal: 
Interpretieren—Vergleichen—Kritisieren—Weiterentwickeln I (1997): 68-71. 
41 Ronald H. Stone, “Christian Ethics and the Socialist Vision of Paul Tillich,” in Tillich Studies: 1975, ed. John J. 
Carey (Chicago: The North American Paul Tillich Society, 1975), 51-62. 
42 Ronald H. Stone, “Kairos Circle,” Meeting Papers: North American Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1989): 23-27. 
43 Peterson, Anna L., “Paul Tillich’s Political Ethics: In Defense of Socialism,” Meeting Papers: North American 
Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1992): 38-49. 
44 John J. Carey, “Tillich, Marx and the Interpretation of History: A Prototype of a Marxist-Christian Dialogue,” The 
St. Luke’s Journal of Theology XIV, #1 (January 1971): 3-15. 
45 Roger L. Shinn, “Tillich as Interpreter and Disturber of Contemporary Civilization,” in The Thought of Paul 
Tillich, eds. James Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Roger Lincoln Shinn (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 
1985), 44-62. 
46 Dennis P. McCann, “Tillich’s Religious Socialism: ‘Creative Synthesis’ or Personal Statement?” in The Thought 
of Paul Tillich, eds. James Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Roger Lincoln Shinn (San Francisco: Harper and 
Row, 1985), 81-101. 
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critical-theoretical treatments of society and psychology.47 O’Keeffe has argued that while 
Tillich had friendships and associations with members of the Frankfurt School, there seems to 
have been no mutual influence on one another’s thinking.48 Weisskopf has described Tillich’s 
The Socialist Decision as a dialectical project with a double tripartite structure: it involves the 
historical, psychological and ontological dimensions through which it assembles the interplay of 
the romantic, bourgeois and socialist principles.49 Bense has described the tensions between 
Tillich and his former friend and colleague, Emanuel Hirsch, specifically over Hirsch’s distortion 
of Tillich’s kairos doctrine into a tool for endorsing racist, nationalism.50 Williams wrote of 
Tillich’s call for socialists and Christians to seek that which united them as World War II 
arose.51 Gilkey wrote of the centrality of the doctrine of kairos in Tillich’s writings of the 1920s 
and 1930s, which was never surrendered but which gradually receded as Tillich’s optimism for 
the post World War II world declined.52 Heimann argued that Tillich underestimated the 
dehumanizing end of the dialectic in Marxist theory.53 West has suggested that Tillich’s religious 
socialism was unrealistic about the capacity of the church to shape communism, failing to see the 
impossibility of a dialogue with communism that could have integrity.54 Champion has 
examined the connections between Tillich’s German and American periods, noting the often 
                                                 
47 Ronald Stone, “Tillich’s Critical Use of Marx and Freud in the Social Context of the Frankfort School,” Union 
Seminary Quarterly Review XXXIII, no. 1 (Fall 1977): 3-9. 
48 Terence O’Keeffe, “Tillich and the Frankfurt School,” in Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich’s 
Engagement with Modern Culture, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1984), 67-87. 
49 Walter A. Weisskopf, “Tillich and the Crisis of the West,” in The Thought of Paul Tillich, eds. James Luther 
Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Roger Lincoln Shinn (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 63-80. 
50 Walter F. Bense, “Tillich’s Kairos and Hitler’s Seizure of Power: The Tillich-Hirsch Exchange of 1934-35,” in 
Tillich Studies: 1975, ed. John J. Carey (Chicago: The North American Paul Tillich Society, 1975), 39-50. 
51 George H. Williams, “Priest, Prophet and Proletariat: A Study in the Theology of Paul Tillich,” The Journal of 
Liberal Religion (Chicago) 1 (Winter, 1940): 25-37. 
52 Langdon Gilkey, “Tillich’s Early Political Writings,” in Gilkey on Tillich (New York: Crossroad, 1990), 3-22. 
53 Eduard Heimann, “Tillich’s Doctrine of Religious Socialism,” in The Theology of Paul Tillich, eds. Charles W. 
Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), 312-325. 
54 Charles C. West, Communism and the Theologians (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958). 
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missed presence of political and social concerns in his later works.55 Kucheman has examined 
whether Tillich adequately argues the case for socialism as the preferable embodiment of justice 
and has questioned whether the economic divisions present in the twentieth century were 
necessary consequences of capitalism.56
The chaplaincy in which Tillich served during World War I gave rise to articles by 
Donald Arther, Erdmann Sturm, and Ronald MacLennan. Arther has described the reality of life 
at the front which served as the context of Tillich’s thinking, writing, and pastoring during World 
War I.57 Sturm has described Tillich’s first decade of preaching to be a combination of pastoral 
care and apologetics toward working class congregations, military units, and gatherings of the 
cultured class.58 He also has argued that Tillich’s World War I chaplaincy sermons amounted to 
a nationalistic war theology out of touch with the brutal realities of the war.59 MacLennan has 
described the complexity of Tillich’s thinking in the context of World War I, arguing that an 
inner turmoil and reflection was occurring which was deeper than that revealed in his public 
work.60
                                                 
55 James W. Champion, “Tillich and the Frankfurt School: Parallels and Differences in Prophetic Criticism,” 
Soundings LXIX (1986): 512-30. 
56 Clark A. Kucheman, “Professor Tillich: Justice and the Economic Order,” The Journal of Religion XLVI, no. 1, 
part II (January 1966): 165-183. 
57 Donald Arther, “Paul Tillich as a Military Chaplain,” North American Paul Tillich Society Newsletter XXVI, #3 
(Summer 2000): 4-12. 
58 Erdmann Sturm, „Zwischen Apologetik und Seelsorge: Paul Tillichs frühe Predigten (1908-1918)," in 
Spurensuche: Lebens- und Denkwege Paul Tillichs, Tillich-Studien, Band 5, Hrsg. Ilona Nord and Yorick Spiegel 
(Münster, Lit Verlag, 2001), 85-104. This first appeared as “Between Apologetics and Pastoral Care: Paul Tillich’s 
Early Sermons (1908-1918), North American Paul Tillich Society Newsletter XXVI,  #1 (Winter 2000): 7-20. cf. 
Peter Haigis, „Erdmann Sturm (Hg): Ergänzung- und Nachlaßbäde zu den Gesammelten Werken Paul Tillichs, Bd. 
7 Frühe Predigten (1909-1918), Berlin, New York, 1994,“ Tillich Journal: Interpretieren—Vergleichen—
Kritisieren—Weiterentwickeln I (1997): 17-19. 
59 Erdmann Sturm, “‘Holy Love Claims Life and Limb’: Paul Tillich’s War Theology (1914-1918),” Zeitschrift für 
neuere Theologiegeschichte II (1994): 60-84. cf. Peter Haigis, „Erdmann Sturm (Hg): ,Holy Love Claims Life and 
Limb. Paul Tillich’s War Theology (1914-1918),‘ Zeitschrift für neuere Theologiegeschichte, 1994, 60-84,“ Tillich 
Journal: Interpretieren—Vergleichen—Kritisieren—Weiterentwickeln I (1997): 52-6. 
60 Ronald MacLennan, “World War I and Paul Tillich: The Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Theology,” 
Unpublished paper delivered before the “Nineteenth Century Theology Group” (A90), American Academy of 
Religion, San Francisco (Nov. 23, 1997). 
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The phenomenon of nationalism as a destructive reality for Europe and a grave concern 
to Tillich generated books by Richard Gutteridge and Jack Forstman and articles by A. James 
Reimer and Jean Richard. Gutteridge has described the tragic and disappointing response of 
German Protestants to antisemitism from the end of the 19th century through the mid-twentieth 
century, descending to its lowest point during the Hitler years.61 Forstman has written of the 
theological and political tensions among the dominant theologians during the time of Nazi rule, 
among them tensions between Tillich and Karl Barth as well as Tillich and Emanuel Hirsch.62  
Reimer has questioned whether Tillich’s theonomous-cultural approach is as effective as 
Barth’s dogmatic-confessional approach in stimulating ethical behavior. 63 Richard has defended 
a national consciousness—versus nationalism—rooted in the thought of Tillich, Buber, Gandhi, 
and Grand’Maison.64
Tillich’s World War II presidency of the Council for a Democratic Germany occasioned 
a book by Petra Liebner.65 His speeches for the Voice of America and articles by Matthias 
Wolbold.66
 
                                                 
61 Richard Gutteridge, Open Thy Mouth for the Dumb! The German Evangelical Church and the Jews, 1879-1950 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976). 
62 Jack Forstman, Christian Faith in Dark Times: Theological Conflicts in the Shadow of Hitler (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992). 
63 A. James Reimer, “Tillich, Hirsch and the Confessing Church: On Issues Related to War and Peace,”  
Unpublished paper delivered before the “Issues in the Thought of Paul Tillich Group” (A220), American Academy 
of Religion, San Francisco (Nov. 24, 1997). 
64 Jean Richard, “The Question of Nationalism,” in Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the Spirit of Paul 
Tillich, eds. Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2001), 35-43. 
65 Petra Liebner, Paul Tillich und der Council for a Democratic Germany: 1933 bis 1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang, 2001). 
66 Matthias Wolbold, ‚‚Meine Deutschen Freunde!‘ Die politischen Rundfunkreden Tillichs während des Zweiten 
Weltkriegs," in Spurensuche: Lebens- und Denkwege Paul Tillichs, Tillich-Studien, Band 5, Hrsg. Ilona Nord and 
Yorick Spiegel (Münster, Lit Verlag, 2001), 183-l98. cf. „Rundfunkarbeit deutscher Exilanten in den USA. 
Hintergründe und Wirkung,“ in Tillich Journal: Interpretieren—Vergleichen—Kritisieren—Weiterentwickeln, 
4/2000, S. 131-136 and Matthias Wolbold, „Tillich als expressionistischer Propagandist? Eine Antwort auf die 
Vorwürfe Matthew Lon Weaver,“ Tillich Journal: Interpretieren—Vergleichen—Kritisieren—Weiterentwickeln, 
3/1999, S. 84-87. cf. Matthew Lon Weaver, “Paul Tillich and the Voice of America,” North American Paul Tillich 
Society Newsletter XXIV, #3 (Summer 1998): 19-29. 
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The inter religious interests of Tillich resulted in a book by Robison James and articles by 
Joseph Kitigawa, Claude Geffré, Marc Boss, Ruwan Palapathwala, David H. Nikkel, M. Thomas 
Thangaraj, Jörg Eickoff, Robert M. Price, Terence Thomas, Masao Abe, David Novak, Franklin 
Sherman, Glenn David Earley, Langdon Gilkey, Yoshinori Takeuchi, Taitetsu Unno, Jawad 
Ashr, and Basit Koshul. James has argued that Tillich’s approach to other religions was one of 
reciprocal inclusivism.67 Kitigawa has compared the contrasting approaches of Tillich and 
Hendrik Kraemer to encountering other religions.68 Geffré has argued that Tillich’s idea of faith 
as “ultimate concern” is the path for the effective encounter of other religions.69 Boss has argued 
for an understanding of inter religious relationships that are informed by context, respectful of 
particularities, but open to mutual transformation.70 Palapathwala has argued for an 
understanding of Tillich’s Systematic Theology that sees it as a springboard for constructing 
spirituality relevant to one’s time.71 Nikkel has examined the tension between Tillich’s 
Christocentrism and his acceptance of the inbreaking of revelation within other religions.72 
Thangaraj has argued that Tillich’s later thought moved from Christian apologetic theology to a 
tripodic dialogic theology using faith, religion and culture as a more sound basis for inter 
religious dialogue.73 Eickoff has argued that Tillich’s universal concept of revelation results in a 
                                                 
67 Robison B. James, Tillich and World Religions: Encountering Other Faiths Today (Macon, Ga.: Mercer 
University Press, 2003). 
68 Joseph Kitigawa, “Tillich, Kraemer, and the Encounter of Religions,” in The Thought of Paul Tillich, eds. James 
Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Roger Lincoln Shinn (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 197-217. 
69 Claude Geffré, “Paul Tillich and the Future of Inter religious Ecumenism,” in Paul Tillich: A New Catholic 
Assessment, eds. Raymond F.Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 268-
288. 
70 Marc Boss, “Religious Diversity: From Tillich to Lindbeck and Back,” in Religion in the New Millennium 
(Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2001), 177-195. 
71 Ruwan Palapathwala, “Beyond Christ and System: Paul Tillich and Spirituality in the Twenty-First Century,” in 
Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the Spirit of Paul Tillich, eds. Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. 
Parrella, (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2001), 205-219. 
72 David H. Nikkel, “Polarities in Tillich’s Thought on Revelation in the World Religions,” Newsletter of the North 
American Paul Tillich Society XXVI, #4 (Fall 2000): 2-6. 
73 M. Thomas Thangaraj, “Faith, Religion, and Culture: A Tripod for Inter religious Dialogue,” Meeting Papers: 
North American Paul Tillich Society (November 1991): 43-47. 
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conditional exclusivism that enables inter religious dialogue which avoids self-exaltation and 
opens the way to a more universal understanding of God.74 Price has argued that Tillich’s 
apparent Christocentrism can be overcome through his method of correlation, replacing the 
notion of the fragmentary nature of particular non-Christian revelations with the idea of localized 
revelations, one of which was Jesus as the Christ.75 Thomas has argued that Tillich’s return to an 
encounter with other world religions was an unstated kairos, an implied new boundary situation 
for his thinking, which had occurred too late in his life to reach full maturity.76 Abe has affirmed  
Tillich’s dynamic typology of inter religious interpretation, but has rejected Tillich’s 
embrace of Christ’s crucifixion as the criterion for the legitimacy of all religions as contradictory 
to his dynamic typology.77 Novak has argued that Buber taught Tillich, but that modern Judaism 
can also be taught by Tillich.78 Sherman has argued for a correlation between Tillich’s 
correlational method and the existential situation of Jewish life and thought in modern times.79 
                                                 
74 Jörg Eickoff, “The New Being in Christ: Tillich’s Universal Concept of Revelation as a Contribution to Inter-
Religious Encounter in the Pluralistic Situation of Post-Modernity,” Newsletter of the North American Paul Tillich 
Society XXVIII, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 18-23. 
75 Robert M. Price, “Tillich on Christian Faith and the Plurality of World Religions,” Bulletin of the North American 
Paul Tillich Society XXX, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 19-25. 
76 Terence Thomas, “On Another Boundary: Tillich’s Encounter with World Religions,” in Theonomy and 
Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich’s Engagement with Modern Culture, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer 
University Press, 1984), 193-211. 
77 Masao Abe, “A Buddhist View of ‘The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic  Theologian,’” 
Meeting Papers: North American Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1988): 1-8. cf. Terence Thomas, “Response to Masao 
Abe’s ‘A Buddhist View of “The Significance of the History of  Religions for the Systematic Theologian,”’” 
Meeting Papers: North American Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1988): 9-13. 
78 Novak, David, “Tillich and Buber,” Meeting Papers: North American Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1990): 9-16. cf. 
Marc Krell, “Constructing a Public Theology: Tillich’s and Buber’s Movement Beyond Protestant and Jewish 
Boundaries in Weimar Germany,” Unpublished Paper delivered before the “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, 
and Culture Group” (A19-124), American Academy of Religion, Philadelphia (November 19, 2005); and Richard A. 
Falk, Martin Buber and Paul Tillich’s Radical Politics and Religion (New York: National Council of Protestant 
Episcopal Churches, 1961). 
79 Franklin Sherman, “Tillich’s Method of Correlation: Some Resonances in Jewish Thought,” Meeting Papers: 
North American Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1990): 17-20. cf. Albert H. Friedlander, “Tillich and Jewish Thought,” in 
The Thought of Paul Tillich, eds. James Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Roger Lincoln Shinn (San Francisco: 
Harper and Row, 1985), 175-196. Guy Hammond has used the thought Martin Buber as a mediating vehicle for a 
discussion of the nature of human relationships in the thought of Tillich and Emmanuel Levinas. Guy B. Hammond, 
“The Primacy of Ethics: Relationality in Buber, Tillich, and Levinas,” Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich 
Society XXX, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 24-30. 
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Earley argued that a more vigorous application of the Protestant principle by Tillich to 
Christianity itself, a more accurate understanding of Judaism, and an attentiveness to Judaism’s 
own questions are necessary correctives to Tillich’s understanding of Judaism.80 Gilkey 
examined the relationship of Tillich’s openness to nonbeing as an aspect of God corresponding 
to Buddhist notions of Nothingness.81 Takeuchi argued that Tillich’s comments on being, 
nonbeing, and being-itself were the basis for useful conversations with Buddhism.82 Unno has 
argued that Tillich’s understanding of Buddhism was largely restricted to Zen Buddhism, leading 
Tillich to neglect the understanding of compassion in Shin Buddhism which is analogous to that 
taught within Christianity.83 Ashr has used Tillich’s thought in efforts to begin the construction 
of a theologically rooted Islamic anthropology.84 Koshul has found that Tillich’s thought 
resonates with the idea of the ambiguity of the divine found in Islamic teaching.85
Tillich’s existentialist makeup led to his engagement with his times, evoking a book by 
Bernard Martin and writings on a full range of issues by Lubomir Mirejovsky, Ronald Stone, 
John B. Lounibos, Jean Richard, Luis G. Pedraja, H. Frederick Reisz, Jr., Anthony A. Akinwale, 
José Míguez Bonino, Mary Ann Stenger, Sharon Burch, Tabea Rösler, Linda Moody, Judith 
Plaskow, Peter Slater, Anne Marie Reijnen, and Guy Hammond. Martin has argued that the 
                                                 
80 Glenn David Earley, “An ‘Everlasting Conversation’: Judaism in the Life and Thought of Paul Tillich” (Ph.D. 
diss., Temple University 1983). cf. Glenn D. Earley, “Tillich and Judaism: An Analysis of the ‘Jewish Question,’” in 
Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich’s Engagement with Modern Culture, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, 
Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1984), 267-280. 
81 Langdon Gilkey, “Tillich and the Kyoto School,” Meeting Papers: North American Paul Tillich Society (Dec. 
1987): 1-10. 
82 Yoshinori Takeuchi, “Buddhism and Existentialism: The Dialogue between Oriental and Occidental Thought,” in 
Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor  of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht, (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 
291-318. 
83 Taitetsu Unno, “Compassion in Buddhist Spirituality,” in Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the Spirit 
of Paul Tillich, eds. Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella, (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2001), 
165-176. 
84 Jawad Ashr, “Paul Tillich and the Reconstruction of Sin and Salvation in Islamic Theological Anthropology,” 
Newsletter of the North American Paul Tillich Society XXIX, #1 (Winter 2003): 27-42. 
85 Basit Koshul, “The Divine, the Demonic, and the Ninety-Nine Names of Allah: Tillich’s Idea of the ‘Holy’ and 
the Qur’anic Narrative,” Newsletter of the North American Paul Tillich Society XXIX, #1 (Winter 2003): 42-48. 
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existentialist characteristic of Tillich’s theological approach derives from his commitment to 
“conversing” with the philosophical and cultural currents of his time rather than the exposition of 
traditional Christian theological dogma.86 Mirejovsky has argued that from the end of World 
War I to the end of his life, Tillich worked as a philosopher of peace.87 Stone has argued that 
while Tillich was no pacifist, his contributions to the cause of peace involved actions and 
policies that confronted the root causes of war and, therefore, laid the groundwork for peace.88 
John B. Lounibos has examined Tillich’s understanding of freedom, rooted in his debt to 
Schelling, as one of hope pursuing liberation.89 Richard has argued that Tillich’s religious 
socialist thought and his life-experience in the early decades of the twentieth century possess 
helpful support to theologies of liberation.90 Pedraja has argued that Tillich’s doctrine of the 
inbreaking of the divine into culture and his serious consideration of the cultural location of any 
given theology make him a fertile partner in discussions of liberation theology.91 Reisz has 
argued that Tillich’s thought can provide the basis for a theology of “liberating” which 
transcends the apparent impasse between Tillich’s ontological approach and liberation theology’s 
commitment to praxis.92 Akinwale argues that Tillich’s method of correlation cultivates a 
                                                 
86 Bernard Martin, The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963). 
87 Lubomir Mirejovsky, “Peace Issues in the Work of Paul Tillich,” North American Paul Tillich Society Newsletter 
XIV, #2 (April 1988): 5-10. 
88 Stone, Ronald H., “Paul Tillich on Peace,” Meeting Papers: North American Paul Tillich Society (Nov. 1989): 17-
22. 
89 John B. Lounibos, “Paul Tillich’s Structures of Liberation,” in Tillich Studies: 1975, ed. John J. Carey (Chicago: 
The North American Paul Tillich Society, 1975), 63-74. 
90 Jean Richard, “The Socialist Tillich and Liberation Theology,” in Paul Tillich: A New Catholic Assessment, eds. 
Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 148-173. 
91 Luis G. Pedraja, “Tillich’s Theology of Culture and Hispanic Theology,” Newsletter of the North American Paul 
Tillich Society XXV, #3 (Summer 1999): 2-10. 
92 H. Frederick Reisz, Jr., “Liberation Theology of Culture: A Tillichian Perspective,” in Kairos and Logos: Studies 
in the Roots and Implications of Tillich’s Theology, ed. John J. Carey, (The North American Paul Tillich Society, 
1978. New Edition: Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1984), 271-282. 
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pluralism that makes him a helpful partner in addressing the concerns of African theologians.93 
Bonino has seen in Tillich a helpful source for Latin American liberation thought, specifically 
with regard to posing socialism as an option, reflecting critically on the types of socialist options, 
and giving consideration to the relationship of religion to socialism.94 Stone has drawn a parallel 
between the religious socialism of Tillich and the liberation theology of Gustavo Gutierrez in 
their use of Marx as a basis for indigenous, existential social thought.95 Stenger has argued that 
Tillich’s movement beyond traditional theological language, his ontological approach to 
theology, the dynamics between being and nonbeing, and his stand against idolatry can serve as 
supports for feminist thought.96 Burch has argued for a parallel between the feminist 
understanding of identity as the creative negotiation of life’s experiences and Tillich’s theology 
of culture as the perspective from which theology negotiates the broad range of cultural 
experiences.97 Rösler has argued that Tillich’s anthropology risks falling into a self-centeredness 
that can be corrected by feminist thinkers offering a more fully multidimensional understanding 
of existence.98 Moody argues that Tillich’s chief contribution to feminist liberation theology was 
                                                 
93 Anthony A. Akinwale, “Tillich’s Method of Correlation and the Concerns of African Theologians,” in Paul 
Tillich: A New Catholic Assessment, eds. Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella (Collegeville, MN: The 
Liturgical Press, 1994), 189-217. 
94 José Míguez Bonino, “Rereading Tillich in Latin America: From Religious Socialism to the Exile,” in Religion in 
the New Millennium: Theology in the Spirit of Paul Tillich, eds. Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella 
(Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2001), 19-33. 
95 Stone, Ronald H., “Paulus und Gustavo: Religious Socialism and Liberation Theology,” Meeting Papers: North 
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96 Mary Ann Stenger and Ronald H. Stone, Dialogues of Paul Tillich (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2002). 
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Catholic Assessment, eds. Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 
1994), 174-188. 
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the Spirit of Paul Tillich, eds. Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 
2001), 109-120. 
98 Tabea Rösler, “Anthropological Perspectives in Tillich’s Systematic Theology: A Constructive Framework in 
Dialogue with Feminist Process Theologies,” Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society XXXI, no. 3 
(Summer 2005): 33-41. cf.  Tabea Rösler, “‘You Never See with Eyes Only’: Reconfiguring Paul Tillich’s Concept 
of Personhood,” Unpublished Paper, November 2005 (to be published in a future issue of the Bulletin of the North 
American Paul Tillich Society). 
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his sense of the openness to new symbolic expressions for theological truths.99 Plaskow has 
argued that there is a conflict between Tillich’s understanding of personhood in terms of self-
actualization and his understanding of union with the ground of being as requiring the surrender 
of self.100 Slater has argued that the power of forgiveness in Tillich’s concept of creative justice 
has been manifested in everything from the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, to the cancellation of third world debt, to the willingness of a woman of color to 
forgive her white attackers.101  
Reijnen has formulated a Tillich-inspired criterion of just punishment as a basis for 
analyzing the state’s use of power in practicing capital punishment.102 Hammond has used 
Tillich’s theology of history to confront President George W. Bush’s self-understanding as a 
providentially-placed instrument for the promulgation of freedom.103 Stone has seen points in 
Tillich’s life in which he advocated resistance, leading Stone to advocate contemporary 
resistance to patterns of fundamentalism, greed, violence and domination.104
Thus, it can be said that dozens of scholars have explored the implications of Tillich’s 
political philosophy for a wide range of social and cultural issues. However, absent from this 
broad and varied secondary literature is a more comprehensive discussion of Tillich’s political  
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 philosophy as it relates to his ethic of war and peace. This dissertation is an effort to fill that 
void. 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
This dissertation tells the story of Tillich’s intellectual development into a religious 
internationalist. Chapter one begins the story, describing his intellectual heritage, pointing to his 
nationalistic roots in imperial Germany, and examining the sermons he penned as a chaplain in 
the German army during World War I. While Tillich was intellectually aware of both the 
centrality of power dynamics and of the necessity to transcend the particular, this chapter will 
show that Tillich remained, at least publicly, loyal to the nationalism  of Wilhelmine Germany. 
Chapter two will proceed with a description of Tillich’s awakening to the thought of Karl 
Marx soon after war’s end. Marx’s early thought influenced Tillich’s thinking to the end of his 
life, but it was during the inter war years that he first came under its influence. Economics 
became a significant factor in his interpretation of the politics among nations and remained 
central from this point forward. Tillich came to see economic structures as either liberating or 
oppressive forces in the lives of people. His sensitivity to trends in history—envisioned through 
the dialectical structure of history which Marx gleaned from Hegel—was another fruit of his 
engagement with Marxian thought: the notions of kairos (ripened or fulfilled time) and the 
demonic (form-destroying force) came to importance for him in this period. Tillich was affiliated 
with the religious socialist movement fermenting in Europe during this time. Consequently, the 
Weimar period became one of deep reflection upon German culture, the patterns of history, 
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and—implicitly—the impact this can have on a nation’s engagement with other nations. The 
Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision were works of primary importance during this 
period. 
In chapter three, Tillich’s thinking during his years as an exile in the United States will 
become the focal point. With the rise of Nazism, Tillich was relieved of his chair of the 
philosophy department at the University of Frankfurt. After a brief period of assessing his future 
in Germany, he made his way to the United States, thanks to the offer of a position at New 
York’s Union Theological Seminary. Biographically, what was most significant for Tillich’s 
interwar period in the United States was the seriousness with which he took his unchosen 
circumstance of being a thinker “on the boundary”. This sensitized him to provincial and 
nationalistic tendencies. During this period, Tillich produced the one work—and this, a 
fragment—in which he gave special attention to religion and international thought, Religion und 
Weltpolitik. On March 4, 1940, he became a U.S. citizen. In September of the same year, he 
became Professor of Philosophical Theology at Union. 
With chapter four, the historical context will turn to the period when Hitler’s murderous 
tyranny had spread beyond the borders of Germany and the Second World War had begun. 
Tillich’s thoughts weighed the meaning and aims of the war, its meaning being a constant theme 
until the war’s conclusion. The documents which recorded Tillich’s thoughts on the war most 
comprehensively were his Voice of America speeches, more than five hundred pages of material 
he wrote for broadcast over short-wave to the European continent, to the German people. Tillich 
was one of many prominent Europeans invited by the Office of War Information to participate in 
this effort. Because it is unknown how many or how few heard the broadcasts, the most 
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conservative way to interpret them is as Tillich’s journal on the many forces influencing the 
behavior of nations—particularly Germany—during the course of the war. 
Chapter five will cover the same period as chapter four, but the audience this time will be 
the English-speaking world. From his perspective on the boundary, he both exhorted Germans to 
resist (chapter four) and Americans and Britons to pursue policies with just, creative, 
transformative outcomes. As the war moved toward its conclusion, Tillich agreed to head the 
Council for a Democratic Germany. However, it soon became clear that Germany’s postwar 
prospects would be dictated by forces that made the Council’s work moot. Tillich became much 
less optimistic about the prospects of a truly changed, reintegrated world as the Cold War 
descended: the optimism and fullness of kairos became the pessimism and emptiness of vacuum. 
Yet, this was quite consistent with Tillich’s philosophy of history. History provides 
moments and periods that are more or less opportune for change. While the time under the 
Weimar Republic had been a fertile period, chapter six will describe post-World War II Europe 
as presenting a different situation. Europe was physically in shambles and politically divided. It 
could be argued that Tillich correctly read the times, and times were simply unappealing and 
depressing. 
However, religion could continue to do its work in such periods. The pattern of 
transcendence and engagement was appropriate in periods of vacuum as well, probing for 
moments in history when fate permitted free acts of reconciliation by individuals and nations. 
Tillich’s Systematic Theology was his effort to formulate the complete story of the relation of 
religion to existence, including the political dimension. Its three volumes were published 
between 1951 and 1963. Though they were his central Cold War project, other shorter works—
among them, Love, Power and Justice, The Courage to Be, and Christianity and the Encounter 
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of the World Religions—were produced during the same period. In these three works, Tillich 
gave attention to the ontological elements of social and personal existence and—true to his 
dialectical/correlational method and mission—showed his growing edge (in his late 70s) in 
pondering the encounter (versus Huntington’s “clash”) of the world religions. Vacuum did not 
result in passive inactivity for Tillich, but called for venturing courage. 
One sees resonances throughout this story with elements of realism, liberalism, and 
radical thought.105 Tillich begins as a realist and never fully leaves realism behind: the primal 
and ontological significance of power and the inescapability of ambiguity and sin in human 
existence remain throughout. However, Tillich fully engaged classical liberalism and its vision of 
the harmonious development of freely thinking and acting human beings. He cherished creative 
freedom, in particular. Though World War I removed the illusion of human development toward 
harmonious existence for Tillich, he never lost hope. The fragments of reconciliation that 
repeatedly crop up within history testify to the importance of an utopian vision despite the 
impossibility of harmony actualized within existence. And, as cited before, radical or socialist 
thought became prominent following World War I and remained present—explicitly and 
implicitly—until the end of Tillich’s life. 
The concluding section of the dissertation will combine construction, critique and 
conclusion. It will argue that elements of an ethic on war and peace can be gleaned from Tillich’s 
thought. It will use Tillich’s own thinking on ethics and morality to frame these elements. 
Tillich’s construction will be weighed to determine its strengths, identify its weaknesses, and 
suggest some reformulations. In the end, the dissertation will show that the thought of Paul 
Tillich provides ample and provocative material for assembling an ethic of war and peace rooted 
                                                 
105 This is not to say that Tillich explicitly seeks to “place” himself with respect to realism, liberalism, and socialism. 
It is simply to observe that all three themes arise within his thinking. 
 21
in religion that can generate constructive discussion regarding the path toward a united world, 
rooted in social and economic justice, while respecting the diversities of religion and culture, in 
short, an ethic of religious internationalism.  
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2.0  PRE-WAR AND WORLD WAR I—PIOUS NATIONALIST 
2.1 INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
Following Gymnasium, Paul Tillich began theological studies at the University of Berlin in the 
winter of 1904. Beginning in the winter of 1905, he studied at the University of Halle.106 His 
most important teacher at Halle was Martin Kähler. In Tillich’s words, Kähler “combined 
traditions of Renaissance humanism and German classicism with a profound understanding of 
the Reformation and with strong elements of the religious awakening of the middle of the 
nineteenth century.”107 From Kähler, Tillich learned of the fullness of the Pauline doctrine of 
justification by faith,108 “gain[ing] the insight that man is justified by grace through faith, not 
only as a sinner but even as a doubter.”109 Tillich’s second most important teacher at Halle was 
Fritz Medicus, a young lecturer in philosophy and a specialist in Fichte and German classical 
philosophy.110 Medicus led a revival in German idealism, functioning as one of the inspirations 
for Tillich’s interest in Schelling.111 Thus, Tillich’s understanding of Schelling was further 
cultivated by Medicus, and his knowledge of Luther was deepened in relationship with Kähler, 
bringing about a philosophical and theological perspective affirming the “‘corruption’ of 
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existence…the irrational and demonic nature of existence, an appreciation of the mystical[, and] 
a rejection of Puritanical legalism.”112
Tillich’s membership in the Wingolf Fellowship led Tillich into lifelong friendships. 
Eventually, it led to his friendship with Emanuel Hirsch in 1908.113 There, he experienced 
“friendship, spiritual exchange on a very high level, intentional and unintentional education, joy 
of living, seriousness about the problems of communal life generally, and Christian fellowship 
especially….”114
In October 1907, Tillich returned to studies at the University of Berlin. In 1910, the 
University of Breslau awarded him a Ph.D. in philosophy for which he prepared The 
Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions 
and Principles.115 In 1912, the University of Halle awarded him a Licentiate in Theology for 
which he submitted Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical 
Development.116 In 1913, he made an initial foray into the assembly of a systematic theology 
which, understandably, has significant resonance with the foundations laid in the 
dissertations..117  In 1915, while serving in the war, Tillich completed his Habilitation’s thesis.118
Therefore, the writings of Tillich prior to the end of World War I seem to be irrelevant to 
a discussion of his political thought. Tillich gave little overt attention to the political implications 
of his theology during the pre war period. Thus, the central documents that reflected his political 
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perspective during the war were his chaplaincy sermons. These will strike many as conventional 
examples of religious endorsement of a governing regime’s war-cause by an official of that 
regime. At a certain level, their function in the present context is to illustrate the politically 
uncritical Tillich of the early years. However, to end the discussion at this level would result in a 
superficial characterization of this stage in Tillich’s thought.  
The pre war pieces have significance because they offer something of the theological 
framework through which Tillich interpreted the world over the subsequent half-century. In the 
first of them, The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its 
Presuppositions and Principles, there are elements that will be key to his later political theory. 
For that reason, this chapter will begin with a brief summary of this dissertation to bring such 
elements to light. Following this, the discussion will turn to a much fuller description of the war 
sermons to establish what Tillich saw religion to say that was of use to warriors. Then a 
theological-political framework for contextualizing the entire period will be presented. 
2.2 SCHELLING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 
F.W.J. von Schelling labored during the time of Hegel, Fichte, and Goethe. In The Construction 
of the History of Religion…, Tillich sought “to present the construction of the history of religion 
as the focal point of Schelling’s positive philosophy.”119 Schelling understood God, humanity, 
and the world at large in a dialectical manner. He saw the metaphysical structure of all three as 
centered around three principles he termed “potencies”.120 The first potency is that of expansion 
and is characterized by subjectivity, by untrammeled and irrational (or, perhaps, non rational) 
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power. It is the principle of self-assertion and naked desire.121 It is the potency of freedom and 
potential being. It involves “infinite possibility” and is “the subject of everything that is.”122 In 
Schelling’s understanding of God, this is the first person of the Christian Trinity, God the 
Father.123
The second potency is that of contraction in which the formative impact of objectivity 
and reason lifts its head against the force of the first potency. Love and selflessness dominate 
here. It is the potency of necessity and actual being.124 This is the potency of Christ in the 
Trinity.125
Finally, there is the third potency which transcends the subject-object positions of the 
first and second principles, mediating and unifying them. It is the potency of “what ought to be 
or what shall be”.126 Here, the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, has its place.127
Tillich devoted significant space to interpreting the relationship among the potencies 
developed in Schelling’s thought. First, he described Schelling’s definition of the nature of God, 
humanity and world according to this triad of powers.128 He then presented Schelling’s outline of 
the story of religion. For Schelling, the history of religion began with the dominance of the first 
potency in prehistoric polytheism.129 From here it evolved through the periods of humanity’s 
mythological interpretation of world history, what Schelling termed natural religion. In this 
period, God allowed for the separation of the potencies, giving in to necessity.130 During this 
period, the second potency evolved further and operated to return estranged existence to unity 
                                                 
121 Ibid., 45-9. 
122 Ibid., 50, 51. 
123 Ibid., 55. 
124 Ibid., 50. 
125 Ibid., 55. 
126 Ibid., 50. 
127 Ibid., 55. 
128 Ibid., 59-64, 66-70, 71-6. 
129 Ibid., 77-80. 
130 Ibid., 80ff., 132-4. 
 26
with God—the period of the second potency’s natural efficacy—crowned by God’s self-
revelation in Judaism and Christianity, i.e., the period of revealed religion.131 At this stage, the 
potencies are spiritually reunited: “God, as the supernatural, as freedom and personality and 
spirit, is the principle of revelation.”132 It is not the realm of reason. Speaking of the “supra-
rationality of revelation,” Tillich interprets Schelling to say that revelation “lies not within the 
intellectual sphere, but within the moral sphere,” one in which humanity “‘must broaden the 
smallness of his thought to the greatness of the divine.’”133 It is by God’s act, by God’s assertion 
of the divine will that humanity experiences “the moment of the absolutely wonderful.”134 In 
Schelling’s reading of Christianity, the selflessness of the second principle conquered the 
selfishness of the first—the period of the second potency’s supernatural efficacy—and set the 
stage for the third potency in philosophical religion.135
Once again, the interplay of these potencies—or powers or forces or principles—forms 
the structure of God, humanity, world, and history for Schelling. Further, while God is able to 
keep these potencies in balance within the Godhead, and while humanity is the one being able to 
apprehend such a structure in life, human history shows that humanity is incapable of keeping 
them in balance. Everything from the inner reality of individuals to the relations among nations 
is rooted in this dynamic structure of the powers at the foundation of existence.136  
Tillich never abandoned the structure he saw in Schelling’s work. For the discussion of 
Tillich’s religious internationalism, the relevance of Schelling is simply the doctrine of the 
potencies, understood by him to be woven through reality and rumbling through history. He 
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embraced the notion that power—the interplay of the dynamics expressed by the Schellingian 
potencies—is at the heart of reality. In the end, the presence or absence of peace is governed by 
the state of relations among the competing powers of being at work within international life.137
More, Tillich would consistently call for ethical and just behavior by linking it to 
humanity’s ability to transcend its provincialism, to “broaden the smallness of his thought to the 
greatness of the divine.” 
A final point to note is this: already in this work from 1910 Tillich took seriously the 
meaning of non-Christian religions.138 It must be conceded that his interpretation of these 
religions is open to some question.139 However, as we consider his thought in light of our own 
period, in which world conflict and religion are closely associated, it is vital to understand that 
Christianity’s relationship to other religions was a topic of works by Tillich that framed his 
career (his 1910 dissertation and his 1963 book, Christianity and the Encounter of World 
Religions140), and that Tillich looked with growing sympathy upon the corrective impact of other 
religions upon Christianity’s truth claims. 
With this general sense of the dialectical framework of Tillichian thought as expressed in 
this very early work, we now turn to Tillich’s first effort to see war through the eyes of his 
religious perspective, his World War I chaplaincy sermons. 
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2.3 WORLD WAR I CHAPLAINCY SERMONS 
Tillich entered the service of the German Imperial Army with an enthusiasm shared by soldiers 
on both sides of the conflict. He was a passionate German nationalist at this time. In 1898 his 
father, Johannes Tillich, had traveled with Kaiser Wilhelm II to Jerusalem. With the outbreak of 
World War I, Paulus was in a position to serve Kaiser and Fatherland. He entered that service 
with full existential force. 141
The sermons Paul Tillich preached as a chaplain in the imperial army of Germany during 
the war covered a full range of issues. In addition to the ninety-three published sermons that are 
the basis of this discussion, there are texts of thirteen funeral sermons, and there are unpublished 
outlines and fragments of fifty further sermons.142 Erdmann Sturm, the editor of the volume of 
published sermons, regretted that he was able to date only one-third of them. However, even with 
this limitation, there is enough documentary evidence to show that in Tillich’s public capacity as 
chaplain, he never swayed from support of the German war effort. As his later reflections 
confirmed, Tillich submitted to the chain of command in his duties. War broke Tillich 
emotionally: he attested to two breakdowns during the war.143 However, his sermons give little 
evidence of any progressive disenchantment with the war. Carl Ratschow has described them as, 
first, “strictly theological and exegetical sermons” and, second, as pieces intended “to make it 
easier for the oppressed to endure.”144
In the face of the breadth of the material, the content of the sermons will be summarized 
under five general areas: (A) Christian piety: matters of doctrine and practice; (B) soldierly 
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qualities; (C) the Fatherland and sacrifice; (D) war, peace, and reconciliation; and (E) power and 
weakness. 
2.3.1 Christian Piety: Matters of Doctrine and Practice 
Much of Tillich’s preaching was traditional Christian orthodoxy. He called his military 
congregants to see God as the source and basis of all things, as the director and ruler of the world 
and of world events, and as the goal of all things: all things are from, through, and to God.145 
Life is from God.146 God is our goal in all things.147 Tillich described God’s message to us as 
this: “I have torn open heaven in order to come into your night, in order to illuminate the night of 
your future as well.”148 God’s goals and purposes are behind the things of life.149 Tillich spoke 
of Christ’s direction and rule of the world150 and of Christ’s victory over four powers on earth: 
fate, pain, sin, and death.151 Because “the Lord giveth [and] the Lord taketh away,” humanity 
was in no position to demand anything from God.152 God was the source of power and grace, 
participating with us in the brokenness of war.153 At a point at which the army was experiencing 
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difficult weeks on the Somme, Tillich preached that even amidst war’s horrors, we must thank 
God for life as a gift.154  
Tillich described God as a companion, as the source and giver of strength, as One who 
loves. He described Christ as the one inexhaustible source of power that arises out of our souls’ 
depths.155 He saw eternal love as the one force stronger than death.156 As God’s friends, we are 
sought by God and need never be lonely.157 God makes demands of us, but God does not 
demand without giving infinitely much in return.158 God bears our cares, worries, and 
concerns.159 God’s “nevertheless” (dennoch)—a powerful image for Tillich of the God’s grace in 
forgiving our sin—enables us to say dennoch to the brokenness and sufferings of life.160 
Expressed in another way, God’s patience toward us is basic to God and should evoke our own 
patience.161  
A sense of blessedness, of the nearness of eternity, of God’s imminence and its fruit of 
inner peace were a significant focus for Tillich’s war sermons. He spoke of the yearning for 
God’s imminence within human beings.162 He invited his hearers to immerse themselves in God: 
“Sink yourself into the depth of the divine, sink your own ‘I’ into the eternal sea of God’s love, 
the waves of which surge in your heart day by day.”163  He cited the image of Shepherd as a 
powerful symbol of God’s deep, personal care for each person: “You can believe that you’re 
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without God. He is not without you. You can deny God. He is with you as the true shepherd, and 
the best which you have—your power, your heroism, and your pride he has given you.”164  
Tillich pointed to justification by faith as Luther’s great teaching of the apostle Paul’s 
understanding of humanity’s path to God.165 He preached that God wants us to sense that we’re 
blessed to the deepest extent.166 He believed that religion had wrongly placed a heavy burden on 
people. Instead, “Religion is joy….”167 Tillich pointed to the sources of power for inner life: joy, 
culture, love.168 He proclaimed the Spirit as the basis for life, the unifying force of all 
community.169  
Tillich related divine love to the love that connects soldiers with loved ones back home: 
“Divine love has bridged worlds; what are a few hundred leagues for it?”170 He argued that God 
comes to replace that which is broken within our hearts in order to become our confidante and 
friend.171 He pointed to the Lord’s Prayer as teaching God’s knowledge of us, and as providing a 
basis for the unity of the human race.172 He called for an understanding of prayer as drawing 
near to God versus making requests to God.173 Prayer cannot change God, nor is it a business 
contract with God: through prayer we should seek conformity of our will with God’s, following 
the example of Jesus.174 The Eucharist—or Lord’s Supper—is a path to unity with God’s 
Spirit.175 It is the symbol of God’s desire to be one with us, just as wine and bread become one 
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with our bodies.176 Tillich wrote, “The actual, living perceptible presence of God is what Luther 
did not want to miss and which for him formed the real mystery of the Last Supper.”177  
Despite war, Tillich saw inner “peace on earth” as perpetually present by means of 
Christ’s peace-giving presence.178 As a result, “new courage, new will-to-love and will-for-
victory pours out of God’s nearness. What you did [in recent battles] was perfect love. That 
remains your honor for all time. What was given to you is God’s friendship. It is your best unto 
eternity.”179 We can believe that eternal goals are attainable, beyond the horrific loss of human 
lives and dreams180 that the Invisible can be our focus, not the visible horrors of war.181  
The condition and care of the soul occupied significant attention in Tillich’s preaching. 
He exhorted soldiers to remember that they have a soul,182 or, more poetically, “Remember you 
have wings.”183 Tillich spoke of the soul as the “organ” of religion: God and the soul, God and 
my soul, that is the heartbeat of religion, that is the source-point of the Reformation, that is the 
deepest, most fragile thing and most living thing in your life as well…When the divine is within 
you, is with you, and a strength from above fills you at all times, then you have the religion of 
the soul. Then your heart is God’s house, then every day is Sunday for you, and every day is a 
day of celebration, then you are pastor, teacher, priest, and church for yourself.184  
Having a soul “means, ultimately, to have an organ for things which are not of this world, 
for duty and love, truth and beauty, God and eternity.”185 The Spirit is “the inner essence, the 
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peculiar quality, the character, the personal life of a person.”186 He declared, “the soul is indeed 
the most powerful thing and more powerful than all the earth’s power”.187 Our immortal souls 
are the closest and most precious things within us.188 Thus, human beings are more than dust, 
they possess divinity, a royal dignity.189 Care for one’s soul is an appropriate concern.190 He 
preached that the deepest truths of scripture speak to our very souls.191 Tillich cited Augustine’s 
comment that souls are restless “until they rest in God”.192 They thirst for God.193 Their 
sanctification is the deepest basis for being “divine fighters”.194 He distinguished Sunday souls 
from everyday souls:  “[E]veryday souls never come out beyond the dusty country road of daily 
life. The Sunday soul has wings and rises again and again into light, clear heights.”195 Finally, 
there is a relative simplicity to acknowledging the soul, doing so at day’s beginning and end, in 
letters, and among comrades.196  
Tillich preached of the nearness and distance of God’s kingdom in life and the fact of that 
kingdom beyond death. He believed human beings were strangers on earth, possessing “a holy 
foreignness to the world,”197 existing as “orphans on earth”.198 We are moved to seek the Spirit 
when we recognize the limits of creation.199 There is a thirst for life that is basic to all creatures, 
but it is really a deeper thirst, unquenchable by life or death.200 Further, the mutual tearing apart 
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of Christendom in a world war testified to the fact that Christ’s kingdom was not “of this 
world”.201
In Tillich’s view, the opening statement of the Lord’s Prayer teaches about the distance 
of God’s Kingdom, i.e., God’s transcendence of the brokenness of the world.202 He preached that 
God allows this world to pass away to reveal his “majesty and grace”.203 The Easter message is 
that “the best lies above us” in the hope of resurrection.204 For him, even more profoundly than 
the death-life pattern of nature, the law of resurrection is that eternal life is stronger than 
death.205 The kingdom is present in lives lived sacrificially and transcendently.206  
Our response to God is to be gratitude, according to Tillich.207 We should surrender our 
self-chosen paths to God’s path for us.208 We should live our lives by Luther’s teachings that 
Christians are free from and free for things, people, and self, “lord of all things…subject to no 
one…subservient slave to all things…subject to everyone.”209 We are to be messengers of God 
as individuals, soldiers, and as nation.210 We become rulers over fear, because of our 
unassailable relationship with God: “We would be slaves of fear…if that which humanity could 
take from us were our best. But now we are rulers of fear, because there is something within that 
is unassailable, impregnable, hidden, our eternal worth, our life in God.”211  
However, our response is repeatedly the opposite of gratitude and faithfulness. Sin, 
doubt, rejection of God, and a distancing of God is often the state of affairs. The cross is the 
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symbol for that situation. God’s judgment is a logical response. Tillich believed the world to 
have entered a time in which sin and untruth lay spread upon the earth and over the nations: “has 
the lie, the ancient serpent, become more powerful than God, has God had to abandon the earth 
before the power of sin?”212 A Spirit of darkness had descended upon Christendom.213 It was the 
sin of blindness rather than evil, something that Jesus had expressed from the cross.214 The 
question was whether God’s love was compatible with the brutality of war, in the case of an 
early sermon amidst the Battle of Soissons.215 The horror of war provoked doubt in God.216 
Tillich saw it to be a period conspiring to make humanity senseless to God’s light.217  
Given the state of reality (the “hatred, misery, and injustice without equal of this war”), it 
was a period which shattered optimism over the possibility of bringing into being God’s 
kingdom.218 The crucifixion symbolized the myriad of ways the entire human race fights against 
God’s will.219 The cross is the sign of God’s discontentment with the ways of the world, of 
individuals, and of communities.220 Grave-crosses illustrated the struggle between light and 
darkness in every human heart.221 The cross was God’s judgment on the world borne by those 
God loves (i.e., Germany).222 Germany bore the sword of Christ’s righteous judgment on 
Europe.223 Tillich pointed out that self-judgment was required by those bearing the sword of 
judgment.224 Humility must characterize our truth claims regarding God.225 But, the feeling of 
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distance from God should not lead to hopelessness: at times, the apostles and prophets 
experienced that same distance.226  
 The seasons of Advent and Christmas were an entry point of Tillich’s into the nature of 
God’s love and into matters of peace, joy and hope. He believed that we could not bear God’s 
coming with the sword of justice, power or spirit.227 Thus, God came in the form of the infant, 
Jesus. Tillich called his listeners to sense the streams of hope in the light of Christ’s birth which 
continue to stretch forth to humanity.228 God could take us back to Bethlehem even amidst 
war.229 In fact, there is no peace like that in the stable of Bethlehem.230 There was the hidden 
blessedness and fragile power of God.231 The story of the infant Christ—weakness and 
helpless—teaches that we must become weak to become strong, to become victors in life and 
death.232 In the face of this, in the third war-Christmas of 1916, in an enemy land, Tillich called 
the soldiers to rejoice.233
2.3.2 Soldierly Qualities 
When speaking of soldierly qualities, Tillich spent much time on personal character and 
behavior. He admonished his listeners to see that God seeks out the faithful in the land.234 God 
breaks willful selves.235 Banality and sin rob us of our human dignity.236 Bad language is 
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demeaning (to self and others).237 He spoke of our repeated choice either to pursue or flee God’s 
light.238 A good or bad conscience is a consequence of whether or not we surrender to God.239 
Even care and concern can become sinfully debilitating: enslaving, humiliating, and weakening 
types of care are wrong.240  
Tillich reminded the congregants that each person is a unique, irreplaceable being, “an 
eternal thought of God”.241 God takes particular, unique pleasure in each of us which we should 
share with each other.242 The Spirit perpetually functions as the humanizing, transcendent force 
in human life.243 The work of eternal goodness is to purify, inspire, and energize the inner 
person.244 God’s dennoch to us (God’s gracious and forgiving act of acknowledging, yet saying 
“nevertheless” to, our sinfulness) enables us to say dennoch to life—no to passions, yes to 
love.245  
This is why mistreatment of one another is onerous. The will of the flesh is hostility to 
others, self and God.246  Tillich counseled,  “Think about it, that when you dishonor your 
brother, you dishonor the one living in him; that when you hurt your brother, you hurt the one 
who suffers with him; that when you are hateful to your brother, you have hatred for the one who 
is his friend, the eternal God!”247  
We are to be responsible people. Responsibility is what distinguishes human beings from 
other creatures. It is our burden, and there is no clear distinction in this: “Surely we are all—
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through our responsibility for ourselves and humanity—equally princes and rulers, and in the 
seriousness and holiness of responsibility there is no difference between king and beggar.”248  
Tillich exhorted his listeners to be satisfied with what they had, but to be dissatisfied with 
what they were in terms of the fruits of the Spirit described in Galatians 5.249 He presented 
Christ's suffering and weakness as God’s way of awakening good and bad conscience, leading to 
forgiveness.250 He called them to unite their wills with God’s will251 remembering that a believer 
is one who is “Free from every law, independent of the judgment of the world, humble before the 
eternal God, trusting not in our work, but in his power.”252 He counseled them that future of both 
nation and self is determined by their personal conduct.253 He led them to ponder the potentially 
profound impact of the Spirit-filled person who knows that “The entire secret of the Spirit is that 
God is near, perceptible, perceivable, living and powerful.”254  
Interwoven with these general comments on character and behavior, Tillich spoke of 
matters peculiar to soldiers in wartime. He called them to cultivate manly courage255 to develop 
the capacity to look death in the face.256 He described the joy associated with discipline257 and 
the fact that lack of discipline was a primary enemy of the solider.258 He affirmed the call to love 
enemies, reminding them that it is not hate for individuals in war but hate for the will of enemy 
nations that drives armed conflict.259  
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Tillich distinguished heroism from cowardice: “A coward fears humanity, a hero fears 
God.”260 God raises up heroes to benefit nations: just as God blessed Israel with David’s line, so 
God blessed Germany with the house of Hohenzollern.261 Sacrifice and heroism in war are acts 
of love.262 Heroic actions bear the light of the world Christ called us to shine.263 Heroic action 
gives each day an eternal significance cannot be measured according to empirical time: they are 
profound moments in history. This explains the significance of youthful heroes whose life-
meaning is far deeper than the decades of shallowness of some lives, though the events of 
heroism last days or hours.264  
In speaking of the meaning of camaraderie, Tillich rooted this deeply in the Eucharist 
event. The Eucharist unites the spirits of participants with one another.265 The Eucharist should 
transform a participant’s perspective on his brother.266 Tillich’s particular communion request 
was that the soldiers become more than comrades.267 He called them to be a light to their 
comrades.268
2.3.3 The Fatherland and Sacrifice 
The relationship of soldier to Fatherland was a deep and significant one to Tillich. In the opening 
months of the war, he called the Fatherland their single concern of the previous year.269 He 
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spoke of love of Fatherland and also described the homeland as a beloved Mother.270 A year into 
the war, Tillich preached if service to country as service to an invisible force:  
For the sake of holy love, for the land of my home, for the sake of pride in being a  
German and the bonds of community which link me with the spirit of my people, for the  
sake of the majesty and honor and the German Empire: all of that is invisible and yet true  
and actual and a thousand times more worthwhile than clothing and food, work and  
success, rest and comfort, because the visible is passing, but the invisible is eternal.271  
 
Another place where one perceives his sense of the Fatherland’s deep spiritual 
significance is in a sermon from 1917 based on Jesus’ declaration to Satan that humanity does 
not live by bread alone:  
[It is t]he Fatherland, for which we live and die, which lets our hearts beat more deeply, 
 which is our home soil, which gave first imprint on our souls, which is the mother 
 language in which we think and speak, which is the German essence which goes through  
us out of which we speak and behave, which is the spirit of the greatness of our people,  
which is the wonderful, hidden and yet living soul of our people, in which we all take  
part, which is God among us and with us. We live not by bread alone, and for that reason 
 we are prepared to live and to die for God and Fatherland.272
  
Elsewhere, Tillich applied his doctrine of God’s forgiving dennoch to Germany’s 
response to the hostility of the world. Like a “hammer which proves its invincibility day by day,” 
it enabled Germany to stand against the world’s powerful nations.273 Further, God’s self-
revelation in the heroic Christ was paralleled by God’s self-revelation in German history.274 
Tillich hailed the impact of Prussian culture and discipline as a source of inner power.275 He 
argued that when soul, honor, conscience and Fatherland are more important than bread and life, 
you are living at a deeper dimension.276  
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The Kaiser obviously symbolized the relationship of Germans to Germany. On the 
Kaiser’s birthday of each of the three years of the war, Tillich the qualities or policies of the 
nation’s leader the core of his sermons. In 1915, he argued that the nation owed the Kaiser 
thanks for the goodness of life bestowed on the Fatherland, for war preparations prior to war’s 
outbreak, for arousing united enthusiasm for war.277 In 1916, Tillich lifted up the Kaiser as the 
personal expression of the state and, therefore, the object of love for his subjects, pointing to him 
as a vehicle of transcendence.278 In 1917, Tillich saw the Kaiser as worthy of thanks more than 
ever, for seeking peace, both domestically and internationally. The word, peace, “rings further in 
the hearts of our hate-filled enemies as a thorn and as a secret fruit. It rings further in the 
thoughts of the deceived and misled nations as doubt in and anger toward their rulers. It rings 
above all in the soul of the German people and has awakened there a wonderful, overpowering 
reverence.”279  
The final “Kaiser” sermon—there is none listed for 1918—became the basis for Tillich’s 
call for further sacrifice as an expression of love to family and homeland: “Holy love demands 
new sacrifices from you, holy love demands life and limb! The highest love becomes the highest 
force.”280 Earlier on, Tillich had equated serving God with serving the Fatherland: “We should 
never serve to exalt ourselves, but in humility and obedience surrender to God, each for himself 
and our entire nation. With that, he will neither depart from us nor reject us. Give to God what is 
God’s! First, complete and unsurpassable service to Fatherland.”281 Sacrifice for country proved 
that soldier and homeland belonged to each other.282 Therefore, be sanctified, just fighters for the 
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Fatherland.283 Realize that death on battlefield produces victory and greatness for the  
Fatherland.284 The faithful serve as an iron wall around their nation and people.285 Keep being 
the light for the sake of (among other things) the Fatherland.286 Ultimately, love of Fatherland 
means working that Germany may become an eternal part of God’s kingdom.287  
As alluded to in passing, Tillich saw sacrifice for something greater than oneself as a 
crucial element in one’s relationship to the Fatherland. Tillich told his audience that sacrifice was 
basic to life.288 He spoke of the great holy law of sacrifice.289 Once again, he argued that the 
kingdom is present in lives lived sacrificially and transcendently.290 God’s salvation of the guilty 
through the suffering of the innocent was an operable theme in his thoughts on Germany’s role in 
the war. Parallel to the experience of ancient Israel, he pointed to what he saw as the necessity of 
Germany’s innocent suffering on behalf of guilty nations.291 He equated the majesty of 
courageous sacrifice on the cross with the sacrifice of soldiers in war.292 He saw Christ’s 
sacrificial spirit as alive in heroism and in self-sacrifice for others.293 The words of the  
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Eucharist—blood poured out and body broken—had taken on new meaning for him.294 Soldiers 
were called to die in order to produce fruit for others295 and as a faithful denial of self.296  
Tillich believed that gratitude to God was the appropriate response to the eternal 
goodness embodied in the wounded and the dead297 whose actions were acts of love.298 He 
preached that suffering was always to be “on behalf of”.299 He repeatedly called for sacrifice for 
Fatherland.300 He called for a self-sacrificial enthusiasm: “Come out of yourself, so calls the 
Fatherland, so calls this time to everyone of you. Sacrifice yourself for that which is greater than 
you, for your Fatherland, for all coming times, for your God who needs you for his work on 
earth.”301 Tillich spoke of Germany’s victimization by, and innocence before, the world.302 In 
one instance, he disparaged a labor strike in the German munitions industry as self-interest 
undercutting the war effort in direct contradiction to the duty to sacrifice.303  
2.3.4 War, Peace and Reconciliation 
Tillich would come to speak of the war as as inhuman and murderous.304 He noted the losses 
caused by the war.305 He observed that estimates and hopes for the war’s end were wrong, 
illustrating that God’s ways are not ours.306  
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Yet, Tillich preached that God draws near to us in war and peace.307 He spoke of the 
peace God can give despite, and amidst, the war.308 War, for Tillich, was a time to learn to pray 
to God and to turn to God.309 He declared God to be standing beyond war in holy rest and that 
faithful service participates in this rest: “When even the nations rage and the globe is burning and 
we stand in the midst of the fire, God stands beyond, beyond all times and nations, in holy rest, 
and whoever serves God faithfully has a part in this rest of God.”310 God was at work among the 
nations in the war:311 in wartime, “Eternity has appeared in time….”312 He wrote that “Every 
earthly fighter is a divine fighter, because God’s battles are fought out in the roaring wars of 
nations. Beloved friends, that is what turns every battle into a work of, and service to, God.”313 
Even more stridently, “There is no conflict between Christianity and war. The battle sword and 
the sword of justice are both of God….”314  
At the same time, war and suffering indicated humanity’s hostility to God.315 War 
manifested the struggle between good and evil in the human heart.316 Surprise at war’s horror 
symbolized humanity’s idolatrous clinging to the world.317  
Tillich preached of the perpetual restlessness of souls in earthly existence.318 He warned 
that the lack of inner peace was the basis for weakness in war.319 The message of Advent 
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resonated with the cry and hope for peace.320 He declared that the child of Bethlehem was the 
source of true, deeper peace.321 In one place he put it, “Eternal, divine, saving love descends on 
Christmas…And with him peace which no war can disturb.”322 One of the fruits of “this 
bloodiest of wars…[was] humanity’s longing for peace without end”.323 Tillich admonished that 
only forgiveness could save humanity, even the nations of world, even between victor and 
defeated.324 More profoundly, “Where hatred or hostility, envy or bitterness toward one another 
dwells in a human heart, God cannot enter in.”325  
Reconciliation with enemies was a priority before participating in the eucharist.326 Tillich 
described the deep basis for reconciliation in the image of God in Christ, possessing both the 
seriousness with which God uncovers and repairs sin and the gracious goodness which bears and 
forgives the guilt.327 He believed that God had come to bring humanity closer by means of the 
destructive storms of world war.328 As already noted, he wrote of the Spirit as the basis for life, 
as a unifying force of all community.329 At the fourth war Christmas, he preached of the 
yearning that enemies as well be “embraced by the band of eternal love in the spirit of Christmas, 
in the richness of the Spirit.”330 On one Holy Week of the war, he rued the prospect of the flight 
of forgiveness: “Woe to humanity and to future generations, if the hatred and the passion for 
vengeance and if the lies which make this war so unchivalrous and awful are not overcome by 
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forgiveness! Only if defeated and victor extend their hands and forget what was and make a new 
beginning can the nations of Europe be saved. Only forgiveness can save us.”331  
2.3.5 Power and Weakness 
The fall of the Russian czar spoke to Tillich of Isaiah’s teaching, “mountains give way and the 
hills fall….”332 In contrast to this, he preached of the ordinary sources of power: the support of 
others; one’s consciousness of duty; iron discipline and order; holy enthusiasm; tough will; and 
joyful humor.333 He described how it was displayed in the fates of individuals and the destinies 
of nations.334 Tillich spoke of sources of power for inner life.335 He called purity, sacrifice, and 
the acknowledgement God the source of life as the roots of strength.336  
As noted before, Tillich preached that Christ was the one inexhaustible source of 
power.337 He pointed to Christ’s capacity to overcome the powers of earth and history.338 He 
spoke of the basic law of nature—the strong rule over the weak—and of Jesus’ respect for this. 
However, Tillich leaned on Luther to remind his listeners that Jesus gave the law of love to guide 
the exercise of all power at all levels of society.339 He even spoke of Christ as a Lord of holy, 
sword-bearing rage: “Our Lord and Master was not a man with a soft, effeminate heart, easily 
moved by every feeling, constantly only kind and meek in dignity, but he was a man with a 
sword in his hand, full of holy rage and merciless seriousness.”340 Tillich declared, “Christianity 
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is sword-religion. The sword of Christ is over us, the sword of Christ is in our hand to judge and 
save our hearts, our nation and all nations of the earth. He shall precede us, our armies, our souls, 
the one who has come not to bring peace, but the sword, and whose name is Savior of the 
world.”341  
Complementing his comments on power and strength, Tillich preached of weakness as 
both vice and virtue. On the one hand, he condemned weakness as an undermining force for a 
soldier and a nation fighting a war. He supported Germany’s rejection of a peace rooted in 
weakness. When tempted by such weakness, Tillich exhorted his listeners to envision “the entire 
Fatherland and your wives and the questioning eyes of your children, whose future peace must 
be built upon your strength…the houses and fields of your homeland with everything in them 
and upon them in richness and beauty. All of these yearn for peace, for your peace, for the peace 
that arises out of your strength.”342 Further, Tillich was concerned that soldiers deal with 
sinfulness in their lives, for guilt makes us weak.343 He warned that denial of God leads to 
betrayal and that weakness leads to hostility toward God.344  
At the same time, Tillich preached of the great theological significance of the notion of 
weakness. He reminded the soldiers that “God’s love is fragile and still like  the child in Mary’s 
lap…hidden and invisible like the Christmas story, and yet it is more powerful than all the 
powers of earth and more blessed than life’s fortune and more expansive than the sun and the 
stars”.345 The poor, fragile Christ child’s entry at Christmas shows that God’s ways are not 
ours.346 Confounding expectations of strength, God “has chosen the poorest, the weakest, the 
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most broken …he wants to dwell in your heart.”347 In fact, Christ’s weakness “was world-
overcoming force”.348 The infant Christ—the epitome of weakness and helpless—says we must 
become weak to become strong, to become victors in life and death.349 Turning from the infant 
Christ to the crucified Christ, Tillich described the suffering and weakness of the crucified Christ 
as reassuring amidst the brokenness of war.350 More deeply, Christ’s suffering and weakness 
were for the sake of humanity.351 While they are to maintain overt strength in battle, Tillich 
called the soldiers to understand that we are to “become weak before God so that we become 
strong…”352 that God desires our prayers in times of deepest weakness, in our own Gardens of 
Gethsemane.353 God knows that all people, of all classes, are burdened with weakness: “The 
King with the golden crown, he goes along next to the beggar on crutches and the old man next 
to the child, and the soldier next to the mother, and the judge next to the condemned: wretched 
and haven-laden are they all!”354
2.3.6 Sturm and MacLennan 
Erdmann Sturm writes that despite Tillich’s later reflections on the war as a period of profound 
and catastrophic change, “These sermons hardly let us visualize anything of the abysmal 
experience of the war.”355 Further, Sturm believes that Tillich’s war sermonizing illustrates that 
his thought “fits into the broad stream of the war theology of the national-conservative 
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Protestantism of that time.”356 Sturm argues that the writing of Jacob Böhme, Schelling and 
Goethe was the basis for “a religious patriotism or nationalism…that profoundly defined German 
Protestantism, especially during the First World War.”357
For Sturm, Tillich’s sermons reveal a disconnect between his theology and the reality 
soldiers were facing, citing the testimony of such soldiers. A student penned these words in 
1914, “‘Masses of human beings are butchering one other without knowing, hating, loving one 
another. A curse to the few giving rise to war without having to go into the terrors of war!’” A 
theological student asked in 1915, “What on earth have we all done…that we are hounded 
around like animals, that we are freezing and running around in loused and torn up clothes…and 
finally are killed like vermin? Why, at last, do they not make peace?’”358 Sturm argues that it 
was Tillich’s “war theology” that blinded him to the reality of these soldiers.359 Sturm concludes 
that, up until the end of the summer 1918 war offensive, Tillich’s blinding “war theology” ends 
in concealing “the brutal reality of war and the necessity to understand this war as the work of 
human beings and as sin and to take responsibility for this war, in this war, and beyond it, for 
future problems in society and state.”360 Rather than judging nationalism’s demonic character, 
Tillich’s war theology legitimized it.361 With Germany’s failures in the summer campaign of 
1918, Tillich renounced his war theology.362
Ronald B. MacLennan is critical of Sturm’s conclusion that the war sermons were merely 
about a nationalistic war theology to the exclusion of prophetic critique of the war as sin. In a 
way, MacLennan is concerned that Sturm takes the sermons out of several contexts: the role of 
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an army chaplain in building morale for the cause and in sensitively responding to the immediate 
needs of  listeners; the fact that Tillich was occasionally accused of not being nationalistic 
enough; the reality of Sturm’s disagreement with Tillich’s notion (shared by MacLennan) that 
God participates in our suffering; and the documentary evidence that Tillich’s thought was 
changing during the war (which Sturm recognizes but also minimizes).363 Even though Tillich 
was silent in his chaplaincy sermons regarding political change, he wrote of a radical change in 
his thought in correspondence with his family. He wrote to his sister Johanna,  
Yesterday as I sat under the (Christmas) tree I suddenly had the thought that is not at all a  
new one with overwhelming clarity that everything living, struggling, progressing, spirit- 
filled, profound, attractive is outside of what we call parish and church…Where are the  
great progressing motives of ethics? They are with the Russian Revolution and the  
German Social Democrats, on the one hand, with Nietzsche and the more profound  
artists, on the other….364
 
In a letter to his father the same week, Tillich said,  
The development in the East is certainly most gratifying. The spirit of the Russian  
revolutionaries is the most original that the war has brought forth: Childlike, simple,  
profound, humane! Trotsky’s telegrams and the armistice agreement are according to my  
perception more imbued with the original Christian spirit than the whole lot of battlefield  
sermons in all the lands west of the Vistula. Should it be that here on the soil of the  
ancient Greek mysticism a new era of church history might crawl forth from the diapers 
of unrecognizable beginnings through the mystical-simple character of the Russian  
people? The West has created the social idea; should the East enact it? These are my  
Christmas ideas 1917!365
 
Sturm opines, “Here for the first time the connection between the war experience and the 
idea of religious socialism becomes visible in Tillich’s thinking.”366  
The core of MacLennan’s argument is that much more was happening in Tillich’s 
thinking than revealed in the sermons: “Against the surface ordinariness of the preaching of a 
military chaplain a contrasting darkness does rather regularly appear,” manifested in mental 
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breakdowns, in the need for restorative leisure activities and in the content of correspondence 
with family and friends at home.367 Using a metaphor based on “sappers”—those soldiers who 
undertook the risky task of tunneling beneath enemy lines to plant explosives beneath those 
lines—MacLennan writes, “In similar fashion, the surface of Tillich’s thought generally remains 
relatively unchanged through most of the war. But beneath the surface, huge voids are being 
carved out, of which only occasional evidence appears on the surface.”368
The Sturm-MacLennan discussion is very useful for interpreting the sermons. Sturm is 
justifiably unrelenting in preventing us from too quickly pardoning Tillich’s short-comings in 
preaching as a chaplain. Tillich’s ideology at the time was an undeniable German nationalism, 
particularly revealed in the spiritual connection of Germans to Kaiser and Fatherland, in self-
righteousness with respect to Germany and its international behavior, particularly seen in his 
repeated reference to the theologically laden notion of innocent Germany’s vicarious suffering 
on behalf of the other guilty nations, and, finally, in a “war theology” repeatedly attributing 
Christological and eschatological significance to the war. 
At the same time, MacLennan rightfully hesitates to accept Sturm’s over generalizations. 
The evidence simply does not support the argument that Tillich was out of touch with the 
existential experience of the soldiers or the significance of the war as profound human sin. A 
significant proportion of the material in the sermons is devoted to communicating the driving 
imminence of a God who seeks to accompany the soldiers and be united with them to the degree 
that the wine and bread of Eucharist is united with their bodies, combined with the elevating 
transcendence of a God drawing the soldiers to embrace the divine in the face of the horrors of 
war. It is logical to assume that the realities of war, the experience of battlefields from which 
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Tillich himself helped carry the wounded and the dead369, were a direct motivation for Tillich’s 
effort to connect his military congregation with God. As for the sinfulness of the war, Tillich 
repeatedly lifts up the cross and Christ’s crucifixion as symbols for the descent of sin upon 
Christendom, pointing as well to the inhumanity and murderousness of the war, the vengeful 
hatreds and passions of the war, the weaknesses that weigh down people of all ranks, while 
lifting up forgiveness as the only hope for the human race: that is a pretty comprehensive catalog 
of sin, even if enunciated from an occasionally self-righteous perspective. 
2.4 POLITICAL-THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: LUTHER AND SCHELLING 
To establish a basic theological and political framework for understanding Tillich’s preaching 
during the war years, the discussion now turns to Schelling and Martin Luther, the founding 
thinker of Tillich’s own church and the proponent of the political viewpoint that had remained 
dominant in Lutheranism at least up until the time of World War I. The point is not that Tillich 
made particular reference to Luther or Schelling in the sermons. Rather, this section argues that 
Luther’s interpretation of the scriptural mandates and Schelling’s interpretation of the 
ontological structure of reality as the interplay of powers or potencies is the structure upon which 
Tillich could base his participation in the war, submitting to the will of the German Empire. A 
discussion of the religious and ideological background with which Tillich had to negotiate will 
come later in chapter 2. 
Luther’s comments on the role and authority of government can be seen in his 1515 
Commentary on Romans and his 1523 treatise, “Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should 
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Be Obeyed”. In his words on chapter 13 of the Apostle Paul’s Letter to the Roman church, 
Luther seemed more concerned with the overreach of church authority than with abuse of power 
by secular government: “Christians should honor the power of governments and not use their 
liberty of grace as a cloak for their maliciousness.”370 In another place, he argued, “There is 
nothing that angers the clerics, these widely opened mouths avariciously coveting temporal 
things, more than when the freedom of the churches, with their rights, their possessions and their 
powers is attacked.”371
Luther affirmed the basic necessity of secular government: “In the preceding chapter the 
Apostle taught that Christians must not throw into disorder the institution of the Church. Here he 
teaches that they must not violate the temporal government; for both these institutions are of 
God.”372 He had no illusion about the perfection of earthly rulers: “Governments (at times) are 
only usurped and managed in ways not ordained (by God). So also other blessings (of God) are 
misused, and yet do not lose their value (by such misuse)…Wherever there is governmental 
power, there it is instituted by God. That is, wherever governments exist, they are ordained 
solely by God.”373
Luther’s 1523 tract on temporal authority was based on a series of sermons on the topic. 
In this three-part work, Luther defended the legitimacy of temporal government, explicating his 
doctrine of two governments or realms (part one), established the limits of temporal government 
(part two), and described how legitimate power was to be executed (part three). 
Luther defended the legitimacy of temporal authority with a full range of biblical texts: 
from Romans 13’s direction to be subject to the ruling authorities, to the implicit presence of an 
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ordering institution following Cain’s slaying of Abel and following the Flood in the command to 
avenge murder; from the proportionate, reciprocal punishment commands of Exodus 21, to 
Christ’s adherence to that guidance in his counsel to Peter against violence in the Matthean 
version of the scene in the Garden of Gethsemane.374 Luther interpreted texts that appeared to 
speak against temporal government (the admonishments against resisting enemies) in a purely 
individualistic way: they concerned the Christian’s response to attacks directed specifically 
against them, not attacks threatening others.375 He argued for the necessity of temporal 
government because of the predominance of the unrighteous in the world, citing I Timothy, 
“‘The law is not laid down for the just but for the lawless.’”376 In this, the basis for the two 
governments is laid: the spiritual government exists to produce Christian and righteous people; 
the temporal government exists to restrain unchristian and unrighteous people.377 Christians 
abide by this temporal authority, not because it is necessary for their own happiness, but for the 
benefit of the rest of the world.378 This is the same reason that Christians can participate in 
secular government, even serving as soldiers or executioners, not for personal benefit, but “to 
restrain wickedness and to defend godliness” for the benefit of others.379
In describing the limits of temporal government, Luther established the boundaries of 
earthly authority on Romans 13’s limit on government, on I Peter 2’s teaching on the limits of 
human ordinances, on Christ’s distinction between that which is rendered to Caesar and that 
which is rendered to God (in Matthew 22), and the distinctions between the divine and human 
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spheres offered in Genesis 1:26 and Psalm 115:16.380 He directed his comments to both secular 
authorities and what he judged to be unbiblical church authorities:  
[W]here the temporal authority presumes to prescribe laws for the soul, it encroaches 
 upon God’s government and only misleads souls and destroys them. We want to make 
 this so clear that everyone will grasp it, and that our fine gentlemen, the princes and 
 bishops, will see what fools they are when they seek to coerce the people with their laws 
 and commandments into believing this or that.”381  
 
Instead, with regard to matters of the soul—an inward matter dealing with one’s 
relationship to God—the sole authority is the Bible.382 In a specific instance of temporal 
government’s overreaching its authority at the time (the command to turn in all copies of the 
New Testament to state officials), Luther wrote, “This should be the response of their subjects: 
they should not turn in a single page, not even a letter, on pain of losing their salvation.”383 
Reminding bishops and princes that their rule is to be Christian service, he warned them of the 
inability of subjects to continue to endure their tyranny.384
Finally, turning to the right enactment of this biblically limited temporal authority, 
Luther’s counsel is rooted in one sentence: “[C]ursed and condemned is every sort of life lived 
and sought for the benefit and good of self; cursed are all works not done in love.”385 He taught 
that temporal authorities must be devoted to their subjects, must not simply defer to the 
powerful, must render justice to the wicked, and—most importantly—must be subject to God.386 
Noteworthy in this context are Luther’s teachings that princes are never to resist superiors with 
force of arms and that if a prince is known to be wrong in conducting war, the people are not 
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required to follow him: “No, for it is no one’s duty to do wrong; we must obey God (who desires 
the right) rather than men [Acts 5:29].”387
All of this can be applied to Tillich’s thinking during the World War I years and even 
placed within the general framework of his pre-Schellingian roots. Tillich believed—as do many 
nationalistic patriots in all periods—his nation was functioning, in Schelling’s terms, as part of 
the second potency, as a force of selfless love and justice, against the irrationally expansive and 
selfish forces of the first potency attacking it from east and west. It is reasonable to assume that 
he did so, at least partially, as a result of Luther’s doctrine of a government’s presumption of 
legitimacy, even that of bad government. 
Tillich’s description—more, proclamation—of a deep spiritual connection between 
soldier and Fatherland seems to support Sturm’s argument that German idealism fed a mystical 
patriotism among Germans. This would have exacerbated the consequences of Luther’s 
presumption of government legitimacy, taking it to the point of an uncritical assumption that 
such a government—such a “Mother/Father”—would be predisposed to act lovingly on behalf of 
His or Her mystical children. As MacLennan noted in his paper, this is hardly extraordinary: for 
example, a similar spirit fed the animus for the entry of the United States into World War I.388
The problem arises when the presumption of governmental legitimacy is stripped of the 
third element of Luther’s doctrine of temporal authority: the rule of love. When a government is 
not measured against the canon of love with openness and integrity and self-criticism, it finds 
itself on the slippery slope destined for cynical Machiavellianism.389 Put another way, when 
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governments are permitted to function under the mere appearance of righteousness, justice and 
love, they have descended to the Machiavellian.  
Perhaps the best element of Schelling’s teaching for this point in the discussion is that 
power must be met with power. Of course, this assumes one is in a position to assert—or to 
foment the assertion of—such power. For instance, one wonders how Sturm imagines Tillich 
should have asserted—or have gained permission from the chain of command to assert—such 
power, such resistance, as an imperial chaplain. Tillich was already engaging in an inner battle. 
As noted above, ge experienced at least two mental breakdowns at the front. He sought out life-
affirming solace in Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra. Tillich’s wife even bore two children by 
his friend, Carl Richard Wegener while Tillich was away at war.390 To then expect Tillich to 
resist the chain of command stretches credulity. 
This points to the deepest weakness of Luther’s doctrine of temporal authority and the 
subjection to rulers: subjection equals the surrender of the right to criticize. When combined with 
Luther’s judgment that temporal rulers tend to be dolts—and even more of them tend towards 
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corruption391—the avenue of effective criticism, particularly criticism of monarchical 
government, would have been all but closed to a military chaplain on the battlefield. In 
conclusion, the apparently non political thought of Tillich’s pre-1918 period is a surprising 
source of material with which to begin the construction of his religious internationalism. From 
Schelling’s thought, one sees Tillich’s perceptions of the transcendental impact of revelation and 
the centrality of power dynamics. In his personal participation in the war, one witnesses the 
dangers of idolatry and ideology. As a consequence, this period presents these initial elements 
for beginning to construct his ethics of war and peace: 
(1) The inherent provincialism of human thought must be broadened to something  
 closer to “the greatness of the divine”; 
 
(2) The voice of religion is to be that of the ultimate concern which holds up all  
 human claims to relentless scrutiny; 
 
(3) Power is of central importance; 
(4) The power position of an entity is significant; 
(5) Political idolatry is a perpetual risk for the bearers and institutions of power; and 
 
(6) The ideological distortion of the institutions and doctrines of religion is an ever  
 present danger. 
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3.0  THE RELIGIOUS SOCIALIST THEOLOGIAN OF CULTURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
The Germany to which Tillich and his compatriots returned was forced to face life after defeat. 
Democracy came to Germany in the war’s aftermath by way of revolution. A.J.P. Taylor 
characterized the Weimar Republic that arose as a six-year experience of democracy framed by 
two shorter non democratic periods: the preceding period, four years of “political and economic 
confusion”; the succeeding period, three years of “temporary dictatorship, half-cloaked in 
legality, which reduced the republic to a sham long before it was openly overthrown.”392 Though 
it was a culturally rich period, it was weighed down by political antagonisms, economic 
instability, and ongoing tensions with the victors in the war created by Germany’s shifting 
capacity to meet its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles.393
Tillich’s political self-consciousness was awakened by the war. He came home to a 
broken nation and a broken marriage. The experience left him “utterly transformed. The 
traditional monarchist had become a religious socialist, the Christian believer a cultural 
pessimist, the repressed puritanical boy a ‘wild man.’”394 There was a live revolutionary spirit 
fueled by Marxist thought operating in several countries in these years following World War I, 
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i.e., at the time of Tillich’s own newly enlivened political interest. For decades, the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) had been a strong presence in Germany, the birthplace of Marxism. 
With war’s end and the Kaiser’s abdication, it rose to even greater prominence. However, the 
German socialist movement was divided among other parties more radical than the SDP, among 
them the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) and the German Communist 
Party (KPD). Mutinous movements in the military fueled revolutionary dynamics beginning in 
Kiel and spreading throughout Germany in November 1918. A Soviet Republic was established 
in Bavaria for a time in 1919. 
However, beyond Germany much was happening. Most prominent was the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, leading to the beginning of Soviet republics in various regions, culminating 
in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922.395 Beyond the Soviet Union were 
revolutionary movements establishing a Finnish Socialist Workers’ Republic (early 1918), an 
Alsace Socialist Republic (late 1918), a Slovak Soviet Republic (1918-1919), a Hungarian 
Socialist Republic (1919), a Galician Soviet Socialist Republic (bordering Poland and the Soviet 
Union, mid-1920), and a Persian Soviet Socialist Republic (1920-21).396  In Austria and Sweden, 
socialism was a significant presence from the time of the Second International of 1889. An 
Austro-Marxist brand of socialism influenced the Social Democrats there to be less collaborative 
with rightist powers than was the case in Germany in the post World War I years. In the case of 
Sweden, Socialism found its entry into political life to be less volatile there than elsewhere in 
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Europe, perhaps based on Sweden’s more homogenous culture. Further, there was a lesser degree 
of class tension, and a less sharp urban/rural divide.397
Tillich makes specific reference to the Russian Revolution, as subsequent pages will 
show. However, when he thought of concrete socialism, he tended to focus on the German 
situation. His primary concern was with socialist theory and its relationship to Christian thought. 
Therefore, one finds no real attention to the broader picture of the consequences of Marxist 
thought on the non German, non Russian situation. 
While he was never a party activist, during the Weimar period Tillich became an active 
cultural theologian and—as one part of that—an active political theorist. His political analysis 
was part of the broader religious socialism movement, associated with Leonhard Ragaz and Karl 
Barth among others.398 The more particular context for his early religious socialism was a group 
which became known as the Kairos Circle, characterized by some members as a naïve group  
gathered to address the problems of the world “which they regarded as now open to new creative 
possibilities.”399 While group members were not attached to a party, their socialism kept them in 
tension with the conservatism dominating the German church.400
During this period, Tillich’s teaching career took him from the University of Berlin 
(1919-1924) to the University of Marburg (1924-1925), to the Universities of Dresden (1925-
1929) and Leipzig (1927-1929), and finally to the University of Frankfurt (1929-1933) where he 
occupied the chair of the philosophy department from which he was fired with the rise of 
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Nazism.401 While in Frankfurt, he had ongoing professional and social contact with members 
ofthe Frankfurt School at the Institute for Social Research.402
The material from this period treated here is in marked contrast to his chaplaincy 
sermons. Tillich was convinced that the world was experiencing the collapse of western capitalist 
civilization: the war had been the natural outcome of that collapse. Therefore, the thinking of the 
early Marx became important for him at this time, and Tillich brought the sociological-economic 
question to play with full force in his analysis. 403 His political works during the Weimar era 
attack capitalism and argue for a particular kind of socialism—religious socialism—as the 
alternative for a culture wounded by the ravages of capitalism. He shared the view that a nation’s 
culture affected its behavior in the politics among nations. Thus, he unrelentingly attacked the 
economic and political issues of the period, driving them to a level of existential and ontological 
significance.404 Thus, Tillich interpreted German reality as a theologian of culture, as one who 
looked at all elements of the culture through his own theological framework, rooted in the belief 
that all of existence has infinite significance and is rooted in the divine, i.e., he viewed all of 
culture theonomously. Here, Tillich’s thinking will be considered under three headings: (1) 
religious socialist theologian of culture; (2) the religious situation; and (3) culture in general—
politics in particular. 
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3.2 RELIGIOUS SOCIALIST THEOLOGIAN OF CULTURE 
It was not long after his discharge from the army in January 1919 that Tillich gave two public 
lectures that expressed the spirit of his political-cultural work to come during this period. The 
first, entitled “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture,” was delivered before the Kant Society in 
Berlin on April 16, 1919.405 Because he was convinced that World War I had arisen as the death 
knell of capitalism and its ideology of bourgeois liberalism, Tillich was moved to consider what 
went wrong in western civilization. After World War I there was a clear gap between traditional 
religion and the cultural revolution in central and eastern Europe. Religious socialism was an 
attempt to bridge that gap. Tillich’s labors in this area were the efforts of a theologian of 
culture.406 The thoughts presented in the 1919 lecture are but a beginning: the entire Weimar 
period saw Tillich offering occasional pieces—articles, lectures and books—that are the products 
of a theologian of culture practicing his craft. 
3.2.1 “On the Idea on a Theology of Culture” 
Put succinctly, Tillich believed that western civilization had become superficial. To a civilization 
that had ignored the divine, he sought to show the presence of God—the Unconditioned—at the 
depths of all of reality. In the lecture, “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture,” Tillich stated,  
[T]hroughout everything, the reality forces itself upon us that is simultaneously a  No and 
 a Yes to things. It is not a being, it is not substance, it is not the totality of beings. It is, to 
 use a mystical formulation, what is beyond being…an actuality of meaning, indeed, the  
                                                 
405 Pauck, 64. Tillich gives a comprehensive description of theology’s place within the analysis of reality in his 
1923, The System of the Sciences, trans. Paul Wiebe (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1981) in which 
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406 Theodore M. Greene thought that his work in this area attested to his being “the most enlightening and 
therapeutic theologian of our time.” Greene, 50. 
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ultimate and most profound actuality of meaning that convulses everything and builds 
 everything anew.407
 
In this understanding, religion does not censor or dictate culture, functioning 
heteronomously.408 All cultural forms and sciences possess their own rules, “the laws that govern 
their employment,” their autonomous quality.409 The goal of a theology of culture is theonomy, 
an analysis that reveals the deepest—sometimes form-exploding—substance within those 
forms.410 All of culture is within the sphere of religious cultural analysis for the theologian of 
culture who classifies them “from the point of view of religious substance realized in them”.411 
Such a theologian is culturally placed himself or herself, but from that position “fashions the 
ideal design for a culture religiously fulfilled.”412 Further, such a person should have a basic 
quality of openness. Though committed to reform versus revolution, the theologian of culture 
“stands freely within the living cultural movement, open not only to every other form but also to 
every new spirit. Of course, he also lives off the soul of a definite [and necessary] concreteness 
…but he is always prepared to expand this concreteness, to change it.”413 The specific task of the 
church in this process is that of “removing the vital religious elements within the cultural 
community from chance by creating a specifically religious sphere for them, to gather them and 
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concentrate them, theoretically and practically, and thereby to make them into a powerful, 
indeed, into the most powerful factor of culture, one that bears all the rest.”414
The form-exploding potency of spiritual substance was obviously relevant for a post war 
world and was consistent with Tillich’s view that civilization was coming apart at its seams. 
Tillich described the way such a process operated: 
The revelation of an overwhelming substance occurs in this way: form becomes more and  
more inadequate for the reality that is supposed to be contained by it, so that this reality  
in overwhelming abundance shatters it. And yet, this overwhelming and this shattering  
are themselves still form. The task of a theology of culture, then, is to trace this process in  
every sphere and creation of culture and to bring it to expression.415
 
This had relevance for understanding art, science, individual and social ethics, and the 
state. 416 The goal is a theonomous perspective that would call forth a cultural community, “a 
universal human community…whose teachers are the great creative philosophers, whose priests 
are artists, whose prophets are visionaries of a new ethics of person and community, whose 
bishops are those who lead the community to new goals, whose deacons and almoners are those 
who guide anew economic processes.”417
3.2.2 Christianity and Socialism Lecture 
Tillich delivered his second lecture, “Christianity and Socialism,” on May 14, 1919 at a meeting 
of the Independent Socialist Party, a group more radical than the ruling Social Democrats but 
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less so than the communists. Friends of his were party members, though Tillich was not. It was 
an appearance that caught the attention and drew the admonishment of his church overseers.418 
The lecture was published later that year in a pamphlet entitled, “Socialism as a Church 
Question,” and its content is also found in a report to the Protestant Consistory of Brandenburg, 
“Christianity and Socialism”.419  
The piece is divided into three sections: “the relationship of Christianity to the social 
order generally and to the socialist order in particular;” “the perspective of socialism and social 
democracy toward Christianity and the church;” and “the tasks of the church over against 
socialism and its parties.”420 Among the fifteen points under section one are these ideas: the love 
ethic of Jesus is a norm for human and social life, making some social orders acceptable and 
others unacceptable; capitalism’s cultivation of a dog-eat-dog system of competition which 
creates conditions that dull the spirits of workers makes it an unacceptable economic order; and 
Christian love is consistent with the socialist economic order.421 Among the eight points under 
section two, the following is found: socialism must be held to account for lack of subtlety in its 
treatment of religion; a distinction must be made between socialism’s attitude toward 
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Christianity as a whole and socialism’s perspective on a state church that fails to see socialist 
economics as closer to the love ethic than the bourgeois-capitalist order which it supports; and, 
as distinct from Luther’s basic doctrine prohibiting revolution, Reformed (Calvinist) Christianity 
defends a limited right to revolution, Thomistic thought speaks of a specific duty to revolt, and 
even Luther provided for exceptions to his basic doctrine.422 Finally, among the seven points of 
the third section, Tillich offered these thoughts: Christianity’s perspective on socialism should be 
basically positive; reform is not enough and, therefore, Christian love should become embodied 
through “destroying the basis of economic misery,” “stopping the possibility of economic 
egoism,” and “destroying the roots of war through supra-national organization;” church 
representatives should be permitted to participate in the socialist movement; church leadership 
must endorse socialism; and short term conflicts over this question in the church will be 
inevitable.423
3.2.3 Additional Core Concepts 
From these beginnings, the discussion now looks to additional concepts which Tillich used in his 
cultural interpretation. Heternonomy, autonomy, theonomy, and the mutual understanding of 
Christianity and socialism are central themes for understanding the theology of culture, rooted in 
religious socialism, which Tillich had begun to assemble. Three more themes became central for 
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it as Tillich more fully developed this line of his thought in the years that followed: kairos; the 
demonic; and power. 
KAIROS  Tillich wrote the article, “Kairos”, for the journal Die Tat in 1922. The word, kairos, 
is the Greek term (καιρός) for “opportune or seasonable time”,424 or “a welcome time”, or “the 
right, proper, favorable time”.425 It is a word that became significant for Tillich’s thought from 
this time forward. Written as he actively participated in the circle by the same name, his stated 
purpose for this article was a summons to “a consciousness of history whose roots reach down 
into the depth of the unconditional…on the basis of the conception of kairos, a demand for a 
consciousness of the present and for action in the present in the spirit of kairos.”426 Tillich wrote 
of “the invisible community of those who believe in the kairos…[a community] which bears all 
and in which the significance of all work is introduced into culture and religion, proletariat and 
church.”427
Tillich rejected both escapism based on religion as well as mechanistic cyclicality built 
upon Technology: to him, both were unaware of history. 428 He also rejected the revolutionary 
and conservative versions of absolute philosophies of history as dangerously devoid of respect 
for the past and, consequently, surprised by the outcomes of the future, yet idolatrously 
absolutizing particular visions of that future. He saw the indifference of crisis theology to 
history—with its perpetual negation of meaning in history—as a failure to see the negation of the 
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old as the simultaneous kairotic in-breaking of the new.429 While more sympathetic to relativistic 
interpretations of history—particularly dialectical relativism—the progressive ideas within some 
forms of it struck Tillich as utopian.430
The theonomous philosophy of history which Tillich advocated takes seriously the notion 
of kairos: any “turning-point in history in which the eternal judges and transforms the 
temporal.”431 It draws from both absolute and relative philosophies of history, including “the 
demand that everything relative become the vehicle of the absolute and the insight that nothing 
relative can ever become absolute itself.”432 He described what condition was necessary to 
discern a kairos:  
the consciousness of the kairos is dependent on one’s being inwardly grasped by the fate  
and destiny of the time. It can be found in the passionate longing of the masses; it can  
become clarified and take form in small circles of conscious intellectual and spiritual  
concern; it can gain power in the prophetic word; but it cannot be demonstrated and  
forced; it is deed and freedom, as it is also fate and grace.433
 
He saw socialism as the movement most prophetically sensitive to the kairos of that 
time.434
THE DEMONIC   During his Dresden period, Tillich wrote an essay on the demonic. 
Influenced by the thought of Augustine, Tillich defined the demonic as “the unity of form-
creating and form-destroying strength.”435 Satanic power is the form-destroying principle absent 
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form-creative power. The power of genius is form-creating power devoid of the destructive.436 
From the inexhaustible, abysmal dimension of the divine comes the demonic: “Form of being 
and inexhaustibility of being belong together. Their unity in the depth of essential nature is the 
divine, their separation in existence, the relatively independent eruption of the ‘abyss’ in things, 
is the demonic.”437 As John Wilson puts it, Tillich sees the demonic [as] the first principle 
[/potency] as a fallen principle, in all human life. As the root of evil it controls or tries to control 
the form principle.438 In short, “Demonry is the form-destroying eruption of the creative basis of 
things.”439 It arises within personality, overwhelming its unity, in “the possessed state.” It exists 
in correlation with the state of grace: “The difference is only that in the state of grace the same 
forces are united with the highest form which contradict the highest form in the possessed 
state.”440
Tillich saw this same structure ruling in society. There, “The object of demonic 
destruction is the personality standing in social connection and the social structure itself, which 
is built up by the former…The breaking of personality becomes demonic at the moment when 
Will to Power and Eros abuse the social form and its just claim to sacrifice [by individual 
personalities] for their destructive aim.”441
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Attempts by religion to free consciousness from the demonic have ranged from 
mysticism (ecstatic unity with the divine), exclusivism (exclusive devotion to a specific “perfect 
ethical-social idea”), and sacramentalism (the bearing and overcoming of demonic destruction by 
the divine).442 Tillich believed that attempts by the profane world to overcome the demonic 
through the tools of rationality, lose the abysmal depth of the divine in the process.443 All 
attempts to overcome the demonic finds that it is inescapable.444
Tillich identified intellectualism, estheticism, capitalism, and nationalism as the 
demonries powerfully operative at that time.445 There is “one certainty, that the demonic is 
overcome in eternity, that in eternity the demonic is depth of the divine and in unity with divine 
clarity.”446 The struggle of religious socialism was against the demonic in the religious and 
natural realms, using elements of autonomy—rationalism, liberalism, democracy—to open up 
reality “to the theonomous elements of past and present spiritual situations.”447
POWER  Having arrived at the University of Frankfurt two years before, in 1931 Tillich 
published an article which gave special attention to a phenomenon that had been a problem for 
socialism during the entire course of its prominence in the 1920s: power.  
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According to Tillich, to assert might against might is the nature of all encounters: 
“Everything living, in an encounter, appears as a union of remaining within itself and advancing 
beyond itself….”448 The strength of one’s might is measured by the extent to which one can 
advance beyond self without losing self. Being is “a constantly changing balance of mights in 
encounter.”449  The power of the group is defined by the degree to which it successfully asserts 
its will—its might—in encounters with other groups.450 “[P]ower is might on the level of social 
existence.”451  
Tillich argued that power is neither held by an individual to the exclusion of a group, nor 
by a group to the exclusion of individuals. Dictatorships depend on a supporting group, and 
ruling groups have individuals who function overtly or covertly in a guiding way.452 The group 
which rules does so because it seems to represent the will of the society as a whole.453 The 
society’s support of this power combines implicit consent with the demand that their leaders’ 
power “express[es] the meaning of life and might of existence of the total group.”454
Power, interest, and culture coexist with the law, in Tillich’s view: “the law and politics 
of a state are always the expression as well of the interest of the groups in power…Only through 
being the expression of an existence, therefore of a power, is culture concrete, real culture and 
not an abstraction, an impotent Utopia.”455 The play of power within societies is always 
dynamic: might against might is the continuing state of affairs. Tillich challenged Marx’s belief 
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that the proletarian revolution would bring about societal homogeneity, saying that such 
homogeneity would be “a static-vegetative final stage” and “the end of history.”456
For Tillich, spiritual power exists—spirit has life—only when it “is the expression of a 
vital tendency,” when it is supported “by a social interest.”457 Truth exerts power “only as 
concrete truth, i.e., as the truth of a life-tendency…as the truth of a society…as the truth within 
society, which is inwardly powerful.”458
By establishing power positions through which laws can be made and political action 
occur, societal unity occurs. Tillich saw the confrontation of trends undermining unity as the task 
of power, using “conviction and compulsion,” i.e., implicit consent and force.459 Instability 
arises when power holders maintain the tools of compulsion without society’s consent. 
Revolution occurs when a group having society’s implicit consent defeats those possessing only 
“the apparatus of power.”460 Revolutions succeed only when they structure their power in a way 
convincing to society.461
Nations are the largest societal entities in which power operates effectively, according to 
Tillich.462 He saw universal human society to be possible only with the creation of a nation-
transcending power “in which the sovereignty of the national groups is broken by an all-inclusive 
power….”463
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Tillich argued that if might defines existence and power social existence, the surrender of 
might and power means the disintegration of existence.464 As a consequence, any ideas 
promoting the renunciation of power either oppose existence or require a different basis.465 For 
example, from a position of might or power, one can choose one’s relationship to their structures 
within existence, choosing to “advance beyond the sphere” structured by might and power to one 
more transcendent: Christianity and Buddhism are examples of religions embracing such a 
perspective.466 More than this, because meaning involves transcendence, all meaningful 
understandings of might and power require some understanding of transcendence and imply, 
therefore, some degree of renunciation.467  
National Socialism understood the importance of power, according to Tillich, but it did 
not see that “power without consent” and power that does not fulfill society’s demand to embody 
society’s sense of meaning “is not power but only robbery and violation.”468 Tillich called 
socialism to take power more seriously, not renounce power from a position of powerlessness 
(which ends its existence), yet to maintain its utopian vision in a way that energized its power 
struggle, with the hope that it would persuade society to see socialism as the embodiment of 
society’s vision of existence.469
The social ethics of religious socialism took power seriously. Tillich wrote, “The 
development of a meaningful society, in which the possibility exists to recognize the meaningful 
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power of being of another, or, what amounts to the same thing, the formation of a community as 
the unity of power and love, is the socio-ethical ideal of religious socialism.”470
3.3 BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR 
Tillich’s theology of culture makes the argument that religion has something to say to all spheres 
of reality. With some sense of the conceptual tools he used, the discussion now turns to these 
examples of his practice of the sacred/secular dialectic: (1) faith and realism; (2) the holy and the 
profane; (3) Christianity and social structure; and (4) critical and creative Protestantism. 
3.3.1 Faith and Realism 
Tillich argued for the primacy of the viewpoint expressed by the designation, “self-transcending 
realism”. It is a perspective that he applied to all realms of existence. It is universal.471 It unites 
two concepts which seem incompatible: realism and faith. It challenges a realism lacking 
spiritual depth and an idealism that is incapable of making the contact with the divine.472
 Tillich contextualized self-transcending realism among the classic schools of realism. He 
was aware of three schools:  technological realism; mystical realism; and historical realism. In 
technological realism, reason and power of being unite in order to control the world. Its presence 
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in the modern world makes it practically futile to struggle against it.473 Mystical realism—in 
direct opposition to technological realism—“seek[s] for the inner power of things beyond (or 
below) the level at which they are calculable or dominable.”474 Yet, neither one is rooted in 
concrete existence. They practice abstraction: technological realism for utilitarian reasons; 
mystical realism “for the sake of essence and intuition.”475 For historical realism, “The really 
real is asked for in time and space, in our historical existence….”476 It is contemporaneity which 
historical realism brings to the table. 
Historical realism is committed to digging into the depths of personal and social 
existence.477 Self-transcending realism affirms historical realism’s contemporaneity, but takes 
the further step of penetrating to its depth of meaning, to its “religious depth…[where] the 
ground of our being…breaks into our existence and…judges us and heals us.”478
3.3.2 The Holy and the Profane 
According to Tillich, the history of western civilization displays this cycle with regard to religion 
and culture: religion attempts to impinge on the cultural dimension in a way that heteronomously 
crushes the legitimate functions of culture (in embodying human autonomy); and culture rejects 
the absolute meaning of its creations (autonomy devoid of theonomy).479  
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Tillich described two levels of meaning: concrete meaning and absolute or ultimate 
meaning. The latter is “the basis and the abyss of meaning.”480 He wrote, “[W]e call [the] object 
of the silent belief in the ultimate meaningfulness, this basis and abyss of all meaning which 
surpasses all that is conceivable, God. And we call the direction of the spirit which turns toward 
Him, religion.”481 The abysmal quality of God, of the Unconditional, is its inexhaustibility.482 
The distinction between holy and profane occurs at the existential level, not at the essential level: 
“One cannot be essentially profane, but one can be consciously profane. One cannot be 
essentially holy, but one can be so consciously.”483 Within existence, the profane lacks deeper 
meaning, and the holy lacks adequate form. 484  
Applied to community, society is human community devoid of meaning and church is 
community devoid of adequate form. 485 The fact that church and society exist separately speaks 
against both. As Tillich put it, “the Church is the perpetual guilty conscience of society and 
society the perpetual guilty conscience of the Church.”486 True holiness is accomplished by God 
through revelation to redeem church and society, religion and culture.487 Holiness understood in 
this way “means to be situated in this tension, in religion over religion and in culture over culture 
and through this superposition to lead both sides toward redemption, to fill the profane forms 
with the content of the holy and to express the contents of the holy in the profane forms.”488 By 
acknowledging the essential oneness of church and culture, the truth is recognized that “the 
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substance of culture is religion and the form of religion is culture.”489 Yet, their existential 
tension and separation remains. Humanity’s responsibility is one of preparation, with the church 
subjecting its forms to judgment and culture filling its forms with meaning. The hope is this: 
“There are many in society and many in the Church who can prepare the way. When there are 
enough, and when their waiting and their action have become profound enough, the a new 
‘Kairos,’ a new fullness of time will have arrived.”490
3.3.3 Christianity and Social Structure 
Tillich saw Christianity and modern western society to be interwoven.491 The impact of 
Christianity’s doctrine of creation is seen in the belief that “the divine essence…is present 
everywhere” and that existence has “a unitary meaning, a unitary origin and goal.”492 
Protestantism brought attention to the importance of individual personality and conscience and 
the meaningful quality of daily life.493
But the “this-worldly” quality of existence eventually lost much of its soul, becoming 
secularized, being reduced to “self-sufficient finitude”.494 Citing Weber’s recognition of the 
“psychic rewards” in Calvin’s notion of work, Tillich wrote, “In Calvinism alone is there the 
holiness of rigorous work” as the confirmation of predestination: “Earning a living in itself, work 
as such, is set above the person, all inactivity is declared godless and profit viewed as divine 
blessing. With that, Calvinist ethics has come completely into the bourgeois-capitalist channel.” 
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495 Luther’s doctrine of civil authority maintained the continuing passivity toward earthly 
authority, making Christianity’s influence on contemporary society quite weak.496 Christianity 
was largely assimilated to the world, “transformed into the economic and technical mastery of 
the world, into humanitarianism and the worldly development of personality.”497 Tillich wrote an 
essay in response to a 1928 exhibition, “The Technical City,” at the Dresden Technical Institute. 
He interpreted the city as a symbol both of humanity’s attempt to escape the strangeness—the 
uncanniness (Umheimlichkeit, “homelessness”)—of existence and of humanity’s search for 
fulfillment through technological control.498 Yet, he observed the inability of technical creations 
to respond to us, that they “cannot speak as life speaks to life.”499 This creates a new 
uncanniness, this time toward the irreconcilably strange and lifeless technological world. It also 
has a life-dissipating impact human life which is “deadened by our being in the service of that 
which we ourselves have brought to lifelessness…condemned to be servants of the servant of 
humankind.”500
Tillich’s friend, colleague, and fellow religious socialist, Eduard Heimann, wrote that 
their use of the word “religious” was not “designed to pull the teeth of socialism and make it 
respectable.”501  Rather, Tillich called religious socialism “the exceedingly difficult attempt, on 
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both the intellectual and the social level, to work toward a new form of future society in which 
the autonomous life of that society will be filled with the meaning-giving essence of 
Christianity,”502 attacking the problem at the point of greatest social tension: the conflict 
between the middle class and the proletariat.”503 With this description of Tillich’s general 
understanding of the sacred/secular relationship, we turn to the relationship of Tillich’s 
Protestantism to this theme. 
3.3.4 Critical and Creative Protestantism 
PROTESTANTISM AS CRITICAL AND CREATIVE DIALECTIC   Tillich understood 
religious socialism theologically as embodying the radicalized dialectic of the Protestant-
prophetic principle. This principle carries with it the “No” and the “Yes” of the boundary 
situation, the “No” in the experience of the presence of the Unconditioned, the “Yes” of the 
experience of justification, and an openness to the  new embodied in culture and community.504 
Thus, it is important to see Protestantism’s role in his religious socialist interpretation of culture. 
In 1929, Tillich examined Protestantism’s relation to culture in three articles:  “The Protestant 
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Message and the Man of Today;” “Protestantism as a Critical and Creative Principle;” and “The 
Formative Power of Protestantism.”505
To a German culture insecure within the autonomous spirit with which he characterized 
intellectual and theological thought of the late 1920s, Tillich presented a Protestantism that went 
beyond the mysticism and sacramentalism of Catholicism in facing the “human boundary-
situation”.506 Human beings are created to live in freedom, accepting “the unconditional demand 
to realize the true and to actualize the good.”507 When one experiences the inevitable failure to 
do so “in its unconditional and inescapable character, the human border-situation is encountered. 
The point at which not-being in the ultimate sense threatens us is the boundary line of all human 
possibility, the human border-situation.”508 In Tillich’s interpretation, Protestantism brings 
people to face the boundary situation.509 In facing the cultural disintegration and abysmal 
meaningless of the period, humanity was experiencing the boundary-situation which 
Protestantism announced.510
The Protestant principle delineated by Tillich is both critical and creative.511 Its prophetic 
criticism works from beyond form: it facilitates “the shattering of life and spirit by that which is 
beyond both of them.”512 In Protestant criticism, prophetic and rational criticism work together 
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to give it an understanding of truth rooted in that which is beyond being, borne by rational 
thought deepened by the Unconditioned, and tempered by grace.513
Tillich took seriously the radically prophetic “No” raised by Karl Barth’s theology of 
crisis.514 At the same time, he criticized Barth’s group for not being self-critical, for “not 
pass[ing] through the fire of its own criticism.”515 Tillich sought a way for “criticism and 
creation” to be united to further the formative impact of Protestantism,516 to hold all of life under 
the “judgment and promise” of justification: 
Luther, the young monk, stood in the depth of this boundary-situation and dared to reject  
all safeguards that piety and the church wished to extend to him. He remained in it and  
learned in it that just this and only this is the situation in which the divine ‘Yes’ over the  
whole of human existence can be received; for this ‘Yes’ is not founded on any human  
achievement, it is an unconditional and free sovereign judgment from above human  
possibilities.517
 
Rather than fighting humanism, Tillich called Protestantism to insist on being the 
substance filling guardian of the material, of reality (Sachlichkeit),518 deepening humanism with 
a sense of the Unconditional,519 possessing a dialectical relationship with humanism.520
Tillich saw prophetic criticism bringing about forms of grace: “The form of grace is the 
form of that which lies beyond being and freedom…It is actual in objects not as an object but as 
the transcendent meaning of an object.”521 The form of grace “is realized only in rational forms 
…in such a way that, on the one hand, it gives to them a meaning that transcends them, while, on 
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the other hand, it unites with the particular meaning inherent in the rational forms…the form of 
grace is a fulfillment of the rational form.”522 In all living forms there is “a hidden form of grace 
that is identical with its power to be,” not predisposing that it “become a form of grace,” but 
serving as the basis through which prophetic criticism can shape it into a realization of grace.523
Protestantism declares, “The form of grace cuts across the secular.”524 Tillich called the 
sacred-profane distinction invalid for Protestantism. Church congregations are simply “an 
explicit expression of the transcendent significance of all sociological forms.”525 Protestantism 
has a three-part message to proclaim: first, the boundary-situation must be radically experienced; 
second, when a person faces the boundary situation with utter seriousness, that person 
simultaneously experiences the divine “Yes” of assurance, wholeness, affirmation, and meaning 
in the face of disintegration within existence; and, thirdly, the “New Being” enables us to 
experience theonomous existence “directly and intentionally” in religious institutions, “indirectly 
and unintentionally” in cultural forms.526 In this way, Protestantism is released for “form-
creation”, creating forms which are open to secular criticism to undermine traces of idolatry, 
which are related to the present, concrete situation, which daringly express grace, and which 
manifest belief-ful realism. 527 It does so by enabling “autonomous forms [to] become bearers of 
ultimate meaning.”528 To the degree that such nonreligious entities do this more effectively than 
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the church, “they and not the churches represent Protestantism for the man of today.”529 Yet, the 
chief task of Protestantism is preparation for the operation of grace.530
PROTESTANTISM AND THE STATE   The Protestant principle informed Tillich’s 
understanding of the state: “The state is the power of a community that realizes itself in the 
positing of justice.”531 Tillich described three possible relationships between the state and its 
“spiritual values”: the state as the oppressive Hobbesian Leviathan which subjects all values to 
itself; the Hegelian “state as God on earth” which is the “bearer of all spiritual values”; and the 
watchman state of liberalism, which assumes just enough power to enable peaceful existence and 
ensure justice.532 The Protestant understanding of the state’s relationship to the church is that the 
state “tacitly transfers” responsibility for spiritual matters to the church: as the depth dimension 
of all reality a religious element remains with the state; however, it is not the direct caretaker of 
spiritual matters (thus the transfer); and the tacitness leaves the boundary between state and 
church murky and penetrable.533
Tillich saw a parallel situation in economics. Mercantilist economics corresponds to the 
Leviathan model. Free trade economics corresponds to the state as watchman. The state as God 
on earth perceives economics as “the lowest grade of holiness”.534 The state’s “tacit transfer” of 
economics to the powers of economic production—rooted in the Protestant principle—defines 
the relationship in ways “that express the fundamental candor of the relationship [between the 
state and economic power-holders],…the participation of the state in the meaning of the 
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economy, in its goal and its social structure, and the state’s renunciation of its own 
productivity.”535
States need the “real and concrete concentration of power” to exist.536 The structure of 
this power may be overt or hidden. Tillich argued for unmasking the powers of “the great 
capitalists” behind democracy: “Concealed by democracy, they utilize it and undermine it, they 
bear it and at the same time destroy it.”537 Instead, a polarity between the power of being of the 
true power-holders and the ideal of democracy as corrective must be made manifest.538
When Tillich turned to the relationship among states, he stated, “The polarity of criticism 
and formative power, of what ought to be and what is, is valid for the inner structure of the state 
as well as for the relationship of states to one another.”539  
An expanding community required a deeper source of meaning, to Tillich, and he found 
this in the church, but only in a way consistent with the Protestant principle of self-criticism, 
“when the church always stands dialectically towards its own forms and existence....”540 
Nonetheless, given the inescapability of this meaning-giving basis, “political unity can extend 
only as far as church unity.”541
PROTESTANTISM AND THE PROLETARIAT   Tillich saw the proletariat as the 
embodiment of the experience of the threat of the boundary situation enunciated by the “No” of 
the Protestant dialectic.542 In three 1922 writings (published in the Gesammelte Werke as a 
group under the title „Masse und Geist“), Tillich addressed the impact of capitalism on the life of 
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the masses, having been moved my “its misery, its formlessness, and its creative force.”543 The 
texts are „Masse und Persönlichkeit,“ (addressing the ethical-social dimension), „Masse und 
Bildung,“ (focusing on the spiritual/ intellectual-pedagogical dimension), and „Masse und 
Religion“ (dealing with the philosophical-religious dimension). In the first, Tillich declared that 
“out of the depth of a new substance, a new humanity must be born in which the contrast 
between mass and personality is overcome.”544 In the second, he advocated a pattern of 
enculturation would develop in which a “mechanized masses” are replaced by the organic and 
dynamic masses.545 In the third, he called for religion in the sense of an inner transcendence—a 
connection of the meaning of all things with the Unconditioned—combined with an immanence 
in which the masses see “the actuality of the holy not in the soul and not in the church, but in the 
world….”546
Tillich was convinced that Protestantism had failed the proletariat in a basic way: it called 
the masses to religious decision, while being silent about the religious significance of the social 
and political life. In this, Protestantism was untrue to its unrelenting principle of holding 
everything conditional accountable to the unconditioned depth of the prophetic spirit.547 The 
failure of Protestantism with respect to the proletariat was its failure to embody its principle. 548
Consistent with the religious socialism rooted in it, the Protestant principle understands 
humanity as the unity of body and spirit, rather than dualistically. Tillich believed that 
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institutional Protestantism had failed to do this in social ethics.549 Again, the primary victims of 
this failure were the masses of the proletariat. As previously noted, the primary demonic force 
perpetrating this victimization was capitalism, an ideology, given its concealment of the truth 
regarding its impact upon existence.550  
Tillich called it one of the Protestant principle’s most significant tasks to expose such 
“concrete ideologies” within itself and within culture at large.551 Historical Protestantism had 
failed the proletariat on at least five fronts, according to Tillich: reducing all truth to “the letters 
of a sacred book;” excluding worldly activity from its concern; emphasizing the conscious and 
the rational while ignoring the impact of the subconscious on human life; replacing Catholic 
hierarchy with the worldly hierarchies of political absolutism and capitalism which stand against 
the proletariat; and endorsing nationalism and the powers behind it.552
For Tillich, anticipation, “calling”, and the bridging of the sacred and secular divide are 
central to giving hope to the proletarian situation. Anticipation is rooted in the tension between 
and awful present and a hoped for future. The Protestant principle works to maintain this, while 
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keeping it from falling into utopianism.553 Religious socialism saw the proletariat to possess the 
call and impulse to engage in the class struggle against capitalism.554 That the Protestant 
principle would be embodied in the proletarian movement displays the limitlessness of the 
unconditional: it “permeates every moment of daily life and makes it holy,”555 it bridges the 
sacred/secular divide. Tillich suspected that socialism itself, “under the disguise of a secular 
theory and practice,” represented “a special religious type, namely the type that originates in 
Jewish prophetism and transcends the given world in the expectation of a ‘new earth’.”556
3.4 CULTURE IN GENERAL—POLITICS IN PARTICULAR 
Perhaps the two most important examples of cultural analysis by Tillich during Weimar were his 
books, The Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision. The first is general analysis of 
German culture, midway through the 1920s. The second is concentrated political analysis of 
Germany as it was about to fall to Hitler. 
3.4.1 The Religious Situation 
Wilhelm and Marion Pauck called Tillich’s The Religious Situation his first successful book. 
Tillich’s concern in it was to give a comprehensive analysis of  the impact of capitalism upon 
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it.557 The year of its German publication (1926) was one Tillich characterized by political 
disillusionment, an economically weaker socialism, and—spiritually—“pacification…tiredness 
…resignation.”558 To him, capitalism had separated the temporal from its roots in the eternal, 
ending in meaninglessness: “If any present has meaning it has eternity.”559 Tillich saw capitalism 
as blinding humanity to God’s glory in creation, as failing to free humanity from the demonic in 
nature, and ignoring “the sacredness of human personality.”560
As a consequence, Tillich called science to stop focusing on the particular to the neglect 
of the totality, on parts versus structure, on explaining rather than understanding, on existence to 
the exclusion of essence and meaning.561 Tillich was concerned with scientific methodology 
from the physical to the social sciences which failed to connect specific elements with a larger 
context of meaning. He called for a “belief-ful realism” open to the Unconditional, the eternal.562 
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562 The Religious Decision, 81-3. In a 1927 article, Tillich called belief-ful realism “a comprehensive attitude…not a 
theoretical world view, but also not a life-praxis, but rather [it] lies at a level of life beneath the split between theory 
and praxis.” (Paul Tillich, „Über gläubigen Realismus (1927),“ in Main Works/Hauptwerke, Vol. 4: Writings in the 
Philosophy of Religion [Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1987], 194.) On the “belief-ful” element in belief-ful 
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Tillich praised expressionism for challenging the self-sufficiency of either the artist or the object, 
expressing instead “the transcendental reference in things to that which lies beyond them is 
expressed.”563
He attacked the politics of capitalism in which “the attitude toward material things comes 
to be dominating, loveless, without the sense of community with them,”564 and where workers 
“are impoverished spiritually for the sake of their service to the machine, that the mechanical 
production of the human mass takes place. For the mass is formed by soldering together 
atomized individuals which have lost all individual quality.”565 Tillich spoke for a religious 
socialism that raised “the demand for that which we have designated belief-ful realism, that is an 
unconditional acceptance of the serious importance of our concrete situation in time and of the 
situation of time in general in the presence of eternity”, which supports unromantic, anti-utopian, 
yet hopeful transcendence beyond the capitalist illusion of “self-sufficient finitude.”566
In the realm of ethics, Tillich believed that capitalism was hypocritical in its morality and 
proposed a communal life resting “on the foundation of the eternal,”567 including sexuality 
which realizes “eternal meanings present in the relation of the sexes,” medicine reviving “the 
central mind-body, doctor-patient relationship,”568 education that “rest[s] upon a common 
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demands that are inherent in things and situations.” (“Religious Socialism,” 51) 
568 The Religious Decision, 141. 
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relationship of both teacher and taught to something ultimate,”569 and “an ideal of community 
and personality which has transcendent references and which every one, quite apart from his 
cultural background and education, is able to realize.”570
Lastly, Tillich turned to religion itself. He wrote of “act[ing] and wait[ing] in the sense of 
Kairos [which] means to wait upon the invasion of the eternal and to act accordingly….”571 He 
criticized Catholicism and Protestantism for cultivating a culture of “self-sufficient finitude”.572 
Beyond the autonomy of capitalism and the heteronomy of church institutions, Tillich pointed to 
theonomy and its goal of “the free devotion of finite forms to the eternal.”573 The church could 
contribute to this through “a union of the priestly spirit of [Catholicism] and the prophetic spirit 
of [Protestantism]”.574  
3.4.2 The Socialist Decision 
As Nazism’s rise to power seemed to be drawing near, two of Tillich’s responses to that prospect 
caught the attention of National Socialists. Tillich prepared the document, “The Church and the 
Third Reich: Ten Theses,” for a 1932 book sent to Hitler entitled, Die Kirche und das Dritte 
Reich: Fragen und Forderungen deutscher Theologen.575 In it, he warned the Protestant Church 
against passively surrendering to Nazi demonism through an escapist and otherworldly 
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understanding of the Kingdom of God and the abandonment of its prophetic role of advocating 
for social and political justice.576
The book, The Socialist Decision, was the culmination of Tillich’s political analysis 
during Weimar. Before discussing it in depth, it should be understood that it is a work which 
capped the dialectical struggle Tillich undertook throughout his post World War I period in 
Germany. The interplay between religion and national identity that one sees in Tillich was 
manifested in broader cultural tensions which arose from this period through the early years of 
Hitler’s rule.577
Tillich did not embrace socialism to the complete exclusion of political romanticism. His 
treatment of romanticism showed a commitment to bringing socialism critically and creatively to 
bear on the cultural issues of the day.  
Tillich knew the cultural fabric of Germany to be one characterized by this same tension: 
socialism ran up against a nation that had evolved an organic sense of its identity. Anthony 
Smith has written of the roots of this “German ‘organic version’ of nationalism.”578 It was 
informed by Johann Gottfried von Herder’s view that the world is composed of a number of 
distinct cultures, “unique organic ‘nations’ or language groups.”579 Under the influence of 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, it asserted that national identity arises by means of struggle and requires 
the absorption of individual identity into national identity. Thus, education became the primary 
tool for accomplishing this, enculturating the individual into the collective national will.580
                                                 
576 Paul Tillich, “The Church and the Third Reich: Ten Theses,” in Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries, ed. 
Mark Kline Taylor (London: Collins, 1987), 117-8. 
577 The discussion here will comment on those tensions briefly in the following chapter, specifically with regard to 
the rupture in German theological circles. 
578 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 17. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid. See also K.R. Minogue, Nationalism (New York: Basic Books, 1967), 57-69. 
 93
For Tillich this was an existential struggle. He freely expressed his roots in romanticism: 
“Romanticism means not only a special relation to nature; it means also a special relation to 
history. To grow up in towns in which every stone is a witness of a period many centuries past 
produces a feeling for history, not as a matter of knowledge, but as a living reality in which the 
past participates in the present.”581 He wrote of the paternalistic culture of his youth, a Prussian 
society which was “authoritarian without being totalitarian,” Lutheran patriarchy manifested in 
family, school, and empire, and a highly developed, hierarchical bureaucracy, expressed most 
impressively (to Tillich) in the military. Tillich’s enthusiasm for military display dissipated only 
with the beginning of his experiences on the front line of the First World War.582 The 
conservative Lutheran culture from which he came distorted and judged democracy and 
socialism to be both wrongly disruptive and criminal.583
The romanticism of Schelling expressed Tillich’s appreciation of nature. The sea was a 
source of thinking for him on matters ranging from the infinite to the “dynamic mass”.584 
Reading Nietzsche during the war reaffirmed the Schellingian influence in his thinking. 
According to Ratschow, Nietzschean thought was a path for Tillich toward a vitalism rooted in 
Schelling.585 Tillich’s membership in the Prussian civil service bureaucracy informed his sense 
of the duty of individuals to “the ‘organic whole’” and his willingness to submit to authority.586 
The religious milieu of his youth—maturing within a pastor’s home in a small German town—
provided the early context for a sense of the mysteries of religious thought and tradition.587  
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However, for Tillich, these were all matters of the givenness of the past, not the 
predisposition for the future. He wrote, 
My attachment to my native land in terms of landscape, language, tradition and mutuality  
of historical destiny has always been so instinctive that I could never understand why it  
should have to be made an object of special attention. The overemphasis of cultural  
nationalism in national education and intellectual productivity is an expression of  
insecurity about national ties…I have always felt so thoroughly German by nature that I  
could not dwell on the fact at length. Conditions of birth and destiny cannot really be  
questioned. We should instead ask: What shall we do with this which is given in our  
lives? What should be our criterion for evaluating society and politics, intellectual and  
moral training, cultural and social life?588
 
Tillich referred to roots of a more revolutionary spirit in his past and in his religious 
tradition: “Perhaps it was a drop of the blood which induced my grandmother to build barricades 
in the Revolution of 1848, perhaps it was the deep impression of the words of the prophets 
against injustice and the words of Jesus against the rich; all these were words which I learned by 
heart in my early years.”589 While World War I still raged, he discovered the depth of the class 
division in Germany and the association of the church with the ruling class from the perspective 
of the working class.590 The war served as a crucible for past presuppositions and as a basis for 
learning regarding politics and war, as well as economics, imperialism and classism.591 Tillich 
wrote of his entry into the religious socialist movement as “the definitive break with 
philosophical idealism and theological transcendentalism,” bringing about an awakening “to the 
religious significance of political Calvinism and social sectarianism, over against the 
predominantly sacramental character of my own Lutheran tradition.”592  
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The outcome of these tensions for Tillich presaged his later self-positioning on the 
boundary. Tillich was conscious of social guilt from early on for being part of the privileged 
class. His attraction to the city saved him from undue romanticism and affirmed the city as 
central to “the critical side of intellectual and artistic life”.593 A sense of duty was present in 
every conscious act of Tillich’s life: in basic decisions; in decisions against tradition especially; 
in insecurity in the face of the new; and in a desire for systematic order.594 Tillich later saw his 
boundary position as the reason for not completely rejecting feudalism with his choice in favor 
of socialism.595 In the early 1950s, Tillich summarized this tension: “The balance of [the 
romantic and revolutionary motives] has remained the basic problem of my thought and life ever 
since [the decision in favor of religious socialism].”596 With these thoughts in mind, the 
discussion turns to the most important product of Tillich’s negotiation of the political tensions 
existing at the point at which Nazism loomed threateningly on the horizon: The Socialist 
Decision. 
The Sociaist Decision is an extensive examination of the weaknesses of German 
socialism, published in the twilight hours of the Weimar Republic. Max Horkheimer later noted, 
“‘after reading some sections of his writings, it was I who told him that, in my opinion, if he did 
not leave the country, he would pay with his life.’”597 The book examines the interplay of 
socialism, bourgeois liberalism, and political romanticism, seeking a path to the future with 
seriousness and hope.598
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In The Socialist Decision, Tillich described a double basis for political behavior: the 
myths of origin and the unconditional demand of the new. The first grows out of the “being” side 
of humanity. The second arises out of humanity’s self-consciousness. Tillich pointed out, “The 
demand that human beings experience is unconditional, but it is not alien to human nature,”599 
leading humanity to true fulfillment, leading to justice.600
Tillich saw these two roots at the heart of the primary political movements of his day: 
“The consciousness oriented to the myth of origin is the root of all conservative and romantic 
thought in politics…The breaking of the myth of origin by the unconditional demand is the root 
of liberal, democratic, and socialist in politics.”601  
The primary characteristics of the myths of origin are cyclicality, the sacrality of space, 
and the holiness of being: space dominates time.602  The sacralization of space is expansive and 
permits a single ethic: “Might makes right.”603 Tillich simultaneously affirmed the powers of 
origin in the principle of political romanticism, while strongly opposing its destructive 
irrationality. 604
The shattering of the myth of origin is what Tillich called “the world-historical mission of 
Jewish prophetism.”605 Prophetism and rationalism threaten political romanticism.606 Reason 
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sees reality as a source of tools of rationality and empirical analysis, sapping the myths of origin 
of their power.607 While prophetism maintains its tie to mythic origins—i.e., it seeks a return to 
their deepest meaning—autonomy severs its connection to origins.608 Prophetism primarily seeks 
reform. Autonomy seeks revolution. Political romanticism responds to both, using the very tools 
it criticizes within these movements: it claims to possess a higher justice than prophetism, and it 
uses the Enlightenment’s tools of rational analysis to justify its irrational assumptions.609
Tillich believed the socialist principle had to redefine its relationship to the bourgeoisie. 
He defined the bourgeois principle as “the radical dissolution of all conditions, bonds, and forms 
related to the origin into elements that are to be rationally mastered, and the rational assemblage 
of these elements into structures serving the aims of thought and action.”610 In principle, the 
“free play of productive forces” (as in liberalism) or the subjection of nature by the decisive 
action of individuals (as in democracy) are to result in progressive harmony.611 In practice, trust 
in laissez faire economics overshadows the democratic corrective. Harmony does not follow 
from the rational mastery of resources, and the corrective function of the democratic, prophetic 
demand for justice that is able to keep the expansive forces of the origin in check is lost.612
The beneficiaries of free market economics turn to alliances with pre-bourgeois forces to 
cope with disharmony and practice freedom as freedom from restraint.613 The dehumanized 
victims of the free market (the proletariat) appeal to the bourgeoisie to live by its principle, 
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seeing democracy (with its rational critique) as the path to a just distribution of resources, even if 
it requires the temporary period of a dictatorship by the proletariat.614 In Tillich’s view, by 
failing in this, the bourgeois principle turns out to be “a corrective, not a normative principle.”615  
The groups refuting any alliance with pre-bourgeois forces—socialism among them—
radicalize the bourgeois principle.616 Socialism sees disharmony as inevitable in the laissez faire 
approach. Therefore, it seeks market control on behalf of justice. Democratic critique seems to 
prevail here. Yet, socialism does not possess the persuasive power to defeat the bourgeois and 
pre bourgeois forces at the ballot box. Consequently, alliances with the forces of the origin are 
required of socialism as well. 617 Tillich asked, “Can socialism be the fulfillment of the bourgeois 
principle when at the same time it is the expression of its destruction? Must not the struggle 
against bourgeois society question the bourgeois principle itself?”618
Tillich believed that a relevant socialism had to have a self-understanding that considered 
both its particularity (bound to the proletariat) as well as its universality (including all of 
society).619 Cut off from the proletariat, socialist theory stays in the conceptual realm. Cut off 
from its transcendent dimension, the proletariat is imprisoned in the class struggle.620  
According to Tillich, it was important for socialism to confront its own inner conflicts 
manifested in these areas: its vision of a utopian future; human nature; society; culture; 
community; and economics. The socialist belief in a utopian future of harmony was unhistorical, 
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yet borne by a school entrenched in history.621 Thus, Tillich believed socialism must turn to an 
expectation looking to a justice consistent with present circumstances and fulfilling its true 
origin.622 While socialism advocated a rationalistic critique bringing about human 
transformation, it was mute on how to do so and misunderstood humanity’s non rational side. 623 
Therefore, Tillich said that it should embrace life as a “complex of vital, erotic, aesthetic, and 
religious impulses…[allowing for] an ascendancy of so-called ‘spiritual’ impulses over the life-
preserving tendencies.”624 Societal and universal harmony, with the proletariat as the tool 
thereto, conflicted with reality as an arena of power struggle.625 As a consequence, Tillich 
declared that socialism must understand power in a positive way, as the means for fulfilling the 
primal claim of the true origin for justice in the concrete situation,626 and democracy should be 
corrective rather than constitutive, since even democratic governmental processes can be used 
for domination.627 In culture, socialism’s approach to science ignores the pre-rational basis for 
human fulfillment, its pursuit of universal education faces insuperable barriers, and its exaltation 
of the proletariat ignored the proletariat’s dissipated cultural and intellectual capacities.628 In the 
face of this, Tillich asserted that socialism must reconnect with its cultural roots, returning to its 
prophetic, “religious” dimension, supported by the powers of origin, “revealing to reason the 
inner infinity of being, and at the same time, by offering it support and structure.”629 Socialism 
failed to see community as “the expression of a unity that also exists apart from a common 
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struggle and a common enemy…rest[ing] on some form of origin, on eros and destiny, and not 
…grounded in reason.”630 To remedy this, Tillich called it to affirm national community while 
resisting nationalism’s exaltation of a particular nation, measuring all nations against the 
standard of the prophetic standard of justice.631 Finally, the proletariat discovered conflicting 
economic interests within itself and the need for alliances with its antagonists to reach its 
goals.632 Tillich’s response to these dynamics was a call for steps rooted in an understanding of 
concrete economic realities: a “standardization of needs” through equal income, and the 
development of a need tradition would avoid economic disruption; technological progress 
possessing controls that mediate its impact upon the labor force and its, consequent, capacity to 
consume;633 a new “meaning of work…so constituted that work serves people and does not 
destroy them”;634 and the subjection of national and international economic behavior to the claim 
of justice.635
Tillich sought legitimate foundations for socialism to overcome its multi-layered, inner 
conflict. The socialist principle’s primary concept of expectation stood against objectification 
and dehumanization as it threatened from both directions: “Expectation… overcomes an 
objectified bond of origin (‘Everything remains the same’) as well as an objectified expectation 
(‘Someday everything will become new’). It is non objectified expectation (‘The new breaks into 
the old’).”636 Tillich understood expectation’s transcendence in terms of the perpetual prophetic 
demand and its imminence through its rational comprehensibility.637
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Finally, the socialist principle had to confront the Marxism of the 1930s along three lines: 
its materialism; its dialectics; and its dogmatism. For Marx, “Materialism is economism.”638 
Socialism has to cease maintaining the bourgeois ideology of harmony, revealing the disharmony 
within society.639 He called into question a history as ruled either by necessity (Hegel, Marx, and 
prophetism) or by freedom (“ethical socialism”), seeking a true dialectic: “Socialist action 
proceeds from the inner conviction that it corresponds to the meaning and impulse of history,”640 
seen most vividly in the proletariat in its almost instinctive response to the injustices of 
capitalism.641 Further, socialism had to reject a dogmatism that had undermined its impact.642
Ultimately, Tillich was convinced that socialism’s success depended on its “reliance on 
its own principle, in which powers of origin and prophetic expectation are combined,” with 
expectation as the primary factor. 643
3.5 CONCLUSION 
If his labors during the First World War were Tillich’s first attempts to see war from a 
theological perspective, the post World War I and Weimar years were ones in which Tillich 
began to see the culture of a nation in a theological way, revealing dynamics therein that are 
implicitly related to the decision for or against war: war led Tillich to look at culture, because 
unjust cultures fomented reckless wars. Religiously rooted cultural analysis led Tillich to take 
seriously the questions of economics and society. The critical and creative capacity of Tillich’s 
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construct, the Protestant principle, led him to question some economic assumptions and to 
endorse other ones that he believed would lead to a more just society. The failure to embody that 
just society sowed seeds for discontent that made Germany ripe for collapse before forces able to 
amass the streams of discontent. 
John Stumme has described the religious socialism of Paul Tillich as concrete, critical, 
comprehensive, and constructive,644 but it was also impotent in the face of the political anemia of 
social democracy and the dynamically irrational nationalism of Hitler. Tillich’s severe criticism 
of capitalism understandably came under the attack of a western world dominated by 
capitalism.645 However, its primary weakness may not have been weakness at all: it may have 
been bad timing, a failure to of discerning whether a kairos had arrived, a time which was ready 
to give consideration to the value of Tillichian religious socialism. 
The elements for an ethic of war and peace from Tillich’s thought during this period 
include the following: 
(1) A nation’s cultural health is of significant importance to its bellicosity; 
 
(2) Religion—as the source of meaning for all of existence—must inform one’s  
 understanding of culture: theonomy as the depth of the embrace of  autonomy and  
 the autonomous rejection of heteronomy; 
 
(3) Religion is critical and creative and is embodied in the Protestant principle; 
 
(4) The Protestant principle measures all truth claims—including those involving  
 culture and politics (as a subset of culture)—by the standards of love and justice; 
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(5) Economics must be included as a central factor in a nation’s cultural health—this  
  includes the socialist critique of capitalism; 
 
(6) Views asserting religious significance that are penultimate—that make claims  
 alleging ultimacy, but that contradict the norms of love and  justice—are either  
 idolatrous or irreligious; 
 
(7) History is of central importance, with these phenomena as particularly significant:  
 power as the primal force which enables being (historical existence); kairoi  as  
 those periods ripe for creative action; and the demonic as power destructively  
 divorced from the creatively ordering dynamics of history; and 
  
(8) Ethical action is consistent with a kairos, embodies self-transcending realism  
 (“believing realism”), and rises above a sacred-secular or holy-profane distinction  
 by seeing all realms of existence as potentially ripe for creative, theonomous  
 activity. 
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4.0  FORCED INTELLECTUAL ÉMIGRE—AMERICAN INTERWAR PERIOD 
4.1 INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
The conclusion of World War I saw the shattering of Tillich’s personal life and political 
perspective: Tillich gave up his nationalistic outlook; the religious socialist was born. The 
descent of Germany into Nazi rule shattered Tillich’s personal and professional life. It was a time 
combining pride with horror. He was proud to join his Jewish colleagues on the first list of 
faculty members fired from their positions at the University of Frankfurt in April 1933 and to be 
the only Protestant on that list. However, his political views put him at significant risk. Reinhold 
Niebuhr cabled an offer of a post at New York City’s Union Theological Seminary in August 
1933. On November 3, Tillich and his wife and daughter arrived in New York.646 Colleagues 
Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Max Wertheimer found positions at Columbia 
University. Adolf Löwe went to work for the New School for Social Research.647
In addition to his teaching responsibilities at Union and his labors to help other émigrés 
cope with the crisis of their changed circumstances through his presidency of Self-Help for 
German Émigrés, Inc., Tillich continued to produce writings that reflected or informed his views 
on politics among nations.648 It was a period when Tillich’s writings were enunciated from his 
preferred spiritual and intellectual position “on the boundary,” from which Tillich’s differences 
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with other German Christian and religious scholars with respect to Nazi rule became clear. 
Consistent with being on the boundary, it was a time during which Tillich tried to interpret the 
German and European situation to his American audience. To this same audience Tillich 
introduced his views on the Christian interpretation of history and the importance of Christian 
action within it. Finally, he produced the piece that most directly addresses the theme of the 
present work, his fragment on religion and world politics. 
4.2 THE BOUNDARY POSITION 
At the beginning of this short autobiography, On the Boundary, Tillich wrote,  
‘The boundary is the best place for acquiring knowledge.’…Since thinking presupposes  
receptiveness to new possibilities, this position is fruitful for thought; but it is difficult  
and dangerous in life, which again and again demands decisions and thus the  
exclusiveness of alternatives. This disposition and its tension have determined both my  
destiny and my work.649
 
The rise of Nazism brought the existing divisions—the boundaries—between German 
theological circles into sharp relief.650 Understandably, it continued the intellectual struggles 
over national and religious identity, over church and culture, and over faith and war which had 
brewed since World War I. Jack Forstman and Robert Ericksen have written extensively on these 
matters. Ericksen has described New Testament scholar Gerhard Kittel’s justification for 
antisemitism, theologian Paul Althaus’ doctrines of revelation and church/state relations as 
encouraging church endorsement of state power, and Emanuel Hirsch’s interpretation of the 
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Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus and Emanuel Hirsch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) and Forstman. For the 
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Kingdom of God as most adequately manifested in Nazi Germany.651 Forstman has addressed a 
full range of tensions, largely placing representatives of the “dialectical” school (primarily Karl 
Barth and Friedrich Gogarten) against a range of opponents. One set of tensions was between 
Barth and Hirsch. It represented a generational shift from the old debate between positivists (who 
wanted to preserve traditional expressions of Christian truth against reason) and liberals (who 
were willing to embrace modern research techniques). In the face of these former paths of 
doctrinalism and relativism, Barth charted one placing all human formulations and directions in 
question in light of God’s word, and Hirsch endorsed the capacity of humanity to embody God’s 
will.652
According to Tillich, Hirsch had provided theological justification for National 
Socialism: in terms of dialectics, he affirmed the “Yes” of God, God’s affirmation of Nazi 
Germany. 653 Tillich asserted that Hirsch had “perverted the prophetic, eschatologically 
conceived Kairos doctrine into a sacerdotal-sacramental consecration of a current event.”654
Barth, to Tillich’s thinking, provided theological justification to apolitical theological 
transcendentalism: he emphasized the “No” of God, diminishing the priority and import of 
human activity. 655 Tillich’s primary criticism of Barth’s thought is first that it is wrongly termed 
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dialectical and, second, that its failure to be dialectical demeans the significance of human 
existence.656 Dialectics involves a synthesis of two opposing ideas. However with Barth, in the 
divine-human relationship paradoxical separation continues: “Between God and man there is a 
hollow space which man is unable of himself to penetrate.” 657 Tillich believed religious 
socialism was a middle way of self-critical, but responsible political action.658  
With his fellow émigrés, Tillich “lived” the boundary situation. During a five-and-a-half 
month trip to Europe in 1936, he occasionally recorded his perspective on the land of his birth. 
On a lunch stop in Holland, Tillich told of being able to see Germany “without any feeling of 
homesickness. Dead, destroyed; barbed wire and Gestapo.”659 While in Basel, Switzerland, 
Tillich went to a part of the city “surrounded on three sides by Germany. Uncanny feeling, like 
being pushed into a sack. The nearest lights are German, the streetcars cross the border….”660 
The status of being between his native land and a new land gave him much to ponder. The result 
was that boundary and migration became important symbols for Tillich.  
On the Boundary was published the same year he traveled to Europe. Tillich framed his 
thoughts around a series of dialectical tensions significant in his life. He attributed his sense of 
the dynamics of history between two opposing poles to the contrasting temperaments of an East 
                                                                                                                                                             
Christianity.’” (Paul Tillich, “Nicholas Berdyaev,” Religion in Life VII, no. 3 (Summer 1938): 414-5.) The Eranos 
Circle (a group surrounding Carl Jung of which Rudolf Otto was a founding member), had a similar escapist 
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“For what they practice there is unpolitical mysticism.” (My Travel Diary, 157.) 
656 For an interpretation of Tillich’s dialectics, see Adams, “Tillich’s Interpretation of History”.  
657 “What Is Wrong with the ‘Dialectic’ Theology?”: 133. By 1939, Tillich argued that Barth had turned from an 
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against the Holy Ghost.’” (“Review of Karl Barth’s…,” 3.) 
658 Stone, Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought, 89-90. 
659 My Travel Diary, 72. 
660 My Travel Diary, 116. 
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German father and a West German mother.661 Tillich appreciated the electricity of the city as 
well as the earthiness of the country (including the sea as symbolic of the “abyss of dynamic 
truth”.662  Between the bourgeoisie and the working classes, Tillich saw “the struggle to 
overcome the narrowness of the petit bourgeoisie constantly open[ing] up vistas….”  He 
identified with Shakespeare’s Hamlet and found therapy in Botticelli’s angels.663 The theory-
practice tension became vivid for Tillich amidst the postwar German revolution.664 The difficulty 
of asserting himself autonomously Tillich experienced specifically in relation to the heteronomy 
of his father, a struggle which marked his whole life.665 Schelling helpfully unified theology and 
philosophy for Tillich, and he found Heidegger’s philosophy to be a helpful expression of 
humanity as finite freedom.666 Religious socialism was Tillich’s synthesis of the religion and 
society tension667 and called into question a strict separation between the sacred and the 
secular.668 To Tillich, Lutheranism taught socialism about sin, and socialism taught Lutheranism 
about the demonic.669 He drew on the essentialism of idealism and the existentialism of Marxism 
to embrace ambiguity and to reject the masking of ambiguity which Marx called ideology.670 
Forced from his native land to an alien land, Tillich valued the United States in which 
representatives of all nations and races can live as citizens.”671 He acknowledged God’s ultimate 
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limitation upon us, in whose presence “even the very center of our being is only a boundary and 
our highest level of accomplishment is fragmentary.”672   
In other places, Tillich reflected on the theological meaning of emigration and the 
boundary situation. From the story of Abraham onward, God’s absolute claim challenged all 
human relationships and ways of living and thinking.673 Emigration was “a protest against the 
nationalistic distortion of Christianity and defamation of humanity.”674 Tillich also wrote of the 
creative potential of emigration: “Periods of transformation always are periods of separation and 
emigration. Father- and mother-lands have to be left. Children-lands have to be found.”675
In a 1937 article, Tillich argued for “an essential relationship between mind and 
migration”, declaring that migration was  
natural for the creative mind. And…it is the mind’s power and dynamic nature to 
 transcend any given actuality, to strive toward universal concepts, to create tools, 
 machines and institutions independent of immediate needs, to find norms, laws and  
categories which constitute the world in which it lives, to which it belongs  and from  
which it is at the same time separated as an individual self….676
 
This led Tillich to consider the adequacy of technology, religion, and mental creativity as medias 
of cultural cross-fertilization. Intellectual migration is the most effective means of cross-
                                                                                                                                                             
of believing, from traditions, from political commitments.” (Jerald Brauer, introduction to My Travel Diary: 1936—
Between Two Worlds, by Paul Tillich [New York: Harper & Row, 1970], 11-2.) 
672 On the Boundary, 98. 
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(PTAH 416:005) 
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fertilization, according to Tillich. It requires community, and it involves creative transformation 
of that which is received.677  
Intensive, intellectual, interdisciplinary group discussion was another practice of the 
boundary situation for Tillich. The collapse of the harmony of autonomous rationalism meant 
“the end of the Protestant-humanist era,”678 but it did not mean the end of the Protestant 
principle. Having benefited from such a practice in the Kairos Circle and elsewhere, Tillich 
advocated the formation of “an order or fellowship” willing to bring about the renovation of 
Protestantism outside of existing churches and distinct from movements resisting involvement in 
the world.679 He called for a “post-Protestantism” or a “new Catholicism” borne “by a group 
which relatively withdraws itself from the ecclesiastical realization of Protestantism and, in the 
sociological form of a closed movement, an alliance or an order, prepares politically and 
spiritually the structure of that which is to come.”680 These religious orders would be a context in 
which “leading intellectuals and men of affairs…would meet regularly to analyze key issues 
confronting mankind,” to approach the boundary of their respective fields to engage in cross-
disciplinarian discussion. 681
                                                 
677 “Mind and Migration,” 300-2. Luther’s translation of Paul’s writings and the Renaissance’s use of Greek culture 
exemplify this transformative process: “the foreign has to become our own in order to be creative.” (“Mind and 
Migration,” 303-4.) 
678 Ibid., 53. 
679 Paul Tillich, “The End of the Protestant Era,” The Student World XXX, no. 1 (First Quarter, 1937): 52. 
680 Ibid., 57. 
681 Jerald Brauer, “Endnotes,” to Paul Tillich’s My Travel Diary: 1936—Between Two Worlds (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1970), 187-8. 
 111
4.3 INTERPRETER OF THE GERMAN AND EUROPEAN SITUATION 
4.3.1 Europe and the United States 
A German exile “on the boundary” was in a position to interpret the European situation to the 
United States. Tillich compared the social functions of the sacramental, socially conservative 
Mother church predominant in Europe with the theocratic, socially and political active, “ruling 
and commanding father” church of the United States.682 He stated the basic contrast in this way: 
“Sacramentalism is independent of individual and social activities. ‘The Holy’ is given before 
human activity begins”; in contrast, “theocracy deals with the problem of realizing the will of 
God…us[ing] political power in order to change social institutions and individual morality in 
obedience to the divine commandments.”683 Sacramentalism leans toward authoritarian power 
and theocracy toward democracy. 
Tillich saw a United States dominated by a technologically fueled capitalism concerned 
with the two dimensional, horizontal (“horizon to horizon”) realm.684 Pragmatism was the 
dominant philosophy: “knowledge as a means of subjection, facts and relations, but not 
meanings; finally dependent on tool-making; philosophy [as] instrumentalistic, making the 
refined tools of logic; but little contemplative interest in natural or historical lives; the pragmatic 
point of view; progress through science.”685 The religious endorsement of technology and 
capitalism as tools of God’s providential plan for the United States was consistent with the 
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world-transforming motivation of theocracy.686 Empirical activism becomes everlasting activism 
in an afterlife.687 The consequences of the two-dimensional perspective is that it must face limits 
in the finite sphere. This is “the horizontal infinity which always remains finite.”688 Anxiety in 
the face of failure in the two-dimensional drives humanity to the third, vertical dimension. This 
existential anxiety provokes the question of where to find the courage to face existence.689
In contrast to this, the European church was, at the least, noncommittal on capitalism and 
technology and, to a degree, distrustful of it: “Generally speaking, capitalism in Europe has been 
without a religious sanction.”690 Religious socialism was a church movement, after all, though 
this was a middle position in the face of Marxism’s inability to find a functional social ethic 
within the church and the church’s hostility to Marx.691 Given the European church’s social 
passivity and the American church’s ties to capitalism, Tillich doubted that either could 
contribute constructively to post-capitalist reconstruction.692
4.3.2 Downfall of Church and Country 
Tillich explained the German situation to his audience, first in articles, then in speeches. He 
wrote about the downfall of Germany and the German church. He wrote on matters of strategy. 
He characterized the church conflict in Germany between the official German Christian Church 
(led by Reichsbishop Emil Ludwig) and the Confessing Church (led by Martin Niemöller) as a 
response to government encroachment on the church. It was not the church engaging in political 
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discussion about general issues in German life. A good number of the preachers were Nazis. The 
majority were apolitical conservatives. Even the Confessing Church was led by a World War I 
submarine commander (Niemöller).693 The relative conservatism of both sides was related to 
Luther’s two-kingdom doctrine described in chapter one, which gave secular government the 
room to exert significant power and brought about a political cultural respectful of strong 
political power holders. Challenging this line of thought, Tillich admonished the German church 
to see that its “religious resistance to attacks made upon religion…must result in religious 
resistance to the fundamental political idea behind the present form of government.694
Fundamentally, Enlightenment rationalism had failed to produce the harmony it had 
promised, and, in this, it had failed church and culture. God became a philosophical idea 
unconnected to the non rational. This created a vacuum into which other non rational forces 
could enter: the labor/proletarian/religious socialist movement and the new paganism at the heart 
of Nazism.695 Christian humanism maintains the high notion of human dignity in the face of both 
demonic attack and secularist determination. It also asserts the fundamental presence of the 
divine within humanity.696 Tillich’s form of religious socialism attempted unsuccessfully to 
reconnect Marxism to its prophetic roots, to bridge the separation within Lutheranism between 
the private and the public, the religious and the political, and to activate a socially passive 
Christianity.697  
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The new paganism was founded on “the sacredness of blood and soil and power and race 
and national values which are minimized by Christian ethics.”698 There was a vigorous 
nationalistic mythology outside the church. However, efforts to “paganize” the church itself 
seemed to have failed.699 Tillich pointed to the limited but exciting impact of the struggle of 
orthodox Protestantism and Roman Catholicism against the new paganism.700
In Tillich’s view, Nazism’s goal was a “dechristianized state church,” with nationalism 
“elevated to religious power against prophetic and Christian universalism,”701 that is, a post-
Christian pagan tribal religion.”702 With the Reformation, the nation rose up as “the boundary of 
Christianity” (against Catholicism), and with the onset of liberal democracy over against 
absolutism, nation became “the boundary of pure reason.” 703 With the disintegration of the 
nation built on reason, nation became a concept “breaking through the boundary of reason and 
Christianity.”704 The nation gained new ultimacy: “The new function of nation: the ultimate 
principle of reintegration which gives meaning to life, subordinating all other meanings and 
raising an infinite or totalitarian claim…the national claim, the unconditional, untouchable and 
ultimate claim.”705
National Socialism frustrated the church’s basic operations, severing it from public 
activities, blocking its communications, imprisoning its representatives, and threatening its 
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finances. National Socialism exerted its power by means of indoctrination, public defamation of 
officials without opportunity for a just defense, condemning Roman Catholic internationalism, 
and seducing Protestantism to its purposes.706 The spirit of its attack was anti-Semitic, anti-
humanistic, and tribal.707 Tillich saw the question to be “whether true Christianity again has to 
go into the catacombs.”708
 He concluded, “Europe has missed her providential moment, her kairos (the right 
moment from the point of view of eternity) and tries in vain to escape the destructive 
consequences of this failure.”709 In a message perhaps aimed at Barth’s group, Tillich wrote, 
“Nobody can escape the threat against his historical existence. Man has a realm of religious and 
humanistic reservation; but it cannot be separated—at least not in the present European situation 
—from the realm of religious and humanistic obligation.”710 The “therapy” Tillich heard 
discussed on his 1936 Europe trip was either to “save what can be saved” or “prepare for 
tomorrow”. 711
4.3.3 The Fate and Future Relationship with the Jewish People 
Tillich had close personal and professional relationships in the Jewish community, from the early 
days of the Kairos Circle to his professorship in Frankfurt. He defended Jewish students and 
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confronted Brown Shirts on the University of Frankfurt campus.712 The meaning he found in 
Marx was strongly related to what he took to be Marx’s resonance with the Jewish prophetic 
tradition: it was Jewish prophetism that he blatantly placed over against political romanticism in 
The Socialist Decision.713 It was a position that placed him in direct opposition to much of 
German Christianity.714 Tillich did not comment on Marx’s own expressed hostility to Judaism 
and the Jewish spirit.715
In his first public speech in English, Tillich addressed a protest meeting at Madison 
Square Garden on the meaning of anti-Semitism. He admonished Germans in the audience to 
understand “the destruction of the German mind and soul which is involved in the destruction of 
Jewish lives and homes.”716 To Christians in the audience, he claimed that the Nazis were 
engaged in “a demonic struggle against the God of Abraham and the prophets, who is also the 
God of Jesus and of St. Paul, of Augustine and of Luther, the God whose name is Jehovah, the 
Lord of Hosts.”717 Among the Jewish members of the audience, Tillich sought to inspire “a new 
and powerful community of peoples, races and creeds, transcending their differences” rather than 
the “poisoned fruits” of vengeance.”718
Tillich appealed for his audience to decide for the true Germany held captive by the Nazi 
impostors. He described the levels of complicity that led to the rise of Hitler. He spoke of the 
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roots of German culture which would be squandered if Nazism were not conquered.719 He called 
for a decision against those persecuting Jews and the true Germans and in favor of both the true 
Germany and the Jewish people.720  
4.4 RELIGIOUS SOCIALIST INTERPRETER OF HISTORY 
This period of Tillich’s work forced him to apply religious socialism to the rise of tyranny. Here 
that project is considered under three headings: history and the Kingdom of God; church and 
state; and biblical tradition and Marxism. 
4.4.1 History and the Kingdom of God 
Tillich constructed his argument on the meaning of history by combining the transcendent idea 
of the Kingdom of God with the imminent ideas of socialism, Nietzschean life philosophy, and 
modern “world”-consciousness.721 Much of what is presented here was part of his presentation at 
the 1937 Oxford Conference on Life and Work.722 Tillich saw history to be composed of the 
subjective element of memory and the objective element of event. It is a combination of nature 
and the free activity of human beings. It is comprised of those human activities related to the 
group, entities with both the power to exist and values for which they are responsible.723 Arguing 
that freedom, humanity and history are intertwined, Tillich explained their relationship in this 
                                                 
719 Paul Tillich, “Germany Is Still Alive,” Protestant Digest Vol. I (Feb. 1939): 45-6. 
720 Ibid., 46. 
721 Paul Tillich, “History as the Problem of Our Period,” The Review of Religion III, no. 3 (Mar. 1939): 257-9. 
722 Ronald H. Stone, introduction to Theology of Peace, by Paul Tillich (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox 
Press, 1990), 12. 
723 Paul Tillich, “The Kingdom of God and History,” 1938, in Theology of Peace, by Paul Tillich, ed. Ronald H. 
Stone (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 27-9. 
 118
way: “Man is that being who is able to determine his being in freedom through 
history…Freedom is that faculty of man by which he is able to determine his being through 
history…History is that happening through which man determines his own being, including his 
freedom.”724 History involves “directed time,” time understood meaningfully. In the biblical 
figure of Abraham, Tillich saw “that essentially historical nation in which the national gods were 
negated on principle; time conquered space, justice replaced power, the future overruled the 
present, hope conquered tragic heroism.”725 History has a beginning, a center, and an end. Its 
center dictates its meaning. In Christianity, history is given meaning with Christ as the center, the 
onset of the expectation of the Kingdom of God as the beginning, and the complete realization of 
Christ’s Kingdom as the end.726
Progress is both a legitimate and illegitimate concept for understanding history: 
technology, political unification, and increasingly humanized relationships bear a quality of 
progress; artistic and moral behavior cannot be understood in such a way. The ultimate meaning 
of history is beyond history, but meaning is experienced in fragmented and ambiguous ways 
within history. 727
The Kingdom of God symbolically captures history’s meaning, including transcendence 
and imminence, dynamically at work in history while not equated with history. In opposition to 
the Kingdom of God are the “kingdoms” of the world, functioning demonically as a combination 
of form-breaking force and creative drive. The Kingdom of God as a symbol implies its own 
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ultimate victory, accomplished dynamically within history as the “fulfillment of the ultimate 
meaning of existence against the contradictions of existence.”728
With its understanding of Christ as the bearer of salvation and the center of history, 
Christianity sees human history as salvation history. The term, kairos—fulfilled or opportune or 
right time —expresses the idea of Christ’s coming as the fulfillment of a period of expectation 
and “the beginning of the period of reception or actualization.”729 Kairos stands “between 
socialist utopianism and Christian transcendentalism,” a matter of “acting with full responsibility 
for a limited purpose.”730 Salvation is a comprehensive reality, “related to individuals as well as 
groups, to mankind as well as to nature, to personalities as well as to institutions.”731
Tillich saw the church—understood as far broader than Christian churches—as “the 
community of those partly visible and partly invisible, who live in the light of the ultimate 
meaning of existence, whether in expectation or reception…[rooted in] the power which gives 
meaning to historical life as a whole.”732 Individual destiny is related to the larger social context. 
History finds “its meaning and frame of reference” in the church, and the church’s goal is to turn 
“latent church history into manifest church history.”733 The prototypical pattern of the Christ 
event—preparation/kairos/reception—is the pattern for smaller subdivisions of history “as the 
rhythm of ‘critical’ and ‘organic’ periods.”734
                                                 
728 “The Kingdom of God and History,” 33-6. The Kingdom of God is the symbol of “the transcendental meaning of 
existence.” (“History as the Problem of Our Period,” 262) The crucial question to be answered in the affirmative for 
history to have meaning is this: “Has historical action any ultimate importance, has the Kingdom of God any 
realization in history or only beyond history?” (“History as the Problem…, 263) 
729 “The Kingdom of God and History,” 37. 
730 Paul Tillich, “The Religious Socialist Movement in Germany between the World Wars,” (1939 at earliest) PTAH 
408:030, p. 4. 
731 “The Kingdom of God and History,” 38. 
732 Ibid., 39.  
733 “History as the Problem of Our Period,” 262.  
734 “The Kingdom of God and History,” 40. 
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In history, essence and existence are generally in contradiction. Salvation is the 
overcoming of that contradiction. Salvation both judges and supports history. History manifests 
salvation partially: “Salvation is actual within world history to the extent in which the destructive 
forces are overcome, the power of the demonic is broken, and the final fulfillment of meaning 
appears.”735
Historical interpretation is done by one active in history, reflecting on “the meaning, the 
purpose, and the presuppositions of his historical action.”736 Christian interpretation is done by 
the church in order to shape the church itself and to shape one’s time. Kairos is the basis for 
action: both “the unique kairos” of Christ as the center of history, as well as the particular 
kairotic turning points. In the first case, the demonic hold was broken “in principle”; in the 
second, present day manifestations of the demonic are confronted. Within the situations of 
history, the demonic (as threat) and the kairotic (as promise) are both present.737   
Two contradictory trends operated in history with respect to freedom, according to 
Tillich. First, he saw a trend towards expanding political freedom. Second, he saw a trend 
reserving outward freedom for those to whom fate had given power, and limiting the freedom of 
all others to merely internal freedom.738  
Tillich saw meaningful freedom as historical freedom or creative freedom, “Freedom for 
meaningful creativity, freedom for autonomous creativity, freedom for self-fulfilling 
creativity.”739 Political freedom is to ensure historical freedom, requiring the existence of 
powerful governments “checked by democratic correctives.”740 However, his observation was 
                                                 
735 Ibid., 41-3. 
736 Ibid., 44. 
737 Ibid., 45-6. 
738 “Freedom in the period of Transformation,” 128-9. 
739 Ibid., 131. 
740 Ibid., 135. 
 121
that such circumstances occur rarely. In periods of transformation—of self-destructive 
capitalism, dehumanizing nationalism and technological civilization—historical freedom must 
find ways to be embodied “in spite of” the oppressive circumstances of such periods. This means 
that meaningful creativity is limited to “the revolutionary attitude”, autonomous creativity occurs 
under a myriad of protective, esoteric cloaks, and self-fulfilling creativity occurs in a present 
experience of eternal life (not escape to an afterlife) and in an attitude of anticipation.741 Tillich 
used the dialectic of demand and expectation to express the reality that a time of kairos is a 
combination of responsible human action and divine promise.742
The demonic forces in operation at the time of Tillich’s writing were capitalism, 
nationalism, and dictatorship. Capitalism’s autonomy created the class struggle and subjected all 
spheres to its processes, creating societal disintegration. 743 Religious socialism responded to this 
with a combination of biblical-prophetic and Marxist sociological criticism. Nationalism exalts 
nation to the level of highest good. The prophetic viewpoint lifts up the Kingdom of God as the 
standard, diminishing the import of national space and lifting up the priority of time over space. 
Christianity is called to point to the demonisms of particularism—spatial-ism, racism, and 
nationalism—which, in their abandonment of time, reject history.744 Dictatorial power 
demonically challenges the authority of God and the values of the Kingdom of God, i.e., “formal 
justice, truthfulness, and freedom.”745
                                                 
741 “Freedom in the period of Transformation,” 135-43. 
742 “The Kingdom of God and History,” 55-6. 
743 One way Tillich defined the demonic was “Structure against individual will. The ‘good’ capitalist and the ‘good’ 
nationalist. The demonic self destruction of the peace policy. (“The Religious Socialist Movement…,” p. 4.) In his 
address to the Fall 1940 conference of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians, “The Meaning of the Triumph of 
Nazism,” Tillich spoke of Nazism as the consequence of the disintegration of German and European culture. (Paul 
Tillich, “The Meaning of the Triumph of Nazism,” in Charles Stinnette, Jr., “Fellowship Conference,” Christianity 
and Society V, no. 4 [1940]: 45-6.) Berdyaev echoed Tillich’s (and socialism’s) view that the meaning of World 
War I was the catastrophe of capitalism, a catastrophe affecting all of culture. (“Nicholas Berdyaev,” 414-5) 
744 “The Kingdom of God and History,” 47-50. 
745 Ibid., 50, 51. 
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In the face of these manifestations of the demonic, the church is called to a twofold task 
of resistance: disengage from the forces of disintegration; and active preparation for the new. 
The first task is relatively self-evident. The second requires a rethinking of the ultimate meaning 
of history from the perspective of history’s center (the Christ) and an application of the results of 
this rethinking to reality in and outside the church. Further, active preparation calls the church to 
activity outside its formal bounds that confront the noted demonisms: using socialism’s “material 
justice” against capitalism; drawing on pacifism’s vision of the unity of humanity against 
nationalism; and defending human dignity as expressed through the rights of man against 
dictatorship.746
4.4.2 Church and State 
Tillich wrote that the Gospel is transcendent in its source and fulfillment and imminent in its 
application and significance: “the kingdom of God is not only of another world; it is also in this 
world…the detachment in principle must be followed by a concern in actuality.”747 Tillich was 
mindful of the range of ways Christianity worked out the transcendence-imminence dialectic 
within the church-state relationship. Roman Catholicism equates the Kingdom of God with the 
church, therefore asserting its authority over all realms of life. Calvinism asserts God’s 
sovereignty over all realms of life. Eastern Orthodoxy, specifically in Russia, had united church 
and state in the czar, but then asserted church authority over religious rites and state authority 
                                                 
746 Ibid., 54-5. 
747 Paul Tillich, “The Gospel and the State,” Crozer Quarterly XV, no. 4 (Oct. 1938): 251-2. 
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over politics. And Lutheranism, dominant within Germany, rejects the identification of the 
Kingdom of God with the church and distinguishes private and public morality.748
The state is the organized embodiment of power.749 A state uses its power to establish a 
social order by means of laws. As an extension of its traditional law-giving role, the modern state 
became an autonomous bureaucratic entity.750 Equal justice seems to be a part of the concept of 
state. However, the question becomes whether power or justice will take priority, whether the 
“law concept of state” or the “power concept of state” will govern the situation.751
                                                 
748 Paul Tillich, “The Totalitarian State and the Claims of the Church,” Social Research: An International Quarterly 
on Political and Social Science I, no. 4 (Nov. 1934): 420-3. 
749 Paul Tillich, “Church and State: Lecture Two from Three Lectures at Union Seminary,” 1938, (PTAH 408:009), 
2. 
750 Ibid., 3-4. 
751 Ibid., 4. Plato took seriously power theory in his discussion of the state. Tillich associated Machiavelli with “the 
invention of state reason” as a promoter of the power concept. Tillich noted that Machiavelli “prefers republic, but 
writes in order to advise a tyrant to use any immoral means in order to maintain the state,” a fact understandable in 
the Italian situation. (“Church and State,” 5.) Tillich gave as examples of raison d’etat over against political rights 
the absolute monarchy of pre-revolutionary France, Ivan IV of Russia, and Frederic Wilhelm I of Germany, and he 
noted the analogous religious examples of the Russian czar as God on earth (“God’s power on earth is the power of 
state and church in identity”) and the secular political claims of Roman Catholic popes, spawning the response of 
Machiavelli noted before. (“Church and State,” 5-7. Tillich crossed out comments regarding Hobbes’ Leviathan in 
his list of secular examples at this point, perhaps to stay with examples of rulers embodying this power model versus 
a theorist thereof.) He pointed to Lutheranism as the exemplar of “spiritualism with respect to the church and power 
theory with respect to the state.” (“Church and State,” 8.) Finally, the thought of Marx and Nietzsche were the basis 
for two unrestricted power theories of state, according to Tillich: Russian communism and German fascism. 
(“Church and State,” 9-12.) Turning to the law theory of state, Tillich cited Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus for the 
comment, “the state is essentially an organization of justice.” (“Church and State,” 12.)With Platonic idealism, Stoic 
rationalism, and Epicurean atomism, “the concept of state is fulfilled if justice and consequently the happiness of all 
is realized.” (“Church and State,” 13.) Roman Catholicism uses natural law (through social contract theory) as the 
basis for criticizing the state, but also for asserting its own secular power aims. Bourgeois state theory was also 
rooted in natural law, standing against feudalism, religious fanaticism and absolute princes: “Its powerful state was 
supposed to serve the realization of the natural laws of justice, freedom, equality, the rights of man.” (“Church and 
State,” 14.) However, the examples of Prussia, revolutionary France, and England illustrate that the law-theory of 
state requires power. (“Church and State,” 14-5.) Religious perspectives possessing a strong sociological concern are 
consistent with the law-theory of state. The right to criticize the state and the expectation of tolerance by the state is 
present in Roman Catholicism, Calvinism and American denominationalism. However, tolerance is not necessarily 
connected with the law theory. The level of tolerance plays out variously in both the law-theory and power-theory of 
state. The tolerance of religion may indicate that a state views religion as being little or no threat. Both theories of 
state can use tolerance—or the absence thereof—based on need. (“Church and State,” 16-7.) Tillich believed that 
Christianity acknowledged the need for both theories. The difficult question is the tension and imbalance between a 
prospective international system based on the law-theory over against nation states founded on the power-theory. 
The church needed to be wary of being “paganized” by the power state and marginalized by the law state. (“Church 
and State,” 18.) 
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The dialectical tension between power and law in the state expresses that power is 
necessary to tame demonic chaos, but that law is required to give order to the state and prevent it 
from becoming demonic.752 Tillich argued that totalitarianism seemed to represent the victory of 
the power pole. The economic insecurity of bourgeois capitalism had led to “the concentration of 
the national state,” the prerequisite of totalitarianism.753 The anti-democratic culture of eastern 
and central Europe was another basis of the totalitarian state.754 Russian totalitarianism stood 
against capitalism and for the spread of “communist enlightenment” on behalf of “the individual 
and the full development of his collectivistic activities,” the success of which would mean the 
downfall of authoritarianism and totalitarianism.755
Under German totalitarianism, the state was raised to mythic, unconditional significance, 
subordinating all other cultural spheres to its power.756 Tillich broadly criticized Christianity’s 
response to state power: Roman Catholicism for its equation of God and church; the Anglicans 
for functioning as a tool of both the state and the ruling class; German Lutheranism for its history 
of requiring strong state rule, with the ultimately destructive affects of Nazism; and the 
American church for its blind idealism.757 Caving in to Nazi totalitarianism continued 
Germany’s cultural disintegration rather than furthering reintegration.758 In a word, Christianity 
under Hitler submitted to human power and defied God’s sovereignty.759 Applying the 
relationship of law and power to the discussion of international politics, Tillich wrote, “[A]s long 
                                                 
752 “The Gospel and the State,” 253-4. 
753 “The Totalitarian State…,” 408-10. 
754 Ibid., 410-1. 
755 Ibid., 413. 
756 Ibid., 413-5. Emanuel Hirsch described the state as the “mysterious sovereign” who was “not God…but an 
immediate revelation of God.” (“The Totalitarian State…,” 415-7.) 
757 Paul Tillich, “The European War and the Christian Churches,” Direction (Darien, Conn.) II, no. 8 (Dec. 1939): 
11. Tillich and Carl Mennicke were of common mind that the place where social pedagogy was most needed was the 
United States. (My Travel Diary, 65.) 
758 My Travel Diary, 50. 
759 “The Totalitarian State…,” 419-20. 
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as there are sovereign nations which act according to their natural will to power, it is idealistic 
utopianism to assume that those States could be subjected to law without an embracing power 
strong enough to enforce the law.”760
The second dialectical tension in the Gospel-State question is whether individuals are the 
priority for the state or the state is the goal of individuals belonging to it. Liberal democracy is 
based on the former. Authoritarian models lean on the latter.761 Christianity never completely 
surrenders the significance of individual dignity, “the infinite value of each individual 
personality as a potential image and child of God.”762 But, Tillich believed “Christianity never 
has and never should neglect” the pole of authority.763 Tillich favored a doctrine “in which 
community is the first and individuality is the second, but in which not the State as such and not 
the individual as such are the ultimate goal of history but the honor and glory of the Kingdom of 
God.”764
The third and final dialectical tension described by Tillich is that between form and 
content. States driving towards form are simply the protective institution of other life forms 
independent of it. States driving towards content have a meaningful, creative purpose or spiritual 
substance.765 This dialectic played itself in history: from the primal, tribal identity of “state” and 
religion to the transcendent Roman “abstract state” in the pre-Christian period; the prophetic 
protest against equating state and religion and in denying immediate access to God, epitomized 
by Jewish prophecy; the evolution from Constantine’s Christian state to a Christian government 
without “direct religious functions”; and the twentieth century secularization of the state, 
                                                 
760 “The Gospel and the State,” 255. 
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762 Ibid., 256. 
763 Ibid., 257. 
764 Ibid., 258. 
765 Ibid. 
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creating a vacuum filled by a regressive tribalism.766 Tillich wrote, “the Gospel is the 
fundamental and everlasting protest against tribal religion, religious nationalism and State 
adoration.”767  
4.4.3 Biblical Tradition and Marxism 
Tillich argued that the conditions of mass disintegration—“the social and intellectual situation of 
late capitalism”—required mass reintegration. 768 His religious socialism was a Christian-Marxist 
hybrid. This was possible because he believed that Marxism and Christianity shared some 
common concerns: the understanding of human nature in a larger context (related to God in 
Christianity, related to society in Marxism); the belief in an original perfect state of humanity; 
the perception of actual human nature as a contradiction to that original harmony; a concern for 
the perilous state created by this contradiction; a sense of existence as the partial, fragmentary 
overcoming of this state of contradiction; and a vision of a final overcoming of the 
contradiction.769
In Tillich’s construction, the divergence between Marxism and Christianity relates to 
Christianity’s transcendence and Marxism’s immanence, the differences in their diagnosis and 
resolution of the contradiction noted above,770 and Protestantism’s individualism versus 
Marxism’s socialism. While communism, fascism, and Roman Catholicism were mass 
                                                 
766 “The Gospel and the State,” 259-60. 
767 Ibid., 260. 
768 Paul Tillich, “The End of the Protestant Era (1937)?” in The Protestant Era (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1948), 223, 225. This is a different piece from “The End of the Protestant Era,” The Student World XXX, no. 
1 (First Quarter, 1937). 
769 Paul Tillich, “The Christian and the Marxist View of Man,” (Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, 
December 1935), PTAH 402:017, pp. 9-13. 
770 Ibid., 14-7. 
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movements able to respond to the need for mass reintegration, Protestantism had to change to 
survive.771  
Tillich called the church as a whole to a theoretical and a practical strategy. The church 
lacked a precise knowledge of communist history and theory.772 Thus, Tillich explained 
communism as the secularized prophetic: a natural mass response to mass disintegration rooted 
in the demonisms of capitalism and nationalism.773 Communism attested to the absence of a 
prophetic spirit within the church. At the same time, Tillich summoned the churches to challenge 
communism’s secularism, utopianism, lies, and tyranny.774
Further, Tillich believed church leaders should be taught about communism. The church 
should publicly echo “the communistic criticism of the present social demonries,” but not 
endorse any political party or movement, sliding into idolatry.775 The laity should work to 
combine communist and Christian principles in their lives. Finally, the church as a whole needed 
both to work to become an embodiment of the Kingdom of God and to consider communism in 
                                                 
771 “The End of the Protestant Era?” 226, 229. 
772 Paul Tillich, “The Church and Communism,” Religion and Life VI, no. 3 (Summer 1937): 347-9. 
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import of our historical existence. He is Utopian, if he expects everything of human freedom; he is fatalist, if he rests 
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Prophetic…,” 28.) 
774 “The Church and Communism,” 351-3. 
775 Ibid., 354-5. 
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the same light as every other historical movement, with a combination of “religious reservation” 
and “religious obligation”.776
All of this would put Christianity into the position to understand the attacks of dialectical 
materialism (Marx’s analysis of capitalism) upon Christianity: the “lack of prophetic protest” in 
past church-state alliances;777 liberal bourgeois humanism’s use of ideology to conceal capitalist 
economic exploitation;778 a Christian idealism and transcendentalism that diminishes the 
importance of social justice and politics; and an individualism and escapism that neglects social 
heroism. 779 Christianity could then push dialectical materialism to see that the import of history, 
social justice and politics is one of unconditional depth.780 More than this, in all its forms, rites 
and practices, Christianity must speak to those yearning for reintegration. In its openness to the 
secular world, Christianity must point to the holy within all spheres of life. It should bear the 
prophetic protest against ultimate claims by penultimate powers.781 Christianity must affirm 
transcendence (not escapism) as way to survive “situations of complete social despair” and love 
as the life-giving, creative root of social justice.782 Taken together, this would protect social 
heroism from utopianism and resignation.783
                                                 
776 Ibid.,  356-7. Such a view was confirmed by discussions and news regarding the Russian situation which Tillich 
had during his 1936 European trip.: on April 26, 1936, his friend Adolf Löwe expressed very positive feelings 
toward Russia; (My Travel Diary, 47.) on June 8, 1936, Tillich recorded Hendrik de Man’s desire to see Russia 
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“shattering revelation” that “Stalin [had] had his former comrades-in-arms shot.” (My Travel Diary, 167.) 
777 Paul Tillich, “The Attack of Dialectical Materialism on Christianity,” The Student World XXXI, no. 2 (Second 
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4.5 RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS 
The place where Paul Tillich expressed his views on international relations most directly, 
systematically, and extensively was in an unfinished work from 1939, „Religion und 
Weltpolitik.“784
4.5.1 Introduction 
Tillich centered “the theme of the whole book and the leading idea for all solutions which are put 
forward in it” around religion’s claim upon world politics: “the demand placed by religion on 
world politics is that it be world-politics [Tillich’s emphasis].”785 The dynamics of world history 
from 1914 to the time of his writing seemed to convince Tillich that all parochial movements—
such as nationalism—destructively, oppressively and unjustly exalted the smaller perspective 
over the larger one. Therefore, world became his metaphor for transcending the limited 
viewpoint of the local. He declared that “national politics should turn itself into the instrument 
for world politics, because the political goal is not ‘nation’, but rather ‘world.’”786 In short, 
“Religion demands that ‘world’ become political reality.”787
Tillich believed history showed a pattern of collective de-politicization against which a 
later individualistic, economically-motivated, international middle class arose, but which was 
incapable of bringing internationalism into reality. The roots of de-politicizing life were planted 
by the Roman Empire: its victory over city and national-states, and its policy of centralization led 
                                                 
784 While the Gesammelte Werke, Band IX gives 1938 as the date for the work, documents in the Paul Tillich 
Archive at Harvard record 1939 in Tillich’s own handwriting as the date of composition (PTAH 205A:001 and 
205A:002). 
785 Paul Tillich, „Religion und Weltpolitik, Ein Fragment (1939),“ in Die Religiöse Substanz der Kultur: Schriften 
zur Theologie der Kultur, Gesammelte Werke, Band IX: (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1967), 139.  
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to “the de-politicization of general consciousness, the separation of culture and political life, and 
the identification of political behavior with governmental behavior.”788 Epicurus’ notion of 
private life gave “classic expression to the alienation of politics from the rest of life.” The 
admonition of Paul and early Christianity to be subject to governing authorities set the basis for 
“debasing political citizenship in favor of citizenship in the kingdom of heaven.”789 By Luther’s 
time, political conduct was limited to negative police power, possessing no positive, creative 
mandate.790
Theocratic internationalism proceeded simultaneously with Roman de-politicization. The 
church took on ever more political functions: “politics was born again as church politics.”791 
Popes Gregory VII and Innocence III combined ideas derived from Roman imperialism with 
Stoic ideas and with Platonic thoughts on the Greek city-state. They saw “the Christian church as 
representing the universal kingdom of God in history”: political will and the prophetic 
interpretation of history were combined in their thought.792 National empires were “forerunners 
of completed theocracies” and “opposing principalities…[were] anti-godly, with their end 
foretold.”793 This was later seen in the Byzantium emperor-papacy and in the power over the 
church of German emperors.794
However, the impracticality of these claims ultimately allowed nationalistic movements 
to become victorious. The conflicting claims of Rome and the German emperors planted seeds 
for antagonism toward theocracy and internationalism. It was natural for Machiavelli to focus on 
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the realities of the city-state polity amidst the turmoil caused in Italy by a politicized papacy.795 
Consequently, the spirit of the Hobbesian Leviathan—“expansion and defense”—dominated 
late-Renaissance Europe.796
Nationalism was eventually challenged by capitalism’s expansion of markets by means of 
colonies. The bourgeoisie’s exclusively economic interests led Tillich to interpret Kant’s vision 
of “eternal peace” for the sake of the individual as too abstract to chart how to establish political 
peace in such a world. Worse, the void in political theory led to the nationalistic exploitation of 
economics.797
Despite all of this, Tillich declared that “international political thought [had] not 
disappeared.”798 He saw it in the anti-capitalist-proletarian movements, in church and humanist 
pacifist groups, and in the League of Nations. Finally, the fact that contemporary dictatorships 
were aggressively challenging the idea of a just world order put the international idea at center 
stage.799 From this historical introduction, Tillich moved to the first and more extensively 
developed part of his two-part discussion, the concept of world. 
4.5.2 The Concept of World 
WORLD-“HAVING”   The “having” of world is a concept Tillich credited largely to Martin 
Heidegger’s existentialism. To have a world means three things. First, it means “to belong to an 
all-encompassing oneness/unity”. The completeness of the self depends on “the universality of 
                                                 
795 Tillich wrote that Machiavelli “gives classic expression to the new meaning of politics.” „Religion und 
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that which is ever against the self.”800 We are who we are in relationship to a larger universal 
entity, what Tillich called the world-self-correlation. Without this, we are less than human.801 
Second, it means “to belong to a structure which constitutes the unifying relationship of world 
(and self)”. The mathematically meaningful cosmos of Pythagoras and the logos of Parmenides 
indicate that world-having requires a structure without which world and consciousness would 
crumble into chaos.802 Third, it means the possession of “eternity for the free self.”803 Tillich 
wrote, “The eternity of the world is the possibility of endless transcendence beyond every world-
having/worldly [welthaft] given.”804 Politically, the denial of the “world-political/internationalist 
idea turns the political into a captive, in principle, a ready-made function of a limited, vegetative 
or brutish group existence and cuts it off from the eternal, world-having possibility.”805
THE TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD-CONCEPT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS    By 
technische and Technik Tillich meant science and technology. For him, to conceptualize and, 
subsequently, to produce anything—whether primitive or sophisticated—testifies to the capacity 
for eternal transcendence within human beings. This distinguishes human beings from 
animals.806 Within this capacity for technological invention, Tillich placed his discussion of the 
idea of progress. 
First, because it is an essential part of the technological world-concept, it is incorrect to 
reject completely the notion of progress. Second, while progress participates in the process of 
capturing the eternal (through theoretical conceptualizations) on behalf of the finite (concrete 
tools/products), it does not question “why” or “for what” in the world-having sense of an eternal 
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goal. Third, the eternal goal or meaning is not amenable to the idea of progress, given that 
meaning manifests itself to a self and given that there is no meaning against which to measure 
progress. Fourth, progress is inappropriate for such areas as philosophy and art, creative forms 
based on a “free grasp of meaning in the interplay of world and self.”807 A phenomenon may be 
better or worse representation of a style, but one period is not better than another period. Fifth, in 
ethics, progress is limited by freedom: decision-making patterns which surrender freedom 
surrender humanity, personality, and character as well. Sixth, there is no biological basis for the 
idea of progress. Plants, animals, and humanity each have an eternal significance untouched by 
the relative quality of their organs of adaptation. And, seventh, both religion and politics are 
realms of “grasping and actualizing eternal meaning and not that of [the] means-end-
relationship” of technological progress.808
THE THEORETICAL WORLD-CONCEPT AND THE PROBLEM OF IDEOLOGY    
Given that technological development required a knowledge of the peculiar qualities of the 
material being shaped, theoretical knowledge is as ancient as technological knowledge. It too is 
rooted in the self-world-correlation. It includes the pluralistic and the particular: 
 
Without an element of identity of differences, pluralism comes to as little as monism 
 without an element of difference in the identity. For the world political problem, that 
 means that the world-unity which is given with the constitution of the world does not 
 exclude a multiplicity of relatively independent political powers, but that the 
 ‘sovereignty’ of those or the denial of the elements of identity among them abolishes 
 ‘world.’809
 
Thus, pluralism and monism are both legitimate, and the denial of either denies the truth. 
                                                 
807 Ibid., 152. 
808 Ibid., 153, 154. 
809 Ibid., 154. 
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The theoretical approach arises from the double effort to establish the nature of structure: 
ontologically and scientifically. For Tillich, the late 1930s was characterized by the denial and 
denigration of the ontological and the exaltation of the scientific. However, science without 
ontological critique became vulnerable to being overwhelmed (and being made subject to) the 
pseudoscientific and the non theoretical, as in Nazism.810
Tillich declared that “the theoretical inexhaustibility of the world is the sharpest 
expression for the infinitude of world-having.”811 The self’s search for answers—its process of 
questioning the world—is unending. Further, the self-world-correlation which is at play—while 
requiring an infinite distance between self and world—requires a certain identity between the 
structures of self and world in order for theory to be possible. Ideology arises out of “the double 
character of theory”: humanity as “knowing self” both stands over against the world and belongs 
to it. This creates the perpetual tension within political theory, “the extent to which a theoretical 
world view expresses the world’s structure and the extent to which it expresses the structure of 
being of a particular self (or a particular group).”812 This describes the subjective and objective 
dimensions of knowledge. Tillich argued that if either is excluded, distorted knowledge results: 
pure objectivity (logical positivism) deprives it of “any connection to the knowing self”; pure 
subjectivity (National Socialist philosophy) deprives it of its “theoretical character, distance and 
objectivity.”813 Tillich argued that the particular and the pluralistic are united in “the knowing 
self, reflecting on itself, continuously maintaining the suspicion of ideology against itself, and 
                                                 
810 Ibid., 155. 
811 Ibid. 
812 Ibid., 156. 
813 Ibid., 157. 
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making the decision in relationship to an analysis of the concrete situation, in which a spiritual 
creation should arise.”814
THE MORAL WORLD-CONCEPT AND THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE    Tillich 
discounted the capacity of the technical and the theoretical (now conflated) to maintain world: 
“Neither the infinite transcendence of technological activity nor the inner inexhaustibility of 
theoretical objectivity are capable of serving as the foundation for the self-world-correlation or 
world-having. Neither possesses the strength to prevent the intermixture of self and world and, 
with that, the destruction of the correlation.”815 One sees the world as technologically 
conquerable. The other feels the self dominated and determined by the world. They are 
simultaneous, non contradictory, and mutually strengthening tendencies. The self cannot escape 
its infinite side, but attempts to carry out an “infinite” struggle in the finite realm (the world), in 
contradiction to the nature of the world. The self’s aspiration to dominate the world requires 
adaptation to the peculiar structure of the world: “The mass person—having turned into a 
machine through its service to the machine—is the symbol for this turn of the technological will-
to-rule into its opposite.”816 The moral conception of the world prevents the collapse of the self-
world-correlation. 
The moral is “primarily an expression of the boundary on which each individual self 
experiences other individual selves,” a boundary on which each self offers the unconditional and 
often unspoken claim “to be acknowledged…as the bearer of a self-world-correlation,” that is, 
“the acknowledgement of the encountered self as self,” creating an I-you (ich-du) relationship, a 
claim (taken as a whole) bearing the name, “justice”.817 Tillich declared that the unconditional 
                                                 
814 Ibid., 158. 
815 Ibid., 159. 
816 Ibid., 160. 
817 Ibid., 160, 162. 
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claims of the moral world precedes the technological-theoretical world: “When Heraclitus says, 
‘Those who are awake share a common world, while asleep each person has their own world,’ 
we must add that those who promote a common theory are not yet awake, but only those who are 
aroused by the claim of the other.”818
Justice protects the self’s capacity for decision, equality, freedom, and happiness. The 
capacity for decision requires that each self be seen as an individual whose claim to be 
acknowledged as a self is fulfilled. Justice requires each self to be seen equally as selves “in the 
sense of world-having”.819 The self is free when it “has” world rather than simply being a part of 
it and when it “represents” or “exhibits” the world’s structure: unlimited economic exploitation 
lacks the infinite structure commensurate with that freedom. 820 Happiness is found by an 
infinite, unconditioned self which is “completely at one with itself as part of the world.”821 This 
happiness is lost either through escapism (rejecting the world) or through the objectifying 
dehumanization: unhappiness comes from debasing either world or self. Justice is crucial, but 
always vulnerable: “A just order cannot forcibly bring about happiness. The moral world is 
constantly threatened by its own presupposition: freedom.”822
THE POLITICAL WORLD-CONCEPT AND THE PROBLEM OF POWER    For Tillich, 
the existence of an ethical world was dependent upon the interplay of mutually-acknowledging, 
decision-making selves who make up political communities which bring together the other, 
aforementioned conceptions of world. Totalitarianism seeks to deny this, spelling its own 
destruction, given the political realm’s dependence on “the practicality of technological activity, 
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819 Ibid., 163. 
820 Ibid., 163-4. 
821 Ibid., 164, 165. 
822 Ibid., 165, 166. 
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the purity of theory, the concrete ethical decision within the individual self.”823 The political 
world-concept is the basis for all others and requires power and justice. Their effective existence 
requires tradition, law and ethos: “Tradition gives the other two substantial form, law forms 
tradition into statute and gives it effective force, ethos (using tradition, law and education) forms 
the individual self in the sense of the ethical substance of the whole.”824 All of this requires 
power, “power to be in the relationship of being in general…and power to make one’s way in the 
interplay of individual encounters, to preserve tradition, to enforce the law, and to carry out 
education.”825 The image used by prophetic religion for a complete world was a political one: the 
kingdom of God.826
The self exists to the degree it offers resistance in the encounter with other selves. The 
self has the capacity both to form itself and to form the world: this is its infinitude and 
exhaustibility. The meaning of infinitude and inexhaustibility is captured by the myth of life-
after-death, philosophy’s notion of the soul’s immortality, and Christianity’s doctrine of the 
resurrection.827
Tillich saw the state as the necessary entity through which the ethical (justice) and the 
natural (power) are manifested. It embodies the just limitation placed on the self by other selves. 
Justice is the saving factor, voicing the rights and the claims of the self.828
Both the execution of justice and the exercise of power in history are carried out by 
individuals. They speak (and/or possess the power to speak) for a small or large group or for 
themselves, no matter the form of government. Through them, the unconditional, universal 
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825 Ibid., 167-8. 
826 Ibid., 168. 
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claims of justice are actualized in history. Democracies—theoretically the guarantors of justice—
can be ruled by majorities resistant to the universal claim of justice. Dictators occasionally can 
fulfill those claims. The benefit of democracy is its amenability to ordered change intended to 
bring about greater justice, over against the need for revolutionary action to accomplish change 
in non democratic systems: “the more claims of individuals it is capable of perceiving and 
translating into reality, the more just a power is.”829
Tillich understood states as necessary, but he also saw them to be potential barriers to the 
existence of “world”. He declared, “The teaching of the sovereignty of the nation-state is the 
clearest and sharpest form in which world as political reality is denied.”830 States tend to give 
unconditional force to their power, rather than limiting their power.831 The existence of world 
required some other notion than the unchallengeable, sovereignty of particular nations. 
Two basic patterns of world-creation had been imperialism (the Roman and British 
Empires) and international organization (League of Nations) to which some sovereignty was 
sacrificed. Rome crushed national identity. Britain cultivated balance-of-power schemes. The 
League either failed to overcome national sovereignty or acted imperialistically.832
Tillich supported a third alternative that erodes away state sovereignty through “the 
formation of overlapping communities as future bearers of a unified world-power”.833 Tillich 
called this “the horizontal solution in contrast to the vertical one of imperialism and the 
unworkable mixed solution of the League.”834 Tillich wrote that this part of his framework 
would be developed in the second and third parts of his book: he only began part two; and part 
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831 Ibid., 173-4. 
832 Ibid., 174-5. 
833 Ibid., 175. 
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three was, evidently, never begun. However, he did offer five fundamentals which he had 
intended to build upon more extensively later. First, the previously-developed notion of justice as 
the mutual acknowledgement of each encountered self as free, world-having beings possessing 
equal dignity is rooted in the biblical idea of the “neighbor”. Second, the community of 
neighbors is built on direct interaction. Third, upon these direct encounters, the nature of indirect 
encounters are to be understood. Fourth, upon both of these, justice is abstractly codified. And, 
fifth, the abstract becomes concrete through actual encounters.835 Tillich believed that justice 
defined intra-nationally was incapable of leading to world. 
Tillich asserted that “the political” is part of what it means to be human. The lower limit 
of the political is “naked power” without cognizance of “the power and dignity of the 
individual,” and the upper limit of the political is that in which justice is executed without power 
(which Tillich characterized as an “angelic-world”) out of which pacifism and world-
renunciation can arise.836
4.5.3 Religion and the Concept of World 
Following the above discussion of the world-concept, Tillich’s fragment gives the beginning of 
his thoughts on religion and the world-concept: the relation of religion to world-having and 
religion’s relationship to the technological and theoretical conceptions of world. 
RELIGION AND WORLD-“HAVING”    Tillich sought to look behind the self-world-
correlation to the root from which it arises and in which self and world are unified: the 
correlation’s religious dimension. This involved three questions: #1—whether and why one must 
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look beyond the self-world-correlation, a correlation which he called, “the human”; #2—what 
comes into view when one transcends the human; and #3—how that which is visible only 
through transcending the human relates to the human.837
Transcendence implies and assumes the religious. Tillich probed beneath religion as “a 
particular religious form” to a religious philosophy concerned with “the point at which the 
religious breaks into the human, the limits of the self-world-correlation.”838 He specified the 
relationship of the self to world more particularly: each determines the other without establishing 
the other; and the integrity of each is maintained without denying the impact each has on the 
other. Fichte’s self-exalting idealism and Nietzsche’s world-exalting naturalism are denied in 
favor of a “bearing-ground” beneath each, beholden to neither, a ground symbolically 
designated, “beyond self and world.”839 Religious philosophy “disclose[s] this structure of 
religious consciousness,” using symbols derived from religion, but unhindered by religion in 
analyzing their structure.840
The “beyond self and world” lies at the foundation of self and world, or being and 
freedom, and is beyond the theoretical and the ethical: “it cuts through all world views and gives 
them their peculiar quality…The religious qualifies the other world-concepts, but adds nothing to 
them.”841 It is captured in the symbol of creation, as well as its separation from that which is 
beyond, captured in the symbol of the Fall. While the self-world-correlation is not determined or 
conditioned by existence, its created-ness confirms the correlation. It offers a “yes, but” to that 
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839 Ibid., 178-9. 
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correlation, going beyond humanistic formulations.842 The creation myth displays a primordial 
wisdom concerning world, long before the theoretical world-concept is conceived. And the 
religious myth shows “a primordial wisdom concerning the threat of world long before political 
reflection held out the prospect for world catastrophes...the Fall is an act, thus it has the element 
of freedom within itself which belongs to an act; and it is simultaneously event, thus it has the 
element of necessity within itself which belongs to an occurrence.”843
To the symbols of creation and fall as central to world-having, Tillich added the kingdom 
of God. The kingdom of God both confirms the construction of a politically-based moral order 
while holding out the symbol of an ultimate community rooted in love which qualifies 
fragmented, penultimate historical communities. Prophetic religion is the bearer of this 
symbol.844  
RELIGION AND NON-POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF WORLD   The Old Testament 
creation story and the Prometheus story from Greek mythology informed Tillich’s treatment of 
religion and technology. On the one hand, the creation story affirms humanity’s role as co-
creator. However, humanity is continuously tempted to supersede the limits established for 
humanity: see the Prometheus myth and the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. By 
transgressing its limits, humanity robs God. Technology leads to progress and to hubris,845 but 
points to supra-historical fulfillment.846
In the final section of the fragment, Tillich looked at religion and the theoretical. 
Theory’s antagonism toward religion exalts the objective over the subjective. Yet, to treat the 
                                                 
842 Ibid., 180. Tillich said that the creation notion is foundational for the world-concept “in the double sense of 
moving beyond and moving toward it.” (pp. 180-1) 
843 Ibid., 180-1, 182. 
844 Ibid., 182-3. Tillich declared extreme, world-escaping religious mysticisms as essentially irrelevant to the 
discussion of world politics and religion. 
845 Ibid., 183-4. 
846 Ibid., 185. 
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realm of “the unconditioned”, theory must use the matter of being which it seeks to transcend. 
And the Kantian construction of the ethical based purely on the ethical claim could not avoid 
rooting it theoretically. Though Hegel’s formulation led to state-idolatry, it mustered both 
religion and theory, subjectivity and objectivity, to establish their primordial unity, endeavoring 
“to draw the beyond self-and-world into the self and, through it, into the world.”847
The world-transcending qualification is an important corrective for the purely theoretical, 
ultimately correcting ideology.848 It provides a corrective limited by neither objective reason nor 
subjective knowledge, yet grasped by the historical individual as the locus of truth, in the manner 
understood by Kierkegaard: “The truth is historical, that is the prophetic insight.”849 False 
prophecy turns historically-bound truth into ideology. Thus, true prophets maintain a self-critical, 
suspicion of ideology, directed even at themselves, as noted before: “the truth which [the 
prophetic spirit] grasps—or by which it is grasped—is never only ‘theoretical’ in the sense of 
objectifying distance, but also ‘practical’ in the sense of unconditioned demand.”850 Limited to 
neither political theory nor ecclesiastical institutions, “The prophetic spirit blows where it wills, 
within churches and parties, and against churches and parties.”851 With these thoughts, the 
fragment concludes. 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
Tillich experienced Union Theological Seminary to be a shelter and refuge and an important help 
in coping with the loss of a way of life in his homeland and rebuilding life and career in a new 
place. From his position of exile, he observed, “If New York is the bridge between the 
continents, Union Seminary is the lane of that bridge, on which the churches of the world 
move.”852 Tillich found “that a too quick adaptation is not what the New World expects from the 
immigrant, but rather preservation of the old values and their translation into the terminology of 
the new culture.”853
Tillich had landed in a place where his boundary perspective could thrive, where he could 
put into practice “the mind’s power and dynamic nature to transcend any given actuality.”854 In 
this new situation, he could inform people ignorant about the German church and larger culture. 
He could translate elements of the political-theological framework he had developed within the 
fertile spirit of Weimar into a new historical period as well as a new geographic place, tracing the 
meaning of the collapse to which his philosophy of history had attested. On the boundary 
between retrospect and prospect, he could begin to sketch an outline of the relation of self and 
world in the broader world. Thus, the element of a religious internationalism that are affirmed in 
a special way during this period of Tillich’s thought are these: 
(1) The perspective most conducive to a truthful interpretation of history is the  
 dynamic boundary; 
 
(2) The kairoi are opportune periods for just and loving action (the kairoi of  
 history) to which participants in history can develop a sense of timing; 
  
                                                 
852 Paul Tillich, “Autobiographical Reflections,” in The Theology of Paul Tillich, eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert 
W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952): 16-7. 
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(3) Religion bears the “suspicion of ideology” as a critical principle against all  
 holders and institutions of power; 
 
(4) Religious orders of leading people of letters willing to approach the  
 boundaries of their disciplines can function as fruitful, intellectual and spiritual  
 centers for cultivating creative, cultural patterns; 
 
(5) Ethical behavior embraces “world,” affirms human dignity, advocates active  
 participation in history, is rooted in “the beyond self and world,” stands for justice  
 and love, and stands against injustice and hatred, including the unjust, space- 
 bound, and dehumanizing provincialisms of nationalism, racism, and capitalism; 
 
(6) Cultures have vulnerabilities to idolatry which must be unveiled; 
 
(7) Cultures have groups vulnerable to injustice at the hands of the powerful; 
 
(8) Love and justice require that the self-world correlation be kept in balance,   
  rejecting both arrogant imposition of self as well as the crushing domination by  
 “world”; 
 
(9) Prophetic, sacred texts can be central, primal sources for religious    
  internationalism; and 
 
(10) Religion affirms international organization and looks on national sovereignty with  
 deep suspicion. 
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5.0  WORLD WAR II—TILLICH’S MESSAGE TO HIS AUDIENCE IN GERMANY: 
THE VOICE OF AMERICA SPEECHES 
5.1 INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
From March 1942 through May 1944, Tillich wrote speeches for the Voice of America (VOA). 
The VOA invited Tillich, along with other celebrated personalities from lands conquered by Nazi 
Germany, to speak to his former compatriots based on his knowledge and experience of his 
former homeland and his new homeland. He was asked to speak the truth as he knew it.855  The 
extent to which family, friends, and colleagues knew of his activity is unclear.856 During the 
period Tillich wrote the speeches, he alluded to his radio broadcasts elsewhere on at least three 
occasions in print.857
 The Voice of America was headed by Robert Sherwood. It was a section of the Office of 
War Information. Its goal was to use truth as an element of persuasion in the Allied forces’ 
psychological warfare against the Axis powers. Its overseers saw its work to be the production of 
what they termed “white” propaganda. “White” propaganda used truth as the means of 
persuasion. Sherwood was unwilling to allow the VOA to be a propagator of “black” 
                                                 
855 Karin Schäfer-Kretzler, “Einleitung,” Paul Tillich’s An meine deutschen Freunde, Ergänzungs- und Nachlass-
bände zu den Gesammelten Werken von Paul Tillich, Band III (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1973), 14. 
856 Tillich’s biographers, Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, describe his VOA work as “an activity so wrapped in secrecy 
that not even his closest friends knew of it.” (Pauck, 198). This may reflect that Tillich did not make the speeches a 
frequent topic of conversation with his colleagues. Tillich’s daughter, Erdmuthe Tillich Farris, seemed surprised to 
learn that her father had written the speeches. (Conversation with MLW in San Francisco, November 1997.) 
857 Paul Tillich, „Was soll mit Deutschland geschehen?“ (Summer 1942) GW XIII, 281; “Comment on ‘The Report 
of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace’” The Witness  26 (April 8, 1943): 4; and “The God of History” 
Christianity and Crisis IV, no. 7 (May 1, 1944): 5-6. 
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propaganda, communications which combined truth with falsehood.858 Tillich’s VOA work was 
labor which used truth as a means of persuasion.859
                                                 
858 Lawrence C. Soley, Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1989), 69, 71; Holly Cowan Shulman, The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 9, 25; and Clayton D. Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade 
Against Nazi Germany (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1996), 7, 119, 123. 
859 In three separate articles, Matthias Wolbold disputes my treatment of Tillich’s work as propaganda: „,Meine 
Deutschen Freunde!‘“; „Against the Third Reich. Zur amerikanischen Erst-veröffentlichung der politischen 
Rundfunkreden Paul Tillichs,“  Tillich Journal 3 (1999): 26-29; and „Tillich als expressionistischer Propagandist?“ 
The less important criticisms of Wolbold arise from his wish that I had written an article on rhetoric rather than one 
on the content of the speeches within the general framework of rhetoric, purely subjective matters.  
     The core of Wolbold’s criticism arises in his review of my 1998 article on the VOA speeches (“Paul 
Tillich and the Voice of America”). His review is the article, „Tillich als expressionistischer Propagandist? Ein 
Antwort…“ Mr. Wolbold is critical of my use of propaganda theory as the beginning basis for understanding of 
Tillich’s VOA speeches. Yet, the VOA’s administrators called what they produced “propaganda”. Tillich’s 
participation in the VOA’s mission makes it impossible to exclude the issue of propaganda as a central element for 
understanding the speeches. The ambiguity of this is entirely consistent with his philosophical/theological 
understanding of what it means to be human: finite freedom or freedom combined with fate. We exercise our 
freedom, but we do so within limits often beyond our control. Tillich exercised his freedom in the production of the 
speeches, but he did so within the limits of the VOA’s structure and goals. (This makes Wolbold’s claim in „,Meine 
Deutschen Freunde!‘ Die politischen Rundfunkreden Tillichs…“ [184-5] that the VOA speech-writers produced 
their work without “conscious propagandistic intent” irrelevant: whatever their intent, it was shaped by the 
institution using the speeches for its propagandistic purposes.)  
     Mr. Wolbold thinks I give inadequate attention to the 1943 change in the leadership of the VOA and its 
consequences for the content of the broadcasts („Tillich als expressionistischer Propagandist?“: 86). In fact, I give a 
quite literal characterization of the impact of this change in leadership (p.24, “Paul Tillich and the Voice of 
America”) and explain the inter-governmental agency disputes occurring at the time, implying the direction to which 
a leadership change might lead. My sources indicate that the truth content of speeches produced by authors for the 
VOA was not affected by the events of 1943. Content was a concern to those critical of the VOA at the time only to 
the degree that VOA broadcasts risked making promises (i.e., the timing liberation of the occupied territories and the 
prospects for Allied victory) that the military could not effectively keep and that did not adequately reflect the 
ambiguousness of the relationship between the United States and its various international partners. 
     Mr. Wolbold argues that I fail to connect my general account of Tillich’s larger intellectual output—
specifically religious socialism and the Protestant Principle—to the speeches („Tillich als expressionistischer 
Propagandist?“: 86). In point of fact, I did that on pages 19-21 and 26 of my article.  
     In my article, I wrote of the political impact of World War I upon Tillich: “his passive conservatism 
turned into a more activist socialism” (24). Wolbold disputes this by misquoting me: he leaves out the crucial word, 
“more”. This permits him to say that I am wrong to see Tillich as a socialist activist following the war. In so doing, 
he denigrates Tillich’s largely theoretical output on the necessary relationship of religious socialism to the future of 
Germany. Tillich changed from the political conservative of the German Lutheranism within which he was nurtured 
to the religious socialist theorist of the Weimar period. Tillich was silent on politics prior to the war. In comparison 
with his nonpolitical (conservative) position prior to the war, any rhetoric that was socialist was “more activist 
socialism”. Further, church authorities admonished him for a radical political speech he gave following the war 
(Pauck, 68).  
     Wolbold falsely concludes that I reduce Tillich’s VOA speeches to “merely/purely propagandistic 
activity” understood in the negative sense (185). Wolbold sets up that misstatement by a discussion of the distinction 
between white and black propaganda, a distinction that I included in my own article three years before. The 
groundwork I laid by distinguishing white and black propaganda was an effort to see the speeches as an exercise in 
persuasive truth-telling, (with which Wolbold agrees) and both my “expressionist propaganda” formulation and my 
passages on the speeches as the embodiment of Tillich’s Protestant Principle were considered efforts to establish 
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The impact of the VOA broadcasts was difficult to determine. The laws of atmospheric 
physics made the success of their short-wave broadcasts unpredictable. On occasion, VOA 
staffers wondered whether there was an audience at the other end any greater than the number of 
people in the broadcast facility at a given time. When VOA broadcasts could be sent over the 
more dependable medium- and long-waves of the BBC, they were subject to potential censor by 
British authorities.860 It was the embodiment of Tillich’s notion of humanity as the combination 
of freedom and fate, as life functioning within the context of structured necessity.861
Tillich wrote a total of one hundred twelve complete speeches. In addition, there are two 
speech fragments. These one hundred fourteen documents were, at the least, Tillich’s journal of 
theological and philosophical reflections on the Nazi regime and the war.862 They served as a 
means for Tillich to reflect weekly, over the course of twenty-six months, on the causes of the 
war, the dynamics of world politics, the operative forces within German culture, and the mutual 
perception of the people of the Allied and Axis nations: in short, they give us his interpretation of 
the meaning of world events in the heat of the moment in which they occurred. 
Radio broadcasts between the nation that had saved him from the ascent of Hitler and the 
nation of his birth provided the perfect medium for Tillich, the thinker “on the boundary”.863 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tillich’s work as weighty pieces of significant value, utterly distinguishable from the nonsense of Goebbels and his 
ilk. 
860 Shulman, 26-27. 
861 There are many places where Tillich wrote in such terms. One place was in the speech he gave in May 1942, 
“Storms of Our Times,” Anglican Theological Review XXV, no. 1 (January 1943): 16. 
862 The 3rd posthumous volume of the Gesammelten Werke contains 87 of the speeches (An meine deutschen 
Freunde: Die politischen Reden Paul Tillichs während des Zweiten Weltkriegs über die „Stimme Amerikas“ [1942-
1944]. Ergänzungs- und Nachlassbände zu den Gesammelten Werken von Paul Tillich III. Stuttgart: Evangelisches 
Verlagswerk, 1973); Against the Third Reich, eds. Ronald H. Stone and Matthew Lon Weaver, trans., Matthew Lon 
Weaver (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John  Knox Press, 1998) contains translations of 55 of the speeches; the Paul 
Tillich Archive at Harvard University’s Andover-Harvard Library has the written and typed manuscripts of all 114 
documents (Boxes 602A, 602B, 603A, 603B, and 604). In the matter of dating, the archival material and the 
material cited from Against the Third Reich will use the American practice of placing the month first, day second, 
and year third. The material cited from An meine deutschen Freunde will use the European practice of placing the 
day first, month second, and year third. 
863 On the Boundary. 
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Here, their content—over five hundred pages of material—are summarized under five headings: 
Cultural Renewal; Guilt; Freedom, Politics, and Resistance; Justice and Economics; and 
Nationalism and Internationalism. 
 
5.2 CULTURAL RENEWAL 
5.2.1 The German Cultural Inheritance 
Tillich saw three primary legacies from Germany’s past: the Christian; the human and the 
Germanic.864 The primary fruits of Germany’s Christian legacy were the “Old Testament belief 
in justice and the New Testament belief in truth and love [which] lived within the hearts of the 
masses who did not know much of Christianity.”865 German history, philosophy, and literature 
testified to the centrality of justice in Germany’s past.866 Tillich’s very first speech faced head-on 
the horror of German oppression of Jews. He directed his remarks specifically to German 
Protestants. The call to oppose Nazism and to stand with Jews on this question had a clear and 
substantial basis in biblical theology: Christianity is rooted in Judaism; the prophetic tradition of 
scripture (while wanting to defend the nation of Israel) specifically opposes nationalist idolatry; 
and National Socialist idolatry and nationalism directly contradict this.867 From the Christian 
                                                 
864 “The Germanic Legacy (3/2/1943),” Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 
1998), 121. 
865 Paul Tillich, “The Christian Legacy (3/8/1943),”  Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1998), 126. 
866 Paul Tillich, “Justice and Humanity (5/11/1942),” Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1998), 26-27. 
867 Paul Tillich, “The Question of the Jewish People (3/31/1942),” Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 13-16. 
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scriptures, Tillich drew vivid analogies for the impact of Nazism upon Germany and the world. 
He described the mutual opposition of figures of Hitler and Christ: will-to-power opposed to 
powerlessness.868 Mixing his sense of the power of art with his own poetic sensibility, Tillich 
offered this poignant interpretation of Germany’s fifth war-Christmas: 
 
 
On the pictures of German painters of old, a ruin is often found as the place where the  
Christmas story took place. Under a half-crumbled roof, Mary seeks shelter from rain and 
 snow. Between crumbling pillars the  sheep graze, while shepherds adore the marvel of 
 the holy night, through empty window holes. Such pictures did not  tell us much in  
previous years in which we understood what ruins were only from pictures. Today, a  
portion of the German people live among the ruins, and with almost every day, the ruins  
multiply. Perhaps you again, like your fathers, are seeking the Savior among the ruins  
and are discovering the child of Christmas through the cracked walls of your houses.  
Certainly he is more likely to be found there than behind the glittering shop windows of  
past Christmas markets or in the new, magnificent structures of the National Socialist  
Herods, or in the palaces of defeated  kings! As long as we are seeking the Christ child in  
markets and palaces, we will not find him. Much more likely, he is in the bomb-torn  
foxholes of the British and the Russians, in the quarters of the German working-class or  
in the loaded stock-cars in which mothers with their infants  are driven into the death- 
camps of the east; or in the dark nights in which innocent hostages look forward to their  
deaths in the coming morning; or in the cold rooms in which badly fed, freezing women  
and children mourn the deaths of their father and husband and son. There, above all, can  
we find the Savior, the child in the manger, the child among the ruins.869
 
Further, Tillich saw the experience of Nazism as the experience of Christ’s passion.870 
The greatness of the suffering of Christ is the fact of innocent suffering which explains its 
saving, healing import: 
[P]recisely because it is the picture of innocent one, it points beyond itself. It has a  
helping, saving force for everyone who is grasped by it. It displays, to perfection, the  
radiating, reconciling power that innocent suffering has, when it is borne with inner  
greatness. It gives us the feeling that we do not have to despair, that within all the guilt  
and self-destruction of people, something has remained in which life can come to a  
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reconciliation with itself.871
 
He observed the world movement toward unity within the Christian ecumenical 
movement over against the divisiveness of Nazism. 872 Nationalism divided the world; 
Christianity sought to unify it.873 The churches’ of the world offered the message that revenge 
brings not peace but new evil. Tillich declared, “[T]he churches do not let up in their demands: 
justice, not revenge; construction, even of the defeated, not destruction; a new beginning for all, 
even Germany! This is a hope, a genuine hope.”874  
Tillich described the fruits of the humanistic legacy of Germany as reason, respect for 
human dignity, and the acknowledgement that each person is a member of the human race.875 
Intellectuals were important custodians of this legacy. Tillich described the breadth responsibility 
of intellectuals:  
  In a deep sense, every thought and writing and utterance and form must be 
 revolutionary. It must attempt to give expression to the everlasting discontent with  
everything that is—a discontent that distinguishes the human being from the  
  beast—it must attempt to change human life, the personal and the social. It must be a bit  
prophetic, it must condemn and demand, it must give hope. If it does not do that, it is a  
beautiful sport, but without seriousness.876
 
From Goethe, Tillich drew the teaching of reverence for other human beings. Goethe’s 
insight was that life and relationships are destroyed by disdain and cynicism. Instead, reverence 
should be the basis for all thought and action, “reverence for those who are superior to [us], 
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reverence for those who are equal to [us], and reverence for those who are beneath [us].”877 In 
another place he put it, “Speak of that which human-being means—that it means reverence for 
everyone who is human, enemies and friends.”878 In this way, victims become human beings 
again, and the weak and vulnerable evoke appreciation for pain and suffering.879 In another 
place, Tillich wrote, “With the German poets and philosophers, the stranger is the one who 
equally bears a human countenance and for whom we must, for that reason, have 
reverence…Education for reverence toward the other person has been—from ancient times—
education in reverence for the stranger.”880 Thus, Tillich exhorted his former compatriots, 
“Begin this training with your children today! Show them what a curse Germany has pulled 
down upon itself when it hunted down those whom it branded as strangers, who weren’t 
strangers, and annihilated them within the borders of Germany.”881  
Tillich’s comments on Germany’s Germanic legacy were limited. This legacy had given 
three gifts to German culture: chivalry, meaning strength combined with nobility; freedom, 
epitomized in the peasantry; and the spiritual depth of German culture.882  
When he considered the cultural significance of education, Tillich believed that it either 
cultivated or demeaned humanity: “Human education awakens the joy in the riches of human 
possibilities, with regard to other nations, races, customs and capabilities. Inhuman education 
awakens contempt for everything that is unfamiliar, the unwillingness to understand it, and the 
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will to fight and exterminate it.”883 Tillich called Germans, to begin the re-education of their 
children: “give your children…the belief in their own personal worth, in the value of individual 
among them.”884
On the ninth anniversary of the 1933 book-burnings, Tillich exalted in the power of 
human reason: 
 
Book-burnings are as old as books. From the beginning onward, books were a power that 
 was dangerous for the existing authorities. In the letters and sentences of a book, an 
 explosive can lie hidden which destroys a world, and there can be locked up within it a 
 spiritual force that constructs a new world! For this reason, books are sinister for all 
 who want to maintain the old at any cost. For this reason, books are sinister for all who 
 have a reason to fear the truth. For this reason, tyrants are enemies of books, just as they 
 have dread before thought-furrowed faces. Behind these furrows and behind the lines of
 books they smell the spirit of rebellion that they can dispel no longer, once it becomes 
 word and letter. For this reason, books are sealed, suppressed and burned—sometimes 
 with those who have written them, sometimes without them. But, again and again, the 
 books are victorious. The thoughts, that have become embodied within them rise up out 
 of their ashes, more powerful than before. The resurrection of thought through the fire of 
 the spirit follows the destruction of the book through natural fire and burns the fire-
 starter.885
 
Ten months later, returning again to a discussion of the potency of human reason, Tillich 
offered this comment:  
Reason in the human being means that the human being—and indeed every human being 
 — has the predisposition to think and to act sensibly. No person, neither sex, and no race 
 is excluded from this. Every person is capable of understanding the difference be-tween 
 true and false, between just and unjust, between good and evil, between believing and 
 lack of belief. The significance of education today is to develop these talents and to turn 
 all people into true human beings, into characters who follow reason, who listen to their 
 consciences, who struggle for truth, who have a sense of the holy in life.”886
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5.2.2 Nazism’s Attack Upon Culture 
The period of the Weimar Republic impressed Tillich as an exuberant cultural period for 
Germany. It had been an immensely fruitful and successful period for Tillich personally. He 
reminded his audience: 
You will remember how new beginnings were made in all spheres of life. Countless 
 buds pressed towards  the light. Much of that was certainly immature and premature. 
 Much was so good that travelers from all over the world came to Germany in order to 
 learn from the new thing which was bursting forth there, and to take it home with them. 
 The first collapse removed many old things, worthless things which had existed, and it 
 generated many new things, valuable things. In spite of the misery of defeat, in spite of 
 all the political defeats, it gave Germany possibilities like it had never before.887
 
During that period and before, Tillich argued that Germans would not have suspected the 
dreary prospects for their fate: 
Had it been said to a German ten years before, indeed even five years before, that 
 children would be murdered, that villages not lying in the battle zone would be wiped 
 from the earth, that women would be carried off into slavery, that innocent people would 
 be shot in the dozens, he would have turned away with horror. And now he has done all 
 of that and doesn’t even know what he’s done. And if it had been said to the German 
 people ten years ago, indeed even five years ago, that they would be turned into 
 accessories of crimes, the like to which have seldom been seen even in the blood-stained 
 pages of world history, the German people would have referred to its great past, to
 Meister Eckhardt and Luther, to Kant and Goethe, and would have declared themselves 
 to be incapable of such horror, of even thinking of it. And now they’ve not only permitted 
 it to be thought, but to be carried out in the name of the German people. All of that 
 formed a part of the diabolical process with which National Socialism has led, and goes 
 on leading, the German nation on the path of destruction.888
 
The blame for Weimar’s failure lay in many quarters, in Tillich’s view: 
In the political as well as the social, in education as well as in the economy, in art as 
 well as in ethical life, everything was undermined which would truly take new paths. All 
 were to blame for that. Not only those who wanted to go back because they could no 
 longer find themselves in the new, not only those who fought against the new because it 
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 threatened their selfish interests and customary positions, but also those who fought for 
 the new, but without the necessary passion and devotion, and without the necessary 
 clarity and foresight.889
 
While the Weimar Republic’s great achievement was in overcoming the dismal attitude 
of post-World War I Germany by means of significant cultural achievements, Nazism intended 
the destruction of all this:  
Ten years of National Socialism have more sufficiently laid waste to this blossoming 
 garden of culture than if wild beasts had broken in on it! And today the gardeners are 
 dispersed into the world, on the stages of foreign cities, in the books of foreign languages, 
 in the museums of foreign countries, in the concerts of foreign nations! One seeks 
 German culture everywhere—except in Germany! In Germany it is destroyed by ten 
 years of barbarity!890
 
Tillich gave the German listeners this standard by which to measure the health of a  
cultural movement: 
A new order of life, a new belief, has to prove itself, has to display its internal and 
 external strength. A new order has to bring more happiness than the old, if it is to have a 
 significance such that people will die for it. A new belief must open up new depths of life 
 and make accessible new heights of living, if it is to awaken the enthusiasm which creates 
 martyrs. Is the National Socialist order such an order? Is its belief such a belief?891
 
Nazism was the renunciation of the good in Germany’s heritage: “Seldom in the history of the 
world has there been such a total renunciation of everything which was precious, great and holy 
in a nation.”892 Tillich compared the onset of Nazi rule to the signs of early spring: it promised 
life with the warmth of the sun, only to give way to the returning cold. 893 Hitler had promised 
much in terms of German culture.894 Instead, Nazism was a manifestation of the worst in the 
German inheritance. He repeatedly associated poison and Nazism. In August 1942, he spoke of 
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Nazi education as an imprisoning, “poisonous” reality.895 The following December he wrote, “I 
believe that National Socialism was the outbreak and the concentration of nearly all of that 
which was diseased within the German soul. Long have these poisons accumulated within it. In 
the great crisis of the 1930’s, they won the upper hand and shook the German nation in frightful, 
feverish convulsions. It was an illness that could have led to death.”896 Nazism meant the revival 
of monstrous, destructive forces from the past.897 In the fall of 1943, Tillich again reflected on 
the nature of the cultural forces within Nazism:  
[T]he sacrifices of the First World War caused the most wretched, the most disastrous of 
 the German inheritance to come to the surface and to result in the great game of the last 
 ten years, to the ruin of Germany; the sense of being less than other nations, and at the 
 same time, the opposite sense of being more; the misconception of having come off badly 
 in the world, and the delusive belief of being the favored race which has developed from 
 that; the servile disposition which a tyranny like that of National Socialism causes to be 
 imposed, and the wish among the greatest and the least to have someone whom one can 
 tyrannize, even if it be one’s own family; the limitless belief in power and—over against 
 power—the distrust of freedom and justice. National Socialism is the embodiment of all 
 these qualities. In it and through it all these toxic substances came into the heart of the 
 German nation and poisoned the entire body.898
 
Using the imagery of puppetry, he described the way Nazi rulers functioned as 
puppeteers manipulating the wires of Mussolini, von Hindenburg, the Reichstag, the Reichs-
bishop, university rectors, German youth, German soldiers (“machines driven by human 
machines”), Quisling  in Norway, and Laval in France.899 Then he turned to the Nazis 
themselves: 
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[I]f you should look carefully, you would discover that at the deepest point, these 
 puppeteers of National Socialism are themselves puppets. Behind them stand not human 
 beings  but dark, sub- and super-human forces by which they are driven. These forces are 
 everything that is dark, distorted and desperate within the German soul and that has 
 embodied itself within them. Look at them, how small and hollow they are as people, as 
 personalities, how little they are free of the basest humanity quality! And then see how 
 strong they are as impersonal, dark powers driven by a demonic will, destroying 
 whatever steps into their path and, in the end, destroying themselves. They are masks, 
 behind  which the powers of destruction hide, puppets on which the darkest sub strata of 
 life draw, and which must, for that reason, turn all others into puppets. Pull off the mask! 
 End the puppet show of darkness which has plunged you and the world into the greatest 
 of all tragedies.900
 
Tillich characterized Nazism’s cultural strategy as an attack on truth and its bearers: 
“…Nazism rips to pieces the religious, intellectual, and ethical oneness of the human race and 
summons every part of humankind to an annihilating battle against every other part.”901 On the 
tenth anniversary of Hitler’s rule, Tillich characterized the despair of the German situation by 
calling it “a day of retrospect, but not a day of prospect”.902 He recounted the spheres of Hitler’s 
destructiveness: the economy;  the political system; the existence of diversity; legal rights;  
human prosperity and human life; and an ethics in which truth is “persecuted”.903 In short, 
Nazism was history’s—not merely Germany’s—“darkest period”.904
Six weeks later, in a reversal of the stereotypical anti-Semitic use of the Passion Story of 
Christ, he used that story to characterize the Hitler regime as the perpetrators of the Passion 
Story of the Europe, specifically pointing to the persecution of the Jews. Recalling the biblical 
story of Jesus’ encounter with the mourning women outside of Jerusalem, he called Germans to 
direct the words of Jesus to themselves, “Weep not for me, weep for your children.” Yet, he 
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exhorted them to have hope, given that defeat of the Nazis would mean rebirth and resurrection 
for Germany.905  
Tillich wrote that Nazism was cursed because of its crimes against the Jewish people.906 
Tillich bemoaned Lutheranism’s passivity in the face of Nazism. He saw it as part of its long 
tradition of renouncing its prophetic function.907 In this, it failed to carry out religion’s necessary 
struggle with the idolatrous: “In all countries of the world, the prophetic-Christian principle of 
life must defend itself against heathen-nationalist attacks. But, to be sure, nowhere as frequently, 
nowhere as fundamentally, nowhere till now has this been so great a battle of life and death as in 
the lands ruled by National Socialism.”908 In this, the church failed to see that Nazism had set in 
clear relief the contrast between a faith informed by the prophets and the teachings of Christ over 
against the paganism and neo-paganism of National Socialism.909
Nazism was the political betrayal of that past, Tillich argued. Nazism was not a return to 
primal human values: “It is wrong to characterize [the Nazi order] as a return to primitive stages 
of humanity. That would be an insult to the primitive peoples. It is much more an attempt to 
create, with every means of highest intelligence and technological maturity, a world in which 
that which is human disappeared.”910 Nazism is hostile to that which is human: “Humankind has 
grasped that with the Nazis it is not a question of the attack of one nation on another, but the 
attack of an enemy of all humanity on humanity itself.”911  
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Nazism was also the betrayal of the future. In the worship of power, the Christian 
teaching of the redeeming consequence of powerlessness was lost: “German youth had no longer 
heard of the belief that the most fragile, the most helpless, and the most humble could be at the 
same time the highest, most creative, and most powerful. And if they heard it, they weren’t 
allowed to accept it. And if they accepted it, they had to conceal it in a corner of their souls and 
had often completely forgotten it!”912 Tillich saw the misguidance of the youth by the deceptive 
fraud of Nazism as one of its most serious legacies. 913
Having heard of Goebbels’ attempt to cultivate hatred for the Nazis’ enemies, Tillich 
declared Nazism to be defined by hatred: National Socialism was “born in hatred, came to power 
in hatred, and exercised its power with hatred.”914 In the season of Advent, Tillich described the  
Nazi promulgation of an attitude of hatred as a unique crime against the Christ child:  
Only National Socialism has consciously and decisively placed itself on the side of those 
 who persecuted the child in the manger, that is, the messenger of love. Only the National 
 Socialists have advocated hatred and ridiculed love. Only they have consciously placed 
 injustice on the throne and disdained justice. Only they have extolled falsehood, in print 
 and in speech, and held the truth up to ridicule.915
 
The publication of a translation of a German soldier’s letter in the American press led 
Tillich to comment on the dehumanizing impact of Nazism upon its soldiers:  
The terrible thing about [the letter] is the objective way with which something terrible is 
 being communicated. No human outcry against the monstrous thing which is being done 
 to innocent people in regions the size of Germany! Not once a word of passion against 
 the hated enemy on whom one bestows all of this. Nothing of that: nothing human in the 
 good and nothing human in the evil; complete inhumanity, destruction as an event that is  
as natural as a flood or a prairie fire. Nazism has brought the German people to this depth  
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of dehumanization!916
 
In contrast to this spirit, Tillich called for a return to the “new heroism...of sacrificial love.”917
Under Nazism, the positions of tyranny and freedom had switched. Tillich reminded his 
listeners that once “Germany [has been] subject to the French conqueror, and Germans [had] 
fought against the Napoleonic tyranny as saboteurs and guerrillas, with actions and writings. 
There was a time when German freedom fighters were shot dead for the same things for which 
the freedom fighters of the conquered nations are now being shot dead by the Germans.”918
5.2.3 Renovation of German Culture 
While Germany could be liberated militarily and politically by outside forces, Tillich argued that 
its spiritual renewal was work that had to be done from within.919 Tillich described the path for 
Germany’s cultural rehabilitation in various places in varied ways. In January 1944 he called for 
Germans to seek a balanced approach to their identity in the world: 
When the German nation ceases to swing to-and-fro between an outrageous arrogance 
 and an absurd sense of inferiority, then a new Germany will be born. If the German 
 nation, through the judgment which is passing on it, is healed of sometimes falling on its 
 knees before power-without-spirit, sometimes fleeing into a thin, feeble spirituality, then 
 greatness will have come to pass for it. If the German nation learns that it is not alone in 
 the world and that it has something essential to contribute to the life of the human  race, 
 then all the immense suffering of these days has not been in vain. Then the path of 
 judgment has become the path of salvation.920
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The following month Tillich called the German people to challenge Hitler’s feeble 
“culture” by using the treasures of Germany’s Christian legacy—manifested in the prophets and 
gospels, poets and sages—as its guide: truth and justice; a knowledge of Germany’s worth and 
limits; trust; the understanding that a nation can become guilty and must give compensation for 
its guilt; the fact that it is a valuable member of the human race as a whole, being both weak and 
gifted; the insight that every human being “must be valued as a reflection of the eternal”, friend 
and foe alike; the belief in the common destiny of all nations; and the perception that humankind 
has meaning.921
Even in their treatment of the Nazis, there was a moral limit on the behavior of German 
citizens. Tillich saw the absence of hatred as the barometer for differentiating themselves from 
the Nazis: “I am telling you in full awareness of what it means, and having the deepest 
conviction that it is true: you are superior to the National Socialists to the degree to which you 
keep yourselves free of hatred toward them! You are identical to them to the degree to which you 
permit yourselves to hate them.”922 To do this was to follow the pattern of Christ in loving one’s 
enemies. One can have a passionate commitment to the cause, but fueled by the passion for 
salvation, not hatred. If this passion for salvation is a species of hatred, then it is a holy hatred 
aimed not at people but at “powers within the person for the sake of the salvation of the 
person.”923 However, to the call of the Nazis to sacrifice themselves, Tillich admonished his 
hearers to refuse to sacrifice Germany in order to preserve its Nazi leaders. 924
                                                 
921 Paul Tillich, „Der ,Deutsche Glaube‘ und der Glaube der Deutschen (9.2.1944),“ An meine deutschen Freunde 
(Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1973), 310-313. 
922 “How Should One View… (9/12/1942)”, 62-63. 
923 Ibid., 65. 
924 Paul Tillich, Voice of America Speech 26 (9/1942), PTAH 602:001(26). 
 161
A commitment to truth was central to Germany’s cultural rehabilitation. Reflecting on the 
anniversary of the book-burnings of 1933, Tillich spoke on the weakness of falsehood and the 
dynamic strength of truth:  
Not all that was burned will rise again from the dead. Much has justly come to ashes, 
 because it was not thought but babble, not depth but temptation. The truth must prove its 
 worth through fire. What is false must burn. And much of that which was thrown from 
 the ox-cart into the fire has no right to a resurrection. It was invalid even before it became 
 ashes. In all of us was much nothingness which had to be burned away. In the entire 
 world from which we came, there was much that was worthy only of rising up in flames. 
 We all are implicated in the book-burning….925
 
Tillich called for a return to the unifying and spiritual renewing force of truth: “The truth is but 
one. When the truth is being distributed among different gods which contradict one another, then 
it is no longer truth; when nation or race is being made the standard of the truth, then the truth is 
sacrificed. And in Germany today, the truth lies bleeding on the altar of idolatrous sacrifice 
called national power worship.”926
Much about facing the truth would be difficult, but it could be liberating as well. To 
clarify this, Tillich established a distinction between Nazism’s portrait of a horrifying future and 
a more accurate picture of future:  
Germany will have to bear three things which are difficult; and everyone among you 
 should  be clear about them. The serious and honest truth chases away the pictures of 
 horror with which they want to drive  you to your death. And the truth looks like this: 
 Germany will be weaponless at the end of the conflict; and Germany will be weak after 
 the devastation of this war; and Germany will be smaller after its defeat. Each of these 
 things is a difficult burden; it would be meaningless to dispute that. They must occur, and 
 they must be borne. It will be the measure of the maturity of the German people, whether 
 and how they are able to look this truth in the face. It really  demands more strength and 
 inner greatness to see and to bear the inevitable, than to avoid it with eyes closed and 
 rush to one’s death in the drunkenness of alleged heroism.927
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Another element of truth-telling involved reversing the world’s perception of German 
culture. Nazism’s reversal of the world’s positive perception of Germany cultivated during the 
Weimar period had created considerable confusion regarding German character.928 Tillich was 
concerned about the caricaturing of Germans, specifically through the assumption that Nazism 
expressed the true German character. To him, the caricaturing of all Germans as Nazis was 
parallel to the Nazi caricature of the Jewish people, which had led to “the ruinous fate of the 
Jews.”929 However, he believed determined people wanted to prevent a German fate equal to the 
fate of the Jewish people. But, he also argued that Germans had to take their fate into their own 
hands, asserting that character is a combination of fate and decision. The German Opposition had 
to lead the way by decisively choosing to change Germany’s fate. Militarism and subservience 
had to be rooted out.930
As the Christian part of the world entered Advent 1943, Tillich led his listeners to 
embrace the hope characteristic of that season: “We stand in the Advent season, the season of 
hope and waiting. At the end of this waiting stands no military victory, no political achievement, 
but rather the birth of a child, the symbol of hope, the force of the rebirth of all humanity—even 
the German people!”931  
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5.3 GUILT 
A second general focus of Tillich’s speeches was the issue of guilt. Tillich saw personal and 
collective (or common) guilt as a part of Germany’s despair.932 This was not blanket guilt after 
the manner of Vansittart.933 Rather, it was a complicated and tragic guilt manifesting itself at 
many levels of society in and outside of Germany. No one was completely innocent in the rise of 
Nazi Germany:  
[N]ot the ones who out of folly, presumably in their own interest, propped up the ruling 
 party in their struggle for power, and  then changed positions, disillusioned and 
 disappointed…[nor those] who stood aside and did nothing but greeted what was 
 happening with hidden or open sympathy, out of political misunderstanding, out of 
 narrowness based on nationalism, or out of class-based and  race-based prejudice…[nor 
 those] who saw what came with objection and horror, and still did not begin to do 
 everything in a timely way to prevent its coming…[nor] the few who decided to do battle 
 and who led it to the bitter end, escaped a share in the guilt: they led the struggle, but they 
 did not lead it with a spiritual strength and depth and with the human greatness that alone 
 would have been able to prevail over the frightening forces of opposition…[Finally, guilt 
 must be assumed by those who] drove Europe into disorder and Germany into despair 
 through the false peace after the First World War, but also [the] wide circles within 
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 England, France and the smaller countries [who] behaved just like the Germans 
 themselves.934
 
As a description of the levels of participation or non-participation in a political milieu, 
this sort of pattern occurs in all nation-states, according to Tillich. For the state of affairs at any 
point in time, there is a guilt/ innocence distinction based on the choice that each person makes 
in each circumstance. In another place Tillich addressed the “levels of guilt” question with these 
words: “You will ask: are we the only guilty ones, then? Certainly not! In the divine words of 
wrath there is never only one guilty party. All are partly to blame, all suffered then and all suffer 
today beneath their shared guilt. But all are not equally guilty.”935
Here we see the “tragic” touching the issue of guilt. Tillich contrasted “tragic guilt” with 
pure evil. Tragic guilt is guilt mixed with the good, exemplified in Great Britain’s colonial 
relationship with India. Pure evil is seen in Nazism. India is placed in the unenviable position of 
choosing between British rule or Japanese oppression, the latter which mirrors the pure evil of 
Nazism. Tragic as well is the German-Russian relationship in which contrasting responses to 
revolution ruptured the relationship.936  
The Nazis themselves were easy to indict. In addition to the pure horror of their 
terrorizing policies, their attempts to shift guilt for the war from themselves to others was absurd. 
Contrary to their claims, Nazi attacks had been neither defensive nor preventative. The war had 
not been forced on Germany (by England and France) while Germany attempted to bring peace 
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(after Poland) as proclaimed in their propaganda. Nazism was not a movement attacked without 
provocation by Allied reactionaries.937  
Yet, within Germany Tillich saw a guilt marked by the impact of authoritarianism:  
The German guilt is that the German nation has been turned into the instrument of a 
 power that has diabolical traits: National Socialism. And this guilt is deeply rooted in 
 the German character. It is the Germans’ false sense of allegiance that has  shattered very 
 resistance to the National Socialist tyranny in the German nation. It is anxiety at the 
 prospect of resistance to evil, when that evil comes from above and has the power and 
 authority of the state behind it. It is the wavering between self-abasement and self-conceit 
 that one finds everywhere in Germany. It is the worship of external power which has 
 been fostered so long in Germany and which has become an idolatry more and more.938  
Germans simultaneously abhorred the crimes of their Nazi leaders and deferred to their 
authority.939  
Tillich responded to simplistic declarations of innocence with this analysis of the guilt-
innocence scale: 
No prophet and no apostle and no martyr ever maintained that he did not share 
 responsibility for collective guilt, even for the guilt of those who persecuted him. No 
 subtle conscience, no person of depth, will entirely exonerate himself from the 
 responsibility for that which happened to him by way of injustice. But after he has done 
 that, after he has placed himself and all the persecuted with him beneath the collective 
 guilt, he will give testimony relating to the persecutors, with respect to his innocence, and 
 now, with clear, good conscience. Compared to those who have dispersed us, robbed us, 
 injured us, or slain us, we are innocent.940
 
Further, he argued that many Germans knew of the crimes of their leaders: 
All Germans have heard of the horrible crimes that have taken place in the 
 concentration camps. But they hardened their hearts and did nothing and, as a result, 
 made themselves culpable. Every German knew of the extermination campaign against 
 the Jewish people. Everyone knew Jewish people about whom he felt sorry, but no 
 protest arose. Not once did the churches take their place with the persecuted of the nation 
 from which Christ came; and, thus, they all became culpable. The entire army saw, and 
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 keeps seeing, what is occurring in the occupied regions through the Gestapo’s henchmen. 
 Generals and soldiers know about it and turn their eyes away, often in shame, but never 
 with action which could save Germany from this disgrace.”941
 
In September of 1943 Tillich turned to the biblical tradition as one way to ponder the 
issue of guilt. He used the Egyptian plagues as the pattern. First, he wrote that “the history of 
nations shows that nations always suffer for what their rulers do. And history shows that nations 
have to be struck so that the rulers are struck. So it was in ancient Egypt…So it was in 
Napoleonic France…So it was in pre revolutionary Russia…So it now is in Germany.”942 
Second, even with tyrants, the nation itself has a responsibility: “When a ruler has power over a 
nation, at that time the nation also has a joint responsibility, even if it hasn’t elected the ruler. It 
has not elected him, but it has tolerated him.”943 In November 1943, he again wrestled with the 
relationship of a people’s guilt to that of their leaders: “It is the guilt of the German nation that it 
has allowed itself to be made an accessory; not consciously, but also not entirely without 
approval; not out of wickedness, but out of weakness; not through a free decision, but through 
diabolical seduction.”944   
The Good Friday tradition led Tillich to deal with Nazism as crucifixion: 
Millions have been nailed to the cross of the most profound suffering and the most 
 agonizing death by the henchmen of National Socialism. And the German people stood 
 by and  looked on, just as in the old pictures of the crucifixion. No one became outraged 
 over the suffering of the innocents. No German seized the German torturers by the arm. 
 Only a few grasped what was taking place, and they had to look on silently as the 
 innocents were slain and as a blood guilt was building up that, sooner or later, had to 
 burst forth over the murderers, as well as over the spectators who were their accessories. 
 They resemble the disciples and women who stand powerless and despairing beneath the 
                                                 
941 Paul Tillich, “Collective Guilt (8/9/1943),” Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1998), 181. 
942 Paul Tillich, “Egyptian Plagues and German Plagues (9/1943),” Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 189. 
943 “Egyptian Plagues… (9/1943),” 190. 
944 VOA Speech 84 (11/1943). 
 167
 cross. A few suspected what was happening. The masses permitted it to occur with 
 indifference, and the murderers triumphed.945
 
Guilt had a specific impact on those fighting for the Nazi cause: “…guilt destroys the 
roots from which all courage stems, the confidence to die for a value which is higher than life 
and fortune.”946 Tillich spoke of the personal responsibility of each soldier for saying “no”:  
It is difficult for the individual officer or man or civil servant, who has to carry out an 
 order, to see that people want to make them guilty of complicity through that. But it isn’t 
 impossible for him to see that. When he feels that he is burdening his own conscience 
 with the fulfillment of his order, then he shouldn’t do it. When he sees that that which is 
 commanded to him violates all human and divine laws, then he shouldn’t allow himself 
 to be made complicit. He should obey God more than humanity. He should ‘fear God and 
 nothing else in the world’—a phrase which is so frequently used in patriotic speeches and 
 according to which action has been taken nowhere as infrequently as in Germany.947
 
Tillich questioned the hope for the German future, if the world was at the breaking point 
in tolerating further destruction and accepting different levels of guilt within Germany.948 To 
encourage the German audience to embrace guilt, he placed it as but the first step on a three-
stage path to salvation, a three-step law of guilt, atonement, and expiation. Expiation happens 
when atoning for German guilt frees Germany from the Nazis. Tillich exhorted his listeners to 
show that expiation had begun.949
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5.4 FREEDOM, POLITICS, AND RESISTANCE 
5.4.1 Freedom and Politics 
Tillich saw a contradiction between the courage of Germans to sacrifice militarily and the 
unwillingness to resist politically.950 In April of 1944, Tillich stated that Germany’s fate was due 
to “the inability of the German people to tolerate freedom”.951 Therefore, there had been no 
genuine revolution, and Germans “never sensed the breath of freedom to be the life-bestowing 
breath of humanism.”952 That same month he concluded that the saturation of German culture 
with intolerance of political freedom had led to this result: 
The upper-middle class aspired to be noblemen rather than free people, the lower middle 
 class aspired to be upper middle class rather than develop a democracy, the laborers 
 aspired to be lower middle class rather than fight for the liberation of their class. The civil 
 servants preferred to have security than the right of free persuasion, the officers preferred 
 human machines to true human beings. That is what went wrong for Germany, for 
 centuries.953
 
Tillich distinguished democracy in the United States from his experience of it in Weimar 
Germany. In the U.S., “Democracy is a human outlook, an interpretation of life, prior to being a 
system and a political method…Defense of democracy means the defense of an interpretation of 
life, of a moral and religious outlook. The word has more of a religious than a political ring, 
although it includes the political.”954 The spirit of democracy is respect for the human dignity of 
all. It is not simply a matter of free expression, universal suffrage, or a parliamentary system, but 
rather “an interpretation of life [involving]… the acknowledgement of the human dignity within 
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every person.”955 Therefore, freedom means the practice of respect for others, including the 
stranger: “Whoever is not free cannot respect himself and, for that reason, can also have no 
respect for others.”956 Without democracy, human dignity was oppressed; with it, human dignity 
was elevated.957
Tillich informed his listeners that 20th century liberal democracy meant a step beyond the 
18th century understanding of it, while Nazism was the rejection of the values of the French 
Revolution: freedom (liberty), equality, fraternity.958 In the world outside of Nazi domination, 
“fraternity” had taken a step further, growing into the call for “social security for all…freedom 
from privation, want and fear”.959
 Tillich wrote that political conflict was normal for democracies, not a source of danger as 
within dictatorships: “In a democracy, they are a sign of internal strength, as long as they are 
being fought on democratic grounds and with democratic methods. In a dictatorship, where there 
are no such means to settle antagonisms, every division is a threat to the system and must be 
removed with violent means.”960
 While political freedom had matured outside of Germany in the modern era, Tillich told 
his audience that Germany’s history of repressing political freedom had produced an internalized 
absence of freedom.961 In June of 1943, he wrote of the dehumanizing impact of what he termed 
blind, “cadaver-obedience” produced by this experience: 
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[N]othing destroys humanity more than an obedience which no longer asks, no longer 
 decides, and has no ultimate responsibility. For this reason, the ancients said that the 
 slave is no true person, that only the free person, who decides independently, can grow to 
 full humanity. For this reason, one speaks of cadaver-obedience. A cadaver is a thing; the 
 person who is no longer permitted to decide has become a thing. Like the cadaver, he has 
 only the external appearance of the human. For this reason, everything depends on the 
 German children being educated into inner freedom!962
 
Alluding to Goethe’s Faust, Tillich believed that just as Gretchen recognized the demonic to 
which she was tempted to surrender, so Germany had to recognize the demonic to which it had 
surrendered its freedom.963
 For Tillich, the basic commitment to the free exercise of democratic rights was 
fundamental to political maturity. He saw fear of the unknown that a change toward democracy 
would involve as the basis for political immaturity in Germany:  
 The German nation is like a child who is courageous face-to-face with an opponent or a  
 group which he knows. But as soon as something unknown appears—an unusual figure,  
 the darkness of night, solitude—then dread breaks out and destroys reason and bravery.  
 Horror in the face of the unknown seizes the child. It has also seized the German nation  
 which, indeed, has never completely grown out of the stage of childhood politically.964  
 
Mature and immature fear differ in this way: “Better the evil when it is known, than the 
unknown which one doesn’t know, whether good or bad. The mind of the child operates in that 
way, but not that of a mature person. The mind of the inwardly subjugated, dread-filled classes 
of a nation operates in that way. The mind of free, courageous people isn’t supposed to operate 
in that way.”965
 Political struggle is the key to political maturity in Tillich’s thought. The reasons for 
political immaturity in Germany were religious and intellectual escapism. Here he was alluding 
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to the tradition going back to Luther of the church’s silence on political matters and his 
perception of pre-1918 academia as functioning in the realm of theory separated from 
existence.966 He argued that “if the political is isolated from God, the devil takes it into its 
hand.”967 He indicted the intellectual leaders for their flight “into the inwardness of the heart 
from the external realm of political action.”968 This political immaturity was also due to the 
separation of nation from authority and of the human from the political.969 Political immaturity 
had implications for both the world community and the intellectual community: “Without 
political responsibility and passion, intellectual life becomes one lacking in seriousness, and a 
nation without an earnest, politically responsible intellect is a danger to itself and to the rest of 
the nations.”970 Tillich called the German opposition to fight this flight from the political.971
 The failure of political freedom in this period of German history represented the deeper 
failure to grasp what it meant to be human. Tillich understood human existence to be a 
combination of freedom and fate. He turned to this formula in several instances in these 
speeches. Early on, he wrote that Germany’s situation is a combination of destiny and guilt.972 
He reminded his audience that Hegel argued for the unity of all life such that one who attacks 
another, in fact, attacks himself or herself and launches fate—his or her own fate—against 
himself or herself.973 Hitler had attacked life and provoked its response. When fate reacts against 
us, we must become reconciled to it by accepting it: 
                                                 
966 Pauck, 41, 55. 
967 Paul Tillich, “Bringing Germany to Political Maturity (8/28/1942),” Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 54. 
968 Ibid. 
969 Ibid., 55. 
970 Ibid., 51. 
971 Ibid., 55. 
972 „Verzweiflung des deutschen Volkes (4.5.1942),“ 35-36. 
973 Paul Tillich, „Das große Gesetz allen Lebens: die Einheit alles Lebendigen (11.4.1944),“ An meine deutschen 
Freunde (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1973), 341. 
 172
It is its own fate by which the German nation is being subjugated, so the fear of this is 
 not the fear of something foreign. It is not the fear of an avenging enemy or a punishing 
 judge, but rather it is the decision to take the pain of injured life onto oneself. It is a 
 courageous fear which includes the fortitude for a life which has only itself to blame; it is 
 reconciliation with fate by accepting it as one’s own fate. The fate which is being armed 
 by the German people against themselves will be disarmed if it is understood and 
 endured, not if is it treated as a strange thing or if it is outwitted. Wherever fate, whether 
 of a person or of a nation, is acknowledged and endured as one’s own, the first and 
 decisive step towards reconciliation is taken.974
 
Were Germans to deny their fate, history would teach them. In a chilling reference to the 
fate to which Nazism had subjected the Jewish people, Tillich wrote these words in late 1943:  
[W]hen those of you on the ruins of the capital city and many other cities ask: ‘Why did 
 this have to strike us, particularly us?’—then perhaps you will hear a voice which repeats 
 this question, a voice from the land of the dead, a voice composed of the despairing 
 voices of hundreds of  thousands of Jewish women and children and old people. And 
 what this voice asks is like an echo of your question: are our people, above all others, 
 predestined for suffering and misfortune? They are asking what you are asking, precisely 
 the same question with precisely the same despair.975
 
Acting decisively against Nazism was the way in which Germans could prevent being 
imprisoned by the diabolical caricature by which the Nazis had tarnished their national identity. 
Tillich wrote that national character, too, is a combination of fate and decision and that the 
German Opposition had to lead the way by decisively choosing to change Germany’s fate, 
rooting out militarism and subservience.976  
5.4.2 Resistance 
Throughout the speeches, Tillich called for German people to resist the National Socialists. In his 
earliest speeches he called his audience to resist Nazi lies by waking up to the truth of 
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Christianity’s indebtedness to Judaism,977 to embrace sacrificial love and break loose from their 
death-bound leaders,978 to see through Nazism’s religiously-garbed irreligion,979 to assert their 
freedom inwardly and outwardly,980 and to emulate the Norwegian church by reawakening the 
prophetic spirit within the church against injustice.981 His diagnosis of Germany’s malady was 
the absence of a resisting spirit:  
Many in Germany saw that it was wrong. Many resisted. Many were expelled, 
 impoverished, killed for their  resistance. But the German nation as a whole, its leaders 
 and its masses, have not resisted. And that is what has gone wrong in Germany: some 
 were too weak to accept the sacrifices of a serious resistance. Others were too apathetic 
 …still others were too foolish to carry out resistance. They didn’t think that the Nazis 
 would take their own principles seriously…But they gave money and the means of power 
 into the hands of those whom they would have readily used for their aims, but by whom 
 they, in fact, were used. They, above all, are responsible for the fact that something went 
 wrong in Germany.982
 
Resistance meant basic self-preservation: “Everything depends on the world seeing, in 
this hour, that under the cover of tyranny a Germany has become mature, before which the 
hatred, which the messengers of the man-beast have aroused to an unimaginable degree, must 
remain silent. If that doesn’t occur, hatred will have free play, then woe to you, Germany, woe to 
you, Europe.”983 This sensitivity to world perception is repeatedly present in his thoughts. In the 
summer of 1942 he wrote of the importance of manifesting a public opinion sympathetic to a 
world community.984 The next summer he wrote of the need for Germany to change the minds of 
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the victims of Nazism by welcoming their Germany’s liberators (i.e., the Allies) just as the 
liberated in other lands had welcomed them.985
He exhorted his listeners in May 1942 to assert their freedom by resisting: “[Take] the 
path of freedom, freedom from a tyranny whose destructive powers control body and soul, 
freedom from hopeless conflict, freedom from hopelessness and despair. Take this course! The 
only worthy course, the only saving course!”986 He understood the dangers of action and, 
therefore, initially encouraged listeners simply to think with their supporters on the outside.987 
But this would change. Repeatedly, he would speak in terms like these: “[I]f many would take up 
arms in order to put an end to the internal siege, then it would be ended, suddenly, unexpectedly, 
and completely. That is now the one thing which has to be said over and over again: you have 
your fate in your hands!”988
Tillich believed that by understanding the roots of their predicament, Germans could find 
the courage to resist.989 This meant rejecting the temptation to flee from the political realm.990 
He challenged the radio audience to separate themselves from “those who have taken the 
freedom and dignity from the German people.”991 Along with fate and a supportive international 
community, Tillich saw the German resistance as a chief educator of the German people.992 In a 
sense, he saw them to be a significant educator of the international community as well, 
persuading the world to believe in the existence of a better Germany true to its great cultural 
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past.993 By resisting, Germans would “become instruments of the moral, constructive world 
order, and not of the immoral, destructive world order.”994 Stating it in another way a year later, 
he wrote, “To the extent to which you yourselves use the sword of justice against those 
committing crimes against humanity, you prove before all the world that your hands are spotless 
and that there is still a German nation which can hear the voice of justice.”995 On another 
occasion, Tillich recalled a legend that embodied the bloody power motive of Nazism to 
motivate soldiers to cease the blood-letting:  
It is just as in the ancient legend, where the old tyrant had to bathe each day in the blood 
 of a person in order to renew his strength and delay his end. The same day he found no 
 sacrifice meant his end and the salvation of all further victims. The same day you, the 
 German soldiers and laborers, refuse to offer the blood sacrifice for your tyrant would 
 bring his end and your salvation.996
 
Though perhaps he did not know his radio project was coming to its end, the issue of 
resistance took on both urgency and resignation near the end of the project. In March 1944, as 
Germans did little to mitigate their fate, Tillich admonished his listeners:  
You surely know what kind of destiny the Nazis are leading Germany to. You have 
 certainly seen that the end is the abyss and that there is no escape. Why, then, do you 
 support them? What sort of responsibility do you have? A responsibility for Germany? 
 Undoubtedly. But that surely means a responsibility over against the Nazis. Because it is 
 they, indeed, who are making any German future impossible. It is your responsibility to 
 get rid of the Nazis for the sake of Germany. You who know and yet don’t want to know 
 are the majority of the nation. Its fate depends upon you. If you know, then do what your 
 knowledge tells you you must do. For the sake of your responsibility for Germany, take 
 the responsibility on yourselves over against the Nazis. There is no loyalty toward those 
 who knowingly allow German people to bleed to death for the sake of their power. Give 
 up this war. It is no longer yours, it is no longer Germany’s  war. It is the Nazis’ war, their 
 war alone, and Germany and you, my German friends, are their instruments and their 
 victims.997
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 Having chosen to deal with the devil, Germany would have to bear the consequences of 
that pact: “Didn’t you know that a pact with the powers of evil first brings what is asked for, and 
that evil then insists on its right, the right to destroy the one with whom it has concluded a 
pact?”998 Further, were Germans to embrace their just fate with bitterness, Tillich argued that 
this would be tragic. Using the Christian themes of Good Friday and Easter, he wrote that 
choosing bitter suffering meant “the true Good Friday has not come for the German people. Then 
you will again proceed among those who crucify others, and the end of this war will be a 
suffering without reconciliation and a death without resurrection.”999
As the inevitable clouds of defeat were gathering, Tillich called the German people to 
look their fate of defeat in the eye, in order that it may be a source of hope.1000 Germany had to 
look into the mirror to see the truth about itself and find salvation.1001 It had to look into fate’s 
dark face and consent to it, thereby taking away its sting and thereby changing its character.1002
5.5 JUSTICE AND ECONOMICS 
Nazism meant the menacing and vile disfigurement of justice.1003 Tillich stated that the German 
conscience testifies to the truth that Germany’s cause is not just. Germany has fought neither to 
protect Europe from Russia, nor to unify Europe, nor to maintain the existence of Germany.1004
                                                 
998 “Breaking the Pact…(11/30/1943)”, 214. 
999 “A German Good Friday (3/28/1944),” 240. 
1000 Paul Tillich, “Dark Clouds Are Gathering (12/1942),” Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1998), 86. 
1001 Paul Tillich, “Blindness Precedes Ruin (4/27/1943),” Against the Third Reich (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1998), 151. 
1002 “Fate and Guilt (5/18/1943),” 155. 
1003 „Zusammenbruch ohne Wiedergeburt (30.10.1943),“ 274. 
 177
Tillich regretted the failure of intellectuals to understand their prophetic responsibility, 
their responsibility to ask questions of justice, particularly in Germany during this period. 
Technology may be morally neutral, but science must choose between good and evil. Germany 
had oppressed its intellectuals who understood this: “Everywhere there were some for whom the 
intellect meant life, struggle, revolution, mission. But where are they today? In exile, in the 
concentration camp, in seclusion, in the grave. They were betrayed by their colleagues… hated 
by the so-called intelligentsia…misunderstood by the masses.”1005 With all of its technological 
know-how, German scientists were not asking deeper questions: “to what end? For whom? What 
happens to the human being who is doing all this? What does it look like to the masses? What 
does it look like within the souls of individuals?”1006 In failing to ask these questions within “the 
Holy of Holies of science…science ceased to be holy, let alone the Holy of Holies. It became 
neutral and fell, when the hour had come, to the power of destruction as welcome tools in its 
hand.”1007 In short, the German intelligentsia “exalted when it should have condemned, it veiled 
when it should have unveiled; it kept silent when it should have spoken; it retreated when it 
should have fought; it betrayed when it should have tolerated.”1008
The response of the world order to Nazism was the response of justice at its very depths:  
The punishment of the war criminals, in the first place by the German people and then 
 by all remaining enslaved and wounded nations, is the response of the divine world order 
 attacked by the National Socialists. It is the response of human dignity which is trampled 
 into the dust by the dehumanized instruments of National Socialism, first in Germany and 
 then in all of Europe; it is the response of the community of human beings and of nations, 
 which is struck in its innermost being by the National Socialists. It is the response of that 
 which is divine in the world to the attempt to distort it into that which is diabolical.1009
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Nazism had meant the revival of monstrous, destructive forces from the past. Allied 
victory would mean a concrete justice: salvation from hunger, deprivation, and destruction; 
security with freedom; and a more just social order.1010 The world war was an embodiment of the 
world’s justice responding to Nazism and Fascism. The bombing of Guernica in the Spanish 
Civil War symbolized Fascism’s “war against the rest of the world”.1011 What was happening in 
the subsequent world war was the world’s retribution against the crimes of Fascism, a retribution 
consistent with that spoken of by the prophets of the Bible.1012
The Jewish prophetic tradition was a keystone to Tillich’s understanding of justice in the 
Voice of America speeches.1013 Each nation would bring the perpetrators [of Nazi crimes] to 
justice in accordance with the laws of each given land. Yet, it would be a global justice. There 
would be no place to hide for perpetrators, but justice would be the goal, rather than vengeance, 
justice for the perpetrators, not vengeance against German innocents.1014
It was easy for Nazism to dismiss Russian communism by branding it as atheism. 
However, Tillich tried to get his listeners to interpret the Russians as possessing a commitment—
an “ultimate concern”—directed toward the “communist social order” and toward “the mission 
of the Russian people as bearers of the idea of a new justice”: this was what he believed 
motivated Russian soldiers.1015
Thus, Tillich called Germans to engage actively in the struggle for justice. He wrote in 
the spring of 1943, “No one is as powerful as the one who fights for justice with good 
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conscience.”1016 The following winter, he offered this standard for measuring national behavior: 
“[T]rue and correct is every belief, every step into the unknown, which a nation takes, when it 
turns away from injustice and turns toward justice.”1017 Nazism was the revival of nationalistic 
tribalism rooted in tribal gods promoting international conflict. The prophetic spirit should have 
been the motivation for political leaders to stand against nationalism. Prophetic and Christian 
tradition lifted up the one God who transcends national boundaries: “the one God and the one 
people of God, beyond all tribes and nations.”1018 The prophetic and apostolic tradition 
“proclaimed the one divine law, the one truth and the one justice for all.”1019 Tillich encouraged 
his listeners to seek the greatness of Germany by the just path: see their defeat as just; admit 
complicity in their rulers’ crimes; ensure that their leaders face the consequences of their crimes; 
and “establish justice within Germany itself.”1020
As described in previous chapters, Tillich was persuaded by his reading of Marx’s 
writings in the post World War I period to take economic justice seriously. In the Voice of 
America speeches he spoke to this matter on many occasions. In the summer of 1942 he 
declared, “[T]here can be no doubt that democracy, even in its best and most effective forms, is 
constantly threatened by economic antagonisms.”1021 Whether in its democratic or totalitarian 
forms, Good Friday death without Easter hope was the recipe for class warfare: “…a nation in 
which one class exploits the others is opening its doors to the conqueror and dies in class 
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hostility.”1022 He saw the cause of the war to be primarily economic: the capitalist system could 
“no longer give the masses of the people the security and the material prosperity which the 
people could demand in the period of limitless productive powers. And because that is so, the 
world is not able to come to rest, until its economic foundations are rebuilt.”1023 An Allied 
victory would mean a more just social order.1024 One must remember that Tillich saw Nazism as 
the most tragic consequence of the dehumanizing impact of capitalism. The downfall of 
capitalism had opened up a power vacuum into which the irrational forces of National Socialism 
had flowed, according to Tillich’s reading of history. At this point in time, he was also optimistic 
that a restructuring of the western social order under more just terms—terms fueled by 
socialism’s concern to fight against the estrangement of people by the economic system—was 
still a realistic possibility. 
Tillich took the impact of economic justice seriously because economic stability is a 
component of what it means to be human. Economic security with democracy preserves human 
dignity; economic security with dictatorship leads to dehumanization. To him, Roosevelt’s New 
Deal  modeled economic stability within democracy. Tillich believed that the western liberals 
among Allied leaders, the Atlantic Charter, and the Declaration of the Allied Nations in their call 
for reform of the economic order—in undermining “freedom from fear”, “freedom from want”—
revealed their sense that economic insecurity had planted the seeds for Nazism.1025 As alluded to 
before, Tillich declared these to be a step beyond the high aspirations of the French Revolution: 
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“[T]oday, we know that freedom and equality before the law are lost if they are not borne by 
freedom from want and equal opportunity for everyone.”1026
The struggle for economic justice was not unique to Germany. Tillich described how in 
Britain, labor parties and churches together were working for social reorganization. In the United 
States, the task was always a challenging one:  
Every foot of social justice must be fought for here, just as in England, just as 
 everywhere in the world. Everywhere there are powerful interest groups which want to 
 sacrifice none of their privileges. Everywhere there is indifference which does not want 
 to fight, and foolishness which does not want to see. And everywhere the battle for 
 justice is a more difficult and perilous battle.1027
 
Tillich spoke of the transformation of churches into advocates for social and economic 
justice which had occurred in the previous two decades. Formerly, “the word justice was used in 
commentaries and sermons in every period, but people didn’t think that practical conclusions 
could be drawn from it. The workers’ parties and struggling trade unions were abhorred in 
church circles. They were interpreted as ungodly and subversive.”1028 With the awakening of the 
social justice conscience of the church, he could tell his audience of an issue of a New York 
paper at the time in which there had been three church position statements published inspired by 
the prophetic spirit: one was a protest by American church leaders about the racist treatment of 
workers; the second was a call for a living versus a minimum wage by British Roman Catholic 
bishops; and the third was the Archbishop of Canterbury William Temple’s warning that victory 
could lead to the exploitative use of freedom for the sake of greed and economic dominance.1029 
Tillich concluded, “It is astonishing to discover over and over again to what degree the thoughts 
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of religious socialism, which were suppressed in Germany, have gained acceptance in the rest of 
the world.”1030    
A few weeks later, Tillich admonished the German Opposition to think with others on the 
post war structure of the world. He told his German listeners that in the larger world, “[i]n 
leading circles of all churches, people grasp that it is useless to preach of divine grace and the 
love of neighbors on Sunday, if at the same time the people are handed over to the spiritual and 
bodily destitution of unemployment, or they are allowed to live in continuous anxiety and 
uncertainty.”1031 This meant that both international and economic reorganization were necessary 
following the war. In this spirit, he exhorted the radio audience to“[a]llow the Protestant protest 
to become strong among you, as it did among your fathers in their time. Internal and external 
freedom have proven to be one. The struggle for both is what your time requires of you.”1032
5.6 NATIONALISM AND WORLD COMMUNITY 
5.6.1 Nationalism 
From his central European perspective, Tillich portrayed Europe as a unifying force in world 
history. That unifying force was built upon Christianity and modern culture. This sounds like a 
naïve romanticization of Europe’s past. Tillich uses the idea as a provocative tool for 
condemning Hitler’s destruction of world unity.1033 Tillich believed that with the rise of Nazism 
and the onset of war, the idea of “nation” had advanced and been victorious over international 
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entities, for example, the Roman Catholic Church, the cosmopolitan spirit in science and culture, 
and the labor movement.1034 He argued that just as truth cannot be divided, so the world cannot 
legitimately be divided.1035
The period of pre war isolation under Nazism had been a time for this nationalistic 
idolatry to germinate. Tillich contrasted healthy isolation with pathological isolation. The first is 
the solitude of greatness: “Completely great people are always, somehow or other, solitary 
people, because they bring something new for which others are still not ready. Even nations 
which bear within themselves something great, something new, go through such periods of 
solitude.”1036 He saw such greatness in ancient Israel and Greece, in Great Britain, in 
revolutionary France and Russia, and in classical German culture.1037 Thus, there is a healthy 
faith in self and nation.1038 In contrast to this is destructive solitude with its international 
consequences. The Germany of Nazism rejected international community, looking “on every 
foreign nation only to see if and when it can be successfully attacked. This is the frightful, not 
creative, but rather destructive solitude into which the German nation has been driven by its 
rulers.”1039
Nazism had used technology—practical truth—to divide the world. At a time when 
technology had accomplished the physical and technological connection of the human race, 
Nazism had distorted these means for the division of the human race:  
All that the human spirit has created in the great overcoming of space has been placed 
 into the service of division, of enmity, of hatred, and of destruction. The implements of 
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 community—in the air, on water, on earth—have been turned into implements of discord. 
 The airplane carries the deadly bomb, the ship the deadly torpedo, the truck the deadly 
 missile; the electric wave connects the continents by word, spreads falsehood and hatred, 
 and the oneness it creates is being simultaneously destroyed! The human race has not 
 been matched to creations of its own spirit. They have become a curse for it, because 
 there was no unified human race which had been able to use them—for a blessing instead 
 of a curse.1040
 
Tillich saw the only unity pursued by Nazism as nationalism. Nazism’s nationalist 
idolatry contradicted the prophetic tradition’s universalism,1041 choosing the path of paganism 
and neo-paganism over that of the prophets and the Christ.1042 The idea of nation had become the 
poison” of nationalistic idolatry in Germany.1043 Idolatry spreads like an epidemic: “As hate 
gives birth to hate, so nationalism gives birth to nationalism, and national idolatry to national 
idolatry.”1044 Nazism promoted a diabolical, nationalistic and idolatrous faith: 
It is the idolatrous belief in the mission of the Germans to redeem the world, in the 
 greater sanctity of the German soil, in the saving strength of German blood. It is the 
 belief in the Führer, through whom a special providence speaks to the Germans, through 
 whom a divine preference exalts the German nation above all other nations. It is the 
 belief that power is the secret to life and that truth and justice must serve power. It is the 
 belief in whose name its fanatical priests, the S.S. and the Gestapo, have slaughtered 
 hundreds of thousands and offered them to the idol for a sacrifice. It is the belief which 
 has torn everything which is human out of the souls of its adherents and has brought the 
 horrors of primeval barbarity  upon the human race in the 20th century. The belief which 
 has been forced on the German people looks like that.1045
 
German youth were nurtured into the nationalistic ideology “that power is everything and 
justice nothing; that blood is everything and spirit nothing; that the nation is everything and the 
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individual nothing.”1046 This was a matter of patriotism gone wrong, patriotism in the extreme. 
Tillich distinguished between blind and seeing patriotism:  
What is genuine love for one’s fatherland? It is seeing, not blind, love. Blind love 
 overrates everything peculiar to itself and underrates everything strange. And for that 
 reason it is incapable of adapting to the rest of humanity. Nothing has become so difficult 
 for the German nation than this adaptation to the spirit of other nations. It has always 
 swayed between senselessly overrating another nation and senselessly overrating 
 itself.1047
 
In short, Fascism and Nazism faced their downfall because they sacrificed the eternal and exalted 
the temporal: nation, military power, Führer, youth, technology and the past.1048  
In Tillich’s view, nationalism is power untamed, predestined to be imperialistic. As in all 
periods of his thought, power in itself was not the difficulty for Tillich. In February 1944 he 
spoke of the legitimate relationship between power and community:  
[C]ommunity needs power to be able to live. That is so with all living entities; also with 
 the life of a national community. It needs power in order to keep from decaying. It needs 
 power to keep from being destroyed. It needs internal and external power. Every 
 community of living cells within a body requires a power that holds the cells together, 
 directs their growth, and protects them against harmful influences from without. A 
 community of human cells, a national community, also needs such a uniting, directing, 
 and protecting power.1049  
 
However, the dangers of power without justice were a perpetual concern for him. In the late 
spring of 1942 he put the issue in the form of a question:  
Shall human beings be creatures who are moved by will-to-power, hatred, contempt, 
 falsehood, hostility, dominion, and slavery? Or shall they be creatures who put their 
 passions into the service of justice, the recognition of that which is human in human 
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 beings, truth, the desire for freedom and equality? Shall that which is bestial or that 
 which is divine in humanity triumph? When it submitted to the present rule, Germany 
 chose in favor of the bestial in humanity.1050  
 
The dehumanizing impact of Nazism was the demonic corruption of humanity. Tillich’s 
concerns about nationalism were related to the way it embodied power: “The secret of pure 
nationalism is that it has no essence and, therefore, is revealed to be pure will-to-power. The 
empty self-deification of the nation takes effect in an unending striving for self-expansion.”1051 
In a speech on power politics in October 1942, Tillich wrote that justice is the effective 
adversary of Nazi power-idolatry. The significance of legitimate power is that it is life-
giving.1052 On the other hand, power without justice is sadistic.1053 It is both dangerous and 
illusory: “Power which is not united with justice is only apparently power, and is, in reality, the 
deepest powerlessness; and justice which possesses no outward power is only apparently 
powerless, but is, in reality, an invincible power.”1054 In a speech on tyrannical power in the 
spring of 1943, Tillich called Nazism a tyrannical machine of oppression. Though it was using 
increasingly oppressive methods, it was simultaneously provoking and strengthening resistance, 
eventually even attacking its own minions and instruments.1055 He concluded, “Tyrannical power 
has limits because it develops forces of self-destruction, and it has limits because humanity is 
created with freedom.”1056 In October 1943 he declared that Nazism’s ascent to power meant 
will for justice was replaced by will-to-power: “[T]he old which they restored was something 
ancient. It was primitive barbarity, idolatry and desire for plunder and conquest, the belief in 
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tyranny of one and the enslavement of others, it was education for death and killing.”1057 Nazism 
had coerced a living nation into becoming a lifeless machine:  
In place of community walks coercion; in place of love, fear; in place of the free 
 interrelation of free people, the forced arrangement of everyone into an enormous, all-
 entangling machine. But a machine is not a community. And a nation which has turned 
 into a machine has lost everything which can be called national community. With the 
 misused term, national community, a coercive machine has been created which is kept in 
 motion with terror, a machine through which any remnant of national community is being 
 destroyed.1058
 
Nazi nationalism was the extreme example of a phenomenon Tillich saw to be 
particularly flawed, that of national sovereignty.1059 Tillich was hopeful that “the national idea—
after it has celebrated its last, mad triumph in Germany—will have lost its power and will have 
to yield to another, higher idea.”1060 This was not to deny the value of particular cultural 
identities or the richness they grant the world, “But no nation, neither German nor any other, 
shall retain the possibility of a politically powerful nationalism.”1061
Seeking to understand the meaning of Good Friday and Easter for international life, 
Tillich believed nationalism meant death without hope of resurrection:   
Many of the fighting, suffering, nearly dying nations of this war have understood the 
 great law of life, of Good Friday and Easter….They have grasped that a nation which 
 lives only to itself, and which scorns the community of nations, perishes in its isolation 
 ...They have grasped that a nation which acknowledges no ultimate religious values but 
 seeks only the penultimate—power and money—squanders its inner strengths and 
 disintegrates.1062
 
He called for Germans to experience a true Easter:  
                                                 
1057 „Zusammenbruch oder Wiedergeburt? (30.10.1943),” 274. 
1058 Voice of America Speech 10 (5-6/1942). 
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1060 „Die nationale Idee…(10.7.1942),” 67. 
1061 Ibid., 68. 
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Easter does not speak of the victory of weapons, it doesn’t speak of the defeat of death 
 through national power seizures and political concentrations of power. The victory over 
 death does not happen in the palace of Augustus who had united the world. It doesn’t 
 happen in the victorious battles of the Romans who made this unification possible. Not 
 once does it happen through the power and position of the high priests and the splendor 
 of their temple. The victory over death occurs there where no one expects it, where no 
 one can hope for it. Easter becomes living where a genuine Passiontide, a genuine Good 
 Friday has preceded it. And for this reason there can be Easter in Germany today better 
 than in the days when it was only a spring festival or a pleasant custom. Because  there is 
 genuine Good Friday in Germany today, there is also a genuine Easter.1063
 
By the summer of 1943, Tillich was posing the question as Germany’s choice between 
two paths: the abysmal path of continued war or the hopeful, life-giving path of “community 
with others”.1064 Taking the latter path meant separating from the Nazis; concluding the war; 
returning self-determination to the people and returning to the community of nations.1065
5.6.2 World Community 
Tillich believed the German people were against Hitler’s approach to the world: “The German 
nation wants to live, like other nations and with other nations. The German nation doesn’t want 
to rule the world. But it also doesn’t want to perish.”1066 Tillich admonished his listeners to act 
on this: “Say no to the fearful choice which the National Socialists have set before you! Say no 
to world rule, say no to destruction. Say yes to the community of nations, say yes to life, to the 
future of the German nation.”1067 He called the German people to speak a profound word on 
world community: “The last word is a word of reconciliation and of the new community of 
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1064 Paul Tillich, Voice of America Speech 73 (8/1943), PTAH 603:001 (73). 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Paul Tillich, Voice of America Speech 66 (7/1943), PTAH 603:001(66). 
1067 Ibid. 
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nations beyond crime, curse and punishment.”1068 In another place he urged, “Speak of that 
which national-being means—that it means community, and the path to take is the community of 
all people.”1069 Germany’s story could become an Easter resurrection story: 
[T]he German resurrection…depends on whether the German nation becomes a new 
 nation, a people that loves justice and not power, that loves truth and not deceit, that 
 wants not to destroy but to build, that does not wish to exist unless it does so within the 
 community of nations. The resurrection of such a Germany would be an Easter message 
 for Germany and for the world. And it would be an Easter message even over the death 
 fields in all lands.1070
 
Tillich argued that “Germany cannot live without the human race, not economically, not 
intellectually, not politically.”1071 In May 1943, he called Germany to become a legitimate force 
for both European and world unity. To do this it must recognize and act upon four bases for 
world unity: it must have a desire for unity; it must seek the preservation of “the particular nature 
of the individual nations”; it must conquer the forces of self-destruction, particularly the vengeful 
spirit; and its commitment must go beyond continental unity to world unity.1072 Tillich’s 
assertion was that the “struggle for the unity of Europe should not become a struggle for an 
isolated Europe….Europe should only signify this, that the hearth of two world wars has 
eliminated within itself the preconditions for a third world war. Europe should signify that a 
great common past has again become present.”1073 In February 1944 he described the requisites 
of community as “common destiny, mutual trust, and the same goals.”1074
On the other hand, the world needed Germany as well. There is a necessary unity that 
forms a part of international relations. Peace or war in one locality has worldwide implications. 
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1073 Ibid., 201-202. 
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Therefore, “A peace which does justice to the necessities of life of all Germans must be granted 
by the victors, for the sake of themselves and for the sake of the world which must otherwise fall 
to ruin.”1075
Further, he endorsed the idea of a world federation over against the post-World War I 
pattern of the League of Nations. In July 1942, Tillich spoke of forward-seeing representatives of 
nations occupied by Germany, now in exile, who sought regional federations and a world 
federation: “[T]hey want to hand over their military and diplomatic sovereignty to this united 
entity and retain only their cultural and internal-political standing. Even the economic questions 
shall be handled in the first place by the large, united entity, the federation….”1076 The amount of 
focus on “world” throughout the world gave him reason to believe that there would be less 
particularism and provincialism after the war. “World” in this sense equals unity, not in the sense 
of a mechanistic or repressive unity, but rather a unity that is “special, unique, free, and 
creative.”1077 Tillich saw the meaning of World War II to be the creation of a broader world 
community.1078 In such a world, there could “no longer be any external freedom, in the sense of 
the sovereignty of the individual states after this war. No nation will be free in this sense. All 
nations of the world will join together in an all-embracing unity.”1079 Tillich pointed to the world 
movement toward unity within Christianity as a basis for hope in the prospect of international 
community. He advocated for the overcoming of “the pernicious results of national sovereignty” 
via the establishment of a community of nations, arguing that “God’s objective is humanity and 
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not any particular nation.”1080 Tillich wrote this at a time during which he still held out hope for 
a united Germany with a legitimate voice in a world not dominated by three or four powerful 
nations. 
In one of his earliest speeches, Tillich had offered his hope for the German people “that 
shortly they will see through and shake off the religious packaging of their nationalism, without 
falling to the level of genuine irreligion, namely to despair and to indifference to any meaning in 
life.”1081 As a remedy for their nationalistic idolatry, he called for Germany to turn to the eternal: 
“It can happen that the German people—turning to the eternal—learns what place it occupies 
within the temporal: where it belongs, what it means for the human race, what its limits are, and 
what its true greatness is.”1082
5.7 CONCLUSION 
On the occasion of his one hundredth speech over the Voice of America, Tillich explained the 
purposes of his speeches: “What I have attempted, week after week over the last two years, is to 
lead the German people to a new, genuine hope…What I have said to you and pondered with you 
in these two years was the inner preparation for the German future…Separate yourselves from 
those who are bringing you to ruin: that tone was missing from none of the speeches.”1083 As this 
chapter has shown, Tillich engaged in a rich and wide-ranging discussion of issues in his pursuit 
of this goal. The quantity of material required a thematic treatment of the content of the speeches 
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rather than a chronological one illustrating both the evolution as well as the constancy of 
Tillich’s thought. The next chapter will be able to deal with those issues as it turns to Tillich’s 
message to his American audience during the same period. Before turning to that chapter, the 
principle elements of the Voice of America speeches to be included in an ethic of religious 
internationalism can be identified as these: 
 (1) National identity within an international community and world unity must be  
  cultivated, rather than isolated nationalism and tribalism;  
 
 (2) Creativity within cultures should be embraced; critical thinking must be  
  unrelenting; reverence for human beings must be practiced(democracy is respect  
  for human dignity; free decision is the expression of one’s humanity); 
 
 (3) Socio-economic justice should be pursued; 
 
 (4) Power with justice is the goal; 
 
 (5) Political resistance is necessary when it functions as an instrument of justice  
  (“instruments of the moral, constructive world order, and not of the immoral,  
  destructive world order”); 
 
 (6) The destructive idolatry of power worship should be rejected; 
 
 (7) Nations will be struck for the international guilt of their leaders; 
 
 (8) Nations must accept responsibility for the crimes of their leaders; and 
 
 (9) Technology is morally neutral, but science must make moral choices. 
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6.0  WORLD WAR II—TILLICH’S MESSAGE TO HIS AUDIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: SOCIAL RENEWAL AND INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION 
6.1 INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
Paul Tillich wrote many articles and lectures for the English-speaking community during World 
War II which addressed the meaning of this historical crisis and which advocated various 
strategies. The discussion here is structured under three general areas: philosophy of history; 
Protestantism and its principle(s); and postwar reconstruction. 
6.2 PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
6.2.1 General Comments 
Tillich’s philosophy of history is anchored in his religious socialism. Religious Socialism posed 
a way for religion to influence social outlook that avoided overemphasizing either human 
essence (and thereby losing human existence) or human existence (losing humanity’s essential 
nature). The way of religious socialism kept essence and existence in tension.1084 Religious 
socialism maintained belief in the downfall of—and estrangement embodied within—the 
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bourgeois period,1085 the rise of a collectivistic period, and the religious understanding of this 
collectivistic period. 1086 Religious socialist anthropology distinguished human being from God 
(infinite freedom) and nature (finite necessity): “The structure of man is the structure of ‘finite 
freedom.’”1087 Thus, utopianism is false: “The perfect never appears”, however, “Man is able to 
act without Utopianism because he is able to realize the infinite meaning of a creative act to 
which he gives his finite existence.”1088
 Tillich clarified that the social group does not equal the person:  
Social groups are not organic or personal beings. They are personalized by analogy, but 
 this analogy is not only vague but also dangerous, because it hides the power structure of 
 every social group and asks for free decisions of a group which can be asked only of 
 those who act for the group…[It] is always the individual person who decides and acts 
 and not a mythological collective which is dressed up as a person.1089
 
Further, he questioned whether creative freedom equaled political freedom, given that political 
freedom and pathological economic insecurity can exist simultaneously. 1090 Finite freedom was 
Tillich’s alternative and challenge to the metaphysical loneliness of religious individualism, the 
detached humanism of cultured individualism and the atomization of rational individualism. For 
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finite freedom, human creativity occurs within the collective and within the other structural 
limits of history. 1091
 Two concrete applications Tillich made of this formulation of finite freedom related to 
the future of Germany and of Jewish-Christian relations. He saw hope for the future of Germany 
as dependent upon groups capable of giving “ingenious leadership which is in creative 
agreement with the historical situation.”1092 He believed any future action on the relationship of 
Judaism and Christianity as a matter of acting within the “gaps” that fate permitted. 1093
For religious socialism, historical dialectics was “a union of waiting and acting,” captured 
by the biblical position of “the Kingdom of God is ‘at hand.’” 1094 History is dynamic, ever 
changing, and always potentially creative.1095 The optimal place from which to interpret history 
is out of broken finitude. In place of the detached “mere observer” and the unreflective “mere 
activist”, broken finitude is “opened for the infinite by suffering.”1096 Occupied by the prophets 
in ancient Israel, the socially vulnerable in the time of Christ, and the proletariat for Marx, 
religious socialism saw it to include the “‘broken’ people in all groups.”1097 In a March 1944 
sermon, Tillich pointed to both Cyrus of Persia and the suffering servant of Isaiah as such 
people: Cyrus, in ignorance; the suffering servant, the prototype of  “all those who are innocently 
sacrificed for the future, to be one small stone in the building of the divine Kingdom….”1098  
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 The activism of religious socialism was founded on its kairos doctrine. As previously 
described, kairos is “the right moment of time, in which eternity breaks into history and demands 
a decisive step, without assuming that this step will lead into an immanent or transcendent stage 
of perfection.”1099 It “unites in a special way theological optimism and pessimism and 
overcomes the alternative”, i.e., the alternatives of “utopianism as well as historical 
indifference”. 1100
6.2.2 Cultural Disintegration 
Tillich argued that the European situation—particularly, the destruction of the bourgeoisie and 
the entry into a period of “radical transformation”—was not accidental, but was a logical 
consequence of the bourgeois fallacy of harmony and the utopian belief in the capacity of reason 
to grant that harmony. Both intra-class and ideological splits had arisen. 1101
Economic security, employment status, the position of the proletariat, lack of academic 
posts, disintegration of the bourgeoisie, and the relationship of politics and religion led to splits 
within the leading bourgeoisie, organized labor, the intelligentsia, the bureaucratic-military 
complex, and Protestantism.1102 The internationalism of the League of Nations had been 
contradicted by nationalistic divisiveness. Antisemitic and anti-alien policies had undermined the 
emancipation of the Jews and the freedom of aliens.1103 Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Stirner, 
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Dolstoyevsky, and Jacob Burckhardt all shared Marx’s sensitivity to disintegrating trends within 
European culture.1104
In the realm of ideas, there were splits between the Marxist and Nietzschean criticisms of 
the bourgeois system, rationalism and irrationalism, classical world-bourgeois liberalism and 
nationalist racialism, Wilsonian pluralism and national sovereignty, and humanistic rationalism 
and traditional religious forms.1105
This collapse was civilizational, not restricted to Germany.1106 The German situation had 
simply become the most pathological. Tillich wrote that Germany’s inter war conditions 
(“political oppression from outside, social insecurity from inside, intellectual disintegration 
everywhere”) led to Nazism. If such conditions arose again, the consequences would again be 
negative.1107 Tillich spoke to the question of whether National Socialism represented the true 
spirit of Germany. While Germany could not be completely separated from Nazism, the same 
was true of Europe and the world as a whole: “All were complicit: an epoch is complicit; and this 
epoch is now going up in flames.”1108 In a July 1942 article, Tillich responded quite sharply to 
publisher Emil Ludwig’s call for a fight against the people of Germany, particularly Ludwig’s 
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declaration that Hitler was Germany and that Germany was a warrior nation.1109 To Tillich, this 
was group defamation: “I have fought against, and will continue to fight against any moralistic 
collective condemnation of a natural or historical existing group.”1110 He saw group stereotype 
as contrary to prophetic justice.1111 Further, it undermined both the efforts to motivate Germans 
to resist Hitler’s regime and one of the ultimate goals for which the war was being fought: a 
Europe in which each nation surrendered parts of its sovereignty in a regional system of 
accountability.1112
Protestantism was a parallel development during the period: unmediated access to the 
divine Spirit and to the sacred texts were consistent with the belief of the power of reason in all 
people. However, reason dominated the period: “Adaptation of religion to reason, but to a reason 
which was based on religion.”1113  
Tillich attributed the failure of the principle of harmony (one of reason’s optimistic 
expectations) to “an economic, a political, and a spiritual exhaustion of this principle.”1114 In 
economics, the middle class had broken down and permanent unemployment had arisen. In 
politics, world power struggles had destroyed any sense of a united world. In spirituality, the 
simultaneous decline of religious conformity and the onset of secular emptiness created a 
“spiritual vacuum.”1115 Elsewhere he attributed Western civilization’s collapse to superficiality: 
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The noise of these shallow waters prevents us from listening to the sounds out of the 
 depth, to the sounds of what really happens at the base of our social structure, in the 
 longing hearts of the masses, in the struggling minds of those who are sensitive to 
 historical changes. Our ears are deaf to the cries out of the social depth as they are deaf to 
 the cries out of the depth of our soul. We leave the bleeding victims of our social system 
 alone as we leave our bleeding souls alone after we have hurt them, without hearing their 
 outcries in the noise of our daily lives.1116
 
Moral anarchy had become manifest. The vacuum was ripe to be filled by irrational 
forces. 1117 Fascism was able to replace “religion” with “nation” as the source of values. Russian 
communism combined rationalism with nationalism.1118 The spiritualist groups maintained their 
non-political positions: Tillich included Karl Barth within this group. Neo-Catholicism 
perpetuated the authority within the church over all realms, but with less power than before. 
Cynicism was the natural consequence for those unpersuaded by any of these options.1119 As the 
postwar period approached, a double disintegration—of personality and community—signaled 
the loss of meaning. 1120 Tillich called the church to face this disintegration and to use its 
structure to interpret the world situation.1121
                                                                                                                                                             
psychological effects of economic and social insecurity, expressed in indifference to freedom and democracy, 
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6.2.3 The Jewish People 
Tillich took various directions to understand the impact of Nazism and western civilization upon 
the Jewish people. He was asked to write on the relationship of Catholicism and Protestantism to 
the Jewish Question during the war years. Tillich saw Catholicism and Judaism as two systems 
competing to provide a comprehensive understanding of existence, two unrelenting and 
exclusive world views. The exclusiveness of their worldviews made Catholic Anti-Judaism and 
Jewish Anti-Catholicism almost inevitable.1122 Tillich reviewed the biblical roots of anti-Judaism 
and the combination of rejection and protection that was present in the period of the Church 
Fathers.1123
In certain cases, the line between of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism was blurred by the 
behavior of clerics. Interestingly, when Catholicism took the path of anti-Semitism, it became 
more vulnerable. As Tillich put it, “Catholic anti-Semitism can be fought, Catholic anti-Judaism 
cannot.”1124 He seemed to have been commenting on the comparative difficulty of fighting a 
doctrinal battle rooted in the sacred texts of Christianity (anti-Judaism) over against a social 
justice struggle against the stereotyping of the character of any person because of their 
membership in a racially-defined group. 
Tillich’s discussion of Protestantism and Antisemitism was structured around 
Lutheranism and comparisons between Lutheranism and Catholicism as well as between German 
Lutheranism and American sectarian, post-Reformation Protestantism. 
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While Lutheranism had no political ethic,1125 Protestant sectarianism’s belief in “the 
presence of the divine in the ground of every human soul,” as well as the principle of tolerance 
which logically arises from this belief, placed Christians and Jews on equal footing in terms of 
human dignity.1126 However, when the notion of “the inner light” within all people slid over into 
a rationalistic secularism devoid of anything feeding the non rational dimension of human 
beings, irrational anti-Semitic movements could move in, allegedly to meet that non rational 
need while doing their destructive and oppressive work.1127
In a 1942 article, Tillich took the opportunity to discuss the nature of faith in the Jewish 
and Christian traditions, part of his intermittent “project” of placing Christianity and Judaism in 
relation to one another. In prophetic Judaism, God “reverses the imminent order of human 
possibilities. The acceptance and confidence in this transcendent order is faith [Tillich’s 
italics].”1128 God’s ways are deeper than the explicit power circumstances of history. The 
achievement of the Protestant Reformation was the rediscovery of this paradox of biblical faith. 
Luther saw faith as a non rational, intellect-transcending gift: faith as “a living, restless 
power,”1129 faith as “the acceptance of the transcendent order which contradicts the order to 
which we belong….Faith is the triumphant paradox of life.”1130  
In his response to Emil Ludwig’s rhetoric cited above, Tillich criticized Ludwig for using 
stereotype in the same way as the Nazis were doing at the time. Germans of integrity had chosen 
emigration in the face of such distortion of the truth by National Socialism. Now, the same 
                                                 
1125 Paul Tillich, “Protestantism and Antisemitism (early 1940s),” PTAH 416:010, 4. 
1126 Ibid., 8-11. 
1127 Ibid., 12. 
1128 Paul Tillich, “‘Faith’ in the Jewish-Christian Tradition,” Christendom (New York), VII, no. 4 (Autumn 1942): 
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1129 Ibid., 525. 
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distorting method was being used by members of the Jewish community against Germans.1131 In 
place of group defamation, Tillich called for a common struggle for that for which he had 
advocated in his “war aims” pamphlets: a Europe in which each nation surrendered parts of its 
sovereignty in a regional system of accountability.1132
In another instance, in his capacity as President of the Council for a Democratic 
Germany, Tillich received a letter from Rabbi Stephen S. Wise “as to the attitude of the members 
of the Council … toward the problem of anti-semitism and the persecution of the Jews”, given 
the absence of comments on the matter in the Council’s first policy statement.1133 In response, 
Tillich noted that no reference to anti-Semitism was present in their policy statement because it 
was an assumption taken as a given by a Council with members who had previously articulated 
their positions on the matter.1134 In this same spirit, and much more explicitly, the Council sent a 
telegram to the very first meeting  of the World Jewish Congress, supporting full rights of 
citizenship and reparations in a future democratic Germany.1135 The World Jewish Congress 
gave a warm response, published in a subsequent issue of the Council’s Bulletin.1136
6.3 PROTESTANTISM AND ITS PRINCIPLE(S) 
Tillich wrote that religion’s word to the people of his time combined the classic viewpoints of 
religious reservation with religious obligation: “Religion is, first, an open hand to receive a gift 
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1134 Ibid., 4. 
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and, second, an acting hand to distribute gifts. Without coming from the religious reservation, 
carrying with us something eternal, we are of no use in working for the religious obligation to 
transform the temporal…The vertical line must become actual in the horizontal line.” 1137 Tillich 
called on the United States to avoid the dangers of a vacuous, unrooted religious obligation when 
the end of the war would finally come.1138 The two sides of religion’s word unite in hope: “Hope 
is the opposite of utopianism…Hope unites the vertical and horizontal lines, the religious 
reservation and the religious obligation. Therefore, the ultimate word that religion must say to 
the people of our time is the word of hope.”1139  
 A Protestantism deeply rooted within the prophetic tradition fueled Tillich’s religious 
understanding. The prophetic spirit—rooted in universal monotheism—is a force standing 
against the rule of particularity and provincialism. The prophets of the Old Testament bore the 
message of peace and justice as the meaning of history over against nationalism. Tillich once 
again pointed to Abraham as the archetype of the prophetic spirit, “called out of his home and 
family and blood and soil to become the nation of history, the nation in which all other nations 
are blessed.”1140 This spirit challenged Nazism and challenges any nation’s claim to ultimacy.1141 
Protestantism provides the persistently critical judgment against claims to ultimacy by any 
human being or institution.1142
In politics, Tillich again honed in on the prophetic spirit embodied in early Marxism, 
which explains his religious socialism and his carefully defined affiliation with Marxist thought: 
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“Marxism never has been accepted indiscriminately and without a serious criticism by the 
Religious-Socialist movements…partly a rejection, partly an acceptance and an essential 
transformation of the Marxist teachings….”1143 For him, Marxism and biblical prophecy shared 
similarities with regard to their understandings of history and humanity. History is meaningful as 
a realm of conflict between good (justice) and evil (injustice). The present state of society, and 
the escape from it into personal piety, are together seen as evil; a catastrophic breakdown of the 
present order will occur prior to the rise of a period dominated by justice; and, there are specific 
vehicles of history that will move it toward its culmination in a just order.1144 Humanity within 
history is estranged from its true destiny. A human being’s individual existence does not tell the 
full story of human meaning, and truth cannot be sought by means of the separation of theory 
and practice.1145 Thus, Marx was led to combat economically and sociologically destructive 
ideologies, and Christian Reformers were compelled to combat idolatry.1146
Realistic though he may have been, Marx’s inner historical understanding of fulfillment 
was utopian to Tillich’s thinking: Tillich and religious socialism saw fulfillment within history as 
unrealistic.1147 Further, communism secularized the prophetic spirit, dissipating its 
dynamism.1148 Nonetheless, Marxism offered religious socialists its existentialism (tying truth to 
theory and practice), its historical materialism (the seriousness with which it takes history), and 
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its dialectical method (the instrument for negotiating the ambiguities of life and the search for 
truth).1149  
With this framework in hand, the discussion turns to principles Tillich attributed to 
Protestantism.1150 Principle one affirms God’s unchallengeable authority and protests all 
ecclesiastical and secular attempts to give absoluteness to human truth-claims.1151 Principle two 
rejects Catholicism’s reduction of divine imminence to hierarchical authority.1152 Principle three 
indicts Protestantism for an institutionalism that results in ethical and doctrinal rigidity and for a 
hyper-critical spirit that trades away the power of religious symbolism, ritual and doctrine for an 
empty and superficial individualism, subjectivity, and rationalism.1153
Principle four rejects the sacred and secular distinction and argues for the imminence of 
God within cultural acts: “The secular realms are no more secular if they penetrate to their own 
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ground and aim. They have their second quality in themselves and need no ecclesiastical 
sanctification.”1154 Further, religious institutions are heavily penetrated by “the secular” through 
the various ways they are dependent “on the special cultural situation in which it has 
appeared.”1155 Principle five affirms the legitimacy of culture apart from ecclesiastical 
authority.1156 Principle six challenges a spiritless secularism. Since “God is directly related to 
every realm of life, no cultural creation can be cut off from this relation without losing its 
ultimate meaning, ground and aim.”1157 Tillich spoke of a spirit of self-critique—“eternal 
Protestantism”—as “the acknowledgment of the divinity of the divine which is neither identical 
with nor dependent on any of our achievements.”1158 This provokes dangerous responses from 
power-holders. He wrote, “Eternal Protestantism is the divine protest against the world,” 
particularly its rootedness in sub- or penultimate concerns.1159 Tillich had been committed to 
helping Protestantism embody this critical voice ever since “the first world war threw me out of 
the ivory tower of philosophical idealism and religious isolationism.”1160 Out of the soil of “an 
empty secularism” and “an autonomous culture” grew cultural self-destruction and “an anti-
divine heteronomy. This is the story of our time.”1161 Principle seven is that “creativity in the 
historical dynamics” is possible, informed by kairos, the notion that history provides openings 
for well-timed, creative, constructive, and salvific (healing) action.1162  
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Principle eight declares that in place of a distinctively Protestant politics or ethics, the 
Protestant principle of prophetic and loving critique is perpetually relevant: “Protestantism is not 
bound to its past; therefore it is free for its future, even if this future should deserve the name: 
‘Post Protestant Era’.”1163  
Principles nine and ten came in his 1943 “Lecture at Meadville,” in which he describes, 
on the one hand, Protestantism’s “open[ness] to both sides” of the East/West divide within 
Christianity and, on the other hand, its “lay character…[enabling it] to embody itself in 
innumerably different forms in individuals, in accidental movements, in secular groups, in 
esoteric seclusion.”1164  
In “The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church for Protestantism,” Tillich 
pointed to the impotency of Protestantism without Catholic mysticism: “A Protestantism which 
has no more place for meditation and contemplation, for ecstasy and ‘mystical union’ has ceased 
to be religion and has become an intellectual and moral system in traditional religious terms.”1165 
A “Protestant Catholicity” would take seriously the collective unconscious and address the 
adequacy of its symbols, seeing its sacramental life as “a means of collective healing.”1166 Thus, 
principle eleven is the practice of the mysticism and sacramentalism of the ancient church. 
Principle twelve applies to the church’s relationship to other religions and cultures, in which 
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Tillich advocated the use of the Protestant principle as a tool for critical assessment,1167 “finding 
a kind of Old Testament in all religions”.1168 Principle thirteen is love, the process of “creating 
unity in a concrete situation.”1169
Tillich noted that while history was moving towards collectivism, Protestantism is 
personalistic. He distinctly distinguished personalism from individualism. Individualism is the 
final, dehumanizing product of technological culture and involved “the loss of a spiritual 
center.”1170 On the other hand, “Protestant personalism”—principle fourteen—includes both 
piety and decision: personal decision triumphs over collective responsibility. Here, the 
subconscious is no longer “a bearer of grace,” and “ritual activities” are replaced by “world-
transforming activities.”1171 As mentioned before, Tillich was careful not to equate the social 
group with the person.1172
The sectarian mysticism and the rationalism at the heart of orthodox theology—both 
within Protestantism—creates a bridge between personalism and individualism.1173 Religion and 
democracy are connected at their deepest level by their understanding that respect for human 
dignity—for the person—is the outcome of perceiving human existence and meaning in their 
ultimate sense.1174 While culture expresses meaning within the collective, the individual is 
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always the creative force in culture. The creations of the individual are either their own personal 
product or the product of the collective via the individual.1175
In tension with Protestantism’s personalism, according to Tillich, was collectivism, a 
social pattern in which the identity of individuals within the group is more influenced by the 
group’s identity than the individual’s.1176 Collectivism does not mean the complete suppression 
of individual self-determination. Totalitarianism is imposed conformism, not self-determined 
collectivism. Authority is different in totalitarianism than it is in collectivism: in totalitarianism, 
it is a force external to the individual; in collectivism, it arises almost automatically within its 
bearers.1177 While Protestantiam is “the principle of eternal and essential non-conformism, 
because God is never conform[ed] with the world,”1178 Protestantism in the West had conformed 
politically, leading to religious wars, apoliticality, and an uncritical and persecuting 
institutionalism.1179 While historical Protestantism had compromised with the conformist, 
progressive ideology of technical civilization, “The Protestant principle is able to detach the 
Church from every form and attach it preliminarily to every still creative form. The solution 
under the Protestant principle [is] the dialectical, non-utopian type of Religious Socialism.”1180 
This is the fifteenth and final principle in the present interpretation of Tillich’s Protestant 
thought. 
Tillich assessed the period culminating in World War II as “reality seen in the light of the 
sacred ‘void,’ as the sacred not-having, a not-yet.”1181 (This was one of his early expressions of 
his sense of history’s entry into a period of a-kairotic vacuum.) His conclusion was that the 
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twentieth century did not mean the end of Christianity or Protestantism and its principle. 
However, it did mean the end of its dominance.1182 He pondered whether a Protestant Catholicity 
—inaugurating a post-Protestant Era—was necessary to cope with “the fever within the body 
Protestant.”1183 He wrote, “I love the Protestant church, but I love more the Protestant principle 
for the sake of which the Protestant church may lose its significance in the next stage of 
history.”1184 Tillich saw Protestantism as “the continuation of the Christian Church, the group 
which carries the historical consciousness of mankind. It is the reception of the New Being as 
manifest in Jesus as the Christ.”1185 As opposed to security rooted in the transient, Protestantism 
stands for security in the transcendent.1186 Tillich concluded, “Protestantism will live as eternal 
principle. Protestantism can live as a self-transforming historical reality representing the New 
Being in history.”1187
6.4 POST WAR RECONSTRUCTION 
Based on his understanding of the failure of Western civilization and his construction of the 
content of Protestantism, Tillich turned to the shape of the postwar world. He directed his 
attention to social renewal and international organization.  
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6.4.1 The Religiously Socialistic Spirit 
Tillich advocated the cause of a  social transformation which is “the development in human 
existence of that species which socially produces and reproduces being with dignity.”1188 That is, 
Tillich sought a path of human existence in which all of humanity was committed to the 
perpetuation of just societies, i.e., societies that allow their members to live in dignity. He 
believed vocation should be the basis for all human creative activity, not merely theological 
work.1189 To permit continued dehumanization was to sanction a human species vulnerable to 
manipulation by tyrannical powers, with the Hobbesian Leviathan state as the consequence.1190 
After the fall of the Enlightenment’s liberating reason, capitalism’s technological reason, and 
Marxism’s revolutionary reason, Tillich argued for planning reason: “We must go forward under 
the direction of planning reason toward an organization of society which avoids both totalitarian 
absolutism and liberal individualism.”1191 By endorsing planning reason, Tillich shows his 
distrust of an untrammeled free market economy, believing some degree of government 
oversight is required to prevent exploitation by economic power holders. e used the biblical and 
Hobbesian image of Leviathan to describe the multiple forms dehumanization can take, the 
three-faced Leviathan of late medieval authoritarianism, bourgeois capitalism, and 
totalitarianism. He believed that “Christianity must give its message to a world in which 
Leviathan in its different aspects threatens all human existence to its very roots,”1192 rejecting the 
paths of both a reactionary and conservative Catholicism and a weak and compromising 
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Protestantism. Instead, it must bear the methods—and embody the truths—of concrete justice 
and unifying love, operating in a non utopian way in the world.1193  
The Nazi crimes against the Jewish people and his own friendships with Jewish 
colleagues led Tillich to repeated consideration of the future of the relationship between Jews 
and non Jews. He observed two paths on which Christians and Jews met and could continue to 
meet in contributing to social renewal: the prophetic and the mystical. Along the prophetic path, 
the demand is for justice, with idolatries of thought and religion, of politics and economics 
constantly questioned, with “the Jews always emphasizing the ‘not yet’ and the horizontal line 
towards the Kingdom, the Christians the transcendent ‘already’ and the vertical line.”1194 Along 
the mystical path, Tillich saw a meeting point in the transcendence of Christ, with its roots in the 
hiddenness of God to which Hellenistic Judaism gave particular attention.1195 Despite the 
genocidal crimes committed by Germans against Jews, Tillich described parallels in German and 
Jewish experience:  
No nation has more contributed to the cruelty of the Jewish fate in our time and—
 nevertheless—no nation shows more similarities in character and destiny within Judaism 
 than the Germans. Both have experienced tremendous catastrophes in their history on 
 religious or ultimate grounds. Both are lacking that balance in historical existence and 
 human attitude which is the gift of destiny to more favored nations. Both show a 
 sociological split and psychological wound which produce highly creative and highly 
 destructive forces at the same time.1196
 
Together, Tillich believed, Jews and non-Jews captured by the prophetic spirit could be bearers 
of both “a period of justice and peace” as well as “cultural interpenetration and cross-
                                                 
1193 Paul Tillich, “Power and Justice in the Postwar World (1944),” in Theology of Peace, ed. Ronald H. Stone 
(Louisville, Ky.: Westminster-John Knox Press, 1990): 101, 103; Paul Tillich, “The Christian Churches and the 
Emerging Social Order in Europe,” Religion in Life Vol. XIV, #3 (Summer 1945): 334-339; and “The World 
Situation,” 43-44. 
1194 “The Religious Relation Between Christianity and Judaism in the Future,” 4. 
1195 Ibid., 5. Tillich’s contemporary and acquaintance, Martin Buber, wrote of the hiddenness of God as a way to 
begin understanding the Holocaust event. (Martin Buber, ‘The Dialogue between Heaven and Earth,’ On Judaism 
[New York: Shocken Books, 1972]. 
1196 Paul Tillich, “The Role of Judaism in Postwar Reconstruction (mid 1940s),” PTAH 405A:001, 1. 
 213
fertilization”.1197 He had hopes that Jews living in their own homeland or homelands would 
become “reservoirs of the special gifts and the special spirit of this nation,”1198 i.e., possessing a 
prophetic spirit that suppresses nationalistic separatism and promotes world unity.1199 In his 
general hope for the rise of a broader, internationalist viewpoint, Tillich seems to offer the 
specific hope that the Jewish people may become a vehicle for intercultural relationships. 
However, it would probably go too far to say that Tillich was asserting the equality of all 
religious traditions, in light of his general Christocentrism. 
6.4.2 Social Renewal 
While Europe was the stated object of Tillich’s comments, Germany in particular and western 
civilization as a whole were always in the background of Tillich’s discussion of social renewal. 
He described the following as elements necessary for that renewal: a convincing sense of life’s 
meaning; symbols adequate to that meaning; reinvigoration of personality and community, “ a 
community which overcomes loneliness by a more collectivistic form of life without sacrificing 
the meaning and right of the individual”; socio-political transformation, specifically, societal 
renewal based on central planning that promotes individual spontaneity, yet not dominated by the 
private decisions of economic-industrial power-holders; “a centralized State power with 
democratic correctives,” authority without oppression, and security; a spiritual vanguard of 
youth; religious people intellectually and spiritually unbound by religious institutions; creative 
representatives of the secular realm; prophetic parties committed to social justice; and the 
mobilization of public opinion in America, England and Europe to prevent a reactionary, “so-
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called Ordnungspolitik (policy for maintaining order)” from being executed by occupying 
authorities.1200  
With regard to Germany, Tillich argued that the following was necessary: the 
puninshment and removal of all Nazi elements and their pre-1933 supporters; stable German 
economic production—in an economy of peace—under a “directed European economy”; the 
revival democratic movements combined with patience towards Germany as its democracy 
developed; the guarantee of basic civil rights, restoring and protecting religious freedom and 
expression; elimination of racial policies; inclusion of Germany in any international security 
arrangement; and the establishment of collective security within a European federation.1201  
He repeatedly expressed his disgust at the Allied rhetoric regarding the re-education of 
Germany. To the question, “Is it possible to reeducate the Germans?” Tillich forcefully declared, 
“It should not even be tried! A nation is not a schoolboy. The only real education is fate and 
nothing else!”1202 He questioned the integrity of such a strategy: would it “mean that American 
teachers teach the German adults the American way of life under the guns of the tanks and a 
censorship of radio, newspapers, magazines, books, public speeches by the American censors? 
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Nazism to German culture and Tillich’s own understanding of the levels of guilt within German society. 
1202 Paul Tillich, “Can the Jew  Return to Germany? (early 1940s)” PTAH, 416:008, 7. 
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Does anyone believe that this is an educational situation?”1203 However, if re-education 
occurred, it had to be sensitive to certain realities: the nature of victor-vanquished relationship; 
the counter-productiveness of oppressive policies by occupiers; the necessity of creative, 
constructive measures by means of a secure social system; and the class and cultural factors that 
influence education. 1204
With respect to the Jewish community, Tillich specifically addressed these matters: the 
nature of the peace concluded at war’s end; the possibility of restitution; and the nature of the 
German anti-Semitism which was the basis for the war. If peace were brought about through 
negotiation with either the German opposition or with the pre-World War I status quo, the 
dynamics for effective cultural change would not be present: only a peace through communist 
revolution or through “autonomous German revolutionary movements” able to set up “a socialist 
and humanist Germany within a more or less federated world” could bring the change necessary 
for the return of Jews to be a real possibility.1205 The restitution of private property would be 
impossible under any scenario. However, restitution in terms of “the symbols of [anti-]Nazi 
future” would not only be possible but a point of honor within “a socialist and humanist 
Germany.”1206 Symbols such as synagogues, hospitals, schools, and old people’s homes 
conveyed an openness to receiving the impoverished Jews back into German society and to 
welcoming Jews back into German cultural life.1207 With respect to anti-Semitism, Tillich did 
not accept the notion of an exclusively German guilt for anti-Semitism, arguing that Europe as a 
                                                 
1203 “The Future of Germany,” 14. 
1204 Paul Tillich, “The Post-War Education of the German People (early 1940s),” PTAH, 404:008, 2-8. 
1205 “Can the Jew Return to Germany?” 1-2. Tillich was vague regarding who or what would bring about such a 
revolution, but the esoteric, religious-intellectual orders he described in the interwar period would likely have 
provided the ideological justification for revolutionaries. 
1206 Ibid., 3-4. 
1207 Ibid., 4. 
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whole (including Germany) was anti-Semitic by tradition and that Germany (under Nazism) was 
even more so through the additional element of indoctrination.1208
Tillich summed up his vision of Europe in this way:  
My vision for the spiritual reconstruction of Europe is a large number of anonymous and 
 esoteric groups consisting of religious, humanist and socialist people who have seen the 
 trends of our period and were willing to resist them, who have contended for personality 
 and community (many of them under persecution), and who know about an ultimate 
 meaning of life even if they are not yet able to express it.1209
 
6.4.3 The Religiously International Spirit 
In his 1943 lectures before the Federal Council of Churches Commission on a Just and Durable 
Peace, chaired by future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Tillich declared that anyone 
seeking a lasting solution had, first, to understand the meaning of the war: not merely war among 
nations, but “a war of world revolution under the cover of a war among nations.”1210 Tillich 
described the theological bases for Christian engagement with this and other political realities in 
three “formal principles”: God’s “absolute transcendence,” God’s “paradoxical imminence,” and 
“the  universal reference” of all things to God. The first halts any claims to absolute truth by any 
human entity. The second means that history is the story of the presence of the transcendent God 
in a way that will not eliminate human freedom and the evil consequences thereof. The third 
means that the holy can be found anywhere and will not be limited by human constraints.1211 To 
these could be added the four elements of prophetic spirit, universal wisdom, collectivism, and 
                                                 
1208 Ibid., 5. 
1209 “Spiritual Problems of Past-War Reconstruction,” 6. Again, see Tillich’s discussion of secular-Protestant 
religious orders in chapter 3. 
1210 “Christian Basis of a Just and Durable Peace,” 73. 
1211 Ibid., 74-75. 
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the Protestant principle of self-critique which he would assemble in May 1944.1212 As a result, 
Tillich disputed the goal of the commission, “argu[ing] the necessity of destroying the moralistic 
arrogance of the concept of a just and durable peace in a situation in which tragedy and possibly 
grace are the only categories that can be applied to the present disrupted world”1213 and asserting 
that a peace had to be sought that was cognizant of the dynamic context within which justice 
must be sought, a context unavoidable, ambiguous, and fragmented, rather than a final, just order 
out of touch with the nature of life (“the peace of the cemetery”).1214 In contrast to this, he would 
later characterized the work of the later Council for a Democratic Germany as a voice of realism 
in the face of historical and cultural distortions. 1215
Given the next direction Tillich would take in the “Just and Durable Peace” speeches, it 
makes sense to have in mind his 1940 speech, “Ethics in a Changing World,” delivered for the 
bicentennial of the University of Pennsylvania. In it he described the inadequacy of three prior 
solutions to ethics in a period of profound change: the static supra-naturalistic solution of 
Catholicism; the dynamic-naturalistic solution of life-philosophy, positivism, pragmatism and (in 
a distorted way) Nazism; and the progressive-rationalistic solution dominant during the 
Enlightenment. In their place Tillich posed what could be termed the agapeic-kairotic solution 
implied in Christian ethics. This solution combines eternal principle with temporal application. 
                                                 
1212 “The Purpose that Unites,” 17, 20. 
1213 “Christian Basis of a Just and Durable Peace,” 87. 
1214 Ibid., 78-79. In “Power and Justice in the Postwar World,” from the summer of 1944, Tillich interpreted the 
dynamics which would dictate the postwar conditions of the world. He did this by outlining the relationship of the 
three metaphysical bases for understanding reality (power, justice and love) and applied these to the international 
arena. Power is simply the power of being, the power to be, which all entities within existence with varying strength. 
Justice is the ordering of these power dynamics within each entity and among entities. Love is the primary structure 
of existence, the drive toward unity which dictates the shape which the ordering process of justice should take. One 
sees the impact of justice upon power by the fact that “[a] just order is an order in which every part gets what its 
deserves according to the structure of power it represents”. One sees the role of power in justice in that “no order has 
existence without an ordering power.” Love tames power and quickens justice. (“Power and Justice in the Postwar 
World,” 90, 92, 94.) 
1215 Paul Tillich, “A Statement,” Bulletin of the Council for a Democratic Germany, vol. 1, #1 (September 1, 1944), 
4. 
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Agapeic love provides the “eternal, unchangeable element, but makes its realization dependent 
on continuous acts of  creative intuition.”1216 Kairos, the qualitative understanding of time 
speaks to a sense of timing necessary for specific acts rooted in love, acts incited by a prophetic 
spirit. In this construction, “love is the principle of ethics and kairos the way of its embodiment 
in concrete contents”.1217 Tillich asserted, “Love realizing itself from kairos to kairos creates 
ethics which is beyond the alternative of absolute and relative ethics.”1218 Agapeic-kairotic ethics 
is neither anti-law nor and anti-institution: “Love demands laws and institutions, but love is 
always able to break through them in a new kairos and to create new laws and new systems of 
ethics.”1219 Justice is Tillich’s term for “the laws and institutions in which love is embodied in a 
special situation.”1220 Tillich summarized the meaning of ethics as this: “to express the ways in 
which love embodies itself and life is maintained and saved.”1221
Returning to the “Just and Durable Peace” lectures, Tillich turned from a discussion of 
“formal principles” to three “material principles”: love, life, and justice.1222 By love, Tillich meant “the 
movement from the one to the complete otherness and the reunion of the remaining 
otherness.”1223 Politically, it is “the fundamental structure on which the others [, i.e., life and 
justice] are dependent.”1224 By life, he meant “the dynamic might of the individual center to be” 
which insists that power be taken seriously in politics, for “being expresses its power character in 
                                                 
1216 Paul Tillich, “Ethics in a Changing World,” in Religion and the Modern World  (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1941), 56. 
1217 Ibid., 60. 
1218 Ibid., 57. 
1219 Ibid., 60. 
1220 Ibid., 61. 
1221 Ibid., 61. The present discussion will return to Tillich’s agapeic-kairotic approach in chapter 7. 
1222 “Christian Basis of a Just and Durable Peace,” 76-77. This formulation presages the love, power and justice 
formula of subsequent years. 
1223 Ibid., 76. 
1224 Ibid. 
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dynamic self-realization.”1225 By justice, Tillich meant “the uniting form of being…[which is] 
the expression of the substance of being: namely, love.”1226 In politics, “It points to the limits in 
which individual self-realization is compatible with the unity of the whole or with love.”1227 In 
criticizing the work of the commission, Tillich related life to justice: “Life without justice is 
chaos and therefore not the power of being. Justice without life is dead law and therefore strange 
to being.”1228 This means that justice is a dynamic concept involved in “the dynamic shaking of 
the durable,” calling into question attempts to restrict and dilute its significance within a 
formulation assuming life to be persistently “just” or “durable.”1229
The boundary situation so important to much of his thought led Tillich to reflect in 
another place on the forced inhabitants of the boundary during international crises: refugees and 
immigrants. As one who moved from the status of refugee to immigrant and citizen (on March 4, 
1940), Tillich wondered whether refugees in the United States would be seen as bearers of 
“cultural cross-fertilization” as history had shown them to be or, he asked, was “the same spirit 
growing in this country, anti-alien, anti-semitic, anti-humanistic, anti-Christian, finally,” as had 
developed in Germany?1230 In a mid-1941 article, Tillich expressed his belief that becoming an 
American citizen had forced him to transcend a nationalistic, provincial bias he perceived within 
European culture.1231 At a 1942 event, he reflected on migration as characteristic of, and 
necessary for, significant world transformation.1232 In a May 1944 speech, he wrote, “Wherever 
there is particularity preserving itself, there is not freedom, there we are slaves of the special 
                                                 
1225 Ibid., 77. 
1226 Ibid., 77-78. 
1227 Ibid., 78. 
1228 Ibid. 
1229 Ibid. 
1230 Paul Tillich, “Refugees: The Consequences of a Half-Religious War Raging in Europe,” 404:003, 7-8. 
1231 “I Am an American,” 25. 
1232 “Tillich Challenges Protestantism”, 1-2. 
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drives and urges of our being, there we are slave drivers of ourselves. And he who is slave and 
slave driver of himself is always slave and slave driver of others at the same time. The realm of 
freedom is the realm of conquered particularity.”1233 Further, particularity is defeated through 
encounters with other particularities: “The more community, the more freedom. They do not 
contradict each other. They are interdependent. The purpose that unites expresses man’s very 
nature: his freedom from and his communion with all things.”1234
Tillich addressed religion’s capacity to catalyze inter-civilizational cross-fertilization. At 
the fourth symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation 
to the Democratic Way of Life, held at Columbia University in September 1943, he wrote, “the 
spiritual unity of mankind is a matter of an existential union of the big cultural groups on the 
basis of decisions they make for one ultimate existential truth.”1235 While religions had been 
successful in creating civilizational unity, world unity had eluded religion. Consistent with his 
realistic but hopeful tone, Tillich wrote, “It is not impossible that, in connection with the present 
religious and cultural cross-fertilization, movements may develop—perhaps under the leadership 
of a profoundly transformed Christianity—which lead to a unity of cooperation between the 
world religions, and later, on this basis to a unity of symbols and existential truth.”1236
6.4.4 International Organization 
Even before the entry of the United States into the war, Tillich did not support world government 
or, even, world federation, both of which he saw to be unrealistic. Yet, he called for a European 
                                                 
1233 “The Purpose that Unites,” 10. 
1234 Ibid., 11, 12. 
1235 Paul Tillich, “Comment,” in Approaches to World Peace: Fourth Symposium, eds. Bryson, Finkelstein and 
Maciver, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), 685. 
1236 Ibid. 
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federation that was more than a vassal of the United States and Great Britain: “America can and 
should support the creation of a European federation, completed by some kind of a free, 
intercontinental union.”1237 He hoped that after failed efforts to unite based on religion and 
humanism there might be “a third foundation of European unity, also not in the political sense, 
whose bearers will be a new, yet unknown group which will arise out of the subsoil/ 
underground of the European tragedy?”1238 By 1943, given the dominance of the Allied powers, 
he was convinced that such a federation was unlikely. 1239  
To Tillich, a realistic assessment of power realities was necessary to escape illusory 
hopes for the postwar shape of the world. In 1943, having given up any hope for a European 
federation which had parity with other world powers or in which Germany would have a role on 
par with its European partners, 1240 Tillich commented, “We should not in our plans go beyond 
the chances that are presented by the constellation of power,”1241 In the 1944 essay, “Power and 
Justice in the Postwar World,”, he wrote:  
It is meaningless to demand structures of justice not implied in the described structures of 
 power, at least as possibilities. It is, for instance, meaningless to demand a continental 
 European federation, an idea which was very near to my heart and to which I gave 
 literary expression in an early stage of the war. The Big Three will by no means admit the 
 creation of a fourth big power in terms of a new world power: “Europe.”1242
 
                                                 
1237 Paul Tillich, “War Aims—III. Whose War Aims?” Protestant Digest (October-November 1941): 27. See also 
“Storms of Our Times,” 31. 
1238 “Die Weltgeschichtliche Zukunft Europas,” 15. 
1239 His friend and colleague, Adolph Löwe believed that “some kind of functional federalism instead of a regional 
federalism” could be the basis for European unity. (Paul Tillich, “Discussion on Post-War Reconstruction in Europe 
[1940s],” PTAH, 206:033.) 
1240 Tillich spoke frankly of the probable outcome of a “dependent, internally pacified, economically calm, asiatic 
peninsula,” a European entity dominated by outside forces: this seemed inescapable. („Die Weltgeschichtliche 
Zukunft Europas,“ 14-15.) 
1241 “Die Weltgeschichtliche Zukunft Europas,” 2. 
1242 “Power and Justice in the Postwar World,” 97. 
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To him, to maintain such an illusion was to endorse a lifeless, abstract, irrelevant notion of 
justice: “This justice is abstract, not real justice; it lacks the power of creating community. It fails 
to fulfill the demand of love, in which power and justice are united.”1243  
Thus, Tillich could be impatient with illusory proposals. On March 1, 1943, the 
Commission on a Just and Durable Peace arrived at six propositions or “pillars” that it argued 
would provide for a just and durable peace:  
1. International political collaboration based on the present unity of the United Nations. 
 2. Control of economic and financial acts which may disturb international peace.  3. 
 Establishment of an organization to adapt the treaty structure to changing conditions. 
 4. Autonomy for subject peoples. 5. International control of armaments. 6. Religious and 
 intellectual liberty.1244
 
Religious leaders were divided on the usefulness of the list.1245 Because of their 
vagueness and lack of realism, Tillich concluded that “No German would even listen to one of 
                                                 
1243 Ibid., 98. 
1244 The Witness, “Six Pillars of Peace Issues by Church,” The Witness, vol. 26, #43 (March 25, 1943): 4. 
1245 Joseph F. Fletcher of the Graduate School of Applied Religion argued that the principles were too general to be 
effective: “we can’t just spout broad principles and leave it to diplomats to make the vital choices.” Rev. John Gass 
of St. Paul’s Church of Troy, N.Y. saw the six pillars as “adequate to support a structure of society which holds out 
the hope of stability, the promise of peace and the achievement of justice.” Professor Harry F. Ward of Union 
Seminary called them “worse than a disappointment…The people want bread and the learned doctors of the law, 
sacred and secular, give them a stone—that is, form syllable generalities.” Rev. C. Leslie Glenn, a chaplain in the 
U.S. Navy, saw them as helpfully moderate, neither too general to be irrelevant nor too specific to go beyond the 
expertise of the commission. Rev. Phillips E. Osgood of Emmanuel Church, Boston, saw the pillars to be ineffective 
generalities. He called for the statement of a program “definitely workable and potently realistic,” declaring, “If 
Christianity (in the large) is at all the conscience of society then something more than principles must be enunciated 
fine as those principles are….” Professor Adelaide Case of the Episcopal Theological School—observing that the 
pillars for peace were presented at a luncheon including leaders of capitalism and college presidents—noted the 
absence of the voice of labor: “It is obviously absurd for the Church to talk about this problem except in conference 
with the workers’ representatives. Where were the labor leaders?” Professor Russell Bowie of Union Seminary had 
mixed feelings. The peace pillars were not a problem for him. His concern was with anti-labor and pro-big business 
trends that could hijack their implementation. (Joseph F. Fletcher, “Comment on the Report of ‘The Commission on 
a Just and Durable Peace,’” The Witness, vol. 26, #45 [April 8, 1943]: 3; John Gass, “Comment on the Report of 
‘The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace,’” The Witness, vol. 26, #45 [April 8, 1943]: 4; Harry F. Ward, 
“Comment on the Report of ‘The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace,’” The Witness, vol. 26, #45 [April 8, 
1943]: 4; C. Leslie Glenn, “Comment on the Report of ‘The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace,’” The 
Witness, vol. 26, #45 [April 8, 1943]: 4; Phillips E. Osgood, “Comment on the Report of ‘The Commission on a Just 
and Durable Peace,’” The Witness, vol. 26, #46 [April 15, 1943]: 5; Adelaide Case, “Comment on the Report of 
‘The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace,’” The Witness, vol. 26, #46 [April 15, 1943]: 5; and W. Russell 
Bowie, “Comment on the Report of ‘The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace,’” The Witness, vol. 26, #46 
[April 15, 1943]: 5-6.) 
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the six pillars. They would not give him the slightest hope for the post-war world.”1246 Yet, until 
the end of the war he staved off cynicism. While he understood comments of a prominent leader 
regarding the prospects of the postwar world—“We have got neither the grace nor the virtue nor 
the wisdom to handle the present world situation’”1247—he would declare, nonetheless, “In spite 
of the tension between the East and West we shall fight for a world-wide solution on the basis of 
the collaboration between the East and the West.” 1248 In early 1945, he and the Council for a 
Democratic Germany expressed their satisfaction with published positions taken at the Crimea 
Conference: its demand for cooperation between East and West in the organization of Europe; its 
position towards the free and independent participation of non-fascist national governments in a 
European organization; and its distinction between Germans and Nazis.1249 At the same time, he 
knew that the future required a serious reckoning with the strengths and weaknesses of 
democracy and collectivism. He wrote, “You cannot have a working democracy built on ruins 
and you cannot have it if the masses prefer death in a revolution to starvation and economic 
slavery under so-called democratic government.”1250 Capitalistic democracy without justice and 
without a commitment to social security must be rejected.In fact, Tillich saw Europe moving in 
the direction of “something new which could be called collectivistic and authoritarian without 
the primitivistic connotations of the former and the absolutistic connotations of the latter.”1251  
                                                 
1246 Tillich, “Comment on the Report of ‘The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace’”: 4. 
1247 Paul Tillich, “Outlook for 1945,” Bulletin of the Council for a Democratic Germany Vol. 1, #3 (1 January 
1945): 1. 
1248 Ibid., 1. 
1249 Paul Tillich, “The Crimea Concept and the Council,” Bulletin of the Council for a Democratic Germany Vol. 1, 
#4 (February 1945): 1. 
1250 “The Christian Churches and the Emerging Social Order in Europe,” 331, 332. The American Friends of German 
Freedom’s Germany Tomorrow describes five matters standing in the way of a transition to democracy in Germany: 
the dependence of such a revolution upon invading armies overturning Nazism; the period of more than a decade 
without democratic organizations; hatred caused by the war initiated by Hitler; the destruction wreaked by the war; 
and the dynamics that make international federation difficult without the Nazi factor (p. 6). 
1251 “The Christian Churches and the Emerging Social Order in Europe,” 332. Context should be given for Tillich’s 
comment here. He was speaking about the post-Nazi social upheaval in Germany: “The relations of parents and 
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Tillich acknowledged that these facts would characterize the postwar lay of the land: the 
dominance of the Big Three of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia; the maintenance of 
the monopoly capitalism which he saw to be the deepest reason for the war; and the growth in 
antidemocratic centralized and authoritarian nations.1252
Nonetheless, changes in international relations had to occur. Tillich saw a range of 
shorter and longer term issues to be important: the fair adjudication of the guilt within Germany; 
the brokering of any division of Germany only as part of a wider strategy for a European 
federation; a renunciation of military autonomy by all European nations not simply by Germany; 
the dependence of Germany’s movement to the East or West on which side posed the more 
creative policies for a secure future; the presence of reactionary nationalism beyond German 
borders; the shape of Europe; social security for all Europeans as a crucial basis for lasting 
peace; a non exploitative approach to Europe; the role of Russia as a future, equal partner; calls 
for national sovereignty by smaller nations; India’s independence; the rejection of a return to the 
balance of power of sovereign nations in favor of independence of national cultures, combined 
with economic and military interdependence; a constructive world unity embodied in an 
international organization involving political and socio-economic concerns; the United States as 
                                                                                                                                                             
children, of the sexes, of friends, of the classes, of experts and laymen, of everybody to everybody, have undergone 
such a change that a man of the late nineteenth century would hardly recognize our present world...In destroying the 
authority of the parents and teachers for the sake of the Party, in subjecting the sexual life to the demands of the 
state, in equalizing (contrary to their archaistic theory) male and female in the service of total war, in removing any 
independent economic or intellectual power, in introducing a universal, technical consciousness, they have created a 
generation which has no approach to the individualism of the nineteenth century.” (“The Christian Churches...,” 
332) In the earlier article, “Ethics in a Changing World,” Tillich argued that equality had become “a mere ideology 
to cover the exclusive chance for a few” and, in so doing, had become “a contradiction of love.” In place of this 
understanding of equality, Tillich spoke for one meaning “equal security of everyone, even if much political equality 
must be sacrificed”. In short, while liberal democracy too often contradicted love, perhaps more collectivistic 
solutions could approximate it more fully. (“Ethics in a Changing World,” 59.) 
1252 “Power and Justice in the Postwar World,” 95-97. 
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a prospective center for world organization; the role of the church; and an Asian policy neither 
racially nor imperialistically motivated.1253
6.5 CONCLUSION 
With a non utopian approach to action within the dynamic flow of history, and with a deep 
sensitivity to the operation of power within international politics, Tillich gave much effort to 
enunciating principles—whether termed Protestant, eternally Protestant, Protestant-Catholic, or 
immortally Post-Protestant—that he saw to facilitate the timely embodiment of agapeic justice in 
the world. His message to his audience in the United States included these elements relevant to 
religious internationalism: 
(1) Religion understood as the grounding and subjection of all things to a  
 transcendent, ultimate source of meaning should be encouraged. Such religion is  
 characterized by the following: depth (and, conversely, criticism of spiritual  
  superficiality in both the “sacred” and “secular” realms); openness (ecumenical,  
  inter religious, ideological); creative criticism of that which is unloving, unjust,  
  and destructive as manifested in the self or the other; creative participation in  
  history; and pursuit of world transformation; 
 
(2) Action should be in “creative agreement with the historical situation”, consistent  
  with dynamic, ever-changing, and potentially creative historical circumstances,  
  making new applications of traditional, past formulations, i.e., practice “agapeic- 
  kairotic” ethics; 
 
(3) Groups or “orders” of intellectuals motivated to “contend for personality and  
  community” must be cultivated; 
 
(4) Consistent with religious socialism, history and socio-economic structure is  
  crucial to meaning in human existence; 
                                                 
1253 “Christian Basis of a Just and Durable Peace,” 87; “Die Weltgeschichtliche Zukunft Europas”, 11-13. In “Power 
and Justice in the Postwar World,” Tillich pointed out that the limits imposed upon justice did not mean the 
elimination of justice. He saw the prospects in the area of economic and social security, what he called “an inroad 
for justice in the power jungle of the postwar situation.” (“Power and Justice in the Postwar World,” 101.) See also 
“Theses on the Peace Treaty,” 7-11; “The Future of Germany,” 9, 11-13; and “Storms of Our Times,” 31. 
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(5) The dialectic between personalism and collectivism should be acknowledged as  
  reflecting the definition of human existence as freedom and finitude; 
 
(6) Social transformation which leads to being with dignity should be a perpetual  
 goal; 
 
(7) Economic security that enables creative freedom should be pursued; 
 
(8) Group stereotype is wrong, whether practiced by international criminals or the  
 formal bearers of international justice; 
 
(9) Nations are to be the vehicles for inter national blessing; 
 
(10) Regional federations should be sought; 
 
(11) “Cultural interpenetration and cross-fertilization” should be pursued; and 
 
(12) The dehumanizing, Hobbesian Leviathans of history must be confronted. 
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7.0  THE COLD WAR: VENTURING COURAGE IN THE FACE OF HISTORICAL  
VACUUM 
7.1 INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
The final period for considering Tillich’s thoughts on war and peace is the longest one, stretching 
over two decades. The most important project during this period was his magnum opus, the 
Systematic Theology. Published in three volumes (and five parts) over a period of twelve years, 
the work is an apt symbol for the period, manifesting Tillich’s goal of communicating—as 
comprehensively as he could—his interpretations of the wide reach of humankind’s questions 
and what he took to be the profoundly meaningful depth of theology’s answers. Here and in a 
dozens of other writings of varying length, strands of his political thought from earlier times 
colored the fabric of his thinking. However, by the time of the Cold War, Tillich’s thinking had 
been shaped by two world wars, a profoundly tumultuous quarter century of German and world 
history, and emigration to the United States. Thus, continuity and change were intriguingly 
combined in this period. 
Tillich continued to frame his understanding of the interpenetration of religion and 
culture around the dynamics of autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy.1254 The dialectical 
                                                 
1254 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume One (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 83-86, 147 ff. 
Hereafter, this volume is referred to as ST I. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume Three (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1963), 157-161, 250-274. Hereafter, this volume is referred to as ST III. See also Tillich, 
“Religion and Secular Culture (1946),” 56-7, 58; Tillich, “The Conquest of Theological Provincialism (1952),” 171-
2; Paul Tillich, “Christian Criteria for Our Culture,” (Edited and shortened version of address to the Yale Christian 
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method—now the method of correlation—remained the engine for distilling truth from existence 
for him.1255 He maintained his commitment to embrace history with deep seriousness, eschewing 
any theory that minimized its import through escape:1256 life and history were ambiguous;1257 
kairos remained, but with an important turn;1258 and progress was questioned.1259 The voice of 
religious socialism,1260 though quieter and perhaps subtler, remained as a dialectical tool for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Association, Dwight Hall, Yale University, Oct. 19, 1952) criterion (New Haven), I, no. 1 (October, 1952), 3; Paul 
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1255 ST I, 30-31, 64-66; Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume Two (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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Situation and the Christian Message,” (1945), [PTAH, 406A:014], 1-6; Paul Tillich, “The Problem of Theological 
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negotiating the tension between the mystical, “vertical”, Catholic substance of religion1261 and 
the prophetic, “horizontal”, Protestant protest of religion,1262 with  the goal of defending creative 
freedom, personhood, and justice1263 against the onslaught of the idolatrously and ideologically 
demonic forces of existence,1264 chief among them the economically oppressive and culturally 
disintegrating and dehumanizing elements of western, capitalistic, industrial civilization.1265 It is 
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difficult to overemphasize the import power continued to possess in this period.1266 The nature of 
a world order remained on Tillich’s mind, stripped of illusions regarding the potential for formal 
organization.1267 In general terms, Tillich summarized the continuity with the earlier periods as 
follows: the importance of participation in “the fight for the fragmentary actualization of the 
Kingdom of God in history”; the assertion that individual and social salvation or healing are 
intermingled; and the call to point to the demonic as it raises its head in “the special historical 
situation of the West” and its industrial society, producing “misery…meaninglessness… 
accommodation….[and] subjection.”1268
Yet, even in the face of this continuity, there was a definite change with the evolution 
toward cold war. At the conclusion of the Second World War, Tillich’s active participation in 
directly political activity lessened significantly. In 1949 he wrote, “I see a vacuum which can be 
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made creative only if it is accepted and endured and, rejecting all kinds of premature solutions, is 
transformed into a deepening ‘sacred void’ of waiting. This view naturally implies a decrease of 
my participation in political activities.”1269 A few years later he recalled, “After the Second 
World War I felt the tragic more than the activating elements of our historical existence, and I 
lost the inspiration for, and the contact with, active politics”, despite his declaration that “politics 
remained, and always will remain, an important factor in my theological and philosophical 
thought.” 1270 By 1960, Tillich admitted that the perception that there was in his thought a partial 
“turn from the social problems to aesthetic and psychological questions…[was] not altogether 
wrong.”1271 There were four reasons for this. First, he wrote, “I felt that for a German-born 
American citizen for whom political activity was difficult and perhaps inappropriate, who was 
practically without political activity, it was more fruitful to try to relate religion to culture in 
realms in which one could work without those barriers imposed by the political climate of the 
times.”1272 Second, “Beyond this there was a feeling which I probably share with many people in 
our time, that we are in the hands of small power groups who, by their very existence, exclude 
most people from bringing influence to bear on actual decisions.”1273 Third, Tillich perceived the 
post World War II period to be one of vacuum (dominated by trend) versus kairos (dominated by 
historical opportunities). Fourth and finally, Tillich sensed a yearning among his students for “a 
transcendent security in a world in which neither social nor spiritual security is guaranteed.”1274 
As a consequence, the Cold War period saw a series of changes between post World War I 
religious socialism and “the later point of view”: (1) the goal was no longer to change the 
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system; (2) historical necessity was no longer a doctrine held; (3) no longer was there a belief in 
a saving vanguard; and (4) no longer was there a total world view.1275 Religious socialism was 
transformed “in America into a movement of protest against the loss of the person in the 
objectifying society.”1276
Neither of Tillich’s self-descriptions—a thinker of politics while remaining political 
inactive, or one who had turned from the social and political to the psychological and aesthetic—
do justice to his labors during this period. The evidence overwhelmingly attests to his ongoing 
commitment to the dialectical task of regularly and comprehensively taking the existential pulse 
of his time and giving dogged pursuit of the meaning of—the answers to the questions posed 
by—existence: from the 1920s to his death in 1965, Tillich was attentive to “the crying of the 
situation” of existence.1277 Culture and politics were not the only concern of Tillich in this 
project, but they were always present in his larger effort to interpret existence in its totality. The 
discussion here will first turn to two broad areas that informed Tillich’s thought on politics, 
peace, and justice during this period: historical vacuum and existentialist estrangement. 
7.2 VACUUM AND ESTRANGEMENT 
7.2.1 Historical Vacuum as a Result of Inner Disintegration 
Tillich characterized the post World War II period as an historical vacuum. To him, one of the 
significant reasons for this was that western technological thought had led to the disintegration of 
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the spiritual center of its culture.1278 A vacuum of vitality within German Protestantism had 
rendered it impotent in the face of Nazism.1279 This vacuity in German Christianity was 
embodied by leaders whose actions showed that “Christian generals and statesmen are in no way 
a guarantee for the Christian character of political decisions….”1280
Tillich’s sense of a kairos following World War I was profoundly shaken by the onset of 
Nazi tyranny, the subsequent war, and the post war East-West division of the world.1281 Having 
made the assessment that the world was experiencing a cultural vacuum,1282 believing that 
paganism was ever prepared to fill such vacuums in history,1283 and observing that recent history 
had shown that totalitarianism is able to fill the voids left by the rationalistic myth of 
harmony,1284 Tillich wondered whether the post World War II vacuum would lead to the 
destructiveness to which the post World War I power vacuum had ultimately led.1285
Tillich’s analysis began with the conclusion that western civilization had lost its center of 
meaning.1286 Spiritual life required a center of meaning as “the ultimate principle of 
understanding existence and the ultimate purpose for acting in existence.”1287 In his view, the 
qualities of an adequate spiritual center and their absence at the time were the basis for the 
difficulties of the time: the spiritual center is to be unitary (over against metaphysical pluralism); 
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it is to be absolute (over against metaphysical relativism); it is to be ultimate (over against 
metaphysical pragmatism).1288 Personalities and communities require spiritual centers: the 
problem was that there was a “psychology without an Ego-Self” and a “sociology without a We-
Self”.1289 A healthy spiritual center maintains unity, as against the disunity that he saw to be 
current at the time.1290 Creativity and culture arise from the spiritual center, as opposed to the use 
of means for penultimate ends which dominated western industrial civilization.1291 The meaning 
of existence is to arise out of the spiritual center: instead, positivism was successfully 
emphasizing facts over meanings.1292 In interpreting time, the present is to be united with past 
and future in a spiritual center, over against the concern for mere memory in historicism and 
mere expectancy in utopianism.1293
While Christianity proclaimed the message of an ultimate center who stands against the 
structure of the time,1294 Christian institutions—as part of that vacuous structure—had lost their 
true center.1295 Christian symbols—rooted in the existentially particular, and cut off from the 
ultimate center—were without truth.1296 Christian activities—reduced to moralism and 
conformity—lost the grace of the spiritual center.1297 Christian churches—intended to be places 
for the vital presence of the ultimate center in activities and symbols—conformed to, rather than 
criticized, the cultural structure.1298 Christian faith—as “the reception of the center of all centers” 
in self-transcendence—had become a disparate, un-centered group of experiences. Therefore, 
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Christianity had lost its spiritual center and was a tool for “monopolistic production and self-
destruction.”1299
7.2.2 Human Anxiety in the Face of Estrangement from Human Essence 
Tillich’s concern about the dehumanizing impact of modern civilization upon people informed 
his existentialist orientation. According to Tillich, the Marburg period of his work (1925) was the 
beginning of his serious encounter with existentialism.1300 He exalted existentialism as the best 
philosophy for which to understand culture. He saw the method of correlation as the best 
theological approach for bridging the divide between supernaturalism and naturalism, 1301 
opening theology to the subjective, existential element.1302 Together, Christian theology and 
existentialist philosophy fully embraced the world.1303
Existentialism poses “the question of the meaning and possibility of human 
existence.”1304 According to Tillich, “[The existentialists] ask a question and insist that this 
question is asked profoundly. It is the old religious question of the human predicament, man’s 
finitude and self-estrangement, his anxiety and despair”,1305 “anxiety [as] the existential 
awareness of nonbeing”,1306 anxiety in the face of death (ontic anxiety), meaninglessness 
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(spiritual anxiety), and condemnation (moral anxiety).1307 Tillich affirmed the existentialist 
protest present in Kierkegaard’s call for religious liberation, Marx’s call for political liberation, 
and Nietzsche’s call for liberation through the self-affirming will. All three struggled against the 
forces of technical society.1308 Pointing to his spiritual father, Schelling, he maintained that  
behind all existential descriptions of the human situation, from Pascal to Heidegger, 
 stands that which Schelling has expressed in poetic-philosophical form, namely, the 
 perception of anxiety and melancholy in all creaturely life, the alienation between man 
 and nature, as well as that of man from himself, and the vision of the unity of the creative 
 and destructive elements in every being.”1309
 
It was Tillich’s view that existentialism and religious socialism shared a sense that human 
existence contradicts human essence (what humanity ought to be).1310 In philosophy, literature, 
and art, it expressed the loss of meaning in the face of the breakdown of harmonious 
rationalism.1311 Of the existentialists, Tillich wrote:  
They revolt against the increasing transformation of man into a thing, a cog in the 
 universal system of organized production and organized consumption. They react  against 
 the education of adjustment which tries to press everyone into a pattern by exposing him 
 day and night to centrally directed means of communication. Although in anti-religious, 
 atheistic, often cynical, often despairing terms, they represent an ultimate religious 
 concern; they see the truth about the human predicament universally and in every 
 particular situation.1312
 
In the immediate postwar period, Tillich observed the “fanatical absolutism and skeptical 
relativism” of young Germans1313 and a generation in America asking Brecht’s question: “‘Is 
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there nothing to which one can hold?’”1314  It led him to wonder “whether the 20th century must 
forever totter between fanaticism and despair.”1315 Space exploration in the late 1950s and early 
1960s provoked him to speak of humanity’s feeling of “vertigo in relation to infinite space”1316 
and of “the anxiety of being a meaningless bit of matter in a meaningless vortex of atoms and 
electrons.”1317 In short, with the twentieth century, humanity could escape the full force of the 
demonic no longer, specifically the angst of finitude and estrangement.1318 Tillich proclaimed, 
“Existence is separation!” [Tillich’s emphasis]1319
Tillich saw a correspondence between the Augustinian doctrine of split or estrangement 
and Marx’s position: “This idea seems to me to be, in fact, an idea which is so fundamental that 
there can scarcely be anything which can express reality, which can express the human situation 
for both Catholicism and Protestantism and, over and above this, for socialism.”1320 
Existentialism and religious socialism shared a sense that the industrial situation was a basis for 
human estrangement and objectification and that socialism was a protest against the repression of 
creative freedom.1321
Beyond the western industrial and economic reality, the decision for nationhood was the 
breaking of humanity, to Tillich: “…in that decision we excluded mankind and all symbols 
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expressing the unity of all men. The former unity was broken, and no international group has 
been able to re-establish it.”1322 The inevitable consequence was international estrangement:  
The most irrevocable expression of the separation of life from life today is the attitude of 
 social groups within nations towards each other, and the attitude of nations themselves 
 towards other nations. The walls of distance, in time and space, have been removed by 
 technical progress; but the walls of estrangement between heart and heart have been 
 incredibly strengthened.1323
 
 The Holocaust experience of the Jewish people was a crisis of cultural and international 
estrangement arguably without comparison in the modern era. Tillich analyzed it in Berlin 
lectures delivered in 1953. There he noted operative factors in the German-Jewish situation 
common to Europe as a whole: (1) Jews were protected as long as they were useful to the ruling 
classes as “brokers of capital”; (2) religious anti-Semitism was used as a diversion tactic by the 
rulers when it was advantageous; (3) political anti-Semitism used stereotypes of Jews which 
removed the personal responsibility and, in the process, the personhood of Jews, consistent with 
the dehumanizing pattern of industrial society.1324
 As a German problem, Tillich saw the fate of the Jews as related to the notion that 
similarity breeds both strong attraction and strong revulsion: (1) both groups “experienced a 
prophetic movement of reform: the Jews in Prophecy, the Germans in the Reformation”;1325 and 
(2) both possessed a “spiritual inner strife…a mixture of self-hatred and self-over-stimation.”1326 
He then wrote of what he judged to be the response of Germans to the stranger within, over 
against the stranger without:  
                                                 
1322 The Shaking of the Foundations, 180. 
1323 Ibid., 157. 
1324 Tillich, “The Jewish Question: a Christian and a German Problem,” translated by Marion Pauck, North 
American Paul Tillich Society Bulletin XXX, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 12-13 (originally published as Die Judenfrage, 
ein christliches und ein deutsches Problem: Vier Vorträge, gehalten an der Deutschen Hochschule fr Politik Berlin, 
“Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik Berlin” [Berlin: Gebrüder Weiss, 1953], GW III: 128-170). 
1325 Ibid., 9. 
1326 Ibid., 10. See also page 12. Tillich gives no supportive reasoning or documentation for the latter statement. 
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 We have seen that Germans love that which is foreign, partly because they want to be rid  
 of themselves by losing themselves in what is strange. But they cannot tolerate the  
 foreign elements alive among them, because it wrenches them from their unquestioning  
 self-affirmation, and because their self-realization is so weak that it cannot admit  
 anything foreign.1327
 
 As an existential problem for the Jewish people, Tillich believed that the lack of national 
space for Jews had led either to assimilation or to Zionism. This created complexity in 
understanding the identity of the Jewish people in history.1328 In contrast to his interpretation of 
the Jewish people as the people of history—which had originally led him to have reservations 
about establishing a Zionist state in order to maintain his construct of the function of the Jewish 
people as the nation of time and history as opposed to being a nation of physical space—Tillich 
wrote this of Zionism, “we must ask ourselves whether it makes sense to condemn the average 
Jew in the world for wanting to escape the fate of dispersion for refusing to belong to the nation 
of time, the nation without its own space.”1329 Further, he wondered, “is it possible that the space 
Israel has found as its own space may lead to new embodiments of the prophetic spirit, and that 
from this new impulses will arise for Israel, as well as for the Diaspora?”1330 He posed the other 
option as well, “that modern nationalism will triumph completely, that Israel will become a 
nation that is only a nation, and that the element of the religious community will be lost.”1331
Turning in another direction, Tillich saw in the East and the West the onset of 
collectivism, conformity, and patternization, that is “[t]he transformation of the present world 
into a new collectivism as the structural trend in all realm[s] of life.”1332 Within the enigma of 
                                                 
1327 Ibid., 13. 
1328 Ibid., 19-20. 
1329 Ibid., 20. 
1330 Ibid., 20. 
1331 Ibid., 21. 
1332 “The Revolutionary Character of the Struggle…,” 1. 
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economic security he saw the problem of conformity,1333 perceiving “fear as the main problem.” 
He asked whether security without slavery was possible.1334 As for religion, he saw these 
elements of institutional religion working against freedom and in favor of conformity: 
conservatism, authoritarianism, intolerance, and transcendentalism.1335
In the United States, the church’s responses to societal patterns had involved either 
withdrawal into doctrinal formulations of the past or conformity to industrial society.1336 
Conformity was not negative per se.1337 However, it was when it became what Tillich termed 
patternization, “if the individual form that gives uniqueness and dignity to a person is subdued by 
the collective form.”1338 He believed the causes of conforming patternization to be technological 
civilization, mass manipulation by economic, advertising, and mass cultural power-holders, and 
the yearning for security by the young which leads to surrender to the group at the cost of 
individual dignity.1339
Tillich noted that in Russia, “The Communists in spite of their prophetic background, 
their valuation of reason, and their tremendous technical productivity have almost reached the 
stage of tribal collectivism.”1340 He saw the evolution of communism in Russia as an 
understandable source of disappointment for utopian liberals worldwide: “it cannot be denied 
that this widespread repudiation of human rights had a depressing affect on those who, like 
myself, without being utopian, saw the dawn of a new creative era in a moment which actually 
                                                 
1333 “Beyond the Dilemma of Our Period,” 211. 
1334 “The Revolutionary Character of the Struggle…,” 7. 
1335 Paul Tillich, “Freedom and the Ultimate Concern,” (Lecture delivered in the Seminar on Religion and the Free 
Society, May 9, 1958, World Affairs Center, New York; sponsored by the Fund for the Republic), in Religion in 
America: Original Essays on Religion in a Free Society, ed. John Cogley (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 274-
77. 
1336 “Aspects of a Religious Analysis of Culture,” 45. 
1337 See The Courage to Be, 103-107, 112. 
1338 Paul Tillich, “Conformity (1957),” The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society (Macon, Ga.: Mercer 
University Press, 1988), 145. 
1339 Ibid., 146-47, 149. 
1340 The Courage to Be, 98. 
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presaged a deeper darkness.”1341 As a consequence, Tillich wrote, “It is by far the greatest 
tragedy of our century that this fight has produced a political system in which man’s creative 
freedom is even more lost than in the economic system over which it has triumphed.”1342 
Socialism had become widely discredited because of communism’s transformation of it into this 
system of dehumanization.1343 Tillich attributed this to a hole in Marx’s system. Marx’s concern 
was “the freely creative person who forms the world of things and who has not become a thing,” 
but this must be gleaned from Marx’s description of estranged humanity: it is not explicitly 
stated as such.1344 The vacuum in Marx’s description opens the way for the subjection of 
humanity in the communist revolution.1345
Another example of the patternizing consequence of mass manipulation to which Tillich 
pointed was the East-West political situation of the Cold War:  
The schizophrenic split of mankind into East and West, and the secrecy connected with it, 
 makes an independent political judgment almost impossible for most people. It prevents 
 the rise of fresh political philosophies, since every nonconformist political thought is 
 denounced as neutralist or worse. Courage is demanded for the expression of serious 
 political disagreement even by a student, because it may later wreck his career.1346
 
Tillich wondered whether there would be a third way that could unite the “freedom thoughts” 
(Freiheitsgedanken) of the west and “the radical faith in security” in the east.1347
 
                                                 
1341 “Beyond Religious Socialism,” 733. 
1342 “Existentialism and Religious Socialism,” 9. A year later he reiterated this concern: It is the great tragedy of our 
time that Marxism, which had been conceived as a movement for the liberation of everyone, has been transformed 
into a system of enslavement of everyone, even of those who enslave the others…The courage to be was 
undermined in innumerable people because it was the courage to be in the sense of the revolutionary movements of 
the 19th century. When it broke down, these people turned either to the neocollectivist system, in a fanatic-neurotic 
reaction against the cause of their tragic disappointment, or to a cynical-neurotic indifference to all systems and 
every content.” (The Courage to Be, 153.) 
1343 „Protestanische Vision…,” 12. Tillich specifically noted the inability of Americans to distinguish between 
socialism and communism. See also “Christentum und Marxismus,” 170-1. 
1344 Der Mensch im Christentum und im Marxismus, 197. 
1345 Ibid., 197. 
1346 “Conformity,” 147. 
1347 „Die philosophisch-geistige Lage und Protestantismus,“ 124. 
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With this description of Tillich’s pessimistic portrayal of Cold War existence, the 
discussion now turns to the prospects for just action which Tillich saw in such a situation, rooted 
in the boundary perspective and leading to venturing courage. 
7.3 BASES FOR HOPE AND HEALING 
7.3.1 The Boundary Perspective 
The boundary remained a symbol of significance for Tillich throughout the decades. He had used 
it most prominently in the autobiography with which he introduced himself to the English-
speaking world.1348 In that little book, Tillich showed that it was a perspective which had already 
played a significant role in his life. In war and peace, from politics to theology, as a refugee, 
emigrant, and citizen, Tillich was existentially marked and defined by the boundary situation.  
Tillich admitted to possessing a theological provincialism when he had arrived in the 
United States in the early 1930s: “It was our feeling that only in Germany was the problem of 
how to unite Christianity with the modern mind taken absolutely seriously.”1349 The collapse of 
German culture into Nazi rule shook this provincialism profoundly: “Neither my friends nor I 
myself dared for a long time to point to what was great in the Germany of our past. If Hitler is 
the outcome of what we believed to be the true philosophy and the only theology, both must be 
false.”1350 Following World War Two, he had several opportunities to travel and lecture in 
Germany. Both in his lectures as well as in his reports on these journeys, Tillich functioned as a 
                                                 
1348 See chapter 3. 
1349 “The Conquest of Theological Provincialism,” 161. Later in the same piece Tillich asked, “Will America remain 
what it has been to us, a country in which people from every country can overcome their spiritual provincialism?” 
(page 176.) 
1350 Ibid., 164. 
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mediator of the boundary.1351 Tillich made a distinction between living on the boundary and 
analysis from the boundary. He described his perspective as rooted in “the experience of 
someone who came from without this country, lives now here for twenty-four years, but still has 
at least in some corners of his being the observer attitude—and I think for observation it is useful 
to live on the boundary line between these cultures. For living, it’s not good; it splits. But for 
observation, it’s good.”1352
It is not surprising that on the occasion of receiving the Peace Prize from the Marketing 
Association of the German Book Trade in Frankfurt Tillich spoke of the centrality of what was 
previously described as the dynamic boundary:  
Existence on the frontier, in the boundary situation, is full of tension and movement. It is 
 in truth no standing still, but rather a crossing and return, a repetition of return and 
 crossing, a back-and-forth—the aim of which is to create a third area beyond the bounded 
 territories, an area where one can stand for a time without being enclosed in something 
 tightly bounded.1353  
 
The boundary was clearly a place of risk and courage to Tillich. When one arrives at the 
boundary, one can either fall back or transcend self. In falling back, resentment or 
disappointment in failing to “meet” the boundary moment can lead to fanaticism. Fanaticism can 
also arise in a new bounded situation following a boundary crossing.1354 He summoned the 
church to regain relevance by “return[ing] to the boundary, to cross over it and wrestle for the 
                                                 
1351 Paul Tillich, “The Social and Spiritual Forces in Germany Today (1946),” PTAH, 404:005 and “Visit to 
Germany,” 147-149. He wrote of how to function as a bridge between the Germany of that time and other cultures: 
“The only possibility of influencing them is to have fellowship with them, not to come as a judge or educator, nor to 
speak of revenge, but as a friend who is willing to receive gifts from them in exchange for what he tries to bring 
them.” (“Visit to Germany,” 148.) 
1352 “Christianity, Democracy and the Arts,” 4. 
1353 Paul Tillich, “Boundaries (1962),” in Theology of Peace, ed. Ronald H. Stone (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 163. 
1354 Ibid., 164, 165. Tillich saw the petit bourgeois as incapable of successfully negotiating the anxiety of the 
boundary where in “seeing themselves in the mirror of the different, can never risk rising above the habitual, the 
recognized, the established. They leave unrealized the possibilities which are given to all from time to time to rise up 
out of themselves….” (page 166.) 
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Beyond in the to-and-fro between church and culture.”1355 Relating this specifically to the matter 
of peace, Tillich emphasized the importance of possessing courage to cross boundaries: 
Only he who participates on both sides of a boundary line can serve the Comprehensive 
 and thereby serve peace—not the one who feels secure in the voluntary calm of 
 something tightly bounded. Peace appears where, in personal as well as in political life, 
 an old boundary has lost its importance and thereby its power to occasion disturbance, 
 even if it still continues as a partial boundary. Peace is not side-by-side existence without 
 tension. It is unity within that which comprehends, where there is no lack of opposition of 
 living forces and conflicts between the Old and the sometime New—yet in which they do 
 not break out destructively but are held in the peace of the Comprehensive. If crossing 
 and reversing the boundaries is the way to peace, then the root of disturbance and of 
 war is the anxiety for that which lies on the other side, and the will to eliminate it which 
 arises from it.1356
 
Tillich saw boundaries as crucial for establishing identity: “…the one who has found his 
identity and thereby the boundary of his nature does not need to lock himself in or to break out. 
He will bring to fruition what his nature is. Of course, in that realization all the questions of 
border crossings come back, but accompanied now by a consciousness of himself and his own 
potential.”1357 Among nations, this consciousness of boundary and identity is expressed in “the 
consciousness of calling, in which the identity, and with it the essential limit, of a nation 
expresses itself.”1358 The danger arises when power is detached from calling in national identity, 
when power is detached from its “essential limit”.1359 Tillich saw peace to be possible under 
conditions in which “power stands in the service of a genuine consciousness of calling and where 
knowledge of the essential limit limits the importance of the factual limits.”1360 The danger in the 
East-West divide was that the consciousness of calling “on both sides has the character of 
exclusiveness and therefore, given the circumstances of contemporary technology, threatens 
                                                 
1355 Ibid., 165. 
1356 Ibid., 163. 
1357 Ibid., 168. 
1358 Ibid., 169. 
1359 Ibid., 170. 
1360 Ibid. 
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humanity with self-destruction.”1361 Therefore, Tillich saw it as “most important for the 
possibility of peace [to be] the acceptance of their own finitude by the nations—of their time, of 
their space, and of their worth. The temptation not to accept finitude, but rather to lift oneself to 
the level of the Unconditioned, the Divine, runs through all history.”1362 Contemplating the 
Berlin crisis and the debate live at the time about the appropriateness of using nuclear weapons, 
Tillich reminded his audience, “There is no human group which has the right, for the sake of its 
boundaries, to begin something whose continuation must lead to the destruction of itself and of 
all other human reality.”1363
7.3.2 Utopia, Kairos, and Movement toward Reunion 
KAIROS AND UTOPIA   As he reflected on the state of Protestantism at the close of World 
War Two, Tillich expressed the belief that when both the utopian hope of the post-World War I 
period and the cynical realism of the post-World War II period were judged by the Protestant 
principle, it led to the conclusion that history should be approached with a realism of hope.1364 In 
this spirit Tillich framed the decade of the 1950s with two series of lectures addressing the theme 
of utopia and kairos: his 1951 Berlin lectures at the Deutschen Hochschule für Politik, The 
Political Meaning of Utopia; and his 1959 Rauschenbusch lectures at Colgate Rochester Divinity 
School, Kairos and Utopia.1365
                                                 
1361 Ibid., 171. 
1362 Ibid., 172. 
1363 Ibid., 173. 
1364 Paul Tillich, “Author’s Introduction”. The Protestant Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), xxix. 
1365 “The Political Meaning of Utopia.” The four lectures of this series are “The Root of Utopia,” “Historical and 
Unhistorical Thinking,” “Religious and Secular Utopia,” and “Critique and Justification of Utopia”. See Paul 
Tillich, “Kairos and Utopia: Rauschenbusch Lectures at Colgate Rochester Divinity School,” (1959). The four 
lectures are “Between Utopianism and Escape from History,” “Kairos and the Awareness of the Historical 
Moment,” “Judging and Misjudging an Historical Moment,” and “The Present Kairos as Problem and Task”. 
Lecture one (“Between Utopianism and Escape from History”) is published in Colgate Rochester Divinity School 
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The Berlin lectures focused on the nature of utopia. Tillich argued that being—
specifically human being—is the beginning of the discussion of utopia.1366 In the distinction 
between human essence (what humanity ought to be) and human existence (what humanity 
actually is), there is the tendency of human beings to posit their essential self as existing in an 
ideal period in the past and making this ideal the basis for what humanity could become.1367 He 
distinguished between those lines of thought which either denied utopia (the pessimistic 
Protestantism of a Karl Barth and existentialism) from those that affirmed utopia (the 
revolutionary spirit and victorious revolutionary progressivism).1368 He saw utopian patterns in 
both historical1369 and unhistorical thinking.1370 Tillich wrote of every utopia as fundamentally a 
“negation of the negative”, a stand against nonbeing, manifested in finitude and estrangement 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bulletin, vol. 31, no. 2, 1959. Lectures two and three (“Kairos and the Awareness of the Historical Moment,” 
“Judging and Misjudging an Historical Moment”) are found as handwritten manuscripts in the Harvard Archive, 
PTAH 408:026. Lecture four is found as a handwritten outline in the Harvard Archive, PTAH 408:026. 
1366 “The Political Meaning of Utopia,” 125-32, 140. See also ST III, 345-46, 353-60, and 398 on utopia. Tillich 
lectured at the Deutschen Hochschule für Politik  for three summers, beginning in 1951. For details, see O.H. 
Gablentz, “Paul Tillich in der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik.” [PTAH, 901E:087]. 
1367 “The Political Meaning of Utopia,” (1951), 133-6, 141. This is captured in Tillich’s discussion of the 
relationship between the German word, Wesen (“essence”) and its cognate, the participle gewesen (“been”), 
capturing the notion of human essence being a phenomenon of the past. (141) 
1368 Paul Tillich, “The Root of Utopia,” in “The Political Meaning of Utopia,” 136-40, 141. 
1369 In historical thinking (in which time rules space, time “runs ahead—inescapable, irreversible, nonrepeatable—
time that moves toward what is new…The new [which] comes to birth in history,” (Paul Tillich, “Historical and 
Unhistorical Thinking,” in “The Political Meaning of Utopia,” 147, 153), Tillich found the utopian in 
Zoroastrianism’s victory of good over evil, the eighteenth century middle class’ vision of the harmonious age of 
reason, and socialism’s proletarian revolution iniating “the utopia of the classless society”. (“Historical and 
Unhistorical Thinking,” 149-50.) Tillich called Marxism “the radicalization of the utopian Christian sect in its 
secular form.” (“Cultural Roots of the Present World Crisis,” 2.) In the vision of Zionism, the political agenda of 
Roman Catholicism, and the crusading spirit of Protestantism, Tillich saw the utopian as expressed by movements 
representing a more balanced tension between time and space. (“Historical and Unhistorical Thinking,” 150-1.) 
1370 In unhistorical thinking (in which space dominates time) Tillich pointed to classical mysticism where history is 
deterioration and utopia is in the past, (“Historical and Unhistorical Thinking,” 142) naturalism in which “the eternal 
return as one observes it in nature (or believes he can) [is] the foundation for denying all significance to history”, 
(“Historical and Unhistorical Thinking,” 144) in Stoicism’s past Golden Age and Nietzsche’s anticipation of the 
Great Noonday of the Superman or Overman, (“Historical and Unhistorical Thinking,” 145) and in the lines of 
existentialism exemplified by Heidegger’s idea of “the ‘revelation of pure being’” and Sartre’s participation in the 
French resistance, “namely, the expectation that in the individual, through his struggle for freedom of decision, the 
system of objectification and authority will one day be overcome.” (“Historical and Unhistorical Thinking,” 146, 
147.) 
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under the conditions of existence.1371 Within utopia, positive and negative meaning were 
combined. Utopia was truthful in expressing the essence of humanity, fruitful in opening up 
possibilities for humanity, and powerful in enabling transformation of the present state of 
affairs.1372 However, it was untruthful in being blind to human existence as estranged from 
human essence (undercutting fulfillment of essence within existence), unfruitful in concealing 
the impossibility of some of the possibilities it posed (ignoring the nature of reality as the 
“oscillation between possibility and impossibility”) and impotent (given the ambiguousness of 
existence and the possibilities therein, leading to disillusionment).1373
Thus, Tillich called for the transcendence of utopia. He wrote of the structural principle 
of life that “Every living thing drives beyond itself, transcends itself.”1374 He argued that World 
War I had taught his generation two things about utopia: 
[F]irst, that a utopia of simply going forward [a horizontal utopia] did not grasp the 
 human situation in its finitude and estrangement, and that it must lead necessarily to 
 metaphysical disillusionment; and second, that a religion for which utopia is exclusively 
 transcendent [a vertical utopia] cannot be an expression of the New Being, of which the 
 Christian message is witness.1375
                                                 
1371 Paul Tillich, “Religious and Secular Utopia,” in “The Political Meaning of Utopia,” 155. This is seen in utopias 
related to the conquest of death through myths of immortality or present participation in the eternal, (Tillich, 
“Religious and Secular Utopia,” (1951), 156-8) the overcoming of estrangement through the various levels of 
healing, including the technological conquering of nature and remedies for illness, (“Religious and Secular Utopia,” 
159-63) the overcoming of the social ills of authority and exploitation by social restructuring, (“Religious and 
Secular Utopia,” 163-6) the return to the Ground of being through the absorption of humanity identity in mysticism, 
and the unity with the Ground (without losing human identity) in prophetic visions. (Tillich, “Religious and Secular 
Utopia,” 166-7.) “In every religious hope, the Christian as well, reunion with the divine ground of being is strived 
for. But the form of reunion is different. It can emphasize the arising of the individual into the eternal more and it 
can emphasize existing within the eternal more. The first is the form of hope in mystically influenced religions; the 
second is the form of hope in prophetically influenced religions. It is no simple either-or. But often a different 
emphasis has immeasurable historical results for ultimate human insights. And so it is with the symbols of hope. The 
valuation of history, of the individual in personality, of the transformation of the actual in service of the ultimate 
goal: all of that belongs to the consequences of the prophetic hope for world history. And when the great religions in 
the near future are engaged in spiritual competition, then the symbols of Christian hope—eternal life and kingdom 
of God—will be of decisive significance. Their actuality in the world, in our world as well, be it openly or secretly, 
be it directly or indirectly, cannot cease.” (Paul Tillich, “Christliche Hoffnung und ihre Wirkung in der Welt 
(1960s),” PTAH 204:048, 10-11.) 
1372 Paul Tillich, “Critique and Justification of Utopia,” in “The Political Meaning of Utopia,” 168-70. 
1373 Ibid., 170-3. 
1374 Ibid., 173. 
1375 Ibid., 176-7. 
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The consequence was that post World War I religious socialism saw its period as a time 
of kairos—as a time in which something new could happen—but that any new order would be an 
ambiguous one, not an absolute one.1376 Therefore, Tillich advocated a doctrine of two orders 
including “both historical reality and transhistorical fulfillment” in which there is “the vertical, 
where alone fulfillment is to be found, yet precisely where we are unable to see it but can only 
point to it” as well as “the horizontal, where fulfillment is realized in space and time but where 
just for this reason it can be found only in an anticipatory, fragmentary way—in this hour, in that 
form.”1377 He concluded, “In whatever way we describe the situation, what is important is the 
idea that overcomes utopia in its untruth and makes it manifest in its truth. Or, as I could perhaps 
say in summation of all four lectures on utopia: it is the spirit of utopia that conquers utopia.”1378
In the Rauschenbusch lectures at the close of the decade, Tillich turned to utopia once 
again, but this time he gave extensive attention to the role of kairos. The visual arts provided a 
powerful stimulus for Tillich’s thinking on these matters: the Renaissance masters presented a 
dual message of anticipated and realized utopia;1379 the German expressionists “were 
seismographs who announced the coming earthquakes” within history.1380 For Tillich, the latter 
were inspired by the spirit of utopia, rooted in “man’s existential dissatisfaction with everything 
that is, his striving beyond the given and his anticipation of a fulfillment which is not yet 
actual.”1381
Regarding the religious roots of utopia, Tillich argued that in prophetism’s anticipation of 
fulfillment at history’s end, in apocalypticism’s momentous, concluding and perfecting 
                                                 
1376 Ibid., 177. 
1377 Ibid., 179. 
1378 Ibid., 180. 
1379 “Between Utopianism and Escape from History,” Lecture 1 of Kairos and Utopia, 36. 
1380 Ibid., 35-36. 
1381 Ibid., 36. 
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inbreaking of the divine into history, and in the Christian Trinitarian understanding of the 
relation of the Holy Spirit to the future were what he perceived as the religious foundations 
underlying religious and secular utopias.1382
With regard to the most prominent secular utopia, socialism, Tillich noted Marx’s 
rejection of a utopian socialism in which the transformation from capitalism to socialism would 
naturally evoke peace and harmony. Yet, he believed Marx’s allegedly scientific socialism failed 
to avoid the same trap with its ultimate goal of a classless society. History, for Tillich, involved 
the interplay of trend (fate or finitude) and chance (freedom). In Marxist thought, history is 
driven by trend. Since history requires the participation of freely acting people, the proletariat as 
the embodiment of chance, the classless society is perpetually vulnerable to failure.1383
In the face of such failure, escapism is the logical response, to Tillich. Tillich interpreted 
escapism as a response to failed utopia. Luther represented a tradition which went back to the 
disappointment of the apocalyptic visionaries about the unfulfilled prophetic expectations, to the 
disappointment of the early Christians about the delay of the second coming of Christ, to the 
disappointment of the church leaders about the spirit movements and their promises, and to 
Augustine’s rejection of the third stage in history.1384 For Lutherans, history must be endured 
rather than transformed.1385 Tillich was led to ask whether this was the death knell for the spirit 
of utopia: “Is it possible to save the spirit of utopia while dismissing utopianism?...are there, we 
now ask, prophetic spirits among us, spirits of utopia who can resist the temptation of the coming 
                                                 
1382 Ibid., 36-37. “The immense world-conquering and nature-subduing dynamic of the West cannot be understood 
without its source in the hope of the Jewish prophets and the Christian proclamation of the coming Kingdom”. The 
utopian hope of the Renaissance, 18th century reason, the 19th century belief progress, socialism’s classless society: 
all are “dependent on the religious expectation of the kingdom of God.” Yet, “the more distant from their religious 
roots, the more technical, dubious, empty, and disappointing became their innerworldly hopes.” (“Christliche 
Hoffnung und ihre Wirkung in der Welt,” 8.) 
1383 “Between Utopianism and Escape from History,” 38-39. 
1384 Ibid.,40. 
1385 The beyond-death-emphasis of German Lutheran and Russian Orthodox traditions led them to be without 
prophetic criticism of worldly powers. (Tillich, “Christliche Hoffnung und ihre Wirkung in der Welt,” 7.) 
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utopianism?”1386 The boundary between utopianism and escapism on which Tillich stood was 
the spirit of utopia.  
To answer the question regarding the spirit of utopia, Tillich first rejected progressivism 
(which was contradicted by history’s inevitable barriers to progress)1387 and historicism (which 
was ignorant of prophet criticism and the situation of the oppressed).1388 Instead, he returned to a 
familiar theme in his philosophy of history: Tillich turned to kairos as “the answer to the 
question of utopianism”.1389  At this point, he defined it as “a moment of time in which 
something can happen and in which something can be done which is impossible at any other 
time,”1390 the “breakthrough of an eternal potentiality of being which now becomes actual as 
something new.”1391 Theologically, it is providence. Anthropologically, it is the convergence of 
conditions necessary for an act or event.1392  
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1392 “Kairos and the Awareness of the Historical Moment”, 11. For humankind as a whole, human history is itself a 
kairos, a “cosmic kairos”. (13). The world’s religions have central, i.e., history-centering, “world-historical” kairotic 
events: for Christians, the earthly life of Jesus; for Jews, the Mt. Sinai covenant; for Muslims, the rise of 
Mohammed; and for Persians, the appearance of Zoroaster. (13-15, 18.) Nonetheless, Tillich argued that Christianity 
“most conspicuously and most successfully” functioned as history’s center: “Conspicuously insofar as here the 
distinction of the old and the new eon determines the name Christ and the self-consciousness of the early church to 
life in the final eon. And it is here most successfully, insofar as even the most secular foe of Christianity accepts the 
division of historical time into the time before and the time after the appearance of the Christ, even if it does not 
mean anything for him religiously. Nobody actually escapes the centrality of the figure of Jesus for historical 
consciousness, even if he does not accept him as the Christ.” (15.) The secular world does not escape the 
kairological understanding of history with its sense of profoundly significant historical occurrences: for the Roman 
Empire, the founding of Rome; for the bourgeoisie, the Enlightenment; and for socialists, the rise of the proletariat. 
(16). Tillich spoke of religious socialism’s non-utopian understanding of kairoi or moments fruitful for the 
fragmentary creation of a new reality. (“Kairos (1958),” 196.) These history-centering kairoi giving meaning to all 
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Kairos answers the question of utopia—treads the boundary between utopianism and 
escapism, and avoids falling to either—by doing two things. First, rather than escaping history, it 
takes history seriously. Within a kairos moment, the eternal enters history, not to bear 
information, but to be present: “the divine presence which changes reality” in a way that matters 
to us, bearing both “announcement and appeal…a promise and a threat”.1393 Recognition of 
kairoi is a matter of timing. Often missed by the privileged, they are fruitful moments for the 
spirit of utopia to function among those “on the negative side of life” whose dissatisfaction with 
the present and dreams for a better future can be at the root of a prophetic spirit.1394
The second way kairos answers the question of utopia is by rejecting utopianism by 
means of “the transcendent foundation of the prophetic spirit.”1395 As deep as dreams for the 
future may be, they are never adequately fulfilled within history. Tillich uses the distortion of the 
Kantian idea of eternal peace into everlasting peace as an example. Understood as “everlasting”, 
the notion sets up pacifists for perpetual disappointment and takes away human freedom, 
namely, the freedom to contradict. On the other hand, understood as eternal, it is the symbol for 
human fulfillment. The confusion of a symbol of fulfillment with actual fulfillment is 
utopianism.1396 This leads to the positive task enabled by kairos. 
                                                                                                                                                             
of history for their “adherents”. Thus, for example, a Christ-centered history, “the beginning of history is the 
indefinite development in which man became aware of his predicament of estrangement and misery and was grasped 
by expectations of a better existence….In the same way, the end of history is determined by the center, namely the 
actualization of what is potentially given in the center, the new principle of being.” (“Kairos and the Awareness of 
the Historical Moment,” 17. Here, cognizant of Bultmann’s presence at the event, Tillich makes parenthetical 
reference to “Bultmann’s eschatological Christ”.) What would be termed smaller kairoi can happen at every moment 
in history, moments at which the prophetic spirit is “the center of a smaller or larger stretch of the historical 
process…always [these serve as a] kairos for somebody in a concrete situation.” (18-19. Here Tillich parenthetically 
refers to “Bultmann’s existential interpretation of history”.) What is occurring at such points in time is “the work of 
the spirit of utopia working in somebody and giving him the certainty of a qualified moment in the flux of 
quantitative time.” (“Kairos and the Awareness of the Historical Moment,” 19.) 
1393 Tillich, “Kairos and the Awareness of the Historical Moment”, (1959), 19-20. 
1394 Ibid., 21-22. 
1395 Ibid., 23. 
1396 Ibid., 25-26. 
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Kairos periods are occasions when the utopian spirit demands and empowers people to 
stand against the demonic. Tillich saw the Roman Empire, Nazism, western industrial capitalism, 
and communism as examples of this ambiguous reality known as the demonic.1397 The key is to 
maintain a spirit of utopia that risks decisive action against the demonic at times of kairos, 
without falling into utopianism.1398
Again, decision involves risk. The sense of a kairos after World War I was both correct 
and incorrect. This is consistent with prophetic consciousness. 1399 False prophecy is “the 
demonic distortion of truth.” True prophecy contains divine truth “independent of the errors of 
those who represent it.”1400 True prophets judge everything that is finite. False prophets proclaim 
something finite to be superior to all other finite things: a nation, a social class, “the elected race, 
blood, soil, as in Nazism”, a particular human cultural activity or cultural institution.1401 False 
prophets prophesy events incapable of bringing fulfillment.1402
As noted above, trend and chance are key to historical interpretation, trend representing 
necessity and chance representing contingency. Trend enables kairos-consciousness to exist.1403 
Chance speaks to the inevitability of error.1404  
                                                 
1397 Ibid., 29-32. 
1398 Ibid., 32. 
1399 Paul Tillich, “Judging and Misjudging an Historical Situation,” Lecture 3 of Kairos and Utopia, 3-4. 
1400 Ibid., 4-5. 
1401 Ibid., 6-7. 
1402 Ibid., 7-8. 
1403 Ibid.,  11. 
1404 “The trend or the element of necessity is based on the relatively perpetual structures of historical existence. The 
nature of historical man, its sociological and psychological character, generally and particularly, the natural 
structures outside of man, the unique constellation of all these elements in a special moment. But in opposition to 
these structural necessities are the contingencies which bring in the element of chance. They result from the 
spontaneity of everything alive, from the freedom of man as centered personality, from the incalculability of the 
moving whole of being which is effective in every part of being [from the original quality of contingency, namely 
the fact that there is something and not nothing]. In this way structural necessities and genuine contingency 
interpenetrate each other in every historical process, producing the polarity of trend and chance.” (Tillich, “Judging 
and Misjudging an Historical Situation,” [1959], 12-13.) 
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The knowledge necessary for determining a moment to be a true kairos goes beyond 
scientific knowledge.1405 In order to judge a period to be a kairos, “one must have been grasped 
by the historical situation in the dimension of the ultimate…Only he who participates in an 
historical situation in its deepest meaning can speak of a kairos”, a participation involving “one’s 
total being.”1406 Pronouncing a kairos requires courage and seriousness.1407 The very 
pronouncement of a kairos is part of that kairos: “He who asserts a kairos makes it, to a certain 
degree, a kairos. He himself is an element in the whole situation.”1408 In such a person, potential 
kairos becomes actual. 
The horizontal-vertical distinction becomes operable here, as well. Horizontally, error is 
possible in describing future events. Vertically—when dealing with the meaning of an historical 
moment—judgments do not involve error or truth, but relation to the demonic or the divine.1409 
Horizontal judgments are theoretical judgments subject to the conditions of all theory. Kairos-
consciousness “trespasses the subject-object structure of theory….”1410
Because it is captive to the horizontal dimension, utopianism is “open to the 
misjudgments of future events”, leading to profound disappointment, having confused the 
horizontal and vertical dimensions.1411 The Kingdom of God is central to the problem. The 
Kingdom of God has “an innerhistorical and a transhistorical dimension.”1412 It is both “at hand” 
                                                 
1405 Ibid., 14-15. 
1406 Ibid., 16. 
1407 Ibid., 16-17. 
1408 Ibid., 17. 
1409 Ibid., 18-19. 
1410 Ibid., 20. 
1411 Ibid., 21-22. 
1412 Ibid., 24. The this-worldly-understanding of the Kingdom of God/Heaven influenced the Roman world church, 
the sects and lay movements of the Middle Ages, and Reformed and Sectarian Protestantism. God’s rule is mediated 
by hierarchy in Catholicism and by Christian preachers and laity in Protestantism. “The establishment of God’s rule 
over all the earth according to the model of Calvin’s Geneva, Cromwell’s England, Puritan and Pietistic America is 
the goal of innerworldly Christian hope.” This is the basis of Rome’s political claims and the Anglo-Saxon 
crusading spirit. (“Christliche Hoffnung und ihre Wirkung in der Welt,” 7-8.) 
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in kairotic moments of history and beyond history, “the eternal fulfillment of what remains 
unfulfilled in the historical process.”1413 Utopianism arises when the innerhistorical 
understanding overwhelms the transhistorical one. Escapism results when the transhistorical 
dominates.1414 The spirit of utopia as embodied in the prophetic spirit entails both dimensions: 
“The ultimate unity of things in the eternal life of God remains the criterion of every moment of 
innerhistorical fulfillment…[present in] the ambiguous structures of historical existence.”1415
Kairotic breakthroughs “reveal and weaken” demonic structures and manifest another 
familiar element of Tillich’s thought, theonomy: “…there is always theonomy in history, but 
always in struggle against both empty autonomy and demonic heteronomy.”1416 As “the 
supporting power of history” theonomy is always present: “as long as there is history there is 
hidden or open theonomy.”1417 Of the dynamics of theonomy, autonomy, and heteronomy, 
Tillich wrote,  
The interplay of these forces is nowhere in our known history as evident as in the 
 Western world. Nowhere do we find such a radical secularism, produced by an almost 
 unrestrained autonomy. Nowhere do we find such fanatical reactions against it, in the 
 name of divine authority or human-totalitarian substitution for it. And nowhere is the 
 longing for new theonomous symbols as strong as in the ancient and modern West. One 
 could write a story of the intellectual development of the West in terms of the interplay of 
 these three forces….1418
  
It is toward a new theonomy that the spirit of utopia—the prophetic spirit—is driving:  
 
Theonomy is not fulfillment but it is the image of fulfillment in history. It is not the 
 removal of the demonic, but it is the victory over special demonic structures, it is not the 
 establishment of peace on earth, but it is the establishment of symbols of the unity of man 
 kind, it is not the final state of justice and harmony, but it is an ever varying 
 manifestation of the principle of love, it is not the guarantee of social or cultural progress, 
                                                 
1413 “Judging and Misjudging an Historical Situation,” 24. 
1414 Ibid., 24. 
1415 Ibid., 25. 
1416 Ibid., 26. 
1417 Ibid., 27. 
1418 Ibid., 29-30. 
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 but it is an ultimate motive for acting into the future, it is not the Kingdom of God, but it 
 is its fragmentary, anticipatory, endangered image in a particular period of human 
 history.1419
 
As a consequence of this analysis, Tillich was led to conclude that he and his 
contemporaries were the preparers of—not bearers of—a kairos.1420 In fact, the post-World War 
II period was an a-kairos.1421 Trend seemed to dominate chance. Resignation was combined with 
an “anger ‘at large’”.1422 Escapist mysticism was stronger than the prophetic spirit. The trend 
was toward security, “‘success’ conquered by ‘security.’”1423 The conquest of space led to space 
“taken as a reality of its own.”1424 The prospect of an “atomic end” provoked an “anti-prophetic 
and anti-utopian” eschatology.1425 Yet, humanity is not captive to existential paralysis. This is 
seen in Tillich’s treatment of love, power, and justice. 
LOVE, POWER AND JUSTICE   The capacity to act at the well-timed moment was rooted in 
the centered person or group. One line that Tillich took to describe the substance at the center of 
what it means to be human—to get at that from which humanity was estranged, to refill the 
vacuum created by the processes of  western, industrial civilization—was to consider the 
elements of human relationships expressed by the concepts of love, power, and justice. In several 
places, but particularly in the short book, Love, Power and Justice, Tillich outlined the essence—
the ontological relationship—of the three components of that book’s title. In this way, he gave a 
sketch of the center out of which religion calls people to participate in community as individuals 
and groups. 
                                                 
1419 Ibid., 31-32. 
1420 Paul Tillich, “The Present Kairos as Problem and Task,” Lecture 4 of Kairos and Utopia, PTAH 408:026, . 
1421 Ibid., 2. Tillich writes, “If there is a kairos it should be a tellmic kairos!” (p.1) I have not successfully found the 
word “tellmic” in a dictionary or any other reference works, but Tillich equates it with “a-kairos”, i.e., the opposite 
of kairos or opportune time. Later, he uses “tellmic” in reference to the division nationalism creates in the 
international arena, a demonic “tellmic split” in the world. (6) 
1422 Ibid., 2. 
1423 Ibid., 3. 
1424 Ibid., 3. 
1425 Ibid., 4. 
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In Tillich’s construction, power is the power of being1426 possessed by all existing things 
in a dynamic process of separation and return.1427 It is “the possibility of self-affirmation despite 
inner and outer negation, it is the possibility to take up into itself and to overcome nonbeing 
without limitation.”1428 Love is the reunion of the separated. 1429 It enables the “returning” 
element in power to occur, and it requires power in its struggle against that which stands against 
love. 1430 Justice gives forming shape to power and love, 1431 enabling them to exist. 1432 Justice 
prevents power from being oppressive and gives backbone to love.1433 With this ontological 
structure, Tillich paints a picture in which power is inimical to neither love nor justice. All three 
are basic elements necessary for existence. 
Love, power and justice all occur in encounters with other beings in Tillich’s 
approach.1434 The capacity for being is determined through conscious and unconscious decisions 
in encounters with other beings.1435 In all positive and negative encounters there is 
“unconsciously or consciously a struggle of power with power, of potential with potential.”1436 
                                                 
1426 „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 207. Tillich saw Nietzsche’s will-to-power is the quintessential formulation of the 
relation of being to power: “the self-affirmation of life, of the life which dynamically reaches beyond itself, which 
overcomes internal and external resistance,” the resistance of nonbeing. („Die Philosophie der Macht,“, 208, 209.) 
1427 Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, 48-9. “Life is the dynamic actualization of being.” (Love, Power and Justice, 
41.) 
1428 Tillich, „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 209. 
1429 Love, Power and Justice, 28. See also Paul Tillich, “Being and Love,” in Moral Principles of Action: Man’s 
Ethical Imperative, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 666-668; Paul Tillich, ”Love, 
Power and Justice,” (A broadcast talk on the BBC’s Third Programme, based on the Firth Lectures delivered in 
Nottingham) The Listener (London) XLVIII, no. 1231 (Oct. 2, 1952), 544; and The Eternal Now, 55-56. 
1430 “Love, in order to exercise its proper works, namely charity and forgiveness, must provide for a place on which 
this can be done, through its strange work of judging and punishing. In order to destroy what is against love, love 
must be united with power…compulsory power.” (Love, Power and Justice, 49.) 
1431 „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 215. 
1432 Love, Power and Justice, (1954), 56, 67. See also “Love, Power and Justice,” 545. 
1433 “A love of any type, and love as a whole if it does not include justice, is chaotic self-surrender, destroying him 
who loves as well as him who accepts such love.” (Love, Power and Justice, 68.) 
1434 „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 215. 
1435 Ibid., 210. 
1436 Ibid., 220. 
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Politically, it includes the capacity to have space1437 as well as economic and technical 
expansion.1438  
Tillich warned against the false analogy between the individual person and the social 
group1439 which he saw expressed in the difficulty of determining guilt among the German 
people in the face of Hitler’s murders.1440 The group possesses no personal center1441 over 
against the individual person who is “the battlefield of the powers which struggle in every cell of 
his body and in every movement of his thought for or against his human being.”1442 Power 
centers in groups are the power-holders who work within a structure requiring both 
acknowledgement and enforcement.1443 The power and being of such a social organism requires 
geographic space, radiation of power through economic and technical expansion, self-expression 
through symbols and ideas, and a sense of vocation.1444  
Force and compulsion are necessary tools of group power: “Power actualizes itself 
through force and compulsion. But power is neither the one nor the other. It is being, actualizing 
itself over against the threat of nonbeing. It uses and abuses compulsion in order to overcome 
this threat. It uses and abuses force in order to actualize itself. But it is neither the one nor the 
other.”1445 The demonic and, thus, ambiguity enter in when coercion is brought into 
                                                 
1437 Ibid., 228. 
1438 Ibid., 229. 
1439 Paul Tillich, “Shadow and Substance: A Theory of Power (1965),” in Political Expectation (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1971; reprint, Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1981), 116. 
1440 Ibid., 117. This was expressed previously in Tillich’s discussions regarding levels of guilt. Tillich wanted the 
Nazi criminals punished, but he understood guilt comprehensively. (Against the Third Reich, 37-39, 109-110, 156-7, 
183-87, 189, 210) 
1441 “Shadow and Substance: A Theory of Power,” 117. 
1442 Paul Tillich, “Humanität und Religion,” Hansischer Goethe-Preis 1958, Gedenkschrift zur Verleihung des 
Hansischen Goethe-Preis 1958 der gemeinnützigen Stiftung F.V.S. zur Hamburg an Professor D. Dr. Paul Tillich, 
Hamburg: Stiftung F.V.S., 1958, pp. 25-35. GW IX, 111. 
1443 Love, Power and Justice, 94-5. 
1444 Ibid., 100-1. “[I]n all power encounters of groups an indistinguishable unity of power-drive and consciousness 
of calling finds itself.” The combining of these two occurred in historical developments in all periods: the conflict at 
the time between Russia and the United States presented this combination. („Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 229-30.) 
1445 Love, Power and Justice, 47 
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consideration. Coercion and force are inescapable in the estranged condition of human existence. 
They are present in all three elements of group power: will, space, and growth.1446 Coercion is 
tragic in dehumanizing its human object, depriving human beings of freedom. It dehumanizes 
both the forced and the enforcer.1447
Much of Tillich’s concern with power focused on its embodiment in the form of 
authority. His main concerns surrounded the impact of authority upon personhood, the 
accountability of authority to those subject to it, and the tendency towards idolatry to which 
power was prone: he was interested in preventing authority from becoming authoritarian. 
Therefore, he distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate authority. Illegitimate authority 
he variously called principled, vested, hypostasized or unjust. It was presumed to be absolute and 
beyond criticism, yet “…every hypostasized authority is unjust authority in its essence, because 
it  takes something away from the capacity for being of the individual and submits him/her to 
that which for the time being must be freely received by him/her.”1448 Illegitimate is an authority 
“which breaks humanity and which breaks consciousness of truth.”1449 It was demonic in 
denying its finitude, in the process provoking and justifying prophetic criticism. 1450 Tillich 
admonished that the God who is Spirit “does not isolate us from the community to which we 
belong and which is a part of ourselves. But he denies ultimate significance to all these 
preliminary authorities, to all those who claim to be images of His authority and who distort 
                                                 
1446 “Shadow and Substance: A Theory of Power,” 119-20, 123. 
1447 Ibid., 121. 
1448 „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 222-3. 
1449 „Protestanische Vision…,” 7. 
1450 “The Prophetic Element in the Christian Message…,” 24-25. “The way in which the true prophet tries to liberate 
them from the demonic power and to heal the authoritarian personality is the message of an ultimate security beyond 
insecurity and security; he reveals the demonic character of unconditional bondage to any vested authority and 
communicates the power of the Spirit which unites ecstasy with order, creativity with community, freedom from and 
for all authorities which can stand under the prophetic judgment.” (“The Prophetic Element in the Christian 
Message…,” 26.) 
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God’s authority into the oppressive power of a heavenly tyrant.”1451 Examples of illegitimate 
authority to which Tillich pointed included “history, a book, a priest, a king or a leader (Führer) 
or a commissar”,1452 the Pope, the Bible (for orthodox/fundamentalist Christians), dictators, 
parents (in patriarchal families) and patriarchal models of teaching. 1453 Tillich was particularly 
concerned that social upheaval made authoritarianism attractive.1454
Legitimate or factical authority “expresses what the truth of the ground of being 
is….”1455 For Tillich, cultural and specifically political authorities “are tools through which the 
Spiritual qualities of mutuality, understanding, righteousness, and courage can be mediated to 
us.”1456 Just authority and power of being go together: “Just authority rests on the fact that 
everyone has a de facto power of being and can for that reason take part in it. In this sense we are 
all authorities for one another.”1457
There are three levels of justice in Tillich’s understanding: (1) “the intrinsic claims for 
justice of everything which has being…raised silently or vocally by a being on the basis of its 
power of being”;1458 (2) tributive forms of justice which are calculating and proportional, 
granting what is determined to be the justice due to a person or thing;1459 and (3) transforming or 
creative justice.1460 There are four principles of justice: adequacy; equality (acknowledging the 
equal dignity of each person); personality (which prohibits treating people like things); and 
                                                 
1451 The New Being, 89-90. 
1452 „Protestanische Vision…,” 6. 
1453 „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 222-3. 
1454 “The Prophetic Element in the Christian Message…,” 18-19 and “Beyond the Dilemma of Our Period,” 211, 
212. 
1455 „Protestanische Vision…,” 7. 
1456 The New Being, 90. 
1457 „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 223. 
1458 Love, Power and Justice, 63. 
1459 Ibid., 63-4. 
1460 Ibid., 64-6. 
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liberty (“political and cultural self-determination”). 1461 Justice, for Tillich, necessarily went 
beyond strict, calculating, proportional justice to creative, productive or transformative justice. 
Proportional justice is that which is calculated to be a person’s due. Productive or creative justice 
is dependent upon love (the reunion of that which belongs together and is separated). 1462 Tillich 
spoke of the ultimate meaning of justice as “creative justice, and creative justice is the form of 
reuniting love.”1463 It is rooted in forgiveness.1464 Forgiveness manifests love to be the principle 
of justice. 1465 Tillich argued,  
Only love can transform calculating justice into creative justice. Love makes justice just. 
 Justice without love is always injustice because it does not do justice to the other one, nor 
 to oneself, nor to the situation in which we meet. For the other one and I and we together 
 in this moment in this place are a unique unrepeatable occasion, calling for a unique 
 unrepeatable act of uniting love.1466
 
Injustice is not a matter of the superiority of one person’s power of being over another’s. 
“Injustice occurs in the moment in which the inner claim, which every single essence has 
through that which it essentially is, is overlooked or denied and its potential for being is reduced 
or destroyed.”1467 Nationalism is innately unjust: “Nationalism denies justice and is afraid of the 
prophetic attack on its consecration of injustice. This explains the weakness of the resistance 
Protestantism showed against the Nazis and the almost complete lack of criticism of their attempt 
to eradicate the Jewish people.”1468 Thus, rather than centered action in which love, power, and 
justice coalesce in a humanizing, life-giving way, untrammeled power crushed human beings. 
                                                 
1461 Ibid., 57, 58, 59-60, 61. 
1462 „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 221. 
1463 Love, Power and Justice, 71. 
1464 “…nothing greater can happen to a human being than that he is forgiven. For forgiveness means reconciliation 
in spite of estrangement; it means reunion in spite of hostility; it means acceptance of those who are unacceptable, 
and means reception of those who are rejected.” (The New Being, 7-8.) “Forgiveness is an answer, the divine 
answer, to the question implied in our existence.” (The New Being, 9.) “But genuine forgiveness is participation, 
reunion overcoming the powers of estrangement.” (The New Being, 10.) 
1465 Love, Power and Justice, 71. 
1466 The New Being, 32. 
1467 „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 222. 
1468 “Jewish Influences on Contemporary Christian Theology,” 41-2. 
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CENTERED, VENTURING COURAGE   To face the historical vacuum, Tillich argued that 
Christianity must combine expectation with action. On the one hand, Tillich confessed, “I see a 
vacuum …,”1469 and “my own personal feeling is that today we live in a period in which the 
Kairos, the right time of realization, lies far ahead of us in the invisible future, and a void, an 
unfulfilled space, a vacuum surrounds us.”1470 On the other hand, the position of waiting meant 
active waiting. He believed that all peoples are rooted in a center that “serves to orient its 
philosophy of history and posits its beginning and its end.”1471 He wrote, “An integrated state of 
society is one in which creative forces are held in balance by the power of an embracing and 
determining principle.”1472 He admonished his coreligionists, “Christianity has the power of 
resistance against paganism only if it is rooted in the message of the divine paradox, namely that 
Jesus is the Christ.”1473 Therefore, rejecting inward, utilitarian, or escapist patterns in 
Christianity,1474 Tillich built upon that stream of his tradition that embraced existence and called 
for Christianity to proclaim Christ as the absolute center of meaning and “the center of all 
centers”.1475 It points to the divine in its symbolism. 1476 It seeks connection to the ground 
through ritual. 1477 Its moral and social actions are touched by the transformative power of the 
absolute. 1478 It takes depth psychology’s goal of connecting people to “their subconscious 
vitality” to the next step of connection to the absolute, in order to have centered personalities. 1479 
                                                 
1469 “Beyond Religious Socialism,” 733. 
1470 “Critique and Justification of Utopia,” 180. 
1471 “Historical and Unhistorical Thinking,” 152. 
1472 “The Disintegration of Society in Christian Countries,” 53. 
1473 “World War II and the Younger Churches,” 10. 
1474 “The Present World Situation…,” 18, 19. 
1475 Ibid., 21-22, 22-23. 
1476 Ibid., 23. 
1477 Ibid., 24. 
1478 Ibid. 
1479 Ibid., 25. 
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And it asserts the necessity of a “church” 1480—apart from complicit “organized Christianity,” or 
demonic “ecclesiastical, national and utopian absolutism,” or culturally infertile 
institutions1481—that represents “the center of meaning for the totality of life…the center and 
basis of all creative life,” that is the core of transformative revolutionary movements, 1482 and 
that is, therefore, composed of “venturing individuals or groups…able today to carry the 
revolutionary movements towards a new, centered or theonomous world-structure.”1483
Just as Augustine called for “a courage which was born out of participation in a new 
reality,”1484 Tillich summoned forth courage to face estrangement.  In summarizing the message 
of his book, The Courage to Be, he spoke of offering courage in the face of existential Angst, 
“But a very special kind of courage…Not the courage of the soldier but the courage of the 
human being who feels all the riddles and all the meaninglessness of life and who is nevertheless 
able to say ‘yes’ to life.”1485 When true to its identity, the church’s most adequate answers to 
reality’s questions are “the good news of the conquest of the law by the appearance of a new 
healing reality...[arising from] the ground and meaning of our existence and of existence 
generally”1486 and prophetic criticism against the demonic. 1487
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS  Tillich attempted to embody this centered, venturing courage in 
concrete ways. The discussion will now consider how this played out in relationship to six 
issues: the Jewish question; personhood versus patternization; the nuclear question and the Berlin 
                                                 
1480 Ibid., 25, 26. 
1481 Ibid., 26, 27, 28. 
1482 Ibid., 25, 26, 27. 
1483 Ibid., 28. 
1484„Protestanische Vision…,” 4. 
1485 Paul Tillich, “Paul Tillich: Interview with Werner Rode (1955),” Andover-Harvard Library Microfilm 281, 
PTAH, bMS 621.], p. 165. See also Paul Tillich, “Human Fulfillment,” in Search for America, ed. Huston Smith 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 164-74 on the courage to face the anxieties of existence. 
1486 “Aspects of a Religious Analysis of Culture,” 49, 50. 
1487 Ibid., 51. 
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crisis; the Cuban missile crisis; the papal encyclical, Pacem in Terris; and inter religious 
community. 
Applied to the healing of German crimes against the Jews and the continuing presence of 
anti-Semitism, Tillich stated the necessity for courage on the Germans’ part to do the following: 
assume responsibility without distractions over guilt and punishment—“If one were able to  
apply the concepts of depth psychology to groups, one would say that the German people must 
undergo a collective analysis that would raise up the past into consciousness”1488; embrace sober 
judgment over against arrogant overreaction; and reintegrate Germany into western 
civilization.1489 On the other hand, the rest of the world had to combine proportionate justice 
with creative justice in its treatment of the Germans, enabling the reunion of parties separated by 
injustice, a reunion that neither forgets the violation nor considers it settled.1490
While sparse in detailed instruction with regard to collectivism and conformity, Tillich 
called both the East and the West to make any “new collectivism a humanized one and to prevent 
its antihuman form”,1491 and to take action against mass conformity that smothers individual 
spontaneity.1492 He saw hope for resistance to patternization in boredom among the masses that 
motivated their manipulators to innovate, in the artistic exposure of patternization, and in “the 
spirit of rebellion which…is the courage to say yes to one’s birthright as a unique, free, and 
responsible individual….”1493
Asked to comment on the development of the hydrogen-cobalt bomb, Tillich shared these 
thoughts: (1) its development awakens the notion than humankind may be destroyed through its 
                                                 
1488 “The Jewish Question…,” 21, 22. 
1489 Ibid., 22. 
1490 Ibid., 5-6. In Tillich’s desire for guilty Germans to be punished versus Germany as a whole, creative justice and 
remembering reunion were the goals. 
1491 “The Revolutionary Character of the Struggle…,” 1-2. 
1492 Paul Tillich, “Man Against Mass Society (1955),” PTAH, 409:001. 
1493 “Conformity,” 149. 
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own devices rather than by “a cosmic event”; (2) history’s meaning is independent of its actual 
end and is beyond history; 1494 (3) the eternal dimension of life and history call for humankind’s 
unrelenting struggle “against man’s suicidal instincts”;1495 (4) such a struggle must be conducted 
at all levels; and (5) the struggle “must be done in acts which unite the religious, moral, and 
political concern, and which are performed in imaginative wisdom and courage.”1496
For a discussion with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Max Freedman, future Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, and journalist James Reston on Eleanor Roosevelt’s television program, 
“Prospects for Mankind,” Tillich constructed seven theses regarding the Berlin crisis of 1961. 
First, political decision is rooted in ethics.1497 Second, social ethics is rooted in creative justice, 
“a justice whose final aim is the preservation or restitution of a community of social groups, 
subnational or supranational.”1498 Third, steps toward creative justice must be conducive to that 
goal.1499 Fourth, war is only justifiable as an instrument of creative justice. Fifth, atomic warfare 
is inconsistent with creative justice. Sixth, given the preceding theses, certain consequences 
necessarily follow: self-defense and defense of those who share the threat is ethically required; 
the impotency of conventional weapons does not lift the prohibition against the use of atomic 
weaponry, defensive or otherwise; the possession of atomic weapons is permitted as a message 
to the other side regarding the potential consequences of a first use of atomic weapons by the 
other side; no first use of atomic weapons is permitted; and should this mean withdrawal from 
                                                 
1494 Paul Tillich, “The Hydrogen-Cobalt Bomb,” Symposium in a Special Issue of Pulpit Digest  (Great Neck, N.Y.) 
XXXIV, no. 194 (June, 1954): 32. 
1495 Ibid., 32, 34. 
1496 Ibid., 34. See also Thielicke, Helmut, “Christians and the Prevention of War in an Atomic Age,” in Religion and 
Culture: Essays in Honor  of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht, 335-340 (New York: Harper & Row, 1959). 
1497 Paul Tillich, “Seven Theses concerning the Nuclear Dilemma” in The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical 
Society (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1988), 197. Originally published as “Contribution to ‘The Nuclear 
Dilemma’ Discussion,” Christianity and Crisis 11:19 (1961): 203-204. (See also the reprint of this piece as “The 
Ethical Problem of the Berlin Situation,” in Theology of Peace, ed. Ronald H. Stone (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 160-1.) See PTAH 905A:003 for further details of this panel discussion. 
1498 “Seven Theses…,” 197. 
1499 Ibid., 197. 
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territory, this is a tolerable short term consequence. Seventh, the distinction between 
conventional and atomic weapons is crucial. Again, no first use of atomic weapons is 
permissible.1500 Tillich saw the first use of nuclear weapons as unethical, because “Its result is 
mutual destruction and neither the preservation of freedom nor the victory of Communism.”1501
Tillich joined several other academics and church leaders in responding to the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962. Together they appealed to “resolution and courage” rather than “rash or 
reckless” action.1502 They believed in unwavering “determination to defend freedom,” but 
admonished that “we must never act so as to defeat the very ideals we seek to defend… [acting] 
not for prestige but for the principles on which our nation was founded.”1503 Therefore, they 
argued that no military steps would be appropriate without exhausting all possible routes of 
negotiation. 1504
In response to the papal encyclical, Pacem in Terris, Tillich gathered thoughts on realism 
and peace. He appreciated the commitment to justice expressed in the encyclical.1505 However, 
he made several points that reveal his judgment that the document was utopian.  To its call for 
the defense of human dignity, Tillich noted that there are cultures in which this is not a first 
concern and that, therefore, freedom and equality would be of little significance to these cultures. 
To the encyclical’s call for resistance to those who attack human dignity, Tillich questioned the 
assumption that such a path was unambiguous.1506 Tillich believed that power, correctly 
                                                 
1500 Ibid., 198. 
1501 Paul Tillich, “The Cold War and the Future of the West (1962),” PTAH, 518:004, 1. 
1502 Paul Tillich, John C. Bennett, Jerald C. Brauer, Angus Dun, Samuel Miller, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Francis 
Sayre, “Cuban Missile Crisis, The: A Joint Statement (1962),” PTAH, 522:021. 
1503 Ibid. 
1504 Ibid. 
1505 Paul Tillich, “On ‘Peace on Earth,’” Theology of Peace, ed. Ronald H. Stone (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1990), 174. 
1506 Ibid., 175. 
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understood, had to be taken more seriously in questions of peace than the encyclical did.1507 
Further, he warned that the personification—and the call to moral accountability—of groups 
carries with it the fallacy of equating the moral agency of an individual with that of a group.1508 
He questioned the encyclical’s appeal to “men of good will.” Rather, it should have been 
understood as an appeal to people in whom good and evil are mixed.1509 In addition to this series 
of criticisms, Tillich offered constructive alternatives to the document’s utopianism, what he 
believed to be an anti-utopian basis for hope to address both the ambiguities of technological 
progress and the destructive realities of the age atomic weapons and totalitarianism.1510 He 
pointed to what he saw as the true seeds for peace into the future: (1) a sense of common 
destiny—the ambiguous fact of “a community of fear” under the atomic shadow; (2) the world-
shaking impact of technology which increases hostility, but which can also dissipate both the 
sense of the strangeness of the other and the perception of danger; (3) growth in cross-national 
and cross-cultural cooperation and collaboration; (4) the limited, but present, structure of legal 
accountability internationally;1511 and, finally, (5) the reality of intermittent successes. Tillich 
wrote, “we cannot hope for a final stage of justice and peace within history; but we can hope for 
partial victories over the forces of evil in a particular moment of time.”1512
Beyond the ecumenical discussions displayed by Tillich’s thoughts on Pacem..., Tillich 
engaged in inter religious work,1513 making an effort to understand those religions with whom he 
believed Christianity shared “the moving depth” of the divine. Tillich came to speak of the 
                                                 
1507 Ibid., 176. 
1508 Ibid., 177. 
1509 Ibid. 
1510 Ibid., 179. 
1511 Ibid., 179-80. 
1512 Ibid., 181. 
1513 On Tillich’s approach to other religions, see Geffré; Kitagawa; Takeuchi; and Thomas, Terence, “On Another 
Boundary: Tillich’s Encounter with World Religions.” 
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Ground of Being as the God transcending theism1514 or the God above God: Absolute faith, or 
the state of being grasped by the God beyond God, is not a state which appears beside other 
states of the mind. It never is something separated and definite, an event which could be isolated 
and described. It is always a movement in, with, and under other states of mind. It is the situation 
on the boundary of man’s possibilities. It is this boundary. Therefore it is both the courage of 
despair and the courage in and above every courage. It is not a place where one can live, it is 
without the safety of words and concepts, it is without a name, a church, a cult, a theology. But it 
is moving in the depth of all of them. It is the power of being, in which they participate and of 
which they are fragmentary expressions.1515
Tillich valued his relationship with Martin Buber personally and professionally. 1516 His 
papers reveal his interest in Islam.1517 He saw both his trip to Japan in 1960 and his collaboration 
with religious historian Mircea Eliade on a course in comparative religion at the University of 
Chicago as important ways to broaden his perspective. Of the Eliade partnership he wrote, 
“Nothing is better for overcoming every theological provincialism.”1518
His most important effort in inter religious thinking was his book, Christianity and the 
Encounter of the World Religions. In this short book, Tillich gave particular attention to what he 
designated quasi-religions and to a comparison of Christianity to Buddhism. In fact, he saw the 
primary inter religious encounter of the early 1960s as that between religion and the quasi-
religions of fascism and communism.1519 He made the provocative judgment that liberal 
                                                 
1514 “Christianity and the Problem of Existence,” 33. 
1515 The Courage to Be, 188-89.  
1516 “Martin Buber and Christian Thought…,” 199. 
1517 Paul Tillich, “Notes from a Book about Islam (early 1960s),” PTAH, 545:001; Paul Tillich, “Notes on Islam 
(early 1960s),” PTAH 422:018; and Paul Tillich, “The Relationship Between Islam and Christianity (early 1960s)” 
PTAH, 422:019, 4. 
1518 Paul Tillich, „Rundbrief, 1964,“ PTAH, 802:055, 2. 
1519 Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, 5-6, 12, 15. (The lectures in this book were originally 
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humanism did not rise to the status of quasi-religion with the potency to defend against 
communism or fascism, unless it defied its own tenets to be successful.1520
Setting the context for his discussion of the Buddhism-Christianity comparison, Tillich 
observed that Christianity’s historic relationship to other religions had alternated between 
tolerance and rejection, with the dominant pattern being exclusivist intolerance.1521 He saw 
himself as approaching non-Christian religions dialectically, the “union of acceptance and 
rejection, with all the tensions, uncertainties, and changes which such dialectics implies.”1522 His 
dynamic typology for interpreting religion isolated “type-determining elements.”1523 To 
assemble these elements in a way that enabled inter religious understanding, Tillich posed four 
presuppositions: (1) “both partners acknowledge the value of the other’s religious conviction”; 
(2) “each of them is able to represent his own religious basis with conviction”; (3) “common 
ground…makes both dialogue and conflicts possible”; and (4) “openness of both sides to 
criticisms directed against their own religious basis.”1524 With these ground rules in mind, he 
compared Christianity’s and Buddhism’s treatment of the purpose of each religion, their 
“valuation[s] of existence”, their approaches to the holy, and their anthropologies.1525
The soundness of Tillich’s interpretation of Buddhism has been soundly challenged. 
What is important here is Tillich’s interpretation of Christianity’s mindset as it enters into inter 
religious dialogue. For Tillich, criteria for assessing itself, other religions, and quasi religions 
had to be rooted in “the appearance and reception of Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ”, in whom 
                                                                                                                                                             
delivered at Columbia University in 1961 as the fourteenth in the series known as The Bampton Lectures in 
America.) 
1520 Ibid., 9-10. 
1521 Ibid., 32-33, 34-36, 37-38, 44. 
1522 Ibid., 30. 
1523 Ibid., 57. 
1524 Ibid., 62. 
1525 Ibid., 63-71. 
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particularity was sacrificed on behalf of the universal, freeing “his image from bondage both to a 
particular religion…and to the religious sphere as such; the principle of love in him embraces the 
cosmos, including both the religious and the secular spheres.”1526 Therefore, the criteria at which 
he arrived were these: “…particular yet free from particularity”; and “religious yet free from 
religion.”1527
With these two criteria in hand, Christianity could be shaped by other religious streams, 
gaining (as examples) a wider sense of the presence of the holy from polytheism, the criticism of 
its cultural flaws from Judaism, a broader knowledge of the non-West from Islam, a deeper sense 
of evil from Zoroastrianism, and a greater understanding of the transpersonal and personal 
dimensions of the holy from the religions of India.1528
Tillich believed that these possibilities should lead Christianity to seek dialogue rather 
than conversion, gaining the insight that in every religion, “that to which it points breaks through 
its particularity, elevating it to spiritual freedom and with it to a vision of the spiritual presence in 
other expressions of the ultimate meaning of man’s existence.”1529
7.4 CONCLUSION 
The final period of Tillich’s life and intellectual output proved him to be the continued 
practitioner of the boundary perspective. Many earlier themes were maintained. However, the 
disappointments of the post World War II order and the descent of the atomic age led Tillich to 
take older themes more deeply and to discover new ones responsive to the existential needs of 
                                                 
1526 Ibid., 81-82. 
1527 Ibid., 82. 
1528 Ibid., 85-89. 
1529 Ibid., 95, 97. 
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the age. The post war fate of Germany, the existence of the state of Israel and its relation to the 
lives of the Jewish people, the stifling bipolarity of the Cold War international structure, the 
oppressive distortion of Marx’s thought (particularly in Russian communism), and the increasing 
power of humanity’s capacity for destruction through the development of ever more powerful 
nuclear weapons were specific issues to which Tillich applied his thinking in this last period of 
his life and career. 
As a consequence, the following are the elements of an ethic of religious internationalism 
that can be derived from the period: 
(1) International action must not contradict the values upon which just  democracies  
 are built; 
 
(2) Courageous, venturing risk is necessary for creative international relationships; 
 
(3) A sense of historical timing to be able to assess whether a moment or period is a  
 kairos or an a-kairos should be developed; 
 
(4) A spirit of utopia—versus utopianism—is necessary to risk decisive action at  
 moments of  kairos; 
 
(5) Serious, self-aware, self-critical, open and receptive cross-cultural dialogue,  
 involving the regular crossing of cultural boundaries, reduces the ignorance of the  
 cultures on the other side of those boundaries; 
 
(6) A nation’s knowledge of the limits of its cultural and national identity prevents it  
 from intruding upon other national and cultural identities; and 
 
(7) Creative justice that bears love, appropriately trammels power, and maintains an  
 anti-authoritarian bias must be sought. 
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8.0  RELIGIOUS INTERNATIONALISM: ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 
8.1 CONSTRUCTION 
Having established the specific intellectual paths Tillich took in his analysis of matters of war 
and peace during each of the five periods of his work, it is time to assemble those elements into 
the ethic of war and peace termed here religious internationalism. Tillich’s general approach to 
ethics will be the framework within which to present his ethics of religious internationalism in 
particular. The recent studies on civilization and civilizational conflict by Samuel Huntington 
will provide an opportunity to apply Tillich’s religious internationalism to current discussions on 
the relationship of culture to international relations. 
8.1.1 Tillich’s Ethics: Ethical Theory and Moral Act 
Paul Tillich argued that religion and morality were inseparable: “the relation of religion and 
morality is not an external one…morality is religious in its very essence.”1530 Ethics was 
inextricably embedded within Tillich’s existentialist theological discourse: “The ethical element 
is a necessary—and often predominant—element in every theological statement” given that “the 
                                                 
1530 ST I , 31. In 1963, John E. Smith wrote, “American Protestantism has moved back and forth between the 
extremes pf a sentimental piety and a social liberalism; there have been few attempts to hold a genuinely ethical and 
well-grounded theology related to both personal and social life. Tillich has tried to show the intimate connections 
between theology and the religious life; he has been unwilling to accept a divorce between the two.” (John E. Smith, 
“Paul Tillich,” in Thirteen for Christ, ed. Melville Harcourt [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963], 79.) 
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doctrines of finitude and existence…are equally ontological and ethical in character.”1531 Here, 
Tillich’s general approach to ethics is briefly outlined, primarily using one of his last books, 
Morality and Beyond.1532  
In arguing for the religious inspiration for the moral imperative, Tillich called the moral 
imperative “the command to become what one potentially [or essentially] is, a person within a 
community of persons…a completely centered self, having himself as a self in the face of a 
world to which he belongs and from which he is, at the same time, separated.”1533 It is the 
religious imperative, “the silent voice of our own being which denies us the right to self-
destruction,” that is, “the awareness of our belonging to a dimension which transcends our own 
                                                 
1531 ST I , 31. 
1532 Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond (New York: Harper and Row, 1963; repr. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox 
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periods. The first three chapters—“The Religious Dimension of the Moral Imperative,” “The Religious Source of 
the Moral Demands,” and “The Religious Element in Moral Motivation”—were written near the time of the book’s 
publication in 1963. The fourth and fifth chapters were published in the 1948 The Protestant Era (another collection 
of writings from different periods) but had their first publications in 1945 (chapter 4, “The Transmoral Conscience”) 
and 1941 (chapter 5, “Ethics in a Changing World”). Tillich gave attention to the general theme of ethics (versus 
ethical discourses on particular issues) on at least two other occasions: a 1957 lecture published in 1959 as “Is a 
Science of Human Values Possible?” and a 1962 lecture not published until 1987 as “Ethical Principles of Moral 
Action,” both of which will be cited below. (See Paul Tillich, “Is a Science of Human Values Possible?” in New 
Knowledge in Human Values, ed. Abraham H. Maslow [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959], 189-196; and Paul 
Tillich, “Ethical Principles of Moral Action (1959),” Appendix to Being and Doing: Paul Tillich as Ethicist, ed. 
John J. Carey [Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1987],  205-217.) 
1533 Morality and Beyond, 19. See also The Courage to Be, 54; My Search for Absolutes, 95; and ST III, 38-44, 157-
161, 266-275. In “Is a Science of Human Values Possible?” Tillich argues against the philosophy of values in 
insisting that human values cannot be derived from existence (via pragmatism) but that they can be derived from the 
essential structures of being, from the essential nature of humanity. See Tillich, “Is a Science of Human Values 
Possible?”  Konrad Glöckner examines Tillich’s ethics as an expression of his theological understanding of 
personhood. See Glöckner. Glenn Graber argues that Tillich’s ethics are materialistic (having a content arising out 
of humanity’s essential nature) rather than formalistic (consistent with Kant’s understanding of moral principles as 
formally categorical or unconditional). Terence O’Keeffe adds the subtlety that while Graber has correctly 
characterized Tillich’s American period, he has not acknowledged the shift from his German period (of formalism) 
to his American period (of materialism). See Glenn Graber, “The Metaethics of Paul Tillich,” in Being and Doing: 
Paul Tillich as Ethicist, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1987), 32ff. and Terence O’Keeffe, 
“The Metaethics of Paul Tillich: Further Reflections,” in Being and Doing: Paul Tillich as Ethicist, ed. John J. 
Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1987), 57-8, 66-7. Louis Midgely questions Tillich’s success in 
grounding his “science of values” in ontology. See Midgley, “Politics and Ultimate Concern.” 
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finite freedom and our ability to affirm or negate ourselves,” an awareness which possesses an 
“unconditional character…[which] is its religious quality.”1534
Tillich posited the religious basis for moral “demands” as “love under the domination of 
its agape quality.” 1535 This love is to be unified “with the imperative of justice to acknowledge 
every being with personal potential as a person.” 1536 To do this, it is to be “guided by the divine-
human wisdom embodied in the moral laws of the past, listening to the concrete situation, and 
acting courageously on the basis of these principles.” 1537 Such love-rooted, wisdom-guided 
decisions have the potential to “transform the given tables of laws into something more adequate 
for our situation as a whole as well as for innumerable individual situations.”1538
                                                 
1534 Morality and Beyond, 25. See also „Die Philosophie der Macht,“ 218 and Tillich, “The Christian Message and 
the Moral Law: Three Lectures (1957),” PTAH 403:027, 29-31. Because the unconditional moral imperative comes 
to be embodied in, and imposed by, conditioned moral authorities—social and institutional ones interpreted by the 
conscience in enabling a person to negotiate his or her way to becoming what he or she essentially is—“every moral 
act includes a risk…True morality is a morality of risk. It is a morality which is based on the ‘courage to be,’ the 
dynamic self-affirmation of man as man.” (Paul Tillich, “Moralisms and Morality: Theonomous Ethics [1952],” in 
Theology of Culture [New York: Oxford University Press, 1959], 140, 141.) 
1535 Morality and  Beyond, 46. 
1536 Ibid.  
1537 Ibid. This same framework—(1) love as ultimate principle, (2) wisdom derived from religious, national, and 
societal law, through which one interprets how to (3) embody love in the concrete situation—arises in the lecture 
from the same period, “Ethical Principles of Moral Action.” Joseph Fletcher argues that Tillich’s thought supported 
Fletcher’s situation ethics. Fletcher quotes Tillich’s My Search for Absolutes to support this claim: “Let us suppose 
that a student comes to me faced with a difficult moral decision. In counseling him I don’t quote the Ten 
Commandments, or the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, or any other law, not even a law of general 
humanistic ethics. Instead, I tell him to find out what the command of agape in his situation is, and then decide for it 
even if traditions and conventions stand against his decision.” (Fletcher, “Tillich and Ethics: The Negation of Law”: 
36.) Fletcher also cites conversations with Tiullich in which he gleaned Tillich’s ethical theory: “He would say that 
we move from agape, the imperative, through the sophia, general principles, to the kairos, the concrete decision. In 
this way ‘love is the principle of ethics’ and ‘kairos is the means of its embodiment in concrete contents.’” It is a bit 
startling that Fletcher sees the changing situation as the priority in these instances, when Tillich clearly makes a 
constant—love—the guiding principle. On negotiating ethics in pluralistic societies, see Paul Tillich, “Grounds for 
Moral Choice in a Pluralistic Society (1963),” PTAH, 403:030, 9-10, 12. 
1538 Morality and Beyond, 46. See also “The Christian Message and the Moral Law,” 8; Paul Tillich, “Basic 
Considerations. Job and Vocation,” First Lecture of Problems of Christian Ethics: 4 Lectures, (1962),  PTAH, 
403:024, 2-3; Paul Tillich, “Sex-Relations, Love and Marriage,” Second Lecture of Problems of Christian Ethics: 4 
Lectures, (1962), PTAH, 403:024, 2; “Grounds for Moral Choice in a Pluralistic Society,” 7; ST I, 280-282; and ST 
III, 129-38, 177ff, and 272ff. Sometime later Tillich wrote, “In the smallest decisions you  make in your classes, or 
in your homes, or wherever it may be, there is the same problem of ethical decision which is found in the crudeness 
of the cavemen; you are not better than they.” (“The Decline and the Validity of the Idea of Progress,” 72.) Tillich 
saw the unwillingness to risk decision to be beyond the tragic: “…if there were not people of this character who take 
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Designating the theological motive for moral behavior to be grace, Tillich declared, “it is 
not the moral imperative in its commanding majesty and strangeness that is morally motivating, 
but the driving or attracting power of that which is the goal of the moral command—the 
good.”1539 To establish an even tighter connection between grace and motivation, Tillich turned 
to the eros quality of love: “Eros  is a divine-human power. It cannot be produced at will. It has 
the character of charis, gratia, ‘grace’—that which is given without prior merit and makes 
graceful [the one] to whom it is given.”1540
Tillich weighed the historical contributions of philosophy and theology to the discussion 
of human conscience and was led to call for a “transmoral conscience”. Revealing the influences 
of both his Christian tradition as well as an analytic psychotherapy to which he was sympathetic, 
Tillich described the transmoral conscience as a transcendence characterized “by the acceptance 
of the divine grace that breaks through the realm of law and creates a joyful conscience,” as well 
as “by the acceptance of one’s own conflicts when looking at them and suffering under their 
ugliness without an attempt to suppress them and to hide them from oneself.”1541
Tillich noted that moral living is life concretizing ethics in a world of change, ethics as 
“the expression of the ways in which love embodies itself, and life is maintained and 
sustained.”1542 Tillich tied his thoughts to his interpretation of kairos as an inspired “sense of 
timing” which characterizes historic, prophetic figures. Connecting kairos to his interpretations 
                                                                                                                                                             
this risk, then our culture would come to a miserable standstill and end.” (“Grounds for Moral Choice in a Pluralistic 
Society,” 13.) 
1539 Morality and Beyond,  60. 
1540 Ibid., 61. Tillich wrote on moral decision at a later point in this way: “He who makes a moral decision…and 
doesn’t prefer the security of following moral convention…which is of course a questionable security…he risks to 
fall into error and guilt…And he must have in himself the certainty that there is a power of forgiveness, overarching 
all that we do and making possible for us to decide without anxiety about falling into error, but with courage to risk 
it…And perhaps by doing so, become representatives of a deeper understanding of man and his relationship to 
others.” (“Grounds for Moral Choice in a Pluralistic Society,” 8.) 
1541 Morality and Beyond, 81. 
1542 Ibid., 95. 
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of the nature of agape and eros, Tillich wrote, “Love, realizing itself from kairos to kairos, 
creates an ethics that is beyond the alternatives of absolute and relative ethics.”1543
Therefore, the elements of Tillich’s approach to ethical theory and moral action from 
Morality and Beyond are these: 
(1) The moral act is the embodiment of one’s essential—transcendent and religious— 
 nature in personhood; 
(2) The movement is from (a) the principle of agape, through (b) the wisdom found in  
 the moral laws of the past, to (c) courageous decision in the concrete situation; 
(3) The divine-human power of love as eros is the grace-based drive toward the good:  
 grace stimulates gracious or grace-bearing action; 
(4) This law-overwhelming grace enables humanity to confront brokenness; and 
(5) The embodiment of love occurs amidst change, from kairos to kairos. 
 
8.1.2 Religious Internationalism 
The specific ethics of religious internationalism can be placed within the general framework of 
Tillich’s ethics by rooting the “religious” part in humanity’s essential nature, the agape principle, 
wisdom, and grace-eros, and then by anchoring the “internationalism” part in courageous 
decision, grace-borne confrontation of brokenness, and constructive and well-timed agape-love. 
Thus, as religious internationalism unfolds within the thought of Paul Tillich, it shows itself to be 
founded upon a handful of religious “givens”, propelled to face certain perpetual problems, and 
led along specific routes to remedy these problems. Here it is argued that the religious givens for 
Tillich were religion per se, power, and history (particularly culture and economics). The 
problems that an internationalism fueled by religion must confront are idolatry and nationalism 
on the one hand and ideology and injustice on the other hand. The constructive work of religious 
                                                 
1543 Ibid., 90. See also Tillich, “The Ethical Teachings of Lutheranism (late 1940s),” PTAH 403:019, 16, 19-20; 
Tillich, “Moralisms and Morality: Theonomous Ethics,” 135, 136, 137; and “The Ambiguities of the Moral Law,” 
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internationalism involves the dialectically dynamic boundary perspective, the promulgation of an 
agapeic-kairotic ethics, and the concrete manifestation of love and justice.  
THE RELIGIOUS “GIVENS”: RELIGION, POWER, AND HISTORY    For religious 
internationalism, religion is both the grounding and subjection of all things to a transcendent, 
ultimate source of meaning which is characterized by depth and the criticism of spiritual 
superficiality in both the “sacred” and “secular” realms. As a consequence, it is the basis for 
openness (ecumenical, inter religious, ideological), creative criticism of that which is unloving, 
unjust, and destructive in the self or the other, creative participation in history, and the pursuit of 
world transformation. Religion calls autonomy to acknowledge its theonomous depth, 
empowering autonomy’s rejection of heteronomy.1544  
Power has ontological significance for religious internationalism. It is a morally neutral 
reality that is the creative force and supportive element behind and within existence. Everything 
that is has some lesser or greater level of power. In the political realm, the bearers and 
Institutions of power assert power claims to carry out policies, some of which have the potential 
to bring about justice, others which carry the perpetual risks of cultivating political idolatry 
and/or exploiting the vulnerable.  
 By taking existence seriously, religious internationalism takes history seriously. Culture 
and economics are of particular significance to it. The state of a nation’s cultural health directly 
affects its decisions regarding war and peace. People choose between various alternatives: 
embracing the creative or the destructive streams within their respective cultures; the 
unrelentingly practice of critical thinking or passive acceptance of prevailing currents; reverence 
                                                 
1544 Glenn Graber believes that Tillich wrongly rejects the possibility of an heteronomous ethics with the assumption 
that “outside powers are barred from pronouncing principles truly based on man’s essential nature.” See Graber, 39. 
David Novak offers a helpful discussion of Tillich’s theonomous ethics, particularly in relationship to analytic 
philosophy, Judaism, and natural law. See Novak, “Theonomous Ethics”: 436-463. 
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for human beings or dehumanization; human dignity expressed in democracy and free decision 
or authoritarian subjection. Healthy cultures cultivate dynamics with a trajectory toward being 
with dignity. Such cultures fight against the dehumanizing, Hobbesian Leviathans of history 
intra-nationally and internationally. This requires that they know their limits, reject exclusivist 
claims to power and truth, and practice ongoing, self-aware boundary crossing that leads to 
“cultural interpenetration and cross-fertilization”. 
  Economics both transcends and is immersed within cultures. It is a central gauge for 
measuring a nation’s cultural health. For religious internationalism, this includes a socio-
economic justice which takes seriously the economic structures of society, working toward 
economic security as a basis for creative freedom. 
THE INTERNATIONALIST CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOUS 
INTERNATIONALISM   Two of the most intransigent and perplexing problems facing 
decisions on war and peace are idolatry and ideology. For religious internationalism, penultimate 
views that claim divine authority—that make claims alleging ultimacy, but that contradict the 
norms of love and justice—are either idolatrous or irreligious. Cultures have vulnerabilities to 
idolatry which must be unveiled and confronted. Perhaps the most destructive form of this 
idolatry is power worship. The form of power worship posing the greatest danger to the world’s 
peace is nationalism. 
As the deceptive cloak for falsehood, ideology is another significant difficulty faced by 
any ethics of war and peace. Religious internationalism calls for a wary attentiveness to 
ideology, whether in the ideological use of capitalism in the western political and economic 
system, the ideological bastardization of Marx in communism, or the ideological distortion of the 
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institutions and doctrines of religion. Ideology can become a powerful basis for injustice against 
the poor and powerless.  
Both idolatry and ideology involve the reign of a heteronomy that violates theonomously-
rooted human autonomy. Religious internationalism, as expressed in the Protestant principle, is 
both critical and creative. Biblical prophecy gives it its primal source of legitimacy. Its critical 
function is to hold all human claims up to relentless scrutiny, bearing the “suspicion of ideology” 
against all holders and institutions of power, gauging the justice of socio-economic structures, 
and measuring all truth claims—including those involving culture and politics (as a subset of 
culture)—by the standards of love and justice. 
War results from idolatrous power claims, the ideological corruption of culture, or in a 
combination of the two, according to religious internationalism. 
The constructive work of religious internationalism is based upon a boundary perspective 
from which to exercise well-timed agapeic moral action conducive to justice. The perspective 
most conducive to a truthful interpretation of history is the dynamic boundary.1545 From the 
boundary it is possible to have greater clarity with regard to any given situation, to have dynamic 
openness to the future, to new understandings, and to new applications of traditional, past 
formulations. It embodies self-transcending realism (“believing realism”) and rises above a 
sacred-secular or holy-profane distinction by seeing all realms of existence as potentially ripe for 
creative, theonomous activity. Religious internationalism must be cultivated by groups of 
intellectuals motivated to “contend for personality and community,” willing to approach the 
boundaries of their disciplines, ready to engage in the practice of dialectical thinking. 
                                                 
1545 Roger Shinn argues for the centrality of the boundary for Tillich’s ethics.  See Roger Shinn, “Tension and Unity 
in the Ethics of Paul Tillich,” in Being and Doing: Paul Tillich as Ethicist, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer 
University Press, 1987), 10-11. 
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In religious internationalism, moral action is consistent with a kairos, working in 
“creative agreement with the historical situation,” cognizant of the dynamic, ever-changing, and 
potentially creative historical circumstances. It involves a sense of timing for historically fruitful 
action. This points to the significance of periods of kairos as well as to the distinction between 
kairotic and a-kairotic periods. In the flow of history, there is power as the primal force which 
enables being (historical existence), and there is the demonic, i.e., power destructively divorced 
from the creatively ordering dynamics of history. A kairos is a moment or period ripe for 
creative action as against demonic distortion. It is these kairotically opportune periods for just 
and loving action (the kairoi of history) to which participants in history can attune their actions 
for maximum creative impact.1546 It requires a readiness for courageous, creative, decisive, and 
venturing risk. In other words, religious internationalism practices “agapeic-kairotic” ethics. 
Moral behavior embraces “world,” affirms human dignity, advocates active participation in 
history, and is rooted in “the beyond self and world.”  
As stated above, and as guided by the Protestant principle, religious internationalism 
measures all truth claims by the standards of love and justice.1547 Love and justice require that 
                                                 
1546 By characterizing Tillich’s understanding of Protestantism as only prophetic critique, Peter Slater forgets 
Tillich’s attempt to speak to the formative impact of Protestantism. More than this, in arguing for the necessity of 
ritualizing forgiveness—set times for acknowledging kairos—Slater needlessly diminishes as “business as usual” 
acts of justice and love and forgiveness which are repeated opportunities to experience the fullness of time. Perhaps 
it is an expression of the perpetual sacramental-ethical tension within Christianity for Roman Catholic thought to 
assume that “the logical and psychological effect of declaring every moment a time for forgiveness is to make no 
specific moment that time,” while Protestant thought revels in embodying continuous action in response to 
continuous—though not constant—and repeated moments of “that time”. See Slater, 50, 51. In this context, perhaps 
Ronald Stone’s statement is apt: “Tillich was primarily a theoretician of practice.” (Stone, Paul Tillich’s Radical 
Social Thought, 156.) 
1547 Jerome Arthur Stone examines the notion of responsibility as rooted in rational thought (using Gert and 
Gewirth) or experience (Tillich and Maguire). He argues that Tillich’s use of agape, in which “listening, giving, and 
forgiving are unlimited in character” can be strengthened and accepted as a persuasive basis for moral action in 
moral philosophy by emphasizing agape’s strong connection to the cultivation of personhood and by conceding that 
personhood can be understood in a naturalistic rather than a transcendent (of religious) way. (Jerome A. Stone, “A 
Tillichian Contribution to Contemporary Moral Philosophy: The Unconditional Element in the Content of the Moral 
Imperative,” in Being and Doing: Paul Tillich as Ethicist, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 
1987), 72, 85. Peter Slater notes that Tillich “explicitly subordinated justice to love, interpreting justice by reference 
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the self-world correlation be kept in balance, rejecting both arrogant imposition of self as well as 
the crushing domination by “world,” cultivating new possibilities for community through 
creative justice. It seeks justice for the vulnerable. It stands against injustice and hatred, 
including the unjust, space-bound, and dehumanizing provincialisms of nationalism, racism, and 
capitalism. It demands that democracy act consistent with its noblest principles. It pursues social 
transformation leading to being with dignity. It supports political resistance when resisters are 
instruments of justice, “instruments of the moral, constructive world order, and not of the 
immoral, destructive world order”.1548 It rejects the destructive idolatry of power worship. It 
rejects group stereotype as wrong, whether practiced by international criminals or the formal 
bearers of international justice. The love-and-justice-forged-Protestant principle works toward 
national identities committed to an international community whose members have equal 
integrity, meaning the just balancing of claims of nations in the international arena, and, thus, to 
world unity rather than isolated nationalism and tribalism. Religious internationalism affirms 
international organization, looks on national sovereignty with deep suspicion, and pursues 
regional federations that enable international accountability to be practicable. It calls nations to 
accept responsibility for the behavior of their national leaders, including the crimes of their 
leaders. It is committed to addressing the dehumanizing, Hobbesian Leviathans of history that 
operate at a level transcending nations. Religious internationalism is informed by the teaching of 
Genesis 12 that nations are to be the vehicles for inter national blessing. 
In the end, peace arises among just societies brought about through weaving together the 
countless strands of well-timed actions of justice along the trajectory towards human dignity, 
                                                                                                                                                             
to conceptions of natural law and love as the absolute demand for agape in the kairos or time of fulfillment.” (Slater, 
50.) 
1548 Informed by Tillich’s formulation of love, power, and justice, Ronald Stone argues that the 21st places before 
humankind the challenge to resist four demonic trends: “fundamentalism, violence, greed, and domination.” (Ronald 
Stone, “The Religious Situation and Resistance in 2001,” 57.) 
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actions taken only after considered deliberation from the perspective most conducive to truth, the 
boundary. 
8.2 CRITIQUE 
One may seek to fight back the religious language and confessional perspective within which 
Paul Tillich couched his thought on these matters of war and peace. One may regret some of the 
limitations of his arguments. One may suggest that the material may possess a soundness which 
remains after the apparent theological shell has been removed. However, for Tillich, theology 
and confessional standpoint and religious orientation formed the life blood of his thought. 
Perhaps the best known expression in his writings is contained in the statements, “Religion as 
ultimate concern is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of forms 
in which the basic concern of religion expresses itself. In abbreviation: religion is the substance 
of culture, culture is the form of religion.”1549 What this means is that Tillich’s writing is 
innately religious and that it is almost redundant to append adjectives making this explicit: when 
Tillich wrote or spoke, religion was implicitly present. Further, for the purpose of assessing his 
contribution to international relations, the thoughts to follow will use his own definition of 
religion (“meaning-giving substance”) as a way to prevent the term “religion” from being a 
barrier. The discussion will even go so far as to question occasions in which Tillich’s use of 
terminology similar to this (i.e., theonomy, theonomous, Protestant, etc.) may have been an 
unnecessary barrier. To the degree that there may be more truth in the reformulations than in 
                                                 
1549 Theology of Culture, 42. 
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Tillich’s original formulations, it can be confidently stated that Tillich would have accepted these 
reformulations as simply better attuned to the religious dimension at the heart of all truth.  
Here, comments in critique of the religious internationalism constructed in the previous 
chapter pages will surround these issues: the boundary; culture and meaning-giving substance; 
kairos and ethics; “world”, Marx, and capitalism; the Jewish people; and contemporary 
relevance. 
8.2.1 The Boundary: Boundary Theologian and Boundary Crosser 
In his later years, Tillich must have grimaced as he read some of the words he penned as an army 
chaplain, unabashedly proclaiming Germany as Christ’s righteous sword in a world sinfully 
directing its power against the German Empire. The pre World War I and World War I period 
were ones in which Tillich was occupied with academic training and held his first church 
positions. He was an inexperienced young man who later characterized himself as living his life 
and carrying out his ministry in a way consistent with the values of his culture: obedience to 
authority was the norm for him. As a chaplain, he preached sermons consistent with this norm. 
These sermons were intended to comfort the soldiers amidst the stresses of war. However, they 
go further. They present a consistently nationalistic perspective. 
At the same time, at least according to Tillich’s own accounts, his superiors were not 
always pleased with the content of his theology and/or sermonizing. In later years, he spoke of 
one officer who criticized him for a theology that was too liberal1550 and asserted that a number 
of superiors admonished him for not cultivating sufficient patriotism among the soldiers through 
                                                 
1550 Pauck, 50. 
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his preaching.1551 There does not seem to be independent documentation of these incidents. 
Thus, we are left with the content of his public sermons and his private correspondence. In these 
we see a tension between private thoughts which were growing in radicality and public preaching 
that maintained the conservative, imperial values of the government and that manifested no 
apparent growth in political perspective during the course of the war. This unquestioning consent 
manifested a perspective strikingly inconsistent with his later thought. 
Further, Tillich’s military career molded his views on the inescapable reality of power, in 
several general ways. Positively, it often kept him from being utopian and Pollyannaish about the 
motives and capabilities of power holders. Additionally, it remained a strength of his political 
theory that power had foundational import. Negatively, Tillich was impressed by power. During 
the First World War, this made him vulnerable to mouthing the uncritical endorsements of his 
government’s policies cited above which slid over into idolatry: in sum, he displayed a 
nationalism with clearly idolatrous traits. In his case, it was a clear German chauvinism which 
used theological arguments to raise the nation to the level of the divine. The impressiveness of 
power made him vulnerable to manipulation by power holders and the promulgators of that 
chauvinism. That he shared this trait with many of his generation in and outside of Germany 
highlights that it was a characteristic of that period. However, this fact neither excuses the 
characteristic nor denies the significant continuing strength and danger of nationalistic 
chauvinism in the twenty-first century. 
Tillich’s nationalism can be attributed to the personalistic piety he practiced at the time 
which produced a spirituality of inwardness that served as a barrier to the consideration of 
broader questions. His life at this point illustrated the correspondence between theological and 
                                                 
1551 MacLennan, 5; Ratschow, 17, GW XIII, 71. 
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spiritual inwardness and the passive toleration of government policy: government was left with 
no theologically rooted moral check on its behavior. Therefore, his life at the time displayed both 
the consequences of silence on the part of the stewards of religious ethics, as well as the reason 
for upholding the mandate to engage in unrelenting questioning of government policies and in 
tenacious weighing of the arguments posed for their execution. 
At the same time, it is significant that there were points in his thought at which Tillich 
brushed against lines of reflection at that time which could have saved him from the closed 
perspective of those war years. His thoughts on the obligation to love brother and to become 
reconciled with enemies prior to sharing the Eucharist could have been broadened to a more 
universal scope. His effort to reject personal hatred for enemy soldiers in favor of a more abstract 
hatred towards the cause for which they fought Germany could have moved to become a 
theological basis against exalting the nation and the temptation to characterize the enemy as 
vehicles of sin and bearers of untruth. Schelling taught him that humanity’s moral sensibility 
should be broadened to something closer to “the greatness of the divine.” Tillich’s ethical 
framework remained imprisoned in the provincial and was not yet liberated through 
transcendence. 
Therefore, for international thought, the period first functions as a negative example: 
provincial cultural and theological ideology are conducive to passive submission to power, 
including powers that can be prone to war. Once again, contemporary circumstances reveal that 
this is a perpetual danger with which justice must cope. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this period effectively threw Tillich onto the 
boundary: he was sent to the actual boundary of his nation in the war; he was driven to the 
boundary of sanity by the destructive experiences of war and his duty to salve the impact of that 
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destruction upon others; he was driven to question the bounds of a traditional, personalistic 
bourgeois ethic by his first wife’s adultery while he was away at war, including her conception 
of two children to a friend of his; he saw himself to be forced from an academic perspective 
separated by traditional boundaries from the rest of existence; and he was driven beyond the 
bounds of a conservative, inwardly looking political perspective to one saturated in social and 
cultural concern. As painful as the transition was for Tillich, and as troubling as the documents 
are to read with the benefit of historical distance, they present another feature of the practice of 
international relations that can make it more truthful: the practice of transcending one’s culture in 
order to see broader truths. 
Post World War I, Tillich sought to make this transcendence core to his approach. In 
contrast to this are present-day approaches, like that of Huntington, which cultivates inter 
cultural hostility on the one hand, while white-washing the history of his own country on the 
other hand. 1552 This makes evident the continuing importance of this work. 
Tillich not only became a theologian of the boundary but was forced to become a 
boundary crosser as an immigrant. The example he set through his thought—between 1933 and 
1945—showed a person unwilling to tolerate the self-righteousness of a nation which had 
become his safe haven. He was also greatly moved by the story of the great biblical immigrant, 
Abram, and the divine command to Abram in Genesis 12 to bring about a nation with the 
mission to become a blessing on behalf of all the peoples of the world. This is an important 
insight for immigration and border policy in a world much more closely intertwined, 
economically, than in Tillich’s day. At the least, it calls the international relations discipline to 
                                                 
1552 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49; Samuel 
P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); 
and Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2004). 
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ask the question of the justice of any nation’s policies with regard to their impact upon the 
populations of other nations. If “blessed” is unpalatable to the discipline, then “just” should not 
be. 
8.2.2 Culture and Meaning-Giving Substance 
The experience of World War I and the German revolution transformed Tillich from an anti-
socialist into a religious socialist. It should be further noted that the church’s significance for him 
changed as well. It became both smaller and larger in its significance for him. No longer simply 
the bearer, protector, and embodiment of a restricted set of Christian doctrine and values, the 
church became but one part of the cultural reality which served as the outer form of the deeper 
substance of religion: the church was but one element of religiously-understood reality; but it 
was a part of a project far broader in scope than Tillich had formerly believed, the project of 
seeking out the depth of that religious reality in all spheres of existence. From the boundary 
perspective, no sphere of reality was out of bounds. 
Tillich interpreted existence as a theologian of culture. This would seem to offer the 
advantage of releasing theologians of culture from being intellectually and institutionally 
bounded in two senses.  
First, there is the scope of inquiry of a theologian of culture. Given that the theologian of 
cultural is an existentialist in the broadest sense of the word, he or she is responsible for 
pondering the ultimate meaning of—and for directing his or her ultimate concern toward—all, 
rather than merely one sphere, of existence. The thought-work of a theologian of culture is not 
restricted to traditional doctrinal questions but is, in theory, infinite in the scope of questions for 
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which it can provide answers. This fact not only permits, but even requires, dialogue with 
practitioners of areas of study beyond the traditional theological realm. 
Second, there is the perspective of the theologian of culture. The cultural theologian is 
unrestricted by boundaries in being a thinker on the boundary. The boundary perspective is 
intended to be an intellectual location, a location from which to transcend existence in order to 
see existence better. Tillich made this clear in specifying it as a perspective from which to 
theorize as opposed to a place in which to live. 
War drove Tillich into cultural analysis. The implication is that for him a nation’s culture 
determines its bases for considering prospect of war. His indictment against post-Enlightenment 
western civilization is that autonomous reason had misled humankind into the arrogant 
presumption that educational progress would bring about universal harmony. It minimized the 
significance of power and the unjust and unloving use of power. Tillich’s solution was theonomy 
and the depth-giving dimension of theonomy. One could imagine that secular theorists would 
find this as an unnecessary leap to take. However, if theonomy is translated from living God-
consciously into living meaningfully (consistent with Tillich’s previously stated definition of 
religion), it can become a less divisive call to living with a sense of depth. 
For instance, the autonomous perspective need not be equated with arrogant 
overestimation of human possibilities or blindness to human limits, as Tillich wrote of 
autonomy, i.e., as devoid of “meaning giving substance”. There is a broader range of possibilities 
for defining autonomy. Considering its most basic meaning, autonomy (combining the Greek 
words αυτός, or “self,” and νόμος, or “law”) is the “law of the self.” Obviously, the content of 
that law can be the subject of endless debates over the plethora of views regarding what it 
fundamentally means to be human. Among the numerous possibilities, it is imaginable that many 
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of these would include some rendition of human imperfection, i.e. “part of what is means to be 
human is to be imperfect and vulnerable to error”. This is a meaningful statement calling for 
humility. Another element of the law of the human self may be the view that peace is the result 
of societies in which justice is sought and love is a significant presence. For adherents of 
religious groups, God may be centrally related to this. However, it is possible to conceive of 
human beings who have been the victims of the deepest injustice and most cruel hatred and who 
are driven to renounce all faith in God and “theonomy”, yet as a consequence of the most 
nightmarish experiences are provoked to demand that love and justice be seen as central to the 
“law of the self,” i.e., it provides part of the meaning giving substance of their lives. Adherents 
of specific religious groups may argue that their experience of human existence compels them to 
believe that any definition of autonomy requires the inclusion of an acknowledgement of God 
with whom human beings should be ultimately concerned and theonomy as the root of the 
yearning for justice and love. The point is that there are both theistic and non theistic ways to 
transcend the expectations of harmonious utopias in existence and to acknowledge the 
inescapability of oppression and hatred. Adequate autonomies with apparently penultimate 
concerns can reach for the same goal. Tillich’s “meaning giving substance” as a goal for policy 
can carry weight in both secular and religious approaches thereto.  
Tillich’s formulation of the Protestant principle provides another way to consider the 
matter. One is led to this question: does an affirmation of the centrality of justice and love 
require the Pauline doctrine of justification by grace through faith? Further, conceding—for the 
sake of argument—the necessity of this doctrine (which is shared by Christianity at large), does 
this successfully argue for the priority of Protestantism over Roman Catholicism or Eastern 
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Orthodoxy in the face of the perpetual violation of justice and love by Christianity over the two 
millennia of its existence? 
This is not a necessary move to make in order to assemble principles consistent with a 
culture with meaning giving substance. One can see this by comparing the list of assertions 
assembled as Tillich’s Protestant principles in chapter 5 of this dissertation to a version of them 
assembled without the confessional bias: 
        PRINCIPLES OF
 PROTESTANT PRINCIPLES   MEANING-GIVING SUBSTANCE
 
1. God’s unchallengeable authority  1. The rejection of absolute   
 truth and the rejection of absolute truth  claims by humanity 
 claims by humanity 
2. Rejection of Catholicism’s reduction   2. The rejection of hierarchical 
 of divine immanence to hierarchical    power  
 authority 
3. Rejection of both Protestant ethical   3. The rejection of ethical rigidity
 rigidity, doctrinal rigidity, and   a hyper critical spirit, and 
 hypercritical spirit, and of Protestant   individualism 
 endorsement of secular individualism, 
 absent spiritual depth 
4. Rejection of secular-sacred    4. Affirmation of the inherent dignity 
 distinction; divine depth in all things   of all things 
5. Culture is legitimate without    5. The inherent dignity and meaning 
 ecclesiastical authority    of culture 
6. Rejection of spiritless secularism  6. The rejection of superficiality 
7. Creativity is possible in history,   7. Affirmation of creative potential 
 consistent with kairos     attuned to historical context 
8. Protestant principle of prophetic,   8. The perpetual relevance of just,  
 loving critique is always relevant   loving critique 
9. Protestant ecumenism    9. Openness to dialogue among 
        competing ideologies 
10. Lay character of Protestantism  10. A limited anarchy 
11. Protestant-Catholicity cognizant   11. Cognizance of the unconscious 
 of collective unconscious 
12. Protestant openness as a basis for   12. [See #9] 
 inter religious relations 
13. Love as the principle of unity   13. Love as the principle of unity 
 within history      within history 
14. Protestant personalism triumphs   14. Personhood trumps collectivism 
 over collective responsibility 
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15. Protestant collectivism which   15. Just, realistic communities support 
 maintains the dignity of personalities   personhood 
 by means of a dialectical, non-utopian  
 religious socialism 
 
If either the theonomous or the Protestant designation of Tillich’s cultural analysis is 
removed, nonetheless his thought can contribute this to the broader thought on international 
relations: a commitment to the centrality of dignified human existence as the primary 
characteristic of healthy cultures and as the condition undermining the possibility of war. While 
rooted in Tillich’s peculiar engagement of the world out of his Protestant Christian tradition, it 
transcends Protestant Christianity: it levels the challenge to produce culture with meaning-giving 
substance. 
8.2.3 Kairos and Ethics 
The doctrine of kairos in Tillich’s thought is a particularly difficult concept to evaluate. Kairos 
involves the metaphors of ripeness and maturity and timing as applied to history in general. For 
Tillich, it was further related to his ethical framework. To him, ethics was thought and theory 
regarding moral behavior. Behavior is moral when it follows the moral imperative to become a 
complete person and to promote fullness of personhood. It is the embodiment of love, informed 
by the wisdom of the past, but creatively and decisively enacted in a way consistent with the 
qualities of the moment, i.e., consistent with kairos.  
With experience, one can learn with a fairly high degree of accuracy when to pluck an 
apple or when to eat an avocado. With experience, one can learn the moods of a partner and, as a 
consequence, generally determine the point at which a word would be helpful or an action would 
be healing. With experience, one can gain some level of mastery over the timing necessary to tell 
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a story or a joke well or to perform a work of music persuasively. However, can this notion be 
transferred to action within history, especially history understood from a religious standpoint?  
Tillich seems to have drawn this term from the Greek Testament, in which it is used 
eighty-eight times. In fifty-five of these cases, kairos is used in ways relevant to Tillich’s 
conception of it. On fourteen occasions, it refers directly to God’s timing.1553 In nine places, it 
designates “the coming age” or “the time” or “the time of judgment”.1554 At seven points, the 
term is found in parables in reference to harvest time or the “proper” time.1555 On thirteen 
occasions, it refers to the fulfillment of Jesus’ time.1556 In all of these places, the actor is God. 
In contrast to these examples, there are five places in which kairos refers to periods when 
evil forces are operative.1557 At seven points, kairos characterizes human behavior: warning of 
the risk of bad timing;1558 calling for a timely alertness;1559 exhorting service to the kairos (a 
usage absent from the most authoritative manuscripts);1560 indicating that the faithful will reap at 
harvest time;1561 exhorting the faithful to work at an opportune time;1562 calling the faithful to 
make the most of the time;1563 and describing the prophetic inquiry into the time of salvation.1564
Whether in reference to God’s timing or to times dominated by evil or to conditions 
propitious for human action, the circumstances making a time ripe for action combine matters 
                                                 
1553 John 5:4 (a verse absent in the most authoritative manuscripts); Acts 1:7; 3:20; 17:26; Romans 5:6; 9:9; 13:11; I 
Corinthians 4:5; 7:29; II Corinthians 6:2 (twice); Ephesians 1:10; I Thessalonians 5:1; and I Peter 5:6. 
1554 Matthew 8:29; Mark 10:30; I Timothy 4:1; Hebrews 9:10; I Peter 1:5; 4:17; Revelation 1:3; 11:18; and 22:10. 
1555 Matthew 21: 34, 41; 24:45; Mark 11:13; 12:2; Luke 12:42; and 20:10. 
1556 Matthew 16:13; 26:18; Mark 1:15; 13:33; Luke 1:20; 12:56; 19:44; John 7:6, 8; II Thessalonians 2:6; I Timothy 
2:6; 6:15; and Titus 1:3. 
1557 Luke 4:13 (the devil); 21:24 (the Gentiles); II Timothy 3:1 (“distressing times”); 4:3 (“times of unfaithfulness”); 
and Revelation 12:12 (the devil’s sense of timing). 
1558 Luke 21:8. 
1559 Luke 21:36. 
1560 Romans 12:11. 
1561 Galatians 6:9. 
1562 Galatians 6:10. 
1563 Colossians 4:5. 
1564 I Peter 1:11. 
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under the human agent’s control and those beyond that control. It can be argued that the 
significantly larger proportion of the circumstances fall into the latter category. 
Further, Tillich characterized the prophetic spirit as one possessing a sense of—even a 
genius for—kairos. Extensive exegetical work would be necessary to assess the degree to which 
the broad variety of prophetic behavior and prophetic literature (particularly from the Hebrew 
Testament) was in accord with all elements of Tillich’s heroic treatment of prophets. The 
specific use of the term, kairos, in the Septuagint (the Greek translation of the Hebrew text) is 
generally rare, rarer still in reference to the quality meaning of time, and never used to 
characterize a prophet’s sense of timing.1565 Therefore, Tillich’s transference of kairos to the 
prophetic spirit communicates his sense of the significance of those people who felt moved to 
offer what they took to be God’s Word to a given time, people Tillich took to be attuned to the 
transcendent meaning of a specific period of time. This is perhaps enough to know in order to 
assess the relationship between Tillich’s kairos doctrine to the prophetic spirit. 
There is substantial merit in calling actors in history to the practice of historical-
contextual awareness. This historical-contextual awareness could be defined as the continuous 
assessment of the conditions within oneself, within one’s culture, within the world, and within 
history—therefore, conditions within and beyond one’s control—which affect the possibilities 
for—and the outcomes of—decisions.  
 Tillich rightly drew attention to the significant factor of risk in decisions made in 
general and in decisions taken in light of a perceived kairos. The risk factor is inescapable, no 
matter how much empirical data one can muster and no matter how many intangibles one senses 
                                                 
1565 Gerhard Delling, “καιρός,” in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament: Volume III, Θ-Κ, ed. Gerhard 
Kittel, trans./ed., Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1965): 458-459. Further, in the case 
of John the Baptist, it is the Jesus of Mark’s gospel uses the occasion of John’s arrest to pronouncement the 
“fulfillment of time”. It is not John who expresses this. (Mark 1:15) 
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at the non rational level in relation to the decision at hand. Further, it is credible to assume that 
there peculiarly gifted personalities who possess such awareness to a greater degree than others. 
In the biblical cases cited which referred to timely human action, human agents had to be 
exhorted to grasp the opportunity for such action. If one goes beyond the seven examples cited in 
the Greek Testament to prophetic behavior in the Hebrew Testament, one sees Elijah and 
Jeremiah hesitant to bear the prophetic mantel, with God presented as pushing them to undertake 
the prophetic task.1566 Even the gifted personalities had to be literally inspired to act. 
The difficulty and flaw in Tillich’s formulation of kairos is revealed in both the larger 
scriptural bases kairos, as well as his own interpretation of manifestations of kairos amidst the 
storms of the early and mid-twentieth century, as well as the general presumptiveness of the 
doctrine.  
The picture drawn of kairos in the Greek New Testament is different from that Tillich 
draws on the matter of an inherently positive moral significance which he attributes to it. In the 
fifty-five instances in which kairos is used in the Greek Testament to indicate qualitatively 
significant time, the matter of timing does not have exclusively positive moral qualification. God 
acts in a way to render conditions conducive for creative action in some instances. However, evil 
forces can also gain mastery of the ability to time when conditions are ripe for destructiveness. 
Further, Jesus’ assessment of the right time largely surrounds his reading of the time to enter into 
a drama mixing good and evil. As a consequence, the moral element must be added to kairos: 
kairos is not accurately understood as inherently moral. Rather, moral behavior is that class of 
activity which is aware of the historical context and which moves in the direction of full 
personhood. 
                                                 
1566 I Kings 19; Jeremiah 1. 
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Turning to Tillich’s own story, it becomes clear that Tillich judged different points in 
history during his lifetime to be characterized either by kairos (the “fullness of time”) or vacuum 
(the “emptiness of time”) under the assumption that kairos designated time ripe for creative and 
just action. The problem is that he was repeatedly wrong in this judgment. At the end of the 
World War I and again near the end of the inter war period, Tillich judged Germany to be ripe 
for social democracy or for a cultural decision in favor (religious) socialism. Yet, much of the 
German culture seemed perpetually hostile to social democracy during the period, eventually 
crumbling in the face of National Socialism. Decades later, Tillich judged World War II to be a 
kairotic turning point toward world-wide social reconstruction and a more unified, world-wide 
political reorganization. In fact, the events of that period precipitated four-and-a-half decades of 
Cold War. Tillich judged the Cold War period to be vacuous—empty—of creative international 
political activity. Yet, history continued to push forward with its ambiguous mixture of steps 
forward in justice—for instance, the beginning of the dismantling of colonialism—and steps 
backward into hegemony—as seen in the behavior of superpowers turning significant parts of the 
world into arenas for their power struggles. Further, Tillich himself made creative forays into 
inter religious dialogue during this period. In doing so, he addressed a central dynamic in 
contemporary international relations: the religious impact upon culture and the religious 
motivations for policies of war and peace. This was not vacuous work, but work full of 
significance. 
This leads to the final point on the doctrine of kairos: it is presumptuous to render any 
moment or period distinctively ripe for action to the exclusion of other moments or period. To do 
so empties these latter moments of meaning and presumes a comprehensive knowledge of 
history at all times and in all places which no person and no civilization can have. Tillich’s 
 295
Christianity led him to place Christ at the center of history. This approach raises needless barriers 
to inter religious discussion and to inter religious community, not to mention minimizing the 
significance of other paths of spirituality. To avoid this move need not imply a denial of the 
intense significance of the Christ event for Christianity. However, avoiding Christo-centrism is 
simply following Tillich (at his best) to the boundary where one’s inner vision may well see an 
ongoing condition of fullness of time, rooted in a plethora of events intensely significant for 
different peoples. 
Thus, Tillich’s doctrine of kairos can be placed within two wider contexts. The first is 
that of human decision, a context which is filled with the moral ambiguity of human existence 
and in which the good and the bad can become competent in reading the signs of the times. The 
second context is that of human spirituality untied to confessional bias and which could be 
summed up in Tillich’s phrase, “meaning giving substance”. If these two contexts are 
considered, Tillich’s thinking provokes international thought to understand the necessity of the 
ongoing practice of intense historical-contextual awareness, particularly with regard to the 
degree that any period buttresses or undermines the meaning giving substance of human 
existence. It is a timely awareness filled with potential for errors and requiring cross-cultural 
community to mitigate ignorance and misunderstanding. It is an awareness which is as 
vulnerable to evil purposes as it is to good ones. 
8.2.4 “World”: Marx, Capitalism, Globalization 
Tillich’s awakening to Marx during the post World War I years began a lifelong consciousness 
of the importance of a just economic order. At the same time, the boundary perspective gave 
Tillich several insights regarding socialism. Tillich was from 1918 forward hostile toward self-
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isolating individualism. However, he was significantly concerned with personhood. The self-
world correlation which he eventually enunciated was attempt to express human wholeness as a 
balance between the richness of human solitude and the cultural importance of human society. 
As a product of an authoritarian period of German history, Tillich treated socialism in a way that 
indicated a real shift in his thought. His socialism was not a call to submission of the person to 
the culture but a call to responsible social behavior on behalf of the creativity of the person. 
It is curious, however, that an intellectual who characterized himself as a thinker on the 
boundary rarely gave written expression to his views on movements inspired by Marx beyond 
the bounds of Germany, and on those occasions when he did give attention to non German 
movements fueled by Marxist thought, he referred (often romantically) to the Russian 
Revolution.1567 It was clear that Tillich shared the dissatisfaction of others with the Social 
Democrats during the Weimar—particularly in light of their alliances with representatives of 
what Tillich called political romanticism. However, as a theologian of culture, it would have 
made sense for him to inquire whether there were parallels between the actions, alliances, and 
policies of the Social Democratic Party in the German context and the Labor Party in British 
context, on the one hand, or socialist movements within the Swedish context, on the other hand. 
Such comparative work may have revealed insights to Tillich that would have given him the 
confidence to participate more fully in the political processes of the United States, that would 
have been useful for his late World War II work with the Council for a Democratic Germany, or 
that would have persuaded him to believe he could have a role in the reconstruction of post 
World War II Germany.  
                                                 
1567 The fact that Tillich to referred to post-revolutionary Russia as Russia, rather than as the U.S.S.R. or the Soviet 
Union, may imply a similar romanticism. 
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Further, the boundary perspective may have led Tillich to be more realistic about the 
Soviet Union. It was certainly fair for him to disparage the ignorance of U.S. citizens regarding 
the difference between communism and socialism. However, Tillich was quite shocked by news 
of Stalin’s purges of communist leaders in 1936, characterizing it as a “shattering revelation”.1568 
On the other hand, his Voice of America addresses—perhaps in deference to the U.S.S.R. as an 
ally—is silent on conditions within Soviet society. In one speech, Tillich maintained a romantic 
regret in the rupture of the historical relationship between Germany and “Russia”: the speech is 
weak on the tragedy of a Germany under Hitler’s sway and a Soviet Union under Stalin’s iron 
hand (he dealt with the latter repeatedly elsewhere, but he was silent on the latter throughout 
twenty-six months of speeches). 1569 In another speech, Tillich castigated Nazism’s assertion of 
Soviet communism’s atheism, arguing that the Soviets bore an “ultimate concern” as “bearers of 
a new justice”: this was nearly six years following news of the purges.1570  
Perhaps the thought only arises from benefit of hindsight, but Tillich sounded a bit naïve 
in asserting the possibility of German revolutionary movements leading to societies promoting 
dignified human existence apart from encroachment by the Soviets from the East. Yet, given 
Soviet territorial demands as conditions of their initial treaty with the Nazis upon the start of 
World War II, Soviet aggression following such a revolution sounds like a logical expectation.  
During the Cold War, Tillich finally gave full vent to his deep disappointment in the 
crushing of human rights in the U.S.S.R. However, he attributed Soviet communism’s repression 
of human dignity to a hole in Marx’s system, i.e., the absence of a fully developed anthropology. 
Once again, the boundary perspective could have provided a comparative perspective, sensitive 
                                                 
1568 My Travel Diary, 167. 
1569 Against the Third Reich, 42-44. 
1570 Ibid., 23, 24. 
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to cultural context more logically the basis for the failure of Marxism rather than Marxist 
thought. In that way, for example, Tillich would have been able to compare the New Deal social 
policies meant to protect U.S. citizens from an unregulated market economy with Soviet social 
policies. 
Tillich argued for democracy as a corrective tool for other forms governance. The 
question is whether that formulation works. Does it work to begin with monarchy or aristocracy 
or oligarchy as the constitutive foundations for governance and then, secondarily, to bring in 
democracy as the corrective factor? Tillich was perpetually suspicious of democracy. Freedom to 
vote does not guarantee freedom against oppression, given the victory of an oppressor. German 
democracy of the 1920s was weak and led to Nazism. However, this does not argue for removing 
democracy as a constitutive factor in the formation of a government. In the spirit of Tillich’s 
dialectical, boundary perspective, it makes sense to bring to the table those elements which strike 
prudent minds as necessary to bring into the mix of sound government, holding them in 
appropriate tension with one another. Effective instrumentalities for exercising power, 
democratic processes for establishing and maintaining those instrumentalities, the access of 
citizens to those instrumentalities, respect for human rights in the operation of those 
instrumentalities and protections against the violation of those rights are some of the elements of 
such a government.  
These discussions remain brimful of relevance. The turn of the millennium still manifests 
the broad context of capitalist dominance in a world that fights it back. Cultural and, more 
specifically, economic globalization has provoked a confusing mixture of receptiveness and 
hostility toward wealthy nations on the part of the less wealthier ones. It is a tension based on 
competing economic philosophies and religious traditions. 
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If Tillich’s discussion of Marx and economic justice is more fully placed within his 
thinking on “world”, his thought brings to international relations a demand for just economic 
systems cognizant of cultural context, aware of the factors embedded within the cultural at any 
given time which facilitate or prevent justice, with the perpetual mission of cultivating a world 
community in which people are liberated for lives possessing meaning giving substance, the 
constitution of which requires broad, inter cultural inquiry and debate. 
8.2.5 The Jewish People: Time and Space 
The Holocaust took place in the middle years of Tillich’s adult life. It avoidably marked him, 
given that he was a sensitive and serious person, a person of German descent, an existentialist 
thinker committed to the importance of history, and an adherent of the religious tradition which 
could be used to justify the Holocaust. 
One senses real Angst in Tillich’s struggle with issues related to the life situation of 
Jewish people. Yet, his argumentation strikes one as significant overcompensation that risks 
doing unintended injustice to Jews and limiting the more universal implications of his thought.  
In The Socialist Decision of 1932, Tillich set the corrective function of Jewish 
prophetism over against the parochial and expansive threat of political romanticism. He was 
speaking to entrenched, exclusivist cultural chauvinism. As one metaphor in the argument for 
justice over against oppression, the biblical example of the prophetic tradition works. As the only 
metaphor, it both reduces the scope of the argument and traps a human group within a metaphor.  
Twenty years later in Berlin, a similar weakness arose in Tillich’s lectures on the Jewish 
question. Here, among other matters, Tillich spoke of both the commonalities between Germans 
and Jews as well as the purported difficulty of Germans with “foreign” elements. While his point 
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was the parallel he perceived in the historical experiences of Germans and Jews, Tillich seemed 
unaware that by posing the comparison between Germans and Jews he evoked a surely 
unintended questioning of the “German-ness” of the Jews. For example, while it was undeniable 
that German Christianity and ancient Israel each experienced reform movements (the former in 
the Protestant Reformation, the latter in the prophetic tradition), Tillich does not catch the 
subtlety that the Protestant Reformation changed nations in which both Jews and Christians were 
present. When Tillich condemned the German pattern of intolerance of “the foreign”, he did not 
take time to question the whole notion of foreignness. Again, the myth of the failure of Jews to 
assimilate was communicated. 
There is also the difficulty of Tillich’s vision for the role of the Jewish people in history. 
In both his high expectations for Israel to be a nation embodying the prophetic spirit and his 
perpetual insistence that the Jewish people were the people of history, there is an unreasonable 
expectation that denies the Jewish people the right to simply be people and nation. Once again, 
Tillich embraced the Jewish people as the metaphor for justice (the bearers of the prophetic 
spirit), for a time even to the point of rejecting the option of a Jewish nation. When he conceded 
the necessity of the existence of the state of Israel, he advocated it seriously, but also saw it as a 
concession to the average Jewish person not ready for their historical role. In the end, one begs 
Tillich simply to permit Jews to be considered as mere human beings and to allow the state of 
Israel to be a nation among the community of nations. 
When Tillich’s thoughts on the Jewish question are released from the space/time 
preoccupation, his contributions to international and cultural thought here becomes more 
apparent. International relations occur among nations in which the political dynamics involve the 
dialectical balance between old “truths” and new possibilities, between status quo and 
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innovation, and between cultural institutions and the demand for justice. Further, in the act of 
balancing, minorities are vulnerable to exploitation and destruction. It is the task of all nations to 
protect their vulnerable minorities as they pursue the goal of promoting ways of life possessing 
meaning giving substance. 
8.2.6 Contemporary Relevance 
The pages of this critique have considered these issues that have arisen in the discussion of Paul 
Tillich’s ethics of war and peace: the boundary; culture and meaning-giving substance; the 
absence or presence of historical-contextual awareness of one’s own nation or of a hostile nation 
or of a potentially hostile nation, and the relation of this awareness to just policies; international 
economics and its relation to a just world order; and the vulnerability of unprotected minorities. 
All of these issues are relevant in varying degrees to policy discussions at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. The boundary perspective and boundary consciousness could aid the United 
States in its economic policy toward the rest of the Americas: it could help the United States 
more honestly assess its corporate and governmental development policies, and it could lead the 
U.S. to more compassionately respond to the understandable attraction of its immense wealth to 
the poor of Latin America and the consequent legal and illegal immigration of Latinos into the 
United States. Palestinian and Israeli relations, clashes between Pakistan and India, France and 
Germany in relation to Islamic immigrant workers, the political culture of the United States and 
the former Yugoslavia, and post-Saddam Hussein Iraq’s efforts to build a nation dealing justly 
with Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds bring together various combinations of, and intensities in, the 
dynamics of religion—the plethoric ways the world seeks out the meaning-giving substance of 
life—and their impingement upon the policies of these governments. Tillich’s approach teaches 
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that efforts to bring about peace within cultures and among cultures requires a far thicker 
knowledge of cultures, and a far deeper and more respectful awareness of the historical-context 
than governments generally achieve: the nature of the United States government’s war and post-
invasion policy in Iraq exemplifies the consequences of thin knowledge. The issue of 
accountability to the world-at-large informs the controversies over the both the policies of the 
United States there as well as the Iranian nuclear energy program. The decision of the former to 
go to war and the decision of the latter to develop its uranium enrichment capacity were made in 
contradiction to world opinion. Both decisions traded the cultivation of the meaning-giving 
substance of the populations involved for the expansion of their power. There is at least some 
level of hypocrisy that would permit either government to comment on the other’s decision. 
Finally, Rwanda in the last decade of the previous millennium and Darfur in the first 
decade of the present millennium attest to the continuing depravity of power without morality in 
dehumanizing and murdering vulnerable people and the necessity for the powerful to cultivate 
the world’s character and muster the world’s conscience to protect them: it is difficult to defend 
the meaning-giving substance of life, unless nations and peoples are first willing to defend life 
itself. 
Because of his willingness to ponder these sorts of issues, and because the world 
continues to face the perplexing problems they pose, the thought of Paul Tillich remains a 
relevant source of thought in international relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 303
9.0  CONCLUSION 
Paul Tillich wrote and thought on issues of culture and conflict, war and peace for most of his 
life. Those strands of thought can be together to form the fabric of an ethic of war and peace that 
is appropriately called religious internationalism. The lines of thought which have been 
highlighted are derived directly from Tillich’s deep experience of existence. 
To be grasped by the religious dimension meant for Tillich meant that nothing within in 
existence had ultimate import. Therefore, all is open to question. No nation can make claims and 
no leader can set policy with the assumption that they will not be questioned. If either is attuned 
to the religious dimension, the interrogative questioning of others are not resented or disdained, 
but are seen as a path toward truth and towards the goal of a justice society: religiously informed 
leaders are grateful for the truth-seeking dialectics of debate. Tillich was nurtured from birth 
within the confines of the Prussian Lutheran Church. Yet, he would come to find liberation in the 
ongoing dialogue with atheists and agnostics, scientists and rationalists, positivists and 
pragmatists, because his search was for ultimate meaning, and all of reality is variously 
transparent or translucent  for the divine. This confused, and continues to confuse, some of his 
fellow Christian adherents and would lead to antagonism with religious and non religious people 
unable or unwilling to take the culturally and inter culturally comprehensive path he took.  
Tillich was driven to the boundary. The German Empire sent had him to the geographic 
boundary to fight in World War I. There he would be driven to the boundary of sanity on at least 
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two occasions. But he was also forced to the boundary between worker and aristocrat that 
launched him to the spiritual and intellectual boundary following the war. Collaborations of 
different kinds and research projects on different topics along this dynamic boundary would open 
him up to insights from sources beyond those of traditional theology. Hitler would throw him 
beyond the bounds of Germany, compelling him to navigate existence in a new land as 
immigrant, refugee, and, ultimately, citizen. It was a position of risk but also great fruitfulness. 
Yet, it was open to controversy. Tillich’s positions on a humane, healing  post war structure for 
Germany and Europe, his continued embrace of religious socialism (as distinct from its distortion 
within Russian communism), his stand against the use–particularly the first use–of nuclear 
weapons all placed him in tension with the prevailing winds of policy of his day. Nonetheless, 
they were positions that showed him to be unwilling to cave in to views with which he disagreed 
and which clamored for endorsement on either side his boundary position. 
Life taught Paul Tillich about the riddles of kairos and vacuum. He firmly believed that 
the post World War I period was a time of kairos. He deeply hoped that the close of World War II 
would provide for a kairos in Europe, his former homeland, and the world as a whole. Yet, he 
never held these positions in any strict or rigid way. Rather than a promise of perfect fulfillment, a 
kairos was a time that summoned people to fruitful, strategic action, with no guarantees for the 
outcome. While the Cold War was a period characterized by particularly strong bipolarity, it is an 
interesting whether Tillich was justified in calling even this period an a-kairos. Such a period may 
not strike one as possessing a necessarily strong ripeness for action, but that may be because of 
either lack of data or the reality that it is not ripe for action in one’s own part of the world. 
Considering the liberation of the colonial empires of Europe in the decades following the war 
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exemplifies the great ambiguity of attempts to read the times. To the degree that Africa and Asia 
experienced liberation, it was fullness of time for historical action. To the degree that the great 
powers acted in a way to abort liberation and evolution, the descent of a historical vacuum could 
be considered justified. One would suspect that Tillich would have accepted such a position as 
pointing to the ambiguity of history: it is neither totally kairotic nor totally a-kairotic. 
The affirmation of life and its dynamism was central to Tillich’s political thinking. The 
image of his reading Thus Spake Zarathustra in the woods of the French countryside during 
World War I as well as the reality of mental breakdowns, pointed to a will that refused to see 
war–the apex of estranging human action--as truth-bearing and affirmed it as the depth of human 
tragedy, not to be embraced and only to be entered when all else failed. This life affirmation was 
also, of course, power affirmation. Tillich clearly saw pacifism as a combination of the prophetic 
and the utopian: prophetic in calling humanity from the powerful temptation of war and utopian in 
refusing to see the rise of the demonic against innocent ones who are destined to die in the face of 
inaction on the part of those who stand against dehumanization and for just, humane existence. 
Love cannot bear its fruit without the power of being necessary to manifest itself. Power is potent 
and dangerous. Power is not evil. However, the challenges of competing powers of being means 
that fulfillment will always be fragmentary. Justice will always be under threat. Institutions of 
world organization will always have to struggle against the demonically parochial and to see their 
gains significantly mitigated by the parochial. Peace will be broken by destructive streams of 
injustice—borne by nations and non governmental entities—which will have to be fought by 
those bearing the cause of creative justice. In short, the religious internationalism of Paul Tillich 
was existentially realistic. 
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Prophetic criticism resulted from two God-given phenomena: humanity’s capacity to think 
and humanity’s courage to act upon its thought. Tillich saw it as Protestantism’s contribution to 
the modern period. That designation is probably not a helpful one in ecumenical, inter religious 
and inter ideological discourse. However, the defense and exaltation of the human being’s 
capacity and responsibility to think combined with the freedom to act is central to what it means 
to have human dignity. This is at the heart of Tillich’s approach to political action and theory. It 
represents the non utopian side of classical liberalism which he valued. It also reveals the reason 
he saw the structure of economic systems as a crucial point of inquiry and Marx’s criticism of 
capitalism’s dehumanizing processes as rooted in the prophetic tradition of scripture: justice and 
creative freedom cry out for existence in the lives of human beings.  
In raising Protestantism as the bearer of the prophetic spirit beginning with the Christian 
Reformation, Tillich affirmed the centrality of history in his thought. Both the affirmation of life 
and the enunciation of prophetic criticism raise the call for the action of free people within the 
finite confines of history. The point is that history matters. Religious people often forget this. 
Religion is not escape from history, but the dialectic of transcending and actively reentering 
history through now inspired participation in history. In religious internationalism, the 
transcending move is away from the perpetual temptation to exalt the historical to ultimacy. The 
religious transcending side of the dialectic bears continuous questions against everything within 
existence. Religious nationalism is always blasphemous and idolatrous. Religious 
internationalism is a move in the right direction, never wholly devoid of the temptation of idolatry 
within exist, but always bearing a fragment of self- and nation-denying justice. 
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The biographer of Tillich’s Harvard years, Grace Cali, tells of a conversation about 
Tillich’s practice of the centuries old German tradition of trimming the Christmas tree with lit 
candles. Thinking of the wariness of Americans to this tradition as well as the cautiousness of his 
students, Tillich commented, “‘I have never seen such slavery to security and the avoidance of all  
risks such as I find among the young Americans. Where is the love of adventure?...So many of the 
students just out of college seek jobs without risks and with only questions about retirement plans, 
fringe benefits–and all at the age of twenty-two!’”1571 Tillich had been tempered by dangers to his 
life on the battlefield, threats to his career in choosing socialism, and consequences for his life, 
career and family for his stand against National Socialism. To him, courageous decision moved 
history forward. Cowardly indecision severed the lifeline to dreams, to cultures, and to the future. 
Courageous, venturing decisiveness could articulate the reconciling and life-giving power of 
creative justice, giving hope to the innocent and the guilty: it inspires dreams, deepens cultures, 
builds the future. Tillich’s probes into inter religious dialogue were a later example of that risk 
taking and of self and communal transcendence. 
Indian-born film maker Mira Nair, commenting on the impact of the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the United States, spoke of the resulting impact upon the world and the consequent 
responsibility for creative people, in her case, a film artist: 
Now, in this post-9/11 world where the schisms of the world are being cemented into 
 huge walls between one belief and way of life and another, now more than ever–I feel–
 we need cinema to reveal our tiny local worlds in all their glorious particularity. In my 
 limited experience [it’s when film has] done full-blown justice to the truths and  
 
 
 
 
1571Grace Cali, Paul Tillich First-Hand: A Memoir of the Harvard Years Chicago: Exploration Press, 1996), 58. 
idiosyncracies of the specifically local that it crosses over to be surprisingly 
 universal.”1572  
 
These words capture the mission of all creative people, and they express the constructive 
approach of religious internationalism in Paul Tillich’s thought: by attempting to do “full-blown 
justice to the truths and idiosyncracies” of his own approach to the world, he expressed a way to 
think that turns out to be surprising in its universality. 
                                                 
1572Mira Nair, “Bollywood Meets Hollywood,” The Arts, Creativity and the Common Good at the Westminster 
Town Hall Forum, broadcasted over Minnesota Public Radio’s “Midday with Gary Eichten,” Thursday, Sept. 22, 
2005, Hour 2, http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/programs/midday/listings/ md20050919.shtml. 
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